Files
lmxopcua/src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/Security
Joseph Doherty 1bf3938cdf ADR-001 Task B — NodeScopeResolver full-path + ScopePathIndexBuilder + evaluator-level ACL test closing #195. Two production additions + one end-to-end authz regression test proving the Identification ACL contract the IdentificationFolderBuilder docstring promises. Task A (PR #153) shipped the walker as a pure function that materializes the UNS → Equipment → Tag browse tree + IdentificationFolderBuilder.Build per Equipment. This PR lands the authz half of the walker's story — the resolver side that turns a driver-side full reference into a full NodeScope path (NamespaceId + UnsAreaId + UnsLineId + EquipmentId + TagId) so the permission trie can walk the UNS hierarchy + apply Equipment-scope grants correctly at dispatch time. The actual in-server wiring (load snapshot → call walker during BuildAddressSpaceAsync → swap in the full-path resolver) is split into follow-up task #212 because it's a bigger surface (Server bootstrap + DriverNodeManager override + real OPC UA client-browse integration test). NodeScopeResolver extended with a second constructor taking IReadOnlyDictionary<string, NodeScope> pathIndex — when supplied, Resolve looks up the full reference in the index + returns the indexed scope with every UNS level populated; when absent or on miss, falls back to the pre-ADR-001 cluster-only scope so driver-discovered tags that haven't been indexed yet (between a DiscoverAsync result + the next generation publish) stay addressable without crashing the resolver. Index is frozen into a FrozenDictionary<string, NodeScope> under Ordinal comparer for O(1) hot-path lookups. Thread-safety by immutability — callers swap atomically on generation change via the server's publish pipeline. New ScopePathIndexBuilder.Build in Server.Security takes (clusterId, namespaceId, EquipmentNamespaceContent) + produces the fullReference → NodeScope dictionary by joining Tag → Equipment → UnsLine → UnsArea through up-front dictionaries keyed Ordinal-ignoring-case. Tag rows with null EquipmentId (SystemPlatform-namespace Galaxy tags per decision #120) are excluded from the index; cluster-only fallback path covers them. Broken FKs (Tag references missing Equipment row, or Equipment references missing UnsLine) are skipped rather than crashing — sp_ValidateDraft should have caught these at publish, any drift here is unexpected but non-fatal. Duplicate keys throw InvalidOperationException at bootstrap so corrupt-data drift surfaces up-front instead of producing silently-last-wins scopes at dispatch. End-to-end authz regression test in EquipmentIdentificationAuthzTests walks the full dispatch flow against a Config-DB-style fixture: ScopePathIndexBuilder.Build from the same EquipmentNamespaceContent the EquipmentNodeWalker consumes → NodeScopeResolver with that index → AuthorizationGate + TriePermissionEvaluator → PermissionTrieBuilder with one Equipment-scope NodeAcl grant + a NodeAclPath resolving Equipment ScopeId to (namespace, area, line, equipment). Four tests prove the contract: (a) authorized group Read granted on Identification property; (b) unauthorized group Read denied on Identification property — the #195 contract the IdentificationFolderBuilder docstring promises (the BadUserAccessDenied surfacing happens at the DriverNodeManager dispatch layer which is already wired to AuthorizationGate.IsAllowed → StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied in PR #94); (c) Equipment-scope grant cascades to both the Equipment's tag + its Identification properties because they share the Equipment ScopeId — no new scope level for Identification per the builder's Remarks section; (d) grant on oven-3 does NOT leak to press-7 (different equipment under the same UnsLine) proving per-Equipment isolation at dispatch when the resolver populates the full path. NodeScopeResolverTests extended with two new tests covering the indexed-lookup path + fallback-on-miss path; renamed the existing "_For_Phase1" test to "_When_NoIndexSupplied" to match the current framing. Server project builds 0 errors; Server.Tests 179/179 (was 173, +6 new across the two test files). Task #212 captures the remaining in-server wiring work — Server.SealedBootstrap load of EquipmentNamespaceContent, DriverNodeManager override that calls EquipmentNodeWalker during BuildAddressSpaceAsync for Equipment-kind namespaces, and a real OPC UA client-browse integration test. With that wiring + this PR's authz-layer proof, #195's "ACL integration test" line is satisfied at two layers (evaluator + live endpoint) which is stronger than the task originally asked for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 02:50:27 -04:00
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Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.
2026-04-18 13:01:01 -04:00
Phase 3 PR 19 — LDAP user identity + Basic256Sha256 security profile. Replaces the anonymous-only endpoint with a configurable security profile and an LDAP-backed UserName token validator. New IUserAuthenticator abstraction in Backend/Security/: LdapUserAuthenticator binds to the configured directory (reuses the pattern from Admin.Security.LdapAuthService without the cross-app dependency — Novell.Directory.Ldap.NETStandard 3.6.0 package ref added to Server alongside the existing OPCFoundation packages) and maps group membership to OPC UA roles via LdapOptions.GroupToRole (case-insensitive). DenyAllUserAuthenticator is the default when Ldap.Enabled=false so UserName token attempts return a clean BadUserAccessDenied rather than hanging on a localhost:3893 bind attempt. OpcUaSecurityProfile enum + LdapOptions nested record on OpcUaServerOptions. Profile=None keeps the PR 17 shape (SecurityPolicies.None + Anonymous token only) so existing integration tests stay green; Profile=Basic256Sha256SignAndEncrypt adds a second ServerSecurityPolicy (Basic256Sha256 + SignAndEncrypt) to the collection and, when Ldap.Enabled=true, adds a UserName token policy scoped to SecurityPolicies.Basic256Sha256 only — passwords must ride an encrypted channel, the stack rejects UserName over None. OtOpcUaServer.OnServerStarted hooks SessionManager.ImpersonateUser: AnonymousIdentityToken passes through; UserNameIdentityToken delegates to IUserAuthenticator.AuthenticateAsync — rejected identities throw ServiceResultException(BadUserAccessDenied); accepted identities get a RoleBasedIdentity that carries the resolved roles through session.Identity so future PRs can gate writes by role. OpcUaApplicationHost + OtOpcUaServer constructors take IUserAuthenticator as a dependency. Program.cs binds the new OpcUaServer:Ldap section from appsettings (Enabled defaults false, GroupToRole parsed as Dictionary<string,string>), registers IUserAuthenticator as LdapUserAuthenticator when enabled or DenyAllUserAuthenticator otherwise. PR 17 integration test updated to pass DenyAllUserAuthenticator so it keeps exercising the anonymous-only path unchanged. Tests — SecurityConfigurationTests (new, 13 cases): DenyAllAuthenticator rejects every credential; LdapAuthenticator rejects blank creds without hitting the server; rejects when Enabled=false; rejects plaintext when both UseTls=false AND AllowInsecureLdap=false (safety guard matching the Admin service); EscapeLdapFilter theory (4 rows: plain passthrough, parens/asterisk/backslash → hex escape) — regression guard against LDAP injection; ExtractOuSegment theory (3 rows: finds ou=, returns null when absent, handles multiple ou segments by returning first); ExtractFirstRdnValue theory (3 rows: strips cn= prefix, handles single-segment DN, returns plain string unchanged when no =). OpcUaServerOptions_default_is_anonymous_only asserts the default posture preserves PR 17 behavior. InternalsVisibleTo('ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests') added to Server csproj so ExtractOuSegment and siblings are reachable from the tests. Full solution: 0 errors, 180 tests pass (8 Core + 14 Proxy + 24 Configuration + 6 Shared + 91 Galaxy.Host + 19 Server (17 unit + 2 integration) + 18 Admin). Live-LDAP integration test (connect via Basic256Sha256 endpoint with a real user from GLAuth, assert the session.Identity carries the mapped role) is deferred to a follow-up — it requires the GLAuth dev instance to be running at localhost:3893 which is dev-machine-specific, and the test harness for that also needs a fresh client-side certificate provisioned by the live server's trusted store.
2026-04-18 08:49:46 -04:00
Phase 3 PR 31 — Live-LDAP integration test + Active Directory compatibility. Closes LMX follow-up #4 with 6 live-bind tests in Server.Tests/LdapUserAuthenticatorLiveTests.cs against the dev GLAuth instance at localhost:3893 (skipped cleanly when unreachable via Assert.Skip + a clear SkipReason — matches the GalaxyRepositoryLiveSmokeTests pattern). Coverage: valid credentials bind + surface DisplayName; wrong password fails; unknown user fails; empty credentials fail pre-flight without touching the directory; writeop user's memberOf maps through GroupToRole to WriteOperate (the exact string WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed expects); admin user surfaces all four mapped roles (WriteOperate + WriteTune + WriteConfigure + AlarmAck) proving memberOf parsing doesn't stop after the first match. While wiring this up, the authenticator's hard-coded user-lookup filter 'uid=<name>' didn't match GLAuth (which keys users by cn and doesn't populate uid) — AND it doesn't match Active Directory either, which uses sAMAccountName. Added UserNameAttribute to LdapOptions (default 'uid' for RFC 2307 backcompat) so deployments override to 'cn' / 'sAMAccountName' / 'userPrincipalName' as the directory requires; authenticator filter now interpolates the configured attribute. The default stays 'uid' so existing test fixtures and OpenLDAP installs keep working without a config change — a regression guard in LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests.LdapOptions_default_UserNameAttribute_is_uid_for_rfc2307_compat pins this so a future 'helpful' default change can't silently break anyone.
2026-04-18 15:23:22 -04:00
Phase 3 PR 31 — Live-LDAP integration test + Active Directory compatibility. Closes LMX follow-up #4 with 6 live-bind tests in Server.Tests/LdapUserAuthenticatorLiveTests.cs against the dev GLAuth instance at localhost:3893 (skipped cleanly when unreachable via Assert.Skip + a clear SkipReason — matches the GalaxyRepositoryLiveSmokeTests pattern). Coverage: valid credentials bind + surface DisplayName; wrong password fails; unknown user fails; empty credentials fail pre-flight without touching the directory; writeop user's memberOf maps through GroupToRole to WriteOperate (the exact string WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed expects); admin user surfaces all four mapped roles (WriteOperate + WriteTune + WriteConfigure + AlarmAck) proving memberOf parsing doesn't stop after the first match. While wiring this up, the authenticator's hard-coded user-lookup filter 'uid=<name>' didn't match GLAuth (which keys users by cn and doesn't populate uid) — AND it doesn't match Active Directory either, which uses sAMAccountName. Added UserNameAttribute to LdapOptions (default 'uid' for RFC 2307 backcompat) so deployments override to 'cn' / 'sAMAccountName' / 'userPrincipalName' as the directory requires; authenticator filter now interpolates the configured attribute. The default stays 'uid' so existing test fixtures and OpenLDAP installs keep working without a config change — a regression guard in LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests.LdapOptions_default_UserNameAttribute_is_uid_for_rfc2307_compat pins this so a future 'helpful' default change can't silently break anyone.
2026-04-18 15:23:22 -04:00
ADR-001 Task B — NodeScopeResolver full-path + ScopePathIndexBuilder + evaluator-level ACL test closing #195. Two production additions + one end-to-end authz regression test proving the Identification ACL contract the IdentificationFolderBuilder docstring promises. Task A (PR #153) shipped the walker as a pure function that materializes the UNS → Equipment → Tag browse tree + IdentificationFolderBuilder.Build per Equipment. This PR lands the authz half of the walker's story — the resolver side that turns a driver-side full reference into a full NodeScope path (NamespaceId + UnsAreaId + UnsLineId + EquipmentId + TagId) so the permission trie can walk the UNS hierarchy + apply Equipment-scope grants correctly at dispatch time. The actual in-server wiring (load snapshot → call walker during BuildAddressSpaceAsync → swap in the full-path resolver) is split into follow-up task #212 because it's a bigger surface (Server bootstrap + DriverNodeManager override + real OPC UA client-browse integration test). NodeScopeResolver extended with a second constructor taking IReadOnlyDictionary<string, NodeScope> pathIndex — when supplied, Resolve looks up the full reference in the index + returns the indexed scope with every UNS level populated; when absent or on miss, falls back to the pre-ADR-001 cluster-only scope so driver-discovered tags that haven't been indexed yet (between a DiscoverAsync result + the next generation publish) stay addressable without crashing the resolver. Index is frozen into a FrozenDictionary<string, NodeScope> under Ordinal comparer for O(1) hot-path lookups. Thread-safety by immutability — callers swap atomically on generation change via the server's publish pipeline. New ScopePathIndexBuilder.Build in Server.Security takes (clusterId, namespaceId, EquipmentNamespaceContent) + produces the fullReference → NodeScope dictionary by joining Tag → Equipment → UnsLine → UnsArea through up-front dictionaries keyed Ordinal-ignoring-case. Tag rows with null EquipmentId (SystemPlatform-namespace Galaxy tags per decision #120) are excluded from the index; cluster-only fallback path covers them. Broken FKs (Tag references missing Equipment row, or Equipment references missing UnsLine) are skipped rather than crashing — sp_ValidateDraft should have caught these at publish, any drift here is unexpected but non-fatal. Duplicate keys throw InvalidOperationException at bootstrap so corrupt-data drift surfaces up-front instead of producing silently-last-wins scopes at dispatch. End-to-end authz regression test in EquipmentIdentificationAuthzTests walks the full dispatch flow against a Config-DB-style fixture: ScopePathIndexBuilder.Build from the same EquipmentNamespaceContent the EquipmentNodeWalker consumes → NodeScopeResolver with that index → AuthorizationGate + TriePermissionEvaluator → PermissionTrieBuilder with one Equipment-scope NodeAcl grant + a NodeAclPath resolving Equipment ScopeId to (namespace, area, line, equipment). Four tests prove the contract: (a) authorized group Read granted on Identification property; (b) unauthorized group Read denied on Identification property — the #195 contract the IdentificationFolderBuilder docstring promises (the BadUserAccessDenied surfacing happens at the DriverNodeManager dispatch layer which is already wired to AuthorizationGate.IsAllowed → StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied in PR #94); (c) Equipment-scope grant cascades to both the Equipment's tag + its Identification properties because they share the Equipment ScopeId — no new scope level for Identification per the builder's Remarks section; (d) grant on oven-3 does NOT leak to press-7 (different equipment under the same UnsLine) proving per-Equipment isolation at dispatch when the resolver populates the full path. NodeScopeResolverTests extended with two new tests covering the indexed-lookup path + fallback-on-miss path; renamed the existing "_For_Phase1" test to "_When_NoIndexSupplied" to match the current framing. Server project builds 0 errors; Server.Tests 179/179 (was 173, +6 new across the two test files). Task #212 captures the remaining in-server wiring work — Server.SealedBootstrap load of EquipmentNamespaceContent, DriverNodeManager override that calls EquipmentNodeWalker during BuildAddressSpaceAsync for Equipment-kind namespaces, and a real OPC UA client-browse integration test. With that wiring + this PR's authz-layer proof, #195's "ACL integration test" line is satisfied at two layers (evaluator + live endpoint) which is stronger than the task originally asked for.
2026-04-20 02:50:27 -04:00
ADR-001 Task B — NodeScopeResolver full-path + ScopePathIndexBuilder + evaluator-level ACL test closing #195. Two production additions + one end-to-end authz regression test proving the Identification ACL contract the IdentificationFolderBuilder docstring promises. Task A (PR #153) shipped the walker as a pure function that materializes the UNS → Equipment → Tag browse tree + IdentificationFolderBuilder.Build per Equipment. This PR lands the authz half of the walker's story — the resolver side that turns a driver-side full reference into a full NodeScope path (NamespaceId + UnsAreaId + UnsLineId + EquipmentId + TagId) so the permission trie can walk the UNS hierarchy + apply Equipment-scope grants correctly at dispatch time. The actual in-server wiring (load snapshot → call walker during BuildAddressSpaceAsync → swap in the full-path resolver) is split into follow-up task #212 because it's a bigger surface (Server bootstrap + DriverNodeManager override + real OPC UA client-browse integration test). NodeScopeResolver extended with a second constructor taking IReadOnlyDictionary<string, NodeScope> pathIndex — when supplied, Resolve looks up the full reference in the index + returns the indexed scope with every UNS level populated; when absent or on miss, falls back to the pre-ADR-001 cluster-only scope so driver-discovered tags that haven't been indexed yet (between a DiscoverAsync result + the next generation publish) stay addressable without crashing the resolver. Index is frozen into a FrozenDictionary<string, NodeScope> under Ordinal comparer for O(1) hot-path lookups. Thread-safety by immutability — callers swap atomically on generation change via the server's publish pipeline. New ScopePathIndexBuilder.Build in Server.Security takes (clusterId, namespaceId, EquipmentNamespaceContent) + produces the fullReference → NodeScope dictionary by joining Tag → Equipment → UnsLine → UnsArea through up-front dictionaries keyed Ordinal-ignoring-case. Tag rows with null EquipmentId (SystemPlatform-namespace Galaxy tags per decision #120) are excluded from the index; cluster-only fallback path covers them. Broken FKs (Tag references missing Equipment row, or Equipment references missing UnsLine) are skipped rather than crashing — sp_ValidateDraft should have caught these at publish, any drift here is unexpected but non-fatal. Duplicate keys throw InvalidOperationException at bootstrap so corrupt-data drift surfaces up-front instead of producing silently-last-wins scopes at dispatch. End-to-end authz regression test in EquipmentIdentificationAuthzTests walks the full dispatch flow against a Config-DB-style fixture: ScopePathIndexBuilder.Build from the same EquipmentNamespaceContent the EquipmentNodeWalker consumes → NodeScopeResolver with that index → AuthorizationGate + TriePermissionEvaluator → PermissionTrieBuilder with one Equipment-scope NodeAcl grant + a NodeAclPath resolving Equipment ScopeId to (namespace, area, line, equipment). Four tests prove the contract: (a) authorized group Read granted on Identification property; (b) unauthorized group Read denied on Identification property — the #195 contract the IdentificationFolderBuilder docstring promises (the BadUserAccessDenied surfacing happens at the DriverNodeManager dispatch layer which is already wired to AuthorizationGate.IsAllowed → StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied in PR #94); (c) Equipment-scope grant cascades to both the Equipment's tag + its Identification properties because they share the Equipment ScopeId — no new scope level for Identification per the builder's Remarks section; (d) grant on oven-3 does NOT leak to press-7 (different equipment under the same UnsLine) proving per-Equipment isolation at dispatch when the resolver populates the full path. NodeScopeResolverTests extended with two new tests covering the indexed-lookup path + fallback-on-miss path; renamed the existing "_For_Phase1" test to "_When_NoIndexSupplied" to match the current framing. Server project builds 0 errors; Server.Tests 179/179 (was 173, +6 new across the two test files). Task #212 captures the remaining in-server wiring work — Server.SealedBootstrap load of EquipmentNamespaceContent, DriverNodeManager override that calls EquipmentNodeWalker during BuildAddressSpaceAsync for Equipment-kind namespaces, and a real OPC UA client-browse integration test. With that wiring + this PR's authz-layer proof, #195's "ACL integration test" line is satisfied at two layers (evaluator + live endpoint) which is stronger than the task originally asked for.
2026-04-20 02:50:27 -04:00