Files
lmxopcua/tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests/WriteAuthzPolicyTests.cs
Joseph Doherty 6b04a85f86 Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 13:01:01 -04:00

135 lines
4.6 KiB
C#

using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class WriteAuthzPolicyTests
{
// --- FreeAccess and ViewOnly special-cases ---
[Fact]
public void FreeAccess_allows_write_even_for_empty_role_set()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess, []).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void FreeAccess_allows_write_for_arbitrary_roles()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess, ["SomeOtherRole"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void ViewOnly_denies_write_even_with_every_role()
{
var allRoles = new[] { "WriteOperate", "WriteTune", "WriteConfigure", "AlarmAck" };
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.ViewOnly, allRoles).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Operate tier ---
[Fact]
public void Operate_requires_WriteOperate_role()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Operate_role_match_is_case_insensitive()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["writeoperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["WRITEOPERATE"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Operate_denies_empty_role_set()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, []).ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void Operate_denies_wrong_role()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Operate, ["ReadOnly"]).ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void SecuredWrite_maps_to_same_WriteOperate_requirement_as_Operate()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeTrue();
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, ["WriteTune"]).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Tune tier ---
[Fact]
public void Tune_requires_WriteTune_role()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, ["WriteTune"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Tune_denies_WriteOperate_only_session()
{
// Important: role roles do NOT cascade — a session with WriteOperate can't write a Tune
// attribute. Operators escalate by adding WriteTune to the session's roles, not by a
// hierarchy the policy infers on its own.
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Configure tier ---
[Fact]
public void Configure_requires_WriteConfigure_role()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Configure, ["WriteConfigure"]).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void VerifiedWrite_maps_to_same_WriteConfigure_requirement_as_Configure()
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, ["WriteConfigure"]).ShouldBeTrue();
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, ["WriteOperate"]).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Multi-role sessions ---
[Fact]
public void Session_with_multiple_roles_is_allowed_when_any_matches()
{
var roles = new[] { "ReadOnly", "WriteTune", "AlarmAck" };
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Tune, roles).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Session_with_only_unrelated_roles_is_denied()
{
var roles = new[] { "ReadOnly", "AlarmAck", "SomeCustomRole" };
WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed(SecurityClassification.Configure, roles).ShouldBeFalse();
}
// --- Mapping table ---
[Theory]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.Operate, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.SecuredWrite, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteOperate)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.Tune, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteTune)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.VerifiedWrite, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteConfigure)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.Configure, WriteAuthzPolicy.RoleWriteConfigure)]
public void RequiredRole_returns_expected_role_for_classification(SecurityClassification c, string expected)
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.RequiredRole(c).ShouldBe(expected);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.FreeAccess)]
[InlineData(SecurityClassification.ViewOnly)]
public void RequiredRole_returns_null_for_special_classifications(SecurityClassification c)
{
WriteAuthzPolicy.RequiredRole(c).ShouldBeNull();
}
}