Files
lmxopcua/src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server/OpcUa/OtOpcUaServer.cs
Joseph Doherty 6b04a85f86 Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 13:01:01 -04:00

123 lines
4.9 KiB
C#

using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Opc.Ua;
using Opc.Ua.Server;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Hosting;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.OpcUa;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.Security;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Server.OpcUa;
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="StandardServer"/> subclass that wires one <see cref="DriverNodeManager"/> per
/// registered driver from <see cref="DriverHost"/>. Anonymous endpoint on
/// <c>opc.tcp://0.0.0.0:4840</c>, no security — PR 16 minimum-viable scope; LDAP + security
/// profiles are deferred to their own PR on top of this.
/// </summary>
public sealed class OtOpcUaServer : StandardServer
{
private readonly DriverHost _driverHost;
private readonly IUserAuthenticator _authenticator;
private readonly ILoggerFactory _loggerFactory;
private readonly List<DriverNodeManager> _driverNodeManagers = new();
public OtOpcUaServer(DriverHost driverHost, IUserAuthenticator authenticator, ILoggerFactory loggerFactory)
{
_driverHost = driverHost;
_authenticator = authenticator;
_loggerFactory = loggerFactory;
}
/// <summary>
/// Read-only snapshot of the driver node managers materialized at server start. Used by
/// the generic-driver-node-manager-driven discovery flow after the server starts — the
/// host walks each entry and invokes
/// <c>GenericDriverNodeManager.BuildAddressSpaceAsync(manager)</c> passing the manager
/// as its own <see cref="IAddressSpaceBuilder"/>.
/// </summary>
public IReadOnlyList<DriverNodeManager> DriverNodeManagers => _driverNodeManagers;
protected override MasterNodeManager CreateMasterNodeManager(IServerInternal server, ApplicationConfiguration configuration)
{
foreach (var driverId in _driverHost.RegisteredDriverIds)
{
var driver = _driverHost.GetDriver(driverId);
if (driver is null) continue;
var logger = _loggerFactory.CreateLogger<DriverNodeManager>();
var manager = new DriverNodeManager(server, configuration, driver, logger);
_driverNodeManagers.Add(manager);
}
return new MasterNodeManager(server, configuration, null, _driverNodeManagers.ToArray());
}
protected override void OnServerStarted(IServerInternal server)
{
base.OnServerStarted(server);
// Hook UserName / Anonymous token validation here. Anonymous passes through; UserName
// is validated against the IUserAuthenticator (LDAP in production). Rejected identities
// throw ServiceResultException which the stack translates to Bad_IdentityTokenInvalid.
server.SessionManager.ImpersonateUser += OnImpersonateUser;
}
private void OnImpersonateUser(Session session, ImpersonateEventArgs args)
{
switch (args.NewIdentity)
{
case AnonymousIdentityToken:
args.Identity = new UserIdentity(); // anonymous
return;
case UserNameIdentityToken user:
{
var result = _authenticator.AuthenticateAsync(
user.UserName, user.DecryptedPassword, CancellationToken.None)
.GetAwaiter().GetResult();
if (!result.Success)
{
throw ServiceResultException.Create(
StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied,
"Invalid username or password ({0})", result.Error ?? "no detail");
}
args.Identity = new RoleBasedIdentity(user.UserName, result.DisplayName, result.Roles);
return;
}
default:
throw ServiceResultException.Create(
StatusCodes.BadIdentityTokenInvalid,
"Unsupported user identity token type: {0}", args.NewIdentity?.GetType().Name ?? "null");
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Tiny UserIdentity carrier that preserves the resolved roles so downstream node
/// managers can gate writes by role via <c>session.Identity</c>. Anonymous identity still
/// uses the stack's default.
/// </summary>
private sealed class RoleBasedIdentity : UserIdentity, IRoleBearer
{
public IReadOnlyList<string> Roles { get; }
public string? Display { get; }
public RoleBasedIdentity(string userName, string? displayName, IReadOnlyList<string> roles)
: base(userName, "")
{
Display = displayName;
Roles = roles;
}
}
protected override ServerProperties LoadServerProperties() => new()
{
ManufacturerName = "OtOpcUa",
ProductName = "OtOpcUa.Server",
ProductUri = "urn:OtOpcUa:Server",
SoftwareVersion = "2.0.0",
BuildNumber = "0",
BuildDate = DateTime.UtcNow,
};
}