Files
lmxopcua/src/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Mqtt/MqttDriverProbe.cs
T
Joseph Doherty 2409d05a28 fix(mqtt): a broker-refused CONNECT no longer reports a Healthy driver
MQTTnet 5 does not throw on an unsuccessful CONNACK — it returns the reason in
MqttClientConnectResult.ResultCode and v5 removed v4's ThrowOnNonSuccessfulConnectResponse,
so ConnectCoreAsync's unconditional SetState(Connected) sealed a wrong-password deployment
green: DriverState.Healthy / HostState.Running on a session that never authenticated.
Caught by the Task-13 Mosquitto fixture; 240 offline tests missed it.

ConnectCoreAsync now inspects the CONNACK and raises MqttConnectRejectedException.
Credentials/identity/protocol/Last-Will refusals are unrecoverable and set Faulted, which
stops the reconnect supervisor; transient refusals (ServerUnavailable, ServerBusy,
QuotaExceeded, UseAnotherServer, ConnectionRateExceeded, and anything unrecognised) stay
Reconnecting under backoff. MqttDriverProbe now shares the rejection wording, so the
AdminUI Test-connect button and the running driver can no longer disagree.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
2026-07-24 18:02:00 -04:00

227 lines
10 KiB
C#

using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Net.Sockets;
using System.Security.Authentication;
using System.Text.Json;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using MQTTnet;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Mqtt;
/// <summary>
/// CONNECT-handshake probe for the <see cref="MqttDriverOptions"/>-shaped driver config.
/// Opens a bounded MQTT CONNECT against the configured broker; a CONNACK-accepted response
/// (<c>MqttClientConnectResultCode.Success</c>) is the "device is answering" proof (green +
/// latency). Refused/TLS/auth/timeout failures each surface a targeted message. Mirrors
/// <c>ModbusDriverProbe</c>'s shape.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>Reuses <see cref="MqttConnection.BuildClientOptions"/></b> for the connect (TLS,
/// CA-pin, credentials, protocol-version mapping) rather than hand-rolling a second
/// connect path — a duplicate would be a security divergence. A distinct client-id suffix
/// (see <see cref="ProbeClientIdPrefix"/>) keeps a probe from colliding with the driver's
/// own session: an MQTT broker disconnects an existing client when a new one CONNECTs
/// with the same client id, so a probe that reused the driver's id would knock the
/// running driver offline every time an operator clicked "Test connect".
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>A broker-rejected CONNACK is not a thrown exception.</b> Live-probed against
/// MQTTnet 5.2.0.1603: <c>IMqttClient.ConnectAsync</c> returns a
/// <c>MqttClientConnectResult</c> whose <c>ResultCode</c> carries the broker's CONNACK
/// reason (e.g. <c>NotAuthorized</c>, <c>BadUserNameOrPassword</c>) — it does
/// <b>not</b> throw for a rejected CONNACK. Only transport-level failures throw, and
/// their shape varies by where the failure occurs: a closed/refused port throws
/// <c>MqttCommunicationException</c> wrapping a <see cref="SocketException"/>; an
/// untrusted broker certificate throws <c>MqttCommunicationException</c> wrapping an
/// <see cref="AuthenticationException"/>; a broker that accepts the TCP handshake and
/// then never answers CONNACK throws either <c>MqttConnectingFailedException</c>
/// (wrapping "Connection closed") or a bare <see cref="OperationCanceledException"/>
/// ("MQTT connect canceled"), inconsistently, depending on whether MQTTnet's own
/// internal <c>Timeout</c> or the deadline token wins the race. Consequently this probe —
/// like <see cref="MqttConnection.Classify"/> — never switches on exception type to
/// detect a timeout; it checks the deadline token itself, which is authoritative
/// regardless of which exception shape MQTTnet happened to throw.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class MqttDriverProbe : IDriverProbe
{
/// <summary>
/// Marks the transient probe identity in the broker's client-id/session logs — mirrors the
/// browser's own <c>-browse-{guid8}</c> suffix so the two transient sessions are
/// distinguishable in broker-side logs, and so a probe can never collide with (and knock
/// offline) the driver's own live session.
/// </summary>
internal const string ProbeClientIdPrefix = "-probe-";
/// <inheritdoc />
public string DriverType => DriverTypeNames.Mqtt;
/// <inheritdoc />
public async Task<DriverProbeResult> ProbeAsync(string configJson, TimeSpan timeout, CancellationToken ct)
{
MqttDriverOptions? options;
try
{
// MqttJson.Options — the one shared instance across factory / probe / driver / browser
// (see its remarks): enums must round-trip by NAME or an AdminUI-authored config that
// Test-connect accepts would fault the deployed driver.
options = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<MqttDriverOptions>(configJson, MqttJson.Options);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
return new DriverProbeResult(false, $"Config JSON is invalid: {ex.Message}", null);
}
if (options is null)
{
return new DriverProbeResult(false, "Config JSON deserialized to null.", null);
}
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(options.Host) || options.Port is <= 0 or > 65535)
{
return new DriverProbeResult(false, "Config has no host/port to probe.", null);
}
// Honour the config's own connectTimeoutSeconds (factory parity, mirrors
// ModbusDriverProbe) — the caller's timeout is the fallback when the config omits it.
var effectiveSeconds = options.ConnectTimeoutSeconds > 0
? options.ConnectTimeoutSeconds
: (int)Math.Ceiling(timeout.TotalSeconds);
if (effectiveSeconds <= 0)
{
effectiveSeconds = 1;
}
// Rebuild with the resolved timeout so BuildClientOptions' own WithTimeout(...) and this
// method's deadline agree — both must expire at the same instant for the deadline check
// below to be a reliable signal regardless of which of the two actually threw.
var probeOptions = options with { ConnectTimeoutSeconds = effectiveSeconds };
MqttClientOptions clientOptions;
try
{
clientOptions = MqttConnection.BuildClientOptions(
probeOptions,
ProbeClientIdPrefix + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N")[..8],
NullLogger.Instance);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
// Never let a configured Password reach the message — BuildClientOptions itself never
// logs it, and no exception path through it can format credential values.
return new DriverProbeResult(false, $"Config could not be used to build a connection: {ex.Message}", null);
}
var target = $"{probeOptions.Host}:{probeOptions.Port}";
var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
using var deadline = new CancellationTokenSource(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(effectiveSeconds));
using var linked = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(ct, deadline.Token);
using var client = new MqttClientFactory().CreateMqttClient();
MqttClientConnectResult result;
try
{
result = await client.ConnectAsync(clientOptions, linked.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
return new DriverProbeResult(false, Classify(target, ex, ct, deadline, effectiveSeconds), null);
}
try
{
if (result.ResultCode != MqttClientConnectResultCode.Success)
{
return new DriverProbeResult(false, ClassifyRejectedConnack(target, result.ResultCode), null);
}
sw.Stop();
return new DriverProbeResult(true, "MQTT CONNECT OK", sw.Elapsed);
}
finally
{
await DisconnectBestEffortAsync(client, effectiveSeconds).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Maps a broker-rejected CONNACK (<see cref="MqttClientConnectResult.ResultCode"/> not
/// <c>Success</c> — never an exception, see the type remarks) to a targeted, credential-free
/// message.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Delegates to <see cref="MqttConnection.DescribeConnackRejection"/> so the "Test connect"
/// button and the running driver report an identical rejection in identical words — they now
/// both classify CONNACK, and disagreeing about it was the exact confusion the Task-13 live
/// gate surfaced.
/// </remarks>
private static string ClassifyRejectedConnack(string target, MqttClientConnectResultCode code)
=> MqttConnection.DescribeConnackRejection(target, code);
/// <summary>
/// Classifies a thrown connect failure. Precedence mirrors
/// <see cref="MqttConnection.Classify"/>: caller cancellation, then the deadline, then the
/// exception's own shape — the deadline check is authoritative regardless of which exception
/// type MQTTnet happened to throw (see the type remarks for why exception type alone is not
/// reliable here).
/// </summary>
private static string Classify(
string target,
Exception ex,
CancellationToken callerToken,
CancellationTokenSource deadline,
int effectiveSeconds)
{
if (callerToken.IsCancellationRequested)
{
return "Probe was cancelled.";
}
if (deadline.IsCancellationRequested)
{
return $"Probe timed out after {effectiveSeconds}s.";
}
// Walk to the root cause — MQTTnet wraps transport/TLS failures one or two levels deep.
var root = ex;
while (root.InnerException is not null)
{
root = root.InnerException;
}
return root switch
{
SocketException se => $"Connect to {target} failed: {se.SocketErrorCode}",
AuthenticationException => $"TLS handshake with {target} failed: {root.Message}",
_ => $"Connect to {target} failed: {root.Message}",
};
}
/// <summary>
/// Best-effort teardown of a session this probe established. Failure here is not the
/// probe's business — the CONNECT outcome already decided Ok/failure — and it must never be
/// allowed to hang past the connect budget.
/// </summary>
private static async Task DisconnectBestEffortAsync(IMqttClient client, int timeoutSeconds)
{
if (!client.IsConnected)
{
return;
}
try
{
using var disconnectDeadline = new CancellationTokenSource(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(timeoutSeconds));
await client.DisconnectAsync(new MqttClientDisconnectOptions(), disconnectDeadline.Token)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch
{
// Best-effort only.
}
}
}