deferment.md §8.1 asked for a decision: wire IPermissionEvaluator into the node
manager, or say plainly that ACLs are not enforced. Decision: the latter. The
evaluator stays in the tree; #520 tracks the wire-up.
Verifying the claim turned up four things worse than the audit recorded:
- docs/security.md, not ReadWriteOperations.md, was the highest-risk doc. It
claimed an anonymous session is "default-denie[d] any node a session has no
ACL grant for". The opposite holds: anonymous can Browse/Read/Subscribe/
HistoryRead the entire address space, and is refused writes and alarm acks
only because it carries no roles.
- Three of five documented data-plane role strings do nothing.
OpcUaDataPlaneRoles declares exactly WriteOperate and AlarmAck; ReadOnly,
WriteTune and WriteConfigure are compared against nowhere in src/. The doc
called all five "exact, case-insensitive, and code-true".
- ReadWriteOperations.md was fiction beyond the ACL claims. OnReadValue has
zero occurrences in src/ — the documented read path did not exist. Reads
never reach a driver: the node manager is push-model and the SDK serves a
Read from the cached pushed value. WriteAuthzPolicy, _sourceByFullRef,
_writeIdempotentByFullRef and IRoleBearer are likewise zero-hit, and
CapabilityInvoker is not referenced by the OpcUaServer project at all. This
file is rewritten rather than bannered.
- v2-release-readiness.md claimed a whole enforcement layer shipped —
FilterBrowseReferences, GateCallMethodRequests, MapCallOperation,
AuthorizationBootstrap, Node:Authorization:* keys. None exist. Whatever
landed on the v2 branch did not survive into the shipped tree.
The UI change is the operative one: ClusterAcls.razor and AclEdit.razor now
warn that a grant is saved and shipped in every deployment artifact but never
evaluated, so an operator cannot author a deny rule believing it works.
deferment.md gains a §9 execution log tracking §8 remediation.
Joseph Doherty
53ede679c3