Files
lmxopcua/tests/Core/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Tests/SqlCredentialGuardTests.cs
T
Joseph Doherty 2193d9f2e4 fix(config): refuse to store a Sql credential in a node config override (#499)
`ClusterNode.DriverConfigOverridesJson` is the third surface a Sql driver's config
is persisted on, and the only one nothing gated. It is a map keyed by
`DriverInstanceId` merged onto the cluster-level `DriverConfig`, so a literal
`connectionString` pasted there leaks exactly as one pasted into the driver — the
leak #498 closed for `DriverInstance.DriverConfig` and `Device.DeviceConfig`.

Gated at the SAVE, not at the deploy — a deliberate departure from both options the
issue offered:

- `DraftSnapshot` carries no `ClusterNode` rows, and adding them would widen the
  snapshot and every builder of one for a single rule about a value that never
  enters the artifact.
- More to the point, a deploy gate is the wrong instrument here. Node overrides are
  not in the artifact, so blocking a deploy would not stop the credential being
  stored — it is already in the database and replicated by then. Refusing the save
  is the only point where "refuse to store it" is literally true, which is #498's
  own framing: discarding a secret on read is not the same as refusing to store it.

The check moves into a shared `SqlCredentialGuard` so the two enforcement points
cannot drift; `DraftValidator` now calls it instead of its own private helper.

Kept deliberately narrow — the `Sql` driver's `connectionString` only, and only for
instance ids that ARE Sql drivers. The issue asked whether to generalise to
credential-shaped keys across every driver type; not doing that, for the same
reason #498 did not: a broader sweep would start refusing configs that are
legitimate today for drivers which never made an indirect-credential guarantee,
which is a regression rather than defence in depth. Widen per driver, as each gains
its own contract.

The error names the offending driver instance(s) and NEVER the value — it reaches
the AdminUI and the audit trail.

14 new cases cover both halves, including the case variants (System.Text.Json binds
`ConnectionString` to `connectionString`, so a case variant is the same key, not a
bypass), non-Sql ids being ignored, and every blank/malformed/non-object shape.
2026-07-26 10:30:04 -04:00

133 lines
6.0 KiB
C#

using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Validation;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="SqlCredentialGuard"/> — the shared "a Sql driver never persists a literal connection
/// string" check behind both the #498 deploy gate and the #499 node-override save gate.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The node-override half is the one #499 is about: <c>ClusterNode.DriverConfigOverridesJson</c> is a
/// map keyed by <c>DriverInstanceId</c> that is merged onto the cluster-level <c>DriverConfig</c>, and
/// it is invisible to <c>DraftSnapshot</c> — so nothing gated it at all before.
/// </remarks>
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class SqlCredentialGuardTests
{
/// <summary>The literal an operator would paste into a raw-JSON textarea.</summary>
private const string Leaked =
"""{"provider":"SqlServer","connectionString":"Server=sql,1433;Database=Mes;User ID=sa;Password=hunter2"}""";
private const string Clean = """{"provider":"SqlServer","connectionStringRef":"Sql:Line3"}""";
// ---- CarriesLiteralConnectionString --------------------------------------------------------
/// <summary>The key is caught at the top level of a config blob.</summary>
[Fact]
public void A_literal_connectionString_is_detected()
=> SqlCredentialGuard.CarriesLiteralConnectionString(Leaked).ShouldBeTrue();
/// <summary>The supported indirect form is not a violation — otherwise the rule would block the fix
/// it tells operators to apply.</summary>
[Fact]
public void The_indirect_connectionStringRef_form_is_clean()
=> SqlCredentialGuard.CarriesLiteralConnectionString(Clean).ShouldBeFalse();
/// <summary>System.Text.Json binds <c>ConnectionString</c> to a <c>connectionString</c> property by
/// default, so a case variant is the same key — not a bypass.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("""{"ConnectionString":"Server=x;Password=p"}""")]
[InlineData("""{"CONNECTIONSTRING":"Server=x;Password=p"}""")]
[InlineData("""{"connectionstring":"Server=x;Password=p"}""")]
public void Case_variants_are_the_same_key(string json)
=> SqlCredentialGuard.CarriesLiteralConnectionString(json).ShouldBeTrue();
/// <summary>Blank, malformed and non-object blobs simply have no keys. Shaping the config JSON is
/// another rule's job, and throwing here would turn a formatting mistake into a credential failure.
/// </summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
[InlineData("{ not json")]
[InlineData("[1,2,3]")]
[InlineData("\"a string\"")]
public void Blank_malformed_and_non_object_blobs_are_not_violations(string? json)
=> SqlCredentialGuard.CarriesLiteralConnectionString(json).ShouldBeFalse();
/// <summary>Only the top level is scanned. The DTO is flat, so a nested occurrence cannot bind and is
/// not the credential-shaped mistake this rule exists to catch.</summary>
[Fact]
public void A_nested_occurrence_is_not_flagged()
=> SqlCredentialGuard
.CarriesLiteralConnectionString("""{"nested":{"connectionString":"Server=x"}}""")
.ShouldBeFalse();
// ---- FindNodeOverrideViolations (#499) -----------------------------------------------------
/// <summary>The #499 leak: a credential pasted into a node's per-driver override map.</summary>
[Fact]
public void A_credential_in_a_node_override_for_a_Sql_driver_is_a_violation()
{
var overrides = $$"""{"di-sql": {{Leaked}} }""";
SqlCredentialGuard.FindNodeOverrideViolations(overrides, ["di-sql"])
.ShouldBe(["di-sql"]);
}
/// <summary>Every offending instance is reported, not just the first — an operator fixing one at a
/// time would otherwise need as many save attempts as there are leaks.</summary>
[Fact]
public void Every_offending_instance_is_reported()
{
var overrides = $$"""{"di-a": {{Leaked}}, "di-clean": {{Clean}}, "di-b": {{Leaked}} }""";
SqlCredentialGuard.FindNodeOverrideViolations(overrides, ["di-a", "di-b", "di-clean"])
.ShouldBe(["di-a", "di-b"]);
}
/// <summary>Keys outside the Sql set are ignored. A non-Sql driver never made the
/// indirect-credential guarantee, so flagging it would break a config that is legitimate today —
/// a regression, not defence in depth.</summary>
[Fact]
public void An_override_for_a_non_Sql_driver_is_ignored()
{
var overrides = $$"""{"di-modbus": {{Leaked}} }""";
SqlCredentialGuard.FindNodeOverrideViolations(overrides, ["di-sql"]).ShouldBeEmpty();
}
/// <summary>The realistic override — a node-specific endpoint — must keep saving.</summary>
[Fact]
public void A_normal_override_is_clean()
{
var overrides = """{"di-sql": {"commandTimeoutSeconds": 45}}""";
SqlCredentialGuard.FindNodeOverrideViolations(overrides, ["di-sql"]).ShouldBeEmpty();
}
/// <summary>Nothing to check when the cluster has no Sql drivers, or the node has no overrides.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
[InlineData("{ not json")]
[InlineData("[1,2,3]")]
public void Blank_and_malformed_override_maps_yield_no_violations(string? overrides)
=> SqlCredentialGuard.FindNodeOverrideViolations(overrides, ["di-sql"]).ShouldBeEmpty();
/// <summary>An empty Sql-driver set short-circuits — there is no instance the key could belong to.</summary>
[Fact]
public void No_Sql_drivers_means_no_violations()
=> SqlCredentialGuard.FindNodeOverrideViolations($$"""{"di-sql": {{Leaked}} }""", [])
.ShouldBeEmpty();
/// <summary>A non-object override entry cannot carry config keys, and must not throw.</summary>
[Fact]
public void A_non_object_override_entry_is_skipped()
=> SqlCredentialGuard.FindNodeOverrideViolations("""{"di-sql": "connectionString"}""", ["di-sql"])
.ShouldBeEmpty();
}