Joseph Doherty
2a8e2981fe
v2-ci / unit-tests (push) Has been cancelled
Owner decisions §14 #5/#6 as built (design §12.5): - Scripting:Worker:Identity (default unset, Windows only, fail-closed validation): each worker starts under a restricted token derived from the host's. Every privilege but SeChangeNotify is removed; the restricting SIDs are NT SERVICE\OtOpcUaScriptWorker's SID + Everyone + Users + RESTRICTED; the token and default DACLs are host + SYSTEM + identity + RESTRICTED. The worker is created suspended, put in its Job Object before it runs, inherits only its stdio pipes, gets an ACL'd work dir as TEMP, and runs with DOTNET_EnableDiagnostics=0. The identity is granted on the host's window station and desktop, because USER32 init made coreclr.dll fail with ERROR_DLL_INIT_FAILED on windev. The logon SID is not used because the host's process DACL gives it PROCESS_VM_READ. - The worker pipe on Windows always has an explicit protected DACL: host account + identity only. There is no owner ACE, so an elevated host's Administrators gets no access. - The worker treats access denied on its parent-pid poll as alive; the Job Object covers that case. - scripts/install/Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 + ScriptWorkerIsolation.psm1 are idempotent and support -WhatIf, -Uninstall and -PlanOnly. They create the disabled anchor service, the PeCacheDir ACL (protected, no Users, key and markers host-only, pe\ Modify for the identity), read+execute on script-worker\, a ReadData deny on the install root, the outbound firewall block on the worker exe, and optionally the host-service env. - Tests: the dry-run harness scripts/install/tests/Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 (46 assertions, mutation-checked); ScriptWorkerIdentityTests; WorkerIsolationTests, which cover the pipe ACL, token access and a real restricted worker running a script, all green on windev. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV