Files
Joseph Doherty
d5fa1f450e
Phase 3 PR 29 — Account/session page expanding the minimal sidebar role display into a dedicated /account route. Shows the authenticated operator's identity (username from ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier, display name from ClaimTypes.Name), their Admin roles as badges (from ClaimTypes.Role), the raw LDAP groups that mapped to those roles (from the 'ldap_group' claim added by Login.razor at sign-in), and a capability table listing each Admin capability with its required role and a Yes/No badge showing whether this session has it. Capability list mirrors the Program.cs authorization policies + each page's [Authorize] attribute so operators can self-service check whether their session has access without trial-and-error navigation — capabilities covered: view clusters + fleet status (all roles), edit configuration drafts (ConfigEditor or FleetAdmin per CanEdit policy), publish generations (FleetAdmin per CanPublish policy), manage certificate trust (FleetAdmin per PR 28 Certificates page attribute), manage external-ID reservations (ConfigEditor or FleetAdmin per Reservations page attribute).
Sidebar's 'Signed in as' line now wraps the display name in a link to /account so the existing sidebar-compact view becomes the entry point for the fuller page — keeps the sign-out button where it was for muscle memory, just adds the detail page one click away. Page is gated with [Authorize] (any authenticated admin) rather than a specific role — the capability table deliberately works for every signed-in user so they can see what they DON'T have access to, which helps them file the right ticket with their LDAP admin instead of getting a plain Access Denied when navigating blindly.
Capability → required-role table is defined as a private readonly record list in the page rather than pulled from a service because it's a UI-presentation concern, not runtime policy state — the runtime policy IS Program.cs's AddAuthorizationBuilder + each page's [Authorize] attribute, and this table just mirrors it for operator readability. Comment on the list reminds future-me to extend it when a new policy or [Authorize] page lands. No behavior change if roles are empty, but the page surfaces a hint ('Sign-in would have been blocked, so if you're seeing this, the session claim is likely stale') that nudges the operator toward signing out + back in.
No new tests added — the page is pure display over claims; its only logic is the 'has-capability' Any-overlap check which is exactly what ASP.NET's [Authorize(Roles=...)] does in-framework, and duplicating that in a unit test would test the framework rather than our code. Admin.Tests Unit stays 23 pass / 0 fail. Admin build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 Streams B–E scaffold + Phase 2 Streams A–C scaffold — 8 new projects with ~70 new tests, all green alongside the 494 v1 IntegrationTests baseline (parity preserved: no v1 tests broken; legacy OtOpcUa.Host untouched). Phase 1 finish: Configuration project (16 entities + 10 enums + DbContext + DesignTimeDbContextFactory + InitialSchema/StoredProcedures/AuthorizationGrants migrations — 8 procs including sp_PublishGeneration with MERGE on ExternalIdReservation per decision #124, sp_RollbackToGeneration cloning rows into a new published generation, sp_ValidateDraft with cross-cluster-namespace + EquipmentUuid-immutability + ZTag/SAPID reservation pre-flight, sp_ComputeGenerationDiff with CHECKSUM-based row signature — plus OtOpcUaNode/OtOpcUaAdmin SQL roles with EXECUTE grants scoped to per-principal-class proc sets and DENY UPDATE/DELETE/INSERT/SELECT on dbo schema); managed DraftValidator covering UNS segment regex, path length, EquipmentUuid immutability across generations, same-cluster namespace binding (decision #122), reservation pre-flight, EquipmentId derivation (decision #125), driver↔namespace compatibility — returning every failing rule in one pass; LiteDB local cache with round-trip + ring pruning + corruption-fast-fail; GenerationApplier with per-entity Added/Removed/Modified diff and dependency-ordered callbacks (namespace → driver → device → equipment → poll-group → tag, Removed before Added); Core project with GenericDriverNodeManager (scaffold for the Phase 2 Galaxy port) and DriverHost lifecycle registry; Server project using Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting BackgroundService replacing TopShelf, with NodeBootstrap that falls back to LiteDB cache when the central DB is unreachable (decision #79); Admin project scaffolded as Blazor Server with Bootstrap 5 sidebar layout, cookie auth, three admin roles (ConfigViewer/ConfigEditor/FleetAdmin), Cluster + Generation services fronting the stored procs. Phase 2 scaffold: Driver.Galaxy.Shared (netstandard2.0) with full MessagePack IPC contract surface — Hello version negotiation, Open/CloseSession, Heartbeat, DiscoverHierarchy + GalaxyObjectInfo/GalaxyAttributeInfo, Read/WriteValues, Subscribe/Unsubscribe/OnDataChange, AlarmSubscribe/Event/Ack, HistoryRead, HostConnectivityStatus, Recycle — plus length-prefixed framing (decision #28) with a 16 MiB cap and thread-safe FrameWriter/FrameReader; Driver.Galaxy.Host (net48) implementing the Tier C cross-cutting protections from driver-stability.md — strict PipeAcl (allow configured server SID only, explicit deny on LocalSystem + Administrators), PipeServer with caller-SID verification via pipe.RunAsClient + WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent and per-process shared-secret Hello, Galaxy-specific MemoryWatchdog (warn at max(1.5×baseline, +200 MB), soft-recycle at max(2×baseline, +200 MB), hard ceiling 1.5 GB, slope ≥5 MB/min over 30-min rolling window), RecyclePolicy (1 soft recycle per hour cap + 03:00 local daily scheduled), PostMortemMmf (1000-entry ring buffer in %ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\driver-postmortem\galaxy.mmf, survives hard crash, readable cross-process), MxAccessHandle : SafeHandle (ReleaseHandle loops Marshal.ReleaseComObject until refcount=0 then calls optional unregister callback), StaPump with responsiveness probe (BlockingCollection dispatcher for Phase 1 — real Win32 GetMessage/DispatchMessage pump slots in with the same semantics when the Galaxy code lift happens), IsExternalInit shim for init setters on .NET 4.8; Driver.Galaxy.Proxy (net10) implementing IDriver + ITagDiscovery forwarding over the IPC channel with MX data-type and security-classification mapping, plus Supervisor pieces — Backoff (5s → 15s → 60s capped, reset-on-stable-run), CircuitBreaker (3 crashes per 5 min opens; 1h → 4h → manual cooldown escalation; sticky alert doesn't auto-clear), HeartbeatMonitor (2s cadence, 3 consecutive misses = host dead per driver-stability.md). Infrastructure: docker SQL Server remapped to host port 14330 to coexist with the native MSSQL14 Galaxy ZB DB instance on 1433; NuGetAuditSuppress applied per-project for two System.Security.Cryptography.Xml advisories that only reach via EF Core Design with PrivateAssets=all (fix ships in 11.0.0-preview); .slnx gains 14 project registrations. Deferred with explicit TODOs in docs/v2/implementation/phase-2-partial-exit-evidence.md: Phase 1 Stream E Admin UI pages (Generations listing + draft-diff-publish, Equipment CRUD with OPC 40010 fields, UNS Areas/Lines tabs, ACLs + permission simulator, Generic JSON config editor, SignalR real-time, Release-Reservation + Merge-Equipment workflows, LDAP login page, AppServer smoke test per decision #142), Phase 2 Stream D (Galaxy MXAccess code lift out of legacy OtOpcUa.Host, dual-service installer, appsettings → DriverConfig migration script, legacy Host deletion — blocked by parity), Phase 2 Stream E (v1 IntegrationTests against v2 topology, Client.CLI walkthrough diff, four 2026-04-13 stability findings regression tests, adversarial review — requires live MXAccess runtime).
Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.