<# ScriptWorker isolation (lmxopcua#780, design §6 + owner decisions §14 #5/#6, §7 PeCacheDir ACL). Pure planning functions (no OS calls — the dry-run harness runs them on any OS) plus the Windows apply step. Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 is the entry point; see its help. The worker identity is the virtual account NT SERVICE\. Its SID is computed from the name (Get-OtOpcUaServiceSid, the algorithm behind `sc.exe showsid`), and the host starts each worker with a restricted token whose restricting SIDs are that identity + Everyone + BUILTIN\Users + RESTRICTED (ScriptWorkerIdentity.cs, RestrictedWorkerLauncher.cs). Every access check the worker makes must therefore pass for the host account AND for that set — which is why the ACLs below grant or deny the worker identity specifically. #> Set-StrictMode -Version Latest # Access masks (FileSystemRights) used in the planned ACEs. $script:FullControl = 0x1F01FF $script:Modify = 0x1301BF # Modify | Synchronize $script:ReadAndExecute = 0x1200A9 # ReadAndExecute | Synchronize $script:ReadData = 0x000001 # ReadData (files) / ListDirectory (folders) # lmxopcua#890: the deny the worker identity gets on the install folder and on every -DenyPaths folder. Read AND write: # ReadData/ListDirectory 0x1, WriteData/AddFile 0x2, AppendData/AddSubdirectory 0x4, WriteExtendedAttributes 0x10, # DeleteSubdirectoriesAndFiles 0x40, WriteAttributes 0x100, Delete 0x10000, ChangePermissions 0x40000, # TakeOwnership 0x80000. # Not denied, so the loader can still walk to script-worker\ and the worker can still run: Traverse/Execute 0x20, # ReadAttributes 0x80, ReadPermissions 0x20000, Synchronize 0x100000 (and ReadExtendedAttributes 0x8, which leaks nothing). # The write half matters because a data drive commonly grants BUILTIN\Users (one of the worker's restricting SIDs) # CreateFiles/AppendData on its subfolders: without it a worker could drop a certificate into pki\trusted\certs. $script:DenyMask = 0x0D0157 # lmxopcua#890: where the installer records the -DenyPaths it applied, so a later re-run removes the ones dropped from # the list and -Uninstall removes exactly what was added without the operator repeating them. The value lives under the # anchor service's key and goes with it. $script:DenyRecordValue = 'DenyPaths' $script:FirewallRuleName = 'OtOpcUa-ScriptWorker-BlockOutbound' $script:WorkerExeName = 'ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ScriptWorker.exe' $script:EnvIdentity = 'Scripting__Worker__Identity' $script:EnvPeCacheDir = 'Scripting__Worker__PeCacheDir' function Get-OtOpcUaServiceSid { <# .SYNOPSIS The SID of the virtual account NT SERVICE\: S-1-5-80- + SHA-1 of the upper-cased name (UTF-16LE) read as five little-endian UInt32 values. Identical to `sc.exe showsid ` and to ScriptWorkerIdentity.ServiceSid. #> [CmdletBinding()] param([Parameter(Mandatory)] [ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]{1,80}$')] [string]$Name) $bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($Name.ToUpperInvariant()) $sha1 = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA1]::Create() try { $hash = $sha1.ComputeHash($bytes) } finally { $sha1.Dispose() } $parts = for ($i = 0; $i -lt 5; $i++) { [BitConverter]::ToUInt32($hash, $i * 4) } 'S-1-5-80-' + ($parts -join '-') } function Format-OtOpcUaAce { # One SDDL ACE string: (A|D;flags;0xMASK;;;SID). param([ValidateSet('A', 'D')] [string]$Type, [string]$Flags, [int]$Mask, [string]$Sid) '({0};{1};0x{2:x};;;{3})' -f $Type, $Flags, $Mask, $Sid } function Get-OtOpcUaPeCacheSddl { <# .SYNOPSIS The PeCacheDir root's security descriptor: owner Administrators, PROTECTED (no inherited Users/Everyone/ Authenticated Users), SYSTEM + Administrators + the host account full control (container + object inherit). The worker identity gets NOTHING here — the HMAC key (pe-cache.key) and the launch markers (workers\) stay host-only; the worker's one writable place is the pe\ subfolder (Get-OtOpcUaPeEntriesAce). #> param([Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$HostSid) $aces = @( (Format-OtOpcUaAce -Type A -Flags 'OICI' -Mask $script:FullControl -Sid 'SY') (Format-OtOpcUaAce -Type A -Flags 'OICI' -Mask $script:FullControl -Sid 'BA') ) if ($HostSid -ne 'S-1-5-18') { $aces += Format-OtOpcUaAce -Type A -Flags 'OICI' -Mask $script:FullControl -Sid $HostSid } 'O:BAG:SYD:PAI' + ($aces -join '') } function Get-OtOpcUaPeEntriesAce { # pe\ : the worker compiles in-process (owner decision §14 #7) and writes HMAC'd entries here — Modify, inherited. param([Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$WorkerSid) Format-OtOpcUaAce -Type A -Flags 'OICI' -Mask $script:Modify -Sid $WorkerSid } function Get-OtOpcUaScriptWorkerFolderAce { # script-worker\ : the worker's own binaries — read and execute, inherited. param([Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$WorkerSid) Format-OtOpcUaAce -Type A -Flags 'OICI' -Mask $script:ReadAndExecute -Sid $WorkerSid } function Get-OtOpcUaInstallRootDenyAce { <# .SYNOPSIS InstallRoot\ and every -DenyPaths folder: DENY the worker identity read and write ($script:DenyMask), inherited — so appsettings*.json, the logs, the host binaries, pki\ (private keys, trust lists) and data\ (secrets.db, LocalDb) are unreadable and unwritable to the worker even where BUILTIN\Users (one of its restricting SIDs) can read or create files (lmxopcua#890). script-worker\'s explicit allow is the nearer ACE and wins below it. #> param([Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$WorkerSid) Format-OtOpcUaAce -Type D -Flags 'OICI' -Mask $script:DenyMask -Sid $WorkerSid } function Test-OtOpcUaPathWithin { # True when $Path equals $Ancestor or is below it (Windows paths, case-insensitive, no OS call). param([string]$Path, [string]$Ancestor) $p = $Path.TrimEnd('\'); $a = $Ancestor.TrimEnd('\') $p -ieq $a -or $p.StartsWith($a + '\', [StringComparison]::OrdinalIgnoreCase) } function Resolve-OtOpcUaDenyPaths { <# .SYNOPSIS Normalises -DenyPaths (lmxopcua#890): splits 'a,b' / 'a;b' (powershell -File passes an array as one string), trims trailing '\', drops blanks, de-duplicates case-insensitively, drops InstallRoot itself (InstallRootDeny covers it) and refuses what would break the worker or deny far too much. #> param([string[]]$Paths, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$InstallRoot, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$PeCacheDir) $root = $InstallRoot.TrimEnd('\') $workerFolder = "$root\script-worker" $cache = $PeCacheDir.TrimEnd('\') $out = [System.Collections.Generic.List[string]]::new() foreach ($raw in @($Paths | Where-Object { $_ } | ForEach-Object { $_ -split '[,;]' })) { $p = $raw.Trim().TrimEnd('\') if (-not $p) { continue } if ($p -match '^[A-Za-z]:$' -or $p -match '^\\\\[^\\]+(\\[^\\]+)?$') { throw "DenyPaths entry '$raw' is a drive or share root; deny the deployment folder instead" } if ($p -notmatch '^([A-Za-z]:\\|\\\\[^\\]+\\)') { throw "DenyPaths entry '$raw' must be an absolute Windows path" } if (Test-OtOpcUaPathWithin -Path $p -Ancestor $workerFolder) { throw "DenyPaths entry '$raw' is (inside) $workerFolder, the worker's own binaries" } if (Test-OtOpcUaPathWithin -Path $p -Ancestor $cache) { throw "DenyPaths entry '$raw' is (inside) PeCacheDir '$PeCacheDir'; the worker writes its compiled entries there" } if ($p -ieq $root) { continue } if (-not ($out | Where-Object { $_ -ieq $p })) { $out.Add($p) } } $out.ToArray() } function New-OtOpcUaPlanStep { param([string]$Id, [string]$Target, [string]$Change, [hashtable]$Data = @{}) [pscustomobject]@{ Id = $Id; Target = $Target; Change = $Change; Data = $Data } } function Get-ScriptWorkerIsolationPlan { <# .SYNOPSIS Every change Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 makes, in order, as data. Pure: no OS call, so the dry-run harness (scripts/install/tests/Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1) asserts it on any OS and -WhatIf prints it verbatim. #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$InstallRoot, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$HostSid, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$PeCacheDir, [string]$WorkerServiceName = 'OtOpcUaScriptWorker', [string]$HostServiceName = 'OtOpcUaHost', # lmxopcua#890: more folders to deny the worker identity (the deployment folder around InstallRoot, pki\, data\, # logs\, a Secrets or LocalDb folder elsewhere). Each gets the same inherited deny as InstallRoot. [string[]]$DenyPaths = @(), # The -DenyPaths a previous run recorded (read by the entry script from the anchor service's key; empty under # -PlanOnly). Install removes the deny from recorded paths no longer listed; -Uninstall removes it from all. [string[]]$RecordedDenyPaths = @(), [switch]$ConfigureHostService, [switch]$Uninstall, [switch]$RemovePeCache ) # Windows paths, planned on any OS (the harness runs on macOS/Linux too): drive-rooted or UNC only. foreach ($p in @{ InstallRoot = $InstallRoot; PeCacheDir = $PeCacheDir }.GetEnumerator()) { if ($p.Value -notmatch '^([A-Za-z]:\\|\\\\[^\\]+\\)') { throw "$($p.Key) '$($p.Value)' must be an absolute Windows path" } } $root = $InstallRoot.TrimEnd('\') $cache = $PeCacheDir.TrimEnd('\') if ($cache -ieq $root -or $cache.StartsWith($root + '\', [StringComparison]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { throw "PeCacheDir '$PeCacheDir' is inside InstallRoot '$InstallRoot'; the host refuses a cache inside its content root" } $workerSid = Get-OtOpcUaServiceSid -Name $WorkerServiceName $identity = "NT SERVICE\$WorkerServiceName" $workerFolder = "$root\script-worker" $workerExe = "$workerFolder\$($script:WorkerExeName)" $entries = "$cache\pe" $deny = @(Resolve-OtOpcUaDenyPaths -Paths $DenyPaths -InstallRoot $root -PeCacheDir $cache) # Recorded paths are not re-validated (they were when recorded); only normalised, so a removal always matches. $recorded = @($RecordedDenyPaths | Where-Object { $_ } | ForEach-Object { $_.Trim().TrimEnd('\') } | Where-Object { $_ -and $_ -ine $root } | Sort-Object -Unique) $denyAce = Get-OtOpcUaInstallRootDenyAce -WorkerSid $workerSid $recordKey = "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\$WorkerServiceName\Parameters" $steps = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new() if (-not $Uninstall) { $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'AnchorService' $WorkerServiceName ` "register the disabled anchor service '$WorkerServiceName' so the virtual account '$identity' ($workerSid) resolves by name (never started)" ` @{ Name = $WorkerServiceName; Identity = $identity; BinPath = $workerExe })) foreach ($stale in @($recorded | Where-Object { $p = $_; -not ($deny | Where-Object { $_ -ieq $p }) })) { $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'SensitiveDirDeny' $stale ` "remove every explicit ACE for the worker identity from '$stale' (recorded by an earlier run, no longer in -DenyPaths)" ` @{ Path = $stale; Sid = $workerSid; Remove = $true })) } $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'DenyPathRecord' $recordKey ` "record the denied folders ($(if ($deny.Count) { $deny -join '; ' } else { 'none beyond the install folder' })) so a re-run or -Uninstall removes exactly these" ` @{ Key = $recordKey; Name = $script:DenyRecordValue; Paths = $deny })) $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'PeCacheDir' $cache ` "create the PE cache directory and set its ACL (protected; SYSTEM, Administrators, host account full control; no Users; no worker access to the key or markers)" ` @{ Path = $cache; Sddl = (Get-OtOpcUaPeCacheSddl -HostSid $HostSid) })) $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'PeEntriesDir' $entries ` "create the PE entries directory and grant the worker identity Modify (it compiles and writes HMAC'd entries)" ` @{ Path = $entries; Ace = (Get-OtOpcUaPeEntriesAce -WorkerSid $workerSid); Sid = $workerSid; Mask = $script:Modify; Type = 'Allow' })) $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'WorkerFolderAcl' $workerFolder ` "grant the worker identity read+execute on its own binaries" ` @{ Path = $workerFolder; Ace = (Get-OtOpcUaScriptWorkerFolderAce -WorkerSid $workerSid); Sid = $workerSid; Mask = $script:ReadAndExecute; Type = 'Allow' })) $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'InstallRootDeny' $root ` "deny the worker identity read and write on the install folder (appsettings, logs, host binaries), inherited; script-worker\ stays readable" ` @{ Path = $root; Ace = $denyAce; Sid = $workerSid; Mask = $script:DenyMask; Type = 'Deny' })) foreach ($p in $deny) { $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'SensitiveDirDeny' $p ` "deny the worker identity read and write on '$p' (certificates, secrets, stores, logs, backups), inherited" ` @{ Path = $p; Ace = $denyAce; Sid = $workerSid; Mask = $script:DenyMask; Type = 'Deny' })) } $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'FirewallBlockOutbound' $script:FirewallRuleName ` "add a Windows Firewall rule blocking ALL outbound traffic from '$workerExe' (every profile)" ` @{ Name = $script:FirewallRuleName; Program = $workerExe })) if ($ConfigureHostService) { $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'HostServiceEnv' $HostServiceName ` "set $($script:EnvIdentity)=$identity and $($script:EnvPeCacheDir)=$cache in the '$HostServiceName' service environment (other entries kept; takes effect on the next service start)" ` @{ Service = $HostServiceName; Set = [ordered]@{ $script:EnvIdentity = $identity; $script:EnvPeCacheDir = $cache } })) } } else { if ($ConfigureHostService) { $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'HostServiceEnv' $HostServiceName ` "remove $($script:EnvIdentity) and $($script:EnvPeCacheDir) from the '$HostServiceName' service environment (workers revert to the host's token on the next start)" ` @{ Service = $HostServiceName; Remove = @($script:EnvIdentity, $script:EnvPeCacheDir) })) } $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'FirewallBlockOutbound' $script:FirewallRuleName ` "remove the Windows Firewall rule '$($script:FirewallRuleName)'" @{ Name = $script:FirewallRuleName; Remove = $true })) foreach ($p in @(@($deny) + @($recorded) | Sort-Object -Unique)) { $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'SensitiveDirDeny' $p ` "remove every explicit ACE for the worker identity from '$p'" @{ Path = $p; Sid = $workerSid; Remove = $true })) } $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'InstallRootDeny' $root ` "remove every explicit ACE for the worker identity from the install folder" @{ Path = $root; Sid = $workerSid; Remove = $true })) $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'WorkerFolderAcl' $workerFolder ` "remove every explicit ACE for the worker identity from script-worker\" @{ Path = $workerFolder; Sid = $workerSid; Remove = $true })) if ($RemovePeCache) { $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'PeCacheDir' $cache ` "delete the PE cache directory (HMAC key, entries, launch markers; the host recreates a fresh cache if still configured)" ` @{ Path = $cache; Remove = $true })) } else { $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'PeEntriesDir' $entries ` "remove every explicit ACE for the worker identity from the PE entries directory (the cache itself is kept; -RemovePeCache deletes it)" ` @{ Path = $entries; Sid = $workerSid; Remove = $true })) } $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'DenyPathRecord' $recordKey ` "delete the record of denied folders" @{ Key = $recordKey; Name = $script:DenyRecordValue; Remove = $true })) $steps.Add((New-OtOpcUaPlanStep 'AnchorService' $WorkerServiceName ` "delete the anchor service '$WorkerServiceName'" @{ Name = $WorkerServiceName; Remove = $true })) } $steps } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Apply (Windows only). Each function is idempotent: it reads the current state, changes only what differs, and # returns 'changed' or 'unchanged'. Callers gate every call with ShouldProcess, so -WhatIf runs none of them. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- function Set-OtOpcUaExplicitAce { # Ensures exactly one explicit ACE for $Sid on $Path with the given type/mask/inheritance (or none when $Remove). param([string]$Path, [string]$Sid, [int]$Mask = 0, [string]$Type = 'Allow', [switch]$Remove) if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $Path)) { if ($Remove) { return 'unchanged' } throw "$Path does not exist" } $acl = Get-Acl -LiteralPath $Path # #800: DirectoryInfo.GetAccessControl does not exist on PowerShell 7 (.NET) $identity = [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]::new($Sid) $explicit = @($acl.GetAccessRules($true, $false, [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]) | Where-Object { $_.IdentityReference -eq $identity }) $inherit = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]'ContainerInherit, ObjectInherit' # #800: @() keeps $wanted an array; the if-expression unrolled it to a scalar ($null on -Remove), and .Count on that # throws under Set-StrictMode -Version Latest on Windows PowerShell 5.1. $wanted = @(if (-not $Remove) { [System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule]::new($identity, [System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemRights]$Mask, $inherit, [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::None, [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]$Type) }) $same = ($explicit.Count -eq $wanted.Count) -and ( $wanted.Count -eq 0 -or ( [int]$explicit[0].FileSystemRights -eq $Mask -and $explicit[0].AccessControlType -eq $wanted[0].AccessControlType -and $explicit[0].InheritanceFlags -eq $inherit -and $explicit[0].PropagationFlags -eq 'None')) if ($same) { return 'unchanged' } $acl.PurgeAccessRules($identity) foreach ($rule in $wanted) { $acl.AddAccessRule($rule) } Set-Acl -LiteralPath $Path -AclObject $acl 'changed' } function Invoke-OtOpcUaSc { # Runs sc.exe with an explicitly quoted command line (CommandLineToArgvW rules), identical on PowerShell 5.1 and 7. # Returns the exit code. Used where an argument contains literal double quotes. param([string[]]$Arguments) $quoted = foreach ($a in $Arguments) { '"' + ($a -replace '(\\*)"', '$1$1\"' -replace '(\\+)$', '$1$1') + '"' } $psi = [System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo]::new((Join-Path ([Environment]::SystemDirectory) 'sc.exe'), ($quoted -join ' ')) $psi.UseShellExecute = $false $psi.CreateNoWindow = $true $psi.RedirectStandardOutput = $true $psi.RedirectStandardError = $true $proc = [System.Diagnostics.Process]::Start($psi) $null = $proc.StandardOutput.ReadToEnd() $null = $proc.StandardError.ReadToEnd() $proc.WaitForExit() $proc.ExitCode } function Set-OtOpcUaStepAce { param([hashtable]$Data) if ($Data.ContainsKey('Remove')) { return (Set-OtOpcUaExplicitAce -Path $Data.Path -Sid $Data.Sid -Remove) } Set-OtOpcUaExplicitAce -Path $Data.Path -Sid $Data.Sid -Mask $Data.Mask -Type $Data.Type } function Invoke-ScriptWorkerIsolationStep { <# .SYNOPSIS Applies one plan step on Windows. Idempotent; returns 'changed' or 'unchanged'. #> [CmdletBinding()] param([Parameter(Mandatory)] $Step) $d = $Step.Data switch ($Step.Id) { 'AnchorService' { $svc = Get-Service -Name $d.Name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue if ($d.ContainsKey('Remove')) { if (-not $svc) { return 'unchanged' } & sc.exe delete $d.Name | Out-Null if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "sc.exe delete $($d.Name) failed ($LASTEXITCODE)" } return 'changed' } $verb = if ($svc) { 'config' } else { 'create' } $cfg = Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -Filter "Name='$($d.Name)'" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue if ($cfg -and $cfg.StartMode -eq 'Disabled' -and $cfg.StartName -ieq $d.Identity -and $cfg.PathName -eq "`"$($d.BinPath)`"") { return 'unchanged' } # #883: the binPath value carries literal quotes. Windows PowerShell 5.1 passes native arguments with legacy quoting # (embedded quotes are dropped or mangled, so the stored path was unquoted and every re-run reported 'changed'), # PowerShell 7 escapes them. Build the command line explicitly so both hosts store the same value. $scExit = Invoke-OtOpcUaSc @($verb, $d.Name, 'binPath=', "`"$($d.BinPath)`"", 'start=', 'disabled', 'obj=', $d.Identity, 'DisplayName=', 'OtOpcUa ScriptWorker identity (anchor, never started)') if ($scExit -ne 0) { throw "sc.exe $verb $($d.Name) failed ($scExit)" } & sc.exe sidtype $d.Name unrestricted | Out-Null & sc.exe description $d.Name 'Anchors the NT SERVICE virtual account OtOpcUa ScriptWorker processes are restricted to (lmxopcua#780). Never started: the OtOpcUaHost launches workers itself under a restricted token.' | Out-Null return 'changed' } 'PeCacheDir' { if ($d.ContainsKey('Remove')) { if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $d.Path)) { return 'unchanged' } Remove-Item -LiteralPath $d.Path -Recurse -Force return 'changed' } $changed = $false if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $d.Path)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $d.Path -Force | Out-Null; $changed = $true } $current = (Get-Acl -LiteralPath $d.Path).GetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm('Access, Owner') $desired = [System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity]::new() $desired.SetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm($d.Sddl, 'Access, Owner') if ($current -ne $desired.GetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm('Access, Owner')) { Set-Acl -LiteralPath $d.Path -AclObject $desired # propagates to the key file, pe\ and workers\ (inherited ACEs) $changed = $true } return $(if ($changed) { 'changed' } else { 'unchanged' }) } 'PeEntriesDir' { if (-not $d.ContainsKey('Remove') -and -not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $d.Path)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $d.Path -Force | Out-Null } return (Set-OtOpcUaStepAce -Data $d) } { $_ -in 'WorkerFolderAcl', 'InstallRootDeny', 'SensitiveDirDeny' } { return (Set-OtOpcUaStepAce -Data $d) } 'DenyPathRecord' { $current = @(Get-OtOpcUaRecordedDenyPaths -Key $d.Key -Name $d.Name) if ($d.ContainsKey('Remove')) { if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $d.Key)) { return 'unchanged' } Remove-Item -LiteralPath $d.Key -Recurse -Force return 'changed' } if ((@($current) -join "`n") -ceq (@($d.Paths) -join "`n")) { return 'unchanged' } if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $d.Key)) { New-Item -Path $d.Key -Force | Out-Null } if (@($d.Paths).Count -eq 0) { Remove-ItemProperty -LiteralPath $d.Key -Name $d.Name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue } else { Set-ItemProperty -LiteralPath $d.Key -Name $d.Name -Type MultiString -Value ([string[]]$d.Paths) } return 'changed' } 'FirewallBlockOutbound' { $rule = Get-NetFirewallRule -Name $d.Name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue if ($d.ContainsKey('Remove')) { if (-not $rule) { return 'unchanged' } Remove-NetFirewallRule -Name $d.Name return 'changed' } if ($rule) { $app = ($rule | Get-NetFirewallApplicationFilter).Program if ($rule.Direction -eq 'Outbound' -and $rule.Action -eq 'Block' -and $rule.Enabled -eq 'True' -and $rule.Profile -eq 'Any' -and $app -ieq $d.Program) { return 'unchanged' } Remove-NetFirewallRule -Name $d.Name } New-NetFirewallRule -Name $d.Name -DisplayName 'OtOpcUa ScriptWorker - block outbound' ` -Description 'lmxopcua#780 design §6: OtOpcUa script workers never need the network; scripts are also denied System.Net at compile time.' ` -Direction Outbound -Action Block -Program $d.Program -Profile Any -Enabled True | Out-Null return 'changed' } 'HostServiceEnv' { $key = "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\$($d.Service)" if (-not (Test-Path $key)) { if ($d.ContainsKey('Remove')) { return 'unchanged' } throw "service '$($d.Service)' is not installed (run Install-Services.ps1 first)" } $current = @((Get-ItemProperty -Path $key -Name Environment -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Environment | Where-Object { $_ }) $names = if ($d.ContainsKey('Remove')) { $d.Remove } else { @($d.Set.Keys) } $next = @($current | Where-Object { $n = ($_ -split '=', 2)[0]; $names -notcontains $n }) if (-not $d.ContainsKey('Remove')) { foreach ($k in $d.Set.Keys) { $next += "$k=$($d.Set[$k])" } } if ((@($current) -join "`n") -eq (@($next) -join "`n")) { return 'unchanged' } Set-ItemProperty -Path $key -Name Environment -Type MultiString -Value ([string[]]$next) return 'changed' } default { throw "unknown plan step '$($Step.Id)'" } } } function Get-OtOpcUaRecordedDenyPaths { # The -DenyPaths an earlier run recorded under the anchor service's key (lmxopcua#890); empty when there is none. param([string]$WorkerServiceName = 'OtOpcUaScriptWorker', [string]$Key, [string]$Name = $script:DenyRecordValue) if (-not $Key) { $Key = "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\$WorkerServiceName\Parameters" } if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $Key)) { return } $v = (Get-ItemProperty -LiteralPath $Key -Name $Name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) if ($v) { @($v.$Name | Where-Object { $_ }) } } function Find-OtOpcUaDenyCoverageGap { <# .SYNOPSIS After the denies are applied (lmxopcua#890): the files and folders under $Path that the inherited deny does NOT reach because their DACL is protected (inheritance switched off, e.g. a store that sets its own ACL on a private key) and that carry no explicit deny of their own. Each one is reported as a WARN; the operator decides. $Skip (script-worker\) is not walked. #> param([Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$Path, [Parameter(Mandatory)] [string]$WorkerSid, [string[]]$Skip = @()) if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $Path)) { return } $identity = [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]::new($WorkerSid) foreach ($item in @(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $Path -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) { if (@($Skip | Where-Object { $_ -and (Test-OtOpcUaPathWithin -Path $item.FullName -Ancestor $_) }).Count) { continue } try { $acl = Get-Acl -LiteralPath $item.FullName } catch { continue } if (-not $acl.AreAccessRulesProtected) { continue } $explicitDeny = @($acl.GetAccessRules($true, $false, [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]) | Where-Object { $_.IdentityReference -eq $identity -and $_.AccessControlType -eq 'Deny' }) if ($explicitDeny.Count -eq 0) { $item.FullName } } } Export-ModuleMember -Function Get-OtOpcUaServiceSid, Get-OtOpcUaPeCacheSddl, Get-OtOpcUaPeEntriesAce, Get-OtOpcUaScriptWorkerFolderAce, Get-OtOpcUaInstallRootDenyAce, Resolve-OtOpcUaDenyPaths, Get-ScriptWorkerIsolationPlan, Invoke-ScriptWorkerIsolationStep, Get-OtOpcUaRecordedDenyPaths, Find-OtOpcUaDenyCoverageGap