using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Authorization;

namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.Security;

/// <summary>
/// Validates OPC UA UserName tokens. The SDK already decrypts the token (using the server
/// application cert) and hands the cleartext username + password to this seam. Implementations
/// decide whether the credentials are valid and what roles to attach for downstream ACL checks.
///
/// Production implementation lives in the Host project (wraps <c>ILdapAuthService</c>); the
/// <see cref="NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator"/> default rejects every attempt so misconfigured
/// dev nodes don't silently accept credentials.
/// </summary>
public interface IOpcUaUserAuthenticator
{
    /// <summary>
    /// Resolves cleartext UserName credentials against the configured backing store. Must not
    /// throw — callers turn results into <c>ImpersonateEventArgs.IdentityValidationError</c>
    /// reject codes, and a thrown exception escapes into the OPC UA SDK's session-activation
    /// path where it surfaces as a generic <c>BadInternalError</c>.
    /// </summary>
    /// <param name="username">The username to authenticate.</param>
    /// <param name="password">The cleartext password to authenticate.</param>
    /// <param name="ct">The cancellation token.</param>
    /// <returns>An OpcUaUserAuthResult indicating success or failure.</returns>
    Task<OpcUaUserAuthResult> AuthenticateUserNameAsync(string username, string password, CancellationToken ct);

    /// <summary>
    ///     <see cref="AuthenticateUserNameAsync(string, string, CancellationToken)"/> with the activating client's
    ///     remote endpoint (lmxopcua#751), so an implementation can account pre-authentication failures per
    ///     client rather than process-wide. This is the overload the server calls; the default ignores the
    ///     endpoint and delegates, so an implementation that does not need it is unchanged.
    /// </summary>
    /// <remarks>
    ///     The endpoint uses the SDK's public transport peer address during activation and is null when unknown — an
    ///     implementation must treat null as "no per-client information", never as a distinct client. Same
    ///     must-not-throw contract as the three-argument overload.
    /// </remarks>
    /// <param name="username">The username to authenticate.</param>
    /// <param name="password">The cleartext password to authenticate.</param>
    /// <param name="remoteEndpoint">The client's IP endpoint, or null when it could not be resolved.</param>
    /// <param name="ct">The cancellation token.</param>
    /// <returns>An OpcUaUserAuthResult indicating success or failure.</returns>
    Task<OpcUaUserAuthResult> AuthenticateUserNameAsync(
        string username, string password, System.Net.IPEndPoint? remoteEndpoint, CancellationToken ct) =>
        AuthenticateUserNameAsync(username, password, ct);

    /// <summary>
    ///     Resolves what an <b>anonymous</b> session is allowed to do. Anonymous is a normal
    ///     principal — <see cref="OpcUaPrincipals.Anonymous"/> — not a special case, so it can be granted
    ///     read or write through ordinary ACL rows.
    /// </summary>
    /// <remarks>
    ///     <para>
    ///         This is asked only AFTER the host has decided anonymous sessions are admissible at all
    ///         (<c>OpcUaApplicationHostOptions.AllowAnonymous</c>). Admission is the host's decision;
    ///         authority is this seam's.
    ///     </para>
    ///     <para>
    ///         The default implementation admits anonymous with <b>no roles</b>, which is exactly the
    ///         behaviour before per-key ACLs: an anonymous session connects, and every role-gated operation
    ///         (write, alarm ack) denies. Implementors that can resolve grants override it; the rest
    ///         keep the safe status quo rather than being forced to reimplement it.
    ///     </para>
    /// </remarks>
    /// <param name="ct">The cancellation token.</param>
    /// <returns>The roles to attach to the anonymous session, or a denial.</returns>
    Task<OpcUaUserAuthResult> AuthenticateAnonymousAsync(CancellationToken ct) =>
        Task.FromResult(OpcUaUserAuthResult.Allow(OpcUaPrincipals.Anonymous, Array.Empty<string>()));
}


/// <summary>Outcome of a UserName authentication attempt. <see cref="Roles"/> populates the session identity's role set.</summary>
/// <remarks>
///     <para>
///         ⚠️ <b><see cref="DisplayName"/> is not the principal, and assuming it was is a live trap</b>.
///         The authenticator passes the principal as the display name, but
///         <c>RoleCarryingUserIdentity</c> derives <c>UserIdentity.DisplayName</c> from the presented
///         <b>token</b> — which for a key-bearing client is the static username <c>apikey</c>, the same
///         for every key in the fleet. So the principal was being dropped on the floor at the identity
///         boundary, and the audit <c>ClientUserId</c> on a rejected write recorded <c>apikey</c> for
///         everyone. <see cref="Principal"/> carries it explicitly; nothing should infer it from a name.
///     </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed record OpcUaUserAuthResult(
    bool Success,
    string? DisplayName,
    IReadOnlyList<string> Roles,
    string? Error)
{
    /// <summary>
    ///     The ACL principal the session authenticates as — the name <c>NodeAcl</c> rows are keyed on.
    ///     Empty on a denial, and on a legacy authenticator that predates the principal model, which the
    ///     ACL gate treats as unauthorized rather than guessing.
    /// </summary>
    public string Principal { get; init; } = string.Empty;

    /// <summary>
    ///     Public id of the API key that authenticated, or null for anonymous. Carried so an open session
    ///     can be re-checked against a later deployment that revoked the key.
    /// </summary>
    public string? ApiKeyId { get; init; }

    /// <summary>Creates a successful authentication result with the specified display name and roles.</summary>
    /// <param name="displayName">The display name for the authenticated user — also taken as the principal.</param>
    /// <param name="roles">The roles to assign to the authenticated user.</param>
    /// <returns>A successful OpcUaUserAuthResult.</returns>
    public static OpcUaUserAuthResult Allow(string displayName, IReadOnlyList<string> roles) =>
        new(true, displayName, roles, null) { Principal = displayName ?? string.Empty };

    /// <summary>Creates a successful result for a key-bearing client, carrying the key id for revocation re-checks.</summary>
    /// <param name="principal">The ACL principal the key maps to.</param>
    /// <param name="roles">The interim server-wide roles.</param>
    /// <param name="apiKeyId">The public key id that authenticated.</param>
    /// <returns>A successful OpcUaUserAuthResult.</returns>
    public static OpcUaUserAuthResult AllowKey(string principal, IReadOnlyList<string> roles, string apiKeyId) =>
        new(true, principal, roles, null) { Principal = principal, ApiKeyId = apiKeyId };

    /// <summary>Creates a failed authentication result with the specified error message.</summary>
    /// <param name="error">The error message describing why authentication failed.</param>
    /// <returns>A failed OpcUaUserAuthResult.</returns>
    public static OpcUaUserAuthResult Deny(string error) =>
        new(false, null, Array.Empty<string>(), error);
}

/// <summary>
/// Default deny-all authenticator. Wired by <c>OpcUaApplicationHost</c> when no production
/// authenticator is registered in DI — keeps the server safe-by-default rather than accepting
/// arbitrary UserName credentials. Production Host DI overrides this with the LDAP adapter.
/// </summary>
public sealed class NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator : IOpcUaUserAuthenticator
{
    public static readonly NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator Instance = new();
    private NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator() { }

    /// <inheritdoc />
    public Task<OpcUaUserAuthResult> AuthenticateUserNameAsync(string username, string password, CancellationToken ct) =>
        Task.FromResult(OpcUaUserAuthResult.Deny("No UserName authenticator is configured on this server."));
}