# FOCAS deployment guide

Per-driver runbook for deploying the FANUC FOCAS driver. See
[`docs/drivers/FOCAS.md`](../drivers/FOCAS.md) for the per-feature
reference and [`focas-version-matrix.md`](./focas-version-matrix.md) for
the per-CNC-series capability surface.

## Operator config-knob cheat sheet

| Knob | Where | Default | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `Devices[].HostAddress` | `FocasDriverOptions.Devices` | — | `focas://{ip}[:{port}]` |
| `Devices[].Series` | `FocasDriverOptions.Devices` | `Unknown` | Drives per-series range validation in `FocasCapabilityMatrix`. |
| `Devices[].OverrideParameters` | `FocasDriverOptions.Devices` | `null` | MTB-specific parameter numbers for Feed/Rapid/Spindle/Jog overrides. `null` suppresses the `Override/` subtree. |
| `Probe.Enabled` | `FocasDriverOptions.Probe` | `true` | Background reachability probe. |
| `Probe.Interval` | `FocasDriverOptions.Probe` | `00:00:05` | Probe cadence. |
| `FixedTree.ApplyFigureScaling` | `FocasDriverOptions.FixedTree` | `true` | Divide position values by 10^decimal-places (issue #262). |
| **`AlarmProjection.Mode`** | **`FocasDriverOptions.AlarmProjection`** | **`ActiveOnly`** | **`ActiveOnly` keeps today's behaviour. `ActivePlusHistory` polls `cnc_rdalmhistry` on connect + on `HistoryPollInterval` ticks (issue #267, plan PR F3-a).** |
| **`AlarmProjection.HistoryPollInterval`** | **`FocasDriverOptions.AlarmProjection`** | **`00:05:00`** | **Cadence of the history poll. Operator dashboards run the default; high-frequency rigs can drop to 30 s.** |
| **`AlarmProjection.HistoryDepth`** | **`FocasDriverOptions.AlarmProjection`** | **`100`** | **Most-recent-N ring-buffer entries pulled per poll. Hard-capped at `250` so misconfigured values can't blast the wire session.** |

## Sample `appsettings.json` snippet for `ActivePlusHistory`

```jsonc
{
  "Drivers": {
    "FOCAS": {
      "Devices": [
        { "HostAddress": "focas://10.0.0.5:8193", "Series": "Series30i" }
      ],
      "AlarmProjection": {
        "Mode": "ActivePlusHistory",
        "HistoryPollInterval": "00:05:00",
        "HistoryDepth": 100
      }
    }
  }
}
```

The history projection emits each unseen entry through
`IAlarmSource.OnAlarmEvent` with `SourceTimestampUtc` set from the CNC's
reported wall-clock — keep CNC clocks on UTC so the dedup key
`(OccurrenceTime, AlarmNumber, AlarmType)` stays stable across DST
transitions.

## Write safety — issue #269 (PARAM/MACRO, F4-b) + issue #270 (PMC, F4-c)

The FOCAS driver supports `cnc_wrparam`, `cnc_wrmacro`, and `pmc_wrpmcrng`
writes behind multiple independent opt-ins. A misdirected parameter write
can put the CNC in a bad state; a misdirected PMC write can move motion or
latch a feedhold. The runbook below MUST be followed before flipping any
of the granular kill switches on.

### Operator pre-checks (every deployment, every change)

1. **CNC must be in MDI mode.** Most parameter writes fail with `EW_PASSWD`
   (surfaces as `BadUserAccessDenied`) unless the CNC is in MDI. The
   server-side write returns immediately with the access-denied status; no
   value reaches the wire.
2. **Parameter-write switch enabled on the CNC pendant.** Even in MDI mode
   protected parameters require the operator to physically enable the
   parameter-write switch. Without it `cnc_wrparam` returns `EW_PASSWD`.
   Plan PR F4-d will land an OPC UA-side unlock workflow; today the only
   path is the pendant.
3. **Verify each tag's address against the FANUC manual.** Ranges vary per
   CNC series; the
   [`focas-version-matrix`](./focas-version-matrix.md) capability matrix
   rejects out-of-range numbers at startup, but address-vs-meaning is the
   operator's job.
4. **Dry run with `Writable = true` but `Writes.AllowParameter = false`.**
   Staged opt-in catches mis-mapped tags: every PARAM write returns
   `BadNotWritable` until you flip the granular flag, so you can confirm
   the tag list before any wire write fires.

### PMC pre-checks (in addition to the above) — F4-c

PMC writes have a higher blast radius than PARAM/MACRO writes because PMC
is the ladder's working memory — bits in R/G/F/D directly drive servo
enables, feedhold latches, and safety interlocks. Before flipping
`Writes.AllowPmc` on:

1. **E-stop verified live + reachable.** The first PMC write of a session
   should be issued with the operator's hand on the e-stop. PMC writes
   bypass the ladder's normal MDI-mode protections; a misdirected bit can
   move motion the moment it lands on the wire.
2. **Machine in JOG mode (or equivalent low-energy mode).** Auto / MEM
   modes interpret PMC state immediately; JOG / MDI surface symptoms
   slowly enough that the e-stop is the recovery path. **Never issue the
   first PMC write of a deployment in Auto.**
3. **Audit the PMC tag list against the ladder print-out.** `R100.3` on
   one machine is "homing complete"; on another it's "feedhold released".
   The driver has no way to distinguish — the ladder source is the only
   ground truth.
4. **Bit writes are read-modify-write — see
   [`docs/drivers/FOCAS.md`](../drivers/FOCAS.md) "PMC bit-write read-modify-write semantics".**
   `pmc_wrpmcrng` is byte-addressed; the driver reads the parent byte
   first, masks the target bit, and writes the byte back. Concurrent
   ladder writes to the same byte create a small race window. Coordinate
   through a ladder-side handshake when this matters.
5. **Dry run with `Writable = true` but `Writes.AllowPmc = false`.** Same
   staged-opt-in pattern as PARAM/MACRO — confirm tag mapping before any
   PMC byte hits the wire.

### LDAP group requirements

Per [`docs/security.md`](../security.md) the server-layer ACL maps
`SecurityClassification` to LDAP groups. Post-F4-b:

| Tag kind | LDAP group required |
| --- | --- |
| `PARAM:N` (writable) | **`WriteConfigure`** — heaviest write tier; matches commissioning roles |
| `MACRO:N` (writable) | `WriteOperate` — standard HMI recipe / setpoint group |
| PMC R/G/F (writable) | `WriteOperate` |
| Read-only | `ReadOnly` |

Per the `feedback_acl_at_server_layer` design note, the FOCAS driver
declares the classification but does NOT enforce it; `DriverNodeManager`
applies the gate before the driver's `WriteAsync` ever runs. A user
without `WriteConfigure` who attempts a `PARAM:` write gets
`BadUserAccessDenied` from the server with no driver-level audit entry —
the OPC UA layer's audit log catches it.

### Audit-log expectations

Every successful write produces:

- An OPC UA AuditWriteEvent (server layer — see
  [`docs/security.md`](../security.md) "Audit logging").
- A FOCAS driver-level Serilog entry tagged `Driver=FOCAS DriverInstanceId=...
  TagName=... Address=... ResultStatus=...`.
- A `Writes/LastWriteAt` and `Writes/LastWriteStatus` diagnostic counter
  refresh on the device's `Diagnostics/` fixed-tree node (planned;
  populated as F4-c lands).

Failures to write (`BadUserAccessDenied`, `BadCommunicationError`, etc.)
produce the same audit entries with the failure status code so a
post-incident reviewer sees the same shape regardless of whether the write
succeeded.

**Audit PMC writes specifically.** Because PMC writes have the highest blast
radius of the three write kinds, ops should set up a saved-search /
dashboard query for `Driver=FOCAS` + `Address` matching the PMC letter
prefixes (`R*`, `G*`, `F*`, `D*`, `Y*`, etc.) and review on the same
cadence as ladder change reviews. A spike in PMC write rate or a write
to an address outside the audited tag list is the leading indicator of a
misconfigured client or compromised credential.

### Granular config example

```jsonc
{
  "Drivers": {
    "FOCAS": {
      "Devices": [
        { "HostAddress": "focas://10.0.0.5:8193", "Series": "Series30i" }
      ],
      "Writes": {
        "Enabled": true,
        "AllowMacro": true,        // recipe / setpoint writes — operator role
        "AllowParameter": false,   // commissioning only — keep locked except during planned work
        "AllowPmc": false          // PMC writes — keep locked unless the deployment specifically needs them
      },
      "Tags": [
        { "Name": "Recipe.PartCount", "DeviceHostAddress": "focas://10.0.0.5:8193",
          "Address": "MACRO:500", "DataType": "Int32",
          "Writable": true, "WriteIdempotent": true },
        { "Name": "MaxFeedrate", "DeviceHostAddress": "focas://10.0.0.5:8193",
          "Address": "PARAM:1815", "DataType": "Int32",
          "Writable": false   /* keep read-only until commissioning window */ },
        { "Name": "OperatorRequest", "DeviceHostAddress": "focas://10.0.0.5:8193",
          "Address": "R100.3", "DataType": "Bit",
          "Writable": false   /* keep PMC read-only until ladder handshake reviewed */ }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

Flipping `AllowParameter` / `AllowPmc` on for the commissioning window
(and back off afterward) is the recommended deployment cadence — the
granular kill switches are lightweight runtime toggles, not config-DB
redeploys. PMC in particular should default OFF in production and only
flip on for windows where the ladder team has signed off on the write
path.

## FOCAS password handling — issue #271 (F4-d)

Some controllers (16i + certain 30i firmwares with parameter-protect on)
gate `cnc_wrparam` and selected reads behind a connection-level password.
The driver supports this via the `Password` field on `FocasDeviceOptions`
which is emitted via `cnc_wrunlockparam` on connect and re-emitted on any
`EW_PASSWD` read/write retry path. See
[`docs/drivers/FOCAS.md`](../drivers/FOCAS.md) § "FOCAS password" for the
driver-side behaviour; this section covers the deployment side.

### Storage in `appsettings.json`

```jsonc
{
  "Drivers": {
    "Focas01": {
      "DriverConfigJson": {
        "Backend": "fwlib",
        "Series": "Sixteen_i",
        "Devices": [
          {
            "HostAddress": "focas://10.0.0.5:8193",
            "Password": "1234"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}
```

For dev environments, the password is materialised under
`.local/focas-passwords.txt` (or whichever .local subkey the deployment
team prefers); production deployments use the same secrets-store /
KeyVault pattern the LDAP `Authentication.Ldap.Password` field follows.
**The `.local/` directory is .gitignore'd** — this is the same posture
as `.local/galaxy-host-secret.txt` and other dev secrets in this repo.

### No-log invariant

The driver guarantees the password is **never logged**:

1. **`FocasDeviceOptions` ToString redaction.** The record overrides
   `PrintMembers` so any Serilog destructure of the device options renders
   `Password = ***` when the field is non-null. This catches the most
   common leak path — a structured-log statement that included
   `{@Device}` for diagnostic context.
2. **No password in exception messages.** `FwlibFocasClient.UnlockAsync`
   omits the password from its `InvalidOperationException` text — only
   the FWLIB error code (`EW_PASSWD`, `EW_HANDLE`, etc.) makes it through.
3. **Driver log line uses host only.** When unlock succeeds the driver
   updates `DriverHealth.StatusText` to `"FOCAS unlock applied for
   {host}"` — no password.
4. **CLI flag covered by the same choke point.** The
   `Driver.FOCAS.Cli --cnc-password` flag flows through
   `FocasDeviceOptions.Password`, so its redaction is identical to the
   server's. The PowerShell e2e harness (`scripts/e2e/test-focas.ps1
   -CncPassword`) follows the same path.

Any new logging surface that touches `FocasDeviceOptions` MUST continue
to use the record's `ToString` (or otherwise omit `Password`). A code
review checklist item: "no log statement contains `device.Options.Password`
or `device.Password` directly."

### Password-rotation runbook

When the CNC password rotates (operator team flipped a parameter-protect
gate, or your security policy requires periodic rotation):

1. **Update the password on the controller** (CNC pendant or vendor's
   admin tool). The exact path varies by series — Fanuc service manual
   page reference depends on the MTB.
2. **Update `appsettings.json`** in place with the new value.
   - Production: bump the secrets-store entry that backs the
     `Devices[*].Password` config-DB column. Same workflow as rotating
     the LDAP service-account password.
   - Dev: update `.local/focas-passwords.txt` (or wherever the dev
     deployment sources the secret).
3. **Restart the OtOpcUa server** (or trigger a config-DB bump that
   forces driver reinitialise). The driver picks up the new password
   on the next `EnsureConnectedAsync` call. **No need to manually
   reconnect each device** — `cnc_wrunlockparam` emits on the next
   wire-call boundary.
4. **Verify**. The first wire call after restart logs
   `"FOCAS unlock applied for focas://{host}:{port}"` at info. A wrong
   password surfaces as `BadUserAccessDenied` on the next gated read or
   write.
5. **Audit.** OPC UA wrote-event entries (per
   [`audit-log-rules.md`](audit-log-rules.md)) cover the
   parameter/macro write paths. Password rotation itself is NOT logged
   beyond "unlock applied" — same posture as LDAP service-account
   rotation, where the password change is logged out-of-band by the IAM
   system.

### Cross-references

- [`docs/Security.md`](../Security.md) — server-wide secrets handling +
  the same `.local/` pattern used for LDAP and the Galaxy.Host pipe
  secret. The FOCAS password follows the same posture.
- [`docs/drivers/FOCAS.md`](../drivers/FOCAS.md) § "FOCAS password" —
  driver-side behaviour, EW_PASSWD retry semantics, status-code
  surface.
- [`docs/v2/implementation/focas-wire-protocol.md`](implementation/focas-wire-protocol.md)
  § "cnc_wrunlockparam" — wire-frame layout for the password buffer.