using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.Ab.Transport; using Shouldly; using Xunit; using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions; namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.AbCip.Tests; /// /// Gitea #611 item 1 — ALMA (ALARM_ANALOG) projection. Driven through fake tag runtimes only: /// ab_server has no alarm instructions, and Z35162 has no ALMA/ALMD, so there is no wire-level gate. /// Status members are declared BOOL, as on a real controller, so every member is read through its own runtime /// (the production read path) rather than the whole-UDT offset fast path. /// [Trait("Category", "Unit")] public sealed class AbCipAlmaProjectionTests { private const string Device = "ab://10.0.0.5/1,0"; private const string Tag = "HighPress"; private static readonly string[] Bits = [ "HHInAlarm", "HInAlarm", "LInAlarm", "LLInAlarm", "ROCPosInAlarm", "HHAcked", "HAcked", "LAcked", "LLAcked", "ROCPosAcked", "OperAckAll", ]; private static readonly string[] Sevs = ["HHSeverity", "HSeverity", "LSeverity", "LLSeverity", "ROCPosSeverity"]; private static AbCipTagDefinition AlmaTag(string name = Tag) => new( name, Device, name, AbCipDataType.Structure, Members: [.. Bits.Select(n => new AbCipStructureMember(n, AbCipDataType.Bool)), .. Sevs.Select(n => new AbCipStructureMember(n, AbCipDataType.DInt))]); private static AbCipTagDefinition AlmdTag(string name) => new( name, Device, name, AbCipDataType.Structure, Members: [new AbCipStructureMember("InAlarm", AbCipDataType.Bool), new AbCipStructureMember("Acked", AbCipDataType.Bool), new AbCipStructureMember("Severity", AbCipDataType.DInt)]); private static AbCipDriverOptions Options(params AbCipTagDefinition[] tags) => new() { Devices = [new AbCipDeviceOptions(Device)], RawTags = AbCipRawTags.From(tags), EnableAlarmProjection = true, AlarmPollInterval = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(20), }; private sealed record Rig(AbCipDriver Drv, FakeAbCipTagFactory Factory, List Events, IAlarmSubscriptionHandle Handle) { public void Set(string member, object v, string tag = Tag) => Factory.Tags[$"{tag}.{member}"].Value = v; public FakeAbCipTag Probe => Factory.Tags[$"{Tag}.HHInAlarm"]; public async Task StopAsync() { await Drv.UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync(Handle, CancellationToken.None); await Drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None); } } /// Starts a quiet ALMA (severities set, nothing in alarm, nothing acked) and applies . private static async Task StartAsync(Action? seed = null) { var factory = new FakeAbCipTagFactory(); var drv = new AbCipDriver(Options(AlmaTag()), "drv-1", factory); await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None); var events = new List(); drv.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) => { lock (events) events.Add(e); }; var handle = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([Tag], CancellationToken.None); var rig = new Rig(drv, factory, events, handle); await WaitFor(() => Bits.Take(10).Concat(Sevs).All(m => factory.Tags.ContainsKey($"{Tag}.{m}"))); foreach (var b in Bits.Take(10)) rig.Set(b, false); rig.Set("HHSeverity", 900); rig.Set("HSeverity", 600); rig.Set("LSeverity", 300); rig.Set("LLSeverity", 800); rig.Set("ROCPosSeverity", 400); seed?.Invoke(rig); return rig; } private static async Task WaitFor(Func cond) { var deadline = DateTime.UtcNow.AddSeconds(5); while (DateTime.UtcNow < deadline) { if (cond()) return; await Task.Delay(5); } throw new TimeoutException("condition never met"); } private static async Task Next(Rig r, Func match) { await WaitFor(() => { lock (r.Events) return r.Events.Any(match); }); lock (r.Events) return r.Events.First(match); } /// Processed-count wait: six more polls of the shared member runtime. private static async Task Settled(Rig r) { var target = r.Probe.ReadCount + 6; await WaitFor(() => r.Probe.ReadCount >= target); } private static List Snapshot(Rig r) { lock (r.Events) return [.. r.Events]; } /// Detector: ALMA by per-limit bits and no plain Acked; ALMD-shaped / plain UDTs are not ALMA. [Fact] public void Detector_Flags_Alma_And_Not_Almd_Or_User_Udts() { AbCipAlarmDetector.IsAlma(AlmaTag()).ShouldBeTrue(); AbCipAlarmDetector.IsAlma(AlmdTag("A")).ShouldBeFalse(); AbCipAlarmDetector.IsAlmd(AlmdTag("A")).ShouldBeTrue(); // A user UDT that is ALMD-shaped but happens to name an "HInAlarm" stays ALMD. var hybrid = new AbCipTagDefinition("U", Device, "U", AbCipDataType.Structure, Members: [new AbCipStructureMember("InAlarm", AbCipDataType.Bool), new AbCipStructureMember("Acked", AbCipDataType.Bool), new AbCipStructureMember("HInAlarm", AbCipDataType.Bool)]); AbCipAlarmDetector.IsAlma(hybrid).ShouldBeFalse(); AbCipAlarmDetector.IsAlma(new AbCipTagDefinition("D", Device, "D", AbCipDataType.DInt)).ShouldBeFalse(); // An ALMA authored WITHOUT members cannot be told apart from an ALMD: it falls to the ALMD path. AbCipAlarmDetector.IsAlma(new AbCipTagDefinition("N", Device, "N", AbCipDataType.Structure)).ShouldBeFalse(); } /// A limit entering alarm raises one ALMA condition keyed on the RawPath, naming the limit, with the limit's severity. [Fact] public async Task A_limit_in_alarm_raises_with_the_limits_name_and_severity() { var r = await StartAsync(); await Settled(r); r.Set("HInAlarm", true); var e = await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); await r.StopAsync(); e.ConditionId.ShouldBe(Tag); e.SourceNodeId.ShouldBe(Tag); e.AlarmType.ShouldBe("ALMA"); e.Message.ShouldBe($"ALMA {Tag} H alarm"); e.OpcUaSeverity.ShouldBe(600); e.Severity.ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.High); } /// With several limits active the most severe one names the condition and sets its severity. [Fact] public async Task The_most_severe_active_limit_wins() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("LInAlarm", true); x.Set("HHInAlarm", true); x.Set("ROCPosInAlarm", true); }); var e = await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); await r.StopAsync(); e.Message.ShouldBe($"ALMA {Tag} HH alarm"); e.OpcUaSeverity.ShouldBe(900); } /// ROC limits are named with their sign. [Fact] public async Task A_rate_of_change_limit_is_named_with_its_sign() { var r = await StartAsync(x => x.Set("ROCPosInAlarm", true)); var e = await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); await r.StopAsync(); e.Message.ShouldBe($"ALMA {Tag} ROC+ alarm"); } /// All limits returning to normal clears the one condition. [Fact] public async Task All_limits_clearing_fires_one_clear() { var r = await StartAsync(x => x.Set("LLInAlarm", true)); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); r.Set("LLInAlarm", false); var e = await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Clear); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); e.ConditionId.ShouldBe(Tag); Snapshot(r).Count(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Clear).ShouldBe(1); } /// A newly entered (unacked) limit while active is a Retrigger, not a second Raise. [Fact] public async Task A_newly_entered_limit_while_active_retriggers() { var r = await StartAsync(x => x.Set("HInAlarm", true)); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); r.Set("HHInAlarm", true); var e = await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Retrigger); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); e.Message.ShouldBe($"ALMA {Tag} HH alarm"); e.OpcUaSeverity.ShouldBe(900); Snapshot(r).Count(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise).ShouldBe(1); } /// L1 — a limit entering ALREADY acked (AckRequired false) is atomic ActiveAcknowledged, never Retrigger+Acknowledge. [Fact] public async Task A_new_limit_entering_already_acked_is_active_acknowledged_not_retrigger_then_ack() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("HInAlarm", true); foreach (var a in new[] { "HHAcked", "HAcked", "LAcked", "LLAcked", "ROCPosAcked" }) x.Set(a, true); }); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.ActiveAcknowledged); r.Set("HHInAlarm", true); // AckRequired=false: HHAcked is already true await WaitFor(() => Snapshot(r).Count(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.ActiveAcknowledged) >= 2); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); var evs = Snapshot(r); evs.Any(x => x.Kind is AlarmTransitionKind.Retrigger or AlarmTransitionKind.Acknowledge).ShouldBeFalse(); } /// M1 — a limit dropping out while another stays active moves the text/severity as a no-row state update. [Fact] public async Task A_limit_dropping_out_is_a_restatement_state_update() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("HInAlarm", true); x.Set("HHInAlarm", true); }); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); r.Set("HHInAlarm", false); var e = await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Unspecified); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); e.IsRestatement.ShouldBeTrue("the host must write no alerts row for it"); e.Message.ShouldBe($"ALMA {Tag} H alarm"); e.OpcUaSeverity.ShouldBe(600); Snapshot(r).Count(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Unspecified).ShouldBe(1); } /// M1 — a non-governing limit flickering (ROC under HH) changes neither text nor severity: no event at all. [Fact] public async Task A_non_governing_limit_flicker_emits_nothing() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("HHInAlarm", true); x.Set("ROCPosInAlarm", true); }); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); r.Set("ROCPosInAlarm", false); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); Snapshot(r).Count.ShouldBe(1); } /// The PLC acknowledging every declared limit surfaces as one Acknowledge. [Fact] public async Task The_plc_acknowledging_the_limits_fires_acknowledge() { var r = await StartAsync(x => x.Set("HInAlarm", true)); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); r.Set("HAcked", true); r.Set("HHAcked", true); r.Set("LAcked", true); r.Set("LLAcked", true); r.Set("ROCPosAcked", true); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Acknowledge); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); Snapshot(r).Count(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Acknowledge).ShouldBe(1); } /// /// M2 — H acked; HH enters unacked then returns to normal still unacked (HHAcked stays false). The surviving, /// acked H must NOT turn into a device "Acknowledged" for an HH excursion nobody acknowledged. /// [Fact] public async Task An_unacked_excursion_that_returns_to_normal_is_not_reported_as_acknowledged() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("HInAlarm", true); x.Set("HAcked", true); }); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); // other limits' Acked bits are false ⇒ still unacked r.Set("LAcked", true); r.Set("LLAcked", true); r.Set("ROCPosAcked", true); r.Set("HHAcked", true); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Acknowledge); r.Set("HHAcked", false); // HH occurrence (unacked)… r.Set("HHInAlarm", true); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Retrigger); r.Set("HHInAlarm", false); // …returns to normal, still unacked await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); Snapshot(r).Count(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Acknowledge).ShouldBe(1, "only the genuine PLC ack — the unacked HH excursion must keep the condition unacknowledged"); } /// F3 — fully acked, then a declared *Acked goes false with the SAME limits active (a limit that left and re-entered /// between polls): the PLC says unacknowledged, so it is told as a Retrigger. [Fact] public async Task An_ack_falling_with_an_unchanged_active_set_retriggers() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("HInAlarm", true); foreach (var a in new[] { "HHAcked", "HAcked", "LAcked", "LLAcked", "ROCPosAcked" }) x.Set(a, true); }); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.ActiveAcknowledged); r.Set("HAcked", false); var e = await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Retrigger); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); e.Message.ShouldBe($"ALMA {Tag} H alarm"); Snapshot(r).Count(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Retrigger).ShouldBe(1); } /// An alarm already active AND acked when first seen is told atomically, never Raise-then-Acknowledge. [Fact] public async Task An_already_acked_active_alarm_is_active_acknowledged() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("LInAlarm", true); foreach (var a in new[] { "HHAcked", "HAcked", "LAcked", "LLAcked", "ROCPosAcked" }) x.Set(a, true); }); var e = await Next(r, x => x.Kind != AlarmTransitionKind.Unspecified); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); e.Kind.ShouldBe(AlarmTransitionKind.ActiveAcknowledged); Snapshot(r).Count.ShouldBe(1); } /// A re-subscribe must not re-raise a still-active ALMA (it would un-acknowledge it). [Fact] public async Task A_resubscribe_does_not_re_raise_a_still_active_alma() { var r = await StartAsync(x => x.Set("HInAlarm", true)); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); var sub2 = await r.Drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([Tag], CancellationToken.None); await Settled(r); await r.Drv.UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync(sub2, CancellationToken.None); await r.StopAsync(); Snapshot(r).Count(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise).ShouldBe(1); } /// A Bad limit read judges nothing that tick: no event, and no false Clear for an active alarm. [Fact] public async Task A_bad_read_does_not_clear_an_active_alarm() { var r = await StartAsync(x => x.Set("HInAlarm", true)); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); // A non-zero libplctag status ⇒ Bad on every member read; the driver evicts the handle and re-creates it, so // every re-created runtime must fail too (a fresh fake would read as "all clear"). var recreations = 0; r.Factory.Customise = p => { Interlocked.Increment(ref recreations); return new FakeAbCipTag(p) { Status = (int)AbStatus.NotFound }; }; foreach (var t in r.Factory.Tags.Values.ToList()) t.Status = (int)AbStatus.NotFound; await WaitFor(() => Volatile.Read(ref recreations) >= 6); await r.StopAsync(); Snapshot(r).Any(x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Clear).ShouldBeFalse(); } /// L2 — a Bad *Acked read is "unknown", not "un-acked": it must neither un-ack nor re-ack. [Fact] public async Task A_bad_acked_read_is_carried_not_stored_as_unacked() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("HInAlarm", true); foreach (var a in new[] { "HHAcked", "HAcked", "LAcked", "LLAcked", "ROCPosAcked" }) x.Set(a, true); }); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.ActiveAcknowledged); // Transient Bad *Acked reads: the evicted runtime is re-created failing, tick after tick. var bad = 0; r.Factory.Customise = p => { if (!p.TagName.EndsWith("HAcked", StringComparison.Ordinal)) return null!; Interlocked.Increment(ref bad); return new FakeAbCipTag(p) { Status = (int)AbStatus.NotFound }; }; r.Factory.Tags[$"{Tag}.HAcked"].Status = (int)AbStatus.NotFound; await WaitFor(() => Volatile.Read(ref bad) >= 4); // The link recovers and HAcked reads true again. r.Factory.Customise = p => new FakeAbCipTag(p) { Value = true }; await WaitFor(() => r.Factory.Tags[$"{Tag}.HAcked"].Status == 0 && r.Factory.Tags[$"{Tag}.HAcked"].Value is true); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); var evs = Snapshot(r); evs.Any(x => x.Kind is AlarmTransitionKind.Acknowledge or AlarmTransitionKind.Retrigger or AlarmTransitionKind.Raise).ShouldBeFalse( "a transient Bad *Acked read must not produce a second ack/raise"); } /// L2 — a Bad severity read must not change the told message/severity. [Fact] public async Task A_bad_severity_read_changes_nothing() { var r = await StartAsync(x => { x.Set("HInAlarm", true); x.Set("HHInAlarm", true); }); await Next(r, x => x.Kind == AlarmTransitionKind.Raise); r.Factory.Customise = p => new FakeAbCipTag(p) { Status = (int)AbStatus.NotFound }; r.Factory.Tags[$"{Tag}.HHSeverity"].Status = (int)AbStatus.NotFound; await Task.Delay(150); await Settled(r); await r.StopAsync(); Snapshot(r).Count.ShouldBe(1, "no Retrigger/update from a Bad severity read"); } /// A client acknowledge writes the ALMA's OperAckAll input — never the ALMD-only Acked member. [Fact] public async Task Acknowledge_writes_OperAckAll_not_Acked() { var r = await StartAsync(); await r.Drv.AcknowledgeAsync([new AlarmAcknowledgeRequest(Tag, Tag, null)], CancellationToken.None); await r.StopAsync(); r.Factory.Tags.ShouldContainKey($"{Tag}.OperAckAll"); r.Factory.Tags[$"{Tag}.OperAckAll"].WriteCount.ShouldBe(1); r.Factory.Tags.ShouldNotContainKey($"{Tag}.Acked"); } /// L4 — one subscription mixing an ALMD and an ALMA: the cursor arithmetic keeps each node's reads apart. [Fact] public async Task A_mixed_almd_and_alma_subscription_projects_each_correctly() { var factory = new FakeAbCipTagFactory(); var drv = new AbCipDriver(Options(AlmdTag("Motor"), AlmaTag(), AlmdTag("Pump")), "drv-1", factory); await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None); var events = new List(); drv.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) => { lock (events) events.Add(e); }; var handle = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync(["Motor", Tag, "Pump"], CancellationToken.None); await WaitFor(() => factory.Tags.ContainsKey($"{Tag}.HHSeverity") && factory.Tags.ContainsKey("Pump.Severity") && factory.Tags.ContainsKey("Motor.Severity") && factory.Tags.ContainsKey($"{Tag}.HAcked")); factory.Tags["Motor.Severity"].Value = 300; factory.Tags["Pump.Severity"].Value = 700; factory.Tags[$"{Tag}.HSeverity"].Value = 600; factory.Tags["Pump.InAlarm"].Value = true; factory.Tags[$"{Tag}.HInAlarm"].Value = true; await WaitFor(() => { lock (events) return events.Count >= 2; }); await Task.Delay(100); await drv.UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync(handle, CancellationToken.None); await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None); List evs; lock (events) evs = [.. events]; evs.Count.ShouldBe(2); var pump = evs.Single(e => e.ConditionId == "Pump"); pump.AlarmType.ShouldBe("ALMD"); pump.Severity.ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.High); var alma = evs.Single(e => e.ConditionId == Tag); alma.AlarmType.ShouldBe("ALMA"); alma.OpcUaSeverity.ShouldBe(600); } }