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+# Follow-up #10 / issue #456 — live proof that authored ResilienceConfig reaches the runtime pipeline
+
+**Date:** 2026-07-15 · **Rig:** docker-dev (central-1 + central-2, MAIN cluster, Warm/2-node) built from source.
+
+## What this proves
+
+The #456 "sub-gap" worried that per-instance `DriverInstance.ResilienceConfig` never reaches the
+runtime resilience pipeline (so it runs tier-defaults only). This is **disproven** — both by a new
+regression test and by this live capture.
+
+## Setup
+
+Seeded on MAIN (SQL): an Equipment namespace `ns-res` + an `OpcUaClient` driver `drv-res` carrying a
+**non-default** override:
+
+```json
+"ResilienceConfig": {"capabilityPolicies":{"Subscribe":{"retryCount":999}}}
+```
+
+`retryCount:999` is deliberately over the cap (100) so the parser emits an unmistakable clamp
+diagnostic that echoes the authored value. Deployed headless: `POST /api/deployments` → Accepted
+(deploymentId 80b4be3c…).
+
+## Evidence
+
+**1. The persisted deployment artifact bytes carry it** (`dbo.Deployment.ArtifactBlob`, 4055 bytes):
+`CHARINDEX('ResilienceConfig') > 0` = YES, `CHARINDEX('999') > 0` = YES; the `drv-res` object slice
+shows `…"DriverType":"OpcUaClient"…"DriverConfig":"…"…"Resil…"`.
+
+**2. The runtime parsed + applied it — on BOTH redundancy nodes:**
+
+```
+central-1  [WRN] Driver resilience config for instance=drv-res type=OpcUaClient: Subscribe.retryCount 999 exceeds the cap (100); clamped.
+central-1  [INF] DriverHost central-1:4053: spawned OpcUaClient driver drv-res (stub=False)
+central-2  [WRN] Driver resilience config for instance=drv-res type=OpcUaClient: Subscribe.retryCount 999 exceeds the cap (100); clamped.
+central-2  [INF] DriverHost central-2:4053: spawned OpcUaClient driver drv-res (stub=False)
+```
+
+The authored value `999` appears verbatim in the runtime log. If the artifact did not carry
+`ResilienceConfig` (the feared sub-gap), `spec.ResilienceConfig` would be null, the parser would take
+pure tier-defaults, and **no clamp diagnostic would fire**. The diagnostic firing = the authored
+policy rode DB → ConfigComposer → artifact → DriverHostActor → DriverCapabilityInvokerFactory.Create →
+DriverResilienceOptionsParser. This is arch-review follow-up #10 acceptance item 2 ("re-verify the
+behavioral gate with a non-default policy"), verified live on both nodes.
+
+## Regression guard
+
+`ConfigComposerTests.ResilienceConfig_survives_ConfigComposer_to_ParseDriverInstances_round_trip`
+(master 809e7886) proves the same composer→artifact→parse leg deterministically, guarding against a
+future projection / `[JsonIgnore]` silently reverting authored policy to tier defaults.
+
+## Still open (acceptance item 1)
+
+The raw retry/breaker log line **on an actual driver fault** was NOT captured. It requires a
+connect-then-fault-mid-flight trigger: the wrapped capability calls (`Subscribe`/`Discover`/`Write`)
+only fire after a driver reaches **Connected** (`DriverInstanceActor` `ResubscribeDesired` runs on the
+`Become(Connected)` transition), so a driver at a dead endpoint stays in Reconnecting and never
+exercises the wrapped path. The reliable trigger is an **idempotent Write to a Connected-then-killed
+driver** (LDAP-gated Client.CLI write) or an S7 dead-socket reconnect. The retry/breaker **behaviour**
+is already proven deterministically (`CapabilityInvokerTests` retry, the pipeline-builder logging test,
+`DriverCapabilityInvokerFactoryTests` override-applies-to-behaviour). This remaining line is
+operator-confidence only.