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Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty
d5fa1f450e Phase 3 PR 29 — Account/session page expanding the minimal sidebar role display into a dedicated /account route. Shows the authenticated operator's identity (username from ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier, display name from ClaimTypes.Name), their Admin roles as badges (from ClaimTypes.Role), the raw LDAP groups that mapped to those roles (from the 'ldap_group' claim added by Login.razor at sign-in), and a capability table listing each Admin capability with its required role and a Yes/No badge showing whether this session has it. Capability list mirrors the Program.cs authorization policies + each page's [Authorize] attribute so operators can self-service check whether their session has access without trial-and-error navigation — capabilities covered: view clusters + fleet status (all roles), edit configuration drafts (ConfigEditor or FleetAdmin per CanEdit policy), publish generations (FleetAdmin per CanPublish policy), manage certificate trust (FleetAdmin per PR 28 Certificates page attribute), manage external-ID reservations (ConfigEditor or FleetAdmin per Reservations page attribute).
Sidebar's 'Signed in as' line now wraps the display name in a link to /account so the existing sidebar-compact view becomes the entry point for the fuller page — keeps the sign-out button where it was for muscle memory, just adds the detail page one click away. Page is gated with [Authorize] (any authenticated admin) rather than a specific role — the capability table deliberately works for every signed-in user so they can see what they DON'T have access to, which helps them file the right ticket with their LDAP admin instead of getting a plain Access Denied when navigating blindly.
Capability → required-role table is defined as a private readonly record list in the page rather than pulled from a service because it's a UI-presentation concern, not runtime policy state — the runtime policy IS Program.cs's AddAuthorizationBuilder + each page's [Authorize] attribute, and this table just mirrors it for operator readability. Comment on the list reminds future-me to extend it when a new policy or [Authorize] page lands. No behavior change if roles are empty, but the page surfaces a hint ('Sign-in would have been blocked, so if you're seeing this, the session claim is likely stale') that nudges the operator toward signing out + back in.
No new tests added — the page is pure display over claims; its only logic is the 'has-capability' Any-overlap check which is exactly what ASP.NET's [Authorize(Roles=...)] does in-framework, and duplicating that in a unit test would test the framework rather than our code. Admin.Tests Unit stays 23 pass / 0 fail. Admin build clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:43:35 -04:00
6fdaee3a71 Merge pull request 'Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page' (#27) from phase-3-pr28-cert-trust into v2 2026-04-18 14:42:52 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
ed88835d34 Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page. New /certificates route (FleetAdmin-only) surfaces the OPC UA server's PKI store rejected + trusted certs and gives operators Trust / Delete / Revoke actions so rejected client certs can be promoted without touching disk. CertTrustService reads $PkiStoreRoot/{rejected,trusted}/certs/*.der files directly via X509CertificateLoader — no Opc.Ua dependency in the Admin project, which keeps the Admin host runnable on a machine that doesn't have the full Server install locally (only needs the shared PKI directory reachable; typical deployment has Admin + Server side-by-side on the same box and PkiStoreRoot defaults match so a plain-vanilla install needs no override). CertTrustOptions bound from the Admin's 'CertTrust:PkiStoreRoot' section, default %ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki (matches OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot default). Trust action moves the .der from rejected/certs/ to trusted/certs/ via File.Move(overwrite:true) — idempotent, tolerates a concurrent operator doing the same move. Delete wipes the file. Revoke removes from trusted/certs/ (Opc.Ua re-reads the Directory store on each new client handshake, so no explicit reload signal is needed; operators retry the rejected connection after trusting). Thumbprint matching is case-insensitive because X509Certificate2.Thumbprint is upper-case hex but operators copy-paste from logs that sometimes lowercase it. Malformed files in the store are logged + skipped — a single bad .der can't take the whole management page offline. Missing store directories produce empty lists rather than exceptions so a pristine install (Server never run yet, no rejected/trusted dirs yet) doesn't crash the page.
Razor page layout: two tables (Rejected / Trusted) with Subject / Issuer / Thumbprint / Valid-window / Actions columns, status banner after each action with success or warning kind ('file missing' = another admin handled it), FleetAdmin-only via [Authorize(Roles=AdminRoles.FleetAdmin)]. Each action invokes LogActionAsync which Serilog-logs the authenticated admin user + thumbprint + action for an audit trail — DB-level ConfigAuditLog persistence is deferred because its schema is cluster-scoped and cert actions are cluster-agnostic; Serilog + CertTrustService's filesystem-op info logs give the forensic trail in the meantime. Sidebar link added to MainLayout between Reservations and the future Account page.
Tests — CertTrustServiceTests (9 new unit cases): ListRejected parses Subject + Thumbprint + store kind from a self-signed test cert written into rejected/certs/; rejected and trusted stores are kept separate; TrustRejected moves the file and the Rejected list is empty afterwards; TrustRejected with a thumbprint not in rejected returns false without touching trusted; DeleteRejected removes the file; UntrustCert removes from trusted only; thumbprint match is case-insensitive (operator UX); missing store directories produce empty lists instead of throwing DirectoryNotFoundException (pristine-install tolerance); a junk .der in the store is logged + skipped and the valid certs still surface (one bad file doesn't break the page). Full Admin.Tests Unit suite: 23 pass / 0 fail (14 prior + 9 new). Full Admin build clean — 0 errors, 0 warnings.
lmx-followups.md #3 marked DONE with a cross-reference to this PR and a note that flipping AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates to false as the production default is a deployment-config follow-up, not a code gap — the Admin UI is now ready to be the trust gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:37:55 -04:00
5389d4d22d Phase 3 PR 27 � Fleet status dashboard page (#26) 2026-04-18 14:07:16 -04:00
8 changed files with 615 additions and 10 deletions

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@@ -41,17 +41,22 @@ can't write a `Tune` attribute unless it also carries `WriteTune`.
See `feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md` in memory for the architectural directive
that authz stays at the server layer and never delegates to driver-specific auth.
## 3. Admin UI client-cert trust management
## 3. Admin UI client-cert trust management — **DONE (PR 28)**
**Status**: Server side auto-accepts untrusted client certs when the
`AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` option is true (dev default).
Production deployments want operator-controlled trust via the Admin UI.
PR 28 shipped `/certificates` in the Admin UI. `CertTrustService` reads the OPC
UA server's PKI store root (`OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot` default
`%ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki`) and lists rejected + trusted certs by parsing the
`.der` files directly, so it has no `Opc.Ua` dependency and runs on any
Admin host that can reach the shared PKI directory.
**To do**:
- Surface the server's rejected-certificate store in the Admin UI.
- Page to move certs between `rejected` / `trusted`.
- Flip `AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` to false once Admin UI is the
trust gate.
Operator actions: Trust (moves `rejected/certs/*.der``trusted/certs/*.der`),
Delete rejected, Revoke trust. The OPC UA stack re-reads the trusted store on
each new client handshake, so no explicit reload signal is needed —
operators retry the rejected client's connection after trusting.
Deferred: flipping `AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates` to `false` as the
deployment default. That's a production-hardening config change, not a code
gap — the Admin UI is now ready to be the trust gate.
## 4. Live-LDAP integration test

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@@ -8,13 +8,14 @@
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/fleet">Fleet status</a></li>
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/clusters">Clusters</a></li>
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/reservations">Reservations</a></li>
<li class="nav-item"><a class="nav-link text-light" href="/certificates">Certificates</a></li>
</ul>
<div class="mt-5">
<AuthorizeView>
<Authorized>
<div class="small text-light">
Signed in as <strong>@context.User.Identity?.Name</strong>
Signed in as <a class="text-light" href="/account"><strong>@context.User.Identity?.Name</strong></a>
</div>
<div class="small text-muted">
@string.Join(", ", context.User.Claims.Where(c => c.Type.EndsWith("/role")).Select(c => c.Value))

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@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
@page "/account"
@attribute [Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization.Authorize]
@using System.Security.Claims
@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services
<h1 class="mb-4">My account</h1>
<AuthorizeView>
<Authorized>
@{
var username = context.User.FindFirst(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier)?.Value ?? "—";
var displayName = context.User.Identity?.Name ?? "—";
var roles = context.User.Claims
.Where(c => c.Type == ClaimTypes.Role).Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
var ldapGroups = context.User.Claims
.Where(c => c.Type == "ldap_group").Select(c => c.Value).ToList();
}
<div class="row g-4">
<div class="col-md-6">
<div class="card">
<div class="card-body">
<h5 class="card-title">Identity</h5>
<dl class="row mb-0">
<dt class="col-sm-4">Username</dt><dd class="col-sm-8"><code>@username</code></dd>
<dt class="col-sm-4">Display name</dt><dd class="col-sm-8">@displayName</dd>
</dl>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-6">
<div class="card">
<div class="card-body">
<h5 class="card-title">Admin roles</h5>
@if (roles.Count == 0)
{
<p class="text-muted mb-0">No Admin roles mapped — sign-in would have been blocked, so if you're seeing this, the session claim is likely stale.</p>
}
else
{
<div class="mb-2">
@foreach (var r in roles)
{
<span class="badge bg-primary me-1">@r</span>
}
</div>
<small class="text-muted">LDAP groups: @(ldapGroups.Count == 0 ? "(none surfaced)" : string.Join(", ", ldapGroups))</small>
}
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-12">
<div class="card">
<div class="card-body">
<h5 class="card-title">Capabilities</h5>
<p class="text-muted small">
Each Admin role grants a fixed capability set per <code>admin-ui.md</code> §Admin Roles.
Pages below reflect what this session can access; the route's <code>[Authorize]</code> guard
is the ground truth — this table mirrors it for readability.
</p>
<table class="table table-sm align-middle mb-0">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Required role(s)</th>
<th class="text-end">You have it?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
@foreach (var cap in Capabilities)
{
var has = cap.RequiredRoles.Any(r => roles.Contains(r, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
<tr>
<td>@cap.Name<br /><small class="text-muted">@cap.Description</small></td>
<td>@string.Join(" or ", cap.RequiredRoles)</td>
<td class="text-end">
@if (has)
{
<span class="badge bg-success">Yes</span>
}
else
{
<span class="badge bg-secondary">No</span>
}
</td>
</tr>
}
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="mt-4">
<form method="post" action="/auth/logout">
<button class="btn btn-outline-danger" type="submit">Sign out</button>
</form>
</div>
</Authorized>
</AuthorizeView>
@code {
private sealed record Capability(string Name, string Description, string[] RequiredRoles);
// Kept in sync with Program.cs authorization policies + each page's [Authorize] attribute.
// When a new page or policy is added, extend this list so operators can self-service check
// whether their session has access without trial-and-error navigation.
private static readonly IReadOnlyList<Capability> Capabilities =
[
new("View clusters + fleet status",
"Read-only access to the cluster list, fleet dashboard, and generation history.",
[AdminRoles.ConfigViewer, AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
new("Edit configuration drafts",
"Create and edit draft generations, manage namespace bindings and node ACLs. CanEdit policy.",
[AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
new("Publish generations",
"Promote a draft to Published — triggers node roll-out. CanPublish policy.",
[AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
new("Manage certificate trust",
"Trust rejected client certs + revoke trust. FleetAdmin-only because the trust decision gates OPC UA client access.",
[AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
new("Manage external-ID reservations",
"Reserve / release external IDs that map into Galaxy contained names.",
[AdminRoles.ConfigEditor, AdminRoles.FleetAdmin]),
];
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
@page "/certificates"
@attribute [Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization.Authorize(Roles = AdminRoles.FleetAdmin)]
@using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services
@inject CertTrustService Certs
@inject AuthenticationStateProvider AuthState
@inject ILogger<Certificates> Log
<h1 class="mb-4">Certificate trust</h1>
<div class="alert alert-info small mb-4">
PKI store root <code>@Certs.PkiStoreRoot</code>. Trusting a rejected cert moves the file into the trusted store — the OPC UA server picks up the change on the next client handshake, so operators should retry the rejected client's connection after trusting.
</div>
@if (_status is not null)
{
<div class="alert alert-@_statusKind alert-dismissible">
@_status
<button type="button" class="btn-close" @onclick="ClearStatus"></button>
</div>
}
<h2 class="h4">Rejected (@_rejected.Count)</h2>
@if (_rejected.Count == 0)
{
<p class="text-muted">No rejected certificates. Clients that fail to handshake with an untrusted cert land here.</p>
}
else
{
<table class="table table-sm align-middle">
<thead><tr><th>Subject</th><th>Issuer</th><th>Thumbprint</th><th>Valid</th><th class="text-end">Actions</th></tr></thead>
<tbody>
@foreach (var c in _rejected)
{
<tr>
<td>@c.Subject</td>
<td>@c.Issuer</td>
<td><code class="small">@c.Thumbprint</code></td>
<td class="small">@c.NotBefore.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd") → @c.NotAfter.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd")</td>
<td class="text-end">
<button class="btn btn-sm btn-success me-1" @onclick="() => TrustAsync(c)">Trust</button>
<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger" @onclick="() => DeleteRejectedAsync(c)">Delete</button>
</td>
</tr>
}
</tbody>
</table>
}
<h2 class="h4 mt-5">Trusted (@_trusted.Count)</h2>
@if (_trusted.Count == 0)
{
<p class="text-muted">No client certs have been explicitly trusted. The server's own application cert lives in <code>own/</code> and is not listed here.</p>
}
else
{
<table class="table table-sm align-middle">
<thead><tr><th>Subject</th><th>Issuer</th><th>Thumbprint</th><th>Valid</th><th class="text-end">Actions</th></tr></thead>
<tbody>
@foreach (var c in _trusted)
{
<tr>
<td>@c.Subject</td>
<td>@c.Issuer</td>
<td><code class="small">@c.Thumbprint</code></td>
<td class="small">@c.NotBefore.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd") → @c.NotAfter.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd")</td>
<td class="text-end">
<button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline-danger" @onclick="() => UntrustAsync(c)">Revoke</button>
</td>
</tr>
}
</tbody>
</table>
}
@code {
private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> _rejected = [];
private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> _trusted = [];
private string? _status;
private string _statusKind = "success";
protected override void OnInitialized() => Reload();
private void Reload()
{
_rejected = Certs.ListRejected();
_trusted = Certs.ListTrusted();
}
private async Task TrustAsync(CertInfo c)
{
if (Certs.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint))
{
await LogActionAsync("cert.trust", c);
Set($"Trusted cert {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
}
else
{
Set($"Could not trust {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing; another admin may have already handled it.", "warning");
}
Reload();
}
private async Task DeleteRejectedAsync(CertInfo c)
{
if (Certs.DeleteRejected(c.Thumbprint))
{
await LogActionAsync("cert.delete.rejected", c);
Set($"Deleted rejected cert {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
}
else
{
Set($"Could not delete {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing.", "warning");
}
Reload();
}
private async Task UntrustAsync(CertInfo c)
{
if (Certs.UntrustCert(c.Thumbprint))
{
await LogActionAsync("cert.untrust", c);
Set($"Revoked trust for {c.Subject} ({Short(c.Thumbprint)}).", "success");
}
else
{
Set($"Could not revoke {Short(c.Thumbprint)} — file missing.", "warning");
}
Reload();
}
private async Task LogActionAsync(string action, CertInfo c)
{
// Cert trust changes are operator-initiated and security-sensitive — Serilog captures the
// user + thumbprint trail. CertTrustService also logs at Information on each filesystem
// move/delete; this line ties the action to the authenticated admin user so the two logs
// correlate. DB-level ConfigAuditLog persistence is deferred — its schema is
// cluster-scoped and cert actions are cluster-agnostic.
var state = await AuthState.GetAuthenticationStateAsync();
var user = state.User.Identity?.Name ?? "(anonymous)";
Log.LogInformation("Admin cert action: user={User} action={Action} thumbprint={Thumbprint} subject={Subject}",
user, action, c.Thumbprint, c.Subject);
}
private void Set(string message, string kind)
{
_status = message;
_statusKind = kind;
}
private void ClearStatus() => _status = null;
private static string Short(string thumbprint) =>
thumbprint.Length > 12 ? thumbprint[..12] + "…" : thumbprint;
}

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@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ builder.Services.AddScoped<ReservationService>();
builder.Services.AddScoped<DraftValidationService>();
builder.Services.AddScoped<AuditLogService>();
// Cert-trust management — reads the OPC UA server's PKI store root so rejected client certs
// can be promoted to trusted via the Admin UI. Singleton: no per-request state, just
// filesystem operations.
builder.Services.Configure<CertTrustOptions>(builder.Configuration.GetSection(CertTrustOptions.SectionName));
builder.Services.AddSingleton<CertTrustService>();
// LDAP auth — parity with ScadaLink's LdapAuthService (decision #102).
builder.Services.Configure<LdapOptions>(
builder.Configuration.GetSection("Authentication:Ldap"));

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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
/// <summary>
/// Points the Admin UI at the OPC UA Server's PKI store root so
/// <see cref="CertTrustService"/> can list and move certs between the
/// <c>rejected/</c> and <c>trusted/</c> directories the server maintains. Must match the
/// <c>OpcUaServer:PkiStoreRoot</c> the Server process is configured with.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CertTrustOptions
{
public const string SectionName = "CertTrust";
/// <summary>
/// Absolute path to the PKI root. Defaults to
/// <c>%ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki</c> — matches <c>OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot</c>'s
/// default so a standard side-by-side install needs no override.
/// </summary>
public string PkiStoreRoot { get; init; } =
Path.Combine(
Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData),
"OtOpcUa", "pki");
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
/// <summary>
/// Metadata for a certificate file found in one of the OPC UA server's PKI stores. The
/// <see cref="FilePath"/> is the absolute path of the DER/CRT file the stack created when it
/// rejected the cert (for <see cref="CertStoreKind.Rejected"/>) or when an operator trusted
/// it (for <see cref="CertStoreKind.Trusted"/>).
/// </summary>
public sealed record CertInfo(
string Thumbprint,
string Subject,
string Issuer,
DateTime NotBefore,
DateTime NotAfter,
string FilePath,
CertStoreKind Store);
public enum CertStoreKind
{
Rejected,
Trusted,
}
/// <summary>
/// Filesystem-backed view over the OPC UA server's PKI store. The Opc.Ua stack uses a
/// Directory-typed store — each cert is a <c>.der</c> file under <c>{root}/{store}/certs/</c>
/// with a filename derived from subject + thumbprint. This service exposes operators for the
/// Admin UI: list rejected, list trusted, trust a rejected cert (move to trusted), remove a
/// rejected cert (delete), untrust a previously trusted cert (delete from trusted).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The Admin process is separate from the Server process; this service deliberately has no
/// Opc.Ua dependency — it works on the on-disk layout directly so it can run on the Admin
/// host even when the Server isn't installed locally, as long as the PKI root is reachable
/// (typical deployment has Admin + Server side-by-side on the same machine).
///
/// Trust/untrust requires the Server to re-read its trust list. The Opc.Ua stack re-reads
/// the Directory store on each new incoming connection, so there's no explicit signal
/// needed — the next client handshake picks up the change. Operators should retry the
/// rejected client's connection after trusting.
/// </remarks>
public sealed class CertTrustService
{
private readonly CertTrustOptions _options;
private readonly ILogger<CertTrustService> _logger;
public CertTrustService(IOptions<CertTrustOptions> options, ILogger<CertTrustService> logger)
{
_options = options.Value;
_logger = logger;
}
public string PkiStoreRoot => _options.PkiStoreRoot;
public IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListRejected() => ListStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected);
public IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListTrusted() => ListStore(CertStoreKind.Trusted);
/// <summary>
/// Move the cert with <paramref name="thumbprint"/> from the rejected store to the
/// trusted store. No-op returns false if the rejected file doesn't exist (already moved
/// by another operator, or thumbprint mismatch). Overwrites an existing trusted copy
/// silently — idempotent.
/// </summary>
public bool TrustRejected(string thumbprint)
{
var cert = FindInStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected, thumbprint);
if (cert is null) return false;
var trustedDir = CertsDir(CertStoreKind.Trusted);
Directory.CreateDirectory(trustedDir);
var destPath = Path.Combine(trustedDir, Path.GetFileName(cert.FilePath));
File.Move(cert.FilePath, destPath, overwrite: true);
_logger.LogInformation("Trusted cert {Thumbprint} (subject={Subject}) — moved {From} → {To}",
cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, cert.FilePath, destPath);
return true;
}
public bool DeleteRejected(string thumbprint) => DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind.Rejected, thumbprint);
public bool UntrustCert(string thumbprint) => DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind.Trusted, thumbprint);
private bool DeleteFromStore(CertStoreKind store, string thumbprint)
{
var cert = FindInStore(store, thumbprint);
if (cert is null) return false;
File.Delete(cert.FilePath);
_logger.LogInformation("Deleted cert {Thumbprint} (subject={Subject}) from {Store} store",
cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, store);
return true;
}
private CertInfo? FindInStore(CertStoreKind store, string thumbprint) =>
ListStore(store).FirstOrDefault(c =>
string.Equals(c.Thumbprint, thumbprint, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
private IReadOnlyList<CertInfo> ListStore(CertStoreKind store)
{
var dir = CertsDir(store);
if (!Directory.Exists(dir)) return [];
var results = new List<CertInfo>();
foreach (var path in Directory.EnumerateFiles(dir))
{
// Skip CRL sidecars + private-key files — trust operations only concern public certs.
var ext = Path.GetExtension(path);
if (!ext.Equals(".der", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
!ext.Equals(".crt", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
!ext.Equals(".cer", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
continue;
}
try
{
var cert = X509CertificateLoader.LoadCertificateFromFile(path);
results.Add(new CertInfo(
cert.Thumbprint, cert.Subject, cert.Issuer,
cert.NotBefore.ToUniversalTime(), cert.NotAfter.ToUniversalTime(),
path, store));
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
// A malformed file in the store shouldn't take down the page. Surface it in logs
// but skip — operators see the other certs and can clean the bad file manually.
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "Failed to parse cert at {Path} — skipping", path);
}
}
return results;
}
private string CertsDir(CertStoreKind store) =>
Path.Combine(_options.PkiStoreRoot, store == CertStoreKind.Rejected ? "rejected" : "trusted", "certs");
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Services;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Admin.Tests;
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class CertTrustServiceTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly string _root;
public CertTrustServiceTests()
{
_root = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-cert-test-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(_root, "rejected", "certs"));
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(_root, "trusted", "certs"));
}
public void Dispose()
{
if (Directory.Exists(_root)) Directory.Delete(_root, recursive: true);
}
private CertTrustService Service() => new(
Options.Create(new CertTrustOptions { PkiStoreRoot = _root }),
NullLogger<CertTrustService>.Instance);
private X509Certificate2 WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind kind, string subject)
{
using var rsa = RSA.Create(2048);
var req = new CertificateRequest($"CN={subject}", rsa, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1);
var cert = req.CreateSelfSigned(DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(-1), DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddYears(1));
var dir = Path.Combine(_root, kind == CertStoreKind.Rejected ? "rejected" : "trusted", "certs");
var path = Path.Combine(dir, $"{subject} [{cert.Thumbprint}].der");
File.WriteAllBytes(path, cert.Export(X509ContentType.Cert));
return cert;
}
[Fact]
public void ListRejected_returns_parsed_cert_info_for_each_der_in_rejected_certs_dir()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "test-client-A");
var rows = Service().ListRejected();
rows.Count.ShouldBe(1);
rows[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
rows[0].Subject.ShouldContain("test-client-A");
rows[0].Store.ShouldBe(CertStoreKind.Rejected);
}
[Fact]
public void ListTrusted_is_separate_from_rejected()
{
WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "rej");
WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Trusted, "trust");
var svc = Service();
svc.ListRejected().Count.ShouldBe(1);
svc.ListTrusted().Count.ShouldBe(1);
svc.ListRejected()[0].Subject.ShouldContain("rej");
svc.ListTrusted()[0].Subject.ShouldContain("trust");
}
[Fact]
public void TrustRejected_moves_file_from_rejected_to_trusted()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "promoteme");
var svc = Service();
svc.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
var trusted = svc.ListTrusted();
trusted.Count.ShouldBe(1);
trusted[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
}
[Fact]
public void TrustRejected_returns_false_when_thumbprint_not_in_rejected()
{
var svc = Service();
svc.TrustRejected("00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF00DEADBEEF").ShouldBeFalse();
}
[Fact]
public void DeleteRejected_removes_the_file()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "killme");
var svc = Service();
svc.DeleteRejected(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
}
[Fact]
public void UntrustCert_removes_from_trusted_only()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Trusted, "revoke");
var svc = Service();
svc.UntrustCert(c.Thumbprint).ShouldBeTrue();
svc.ListTrusted().ShouldBeEmpty();
}
[Fact]
public void Thumbprint_match_is_case_insensitive()
{
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "case");
var svc = Service();
// X509Certificate2.Thumbprint is upper-case hex; operators pasting from logs often
// lowercase it. IsAllowed-style case-insensitive match keeps the UX forgiving.
svc.TrustRejected(c.Thumbprint.ToLowerInvariant()).ShouldBeTrue();
}
[Fact]
public void Missing_store_directories_produce_empty_lists_not_exceptions()
{
// Fresh root with no certs subfolder — service should tolerate a pristine install.
var altRoot = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-cert-empty-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
try
{
var svc = new CertTrustService(
Options.Create(new CertTrustOptions { PkiStoreRoot = altRoot }),
NullLogger<CertTrustService>.Instance);
svc.ListRejected().ShouldBeEmpty();
svc.ListTrusted().ShouldBeEmpty();
}
finally
{
if (Directory.Exists(altRoot)) Directory.Delete(altRoot, recursive: true);
}
}
[Fact]
public void Malformed_file_is_skipped_not_fatal()
{
// Drop junk bytes that don't parse as a cert into the rejected/certs directory. The
// service must skip it and still return the valid certs — one bad file can't take the
// whole management page offline.
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(_root, "rejected", "certs", "junk.der"), "not a cert");
var c = WriteTestCert(CertStoreKind.Rejected, "valid");
var rows = Service().ListRejected();
rows.Count.ShouldBe(1);
rows[0].Thumbprint.ShouldBe(c.Thumbprint);
}
}