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@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ dotnet run --project src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Cli -- --help
| `--tsap-mode` | `Auto` | ISO-on-TCP connection class: `Auto` / `Pg` / `Op` / `S7Basic` / `Other`. Hardened S7-1500 / ET 200SP CPUs may require `Op` or `S7Basic`. See [s7.md TSAP / Connection Type](v2/s7.md#tsap--connection-type). | | `--tsap-mode` | `Auto` | ISO-on-TCP connection class: `Auto` / `Pg` / `Op` / `S7Basic` / `Other`. Hardened S7-1500 / ET 200SP CPUs may require `Op` or `S7Basic`. See [s7.md TSAP / Connection Type](v2/s7.md#tsap--connection-type). |
| `--local-tsap` | (unset) | Optional 16-bit local TSAP override (e.g. `0x0200`). Required when `--tsap-mode Other`; wins over class default under Pg/Op/S7Basic. | | `--local-tsap` | (unset) | Optional 16-bit local TSAP override (e.g. `0x0200`). Required when `--tsap-mode Other`; wins over class default under Pg/Op/S7Basic. |
| `--remote-tsap` | (unset) | Optional 16-bit remote TSAP override. Required when `--tsap-mode Other`; wins over class default under Pg/Op/S7Basic. | | `--remote-tsap` | (unset) | Optional 16-bit remote TSAP override. Required when `--tsap-mode Other`; wins over class default under Pg/Op/S7Basic. |
| `--password` | (unset) | Connection-level password sent right after `OpenAsync`. Used by hardened S7-300/400 (protection levels 1-3) and S7-1200/1500 (TIA Portal *Connection Mechanism* gate). Never logged. NB: S7netplus 0.20 doesn't expose `SendPassword`; the CLI prints a one-line warning and continues. See [s7.md "PLC password / protection levels"](v2/s7.md#plc-password--protection-levels). |
| `--protection-level` | `Auto` | Declarative hint: `Auto` / `None` / `Level1` / `Level2` / `Level3` (S7-300/400) / `ConnectionMechanism` (S7-1200/1500). Diagnostic only — the wire-side unlock is driven by `--password`. |
| `--verbose` | off | Serilog debug output | | `--verbose` | off | Serilog debug output |
## PUT/GET must be enabled ## PUT/GET must be enabled
@@ -95,6 +97,17 @@ otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.30 -a M0.0 -t Bool
# 80-char S7 string # 80-char S7 string
otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.30 -a DB10.STRING[0] -t String --string-length 80 otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.30 -a DB10.STRING[0] -t String --string-length 80
# CPU diagnostics (SZL) — virtual @System.* addresses (PR-S7-E1).
# Requires ExposeSystemTags = true on the driver instance; surfaces as
# BadNotSupported until S7netplus exposes a public ReadSzlAsync (or we ship
# a raw-PDU helper). See docs/v2/s7.md "CPU diagnostics (SZL)" for the full
# table and the snap7 / S7netplus 0.20 caveat.
otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.30 -a @System.CpuType -t String
otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.30 -a @System.Firmware -t String
otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.30 -a @System.OrderNo -t String
otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.30 -a @System.CycleMs.Min -t Float64
otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.30 -a "@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[0]" -t String
``` ```
### `write` ### `write`
@@ -128,6 +141,43 @@ wrong `--slot` produces also shows up when the CPU rejects PG class — try
endpoint config. See [s7.md TSAP / Connection Type](v2/s7.md#tsap--connection-type) endpoint config. See [s7.md TSAP / Connection Type](v2/s7.md#tsap--connection-type)
for the byte table and motivation. for the byte table and motivation.
### Hardened CPU — supplying a connection-level password
```powershell
# S7-300 protection-level 2 — read+write protected without unlock.
otopcua-s7-cli read -h 192.168.1.31 -c S7300 --slot 2 `
--password "tia-portal-set-password" `
--protection-level Level2 `
-a DB1.DBW0 -t Int16
# S7-1500 ConnectionMechanism — TIA Portal Protection & Security pane gate.
otopcua-s7-cli probe -h 10.50.12.30 `
--tsap-mode Op `
--password "tia-portal-set-password" `
--protection-level ConnectionMechanism
```
The password is emitted to the PLC immediately after `OpenAsync` succeeds and
before the pre-flight PUT/GET probe runs (the same probe that would otherwise
be the first operation a hardened CPU refuses). Never logged in any form;
identifier-only success line is `S7 password sent for {Host}`.
**S7netplus 0.20 does not yet expose a public `SendPassword`** — the driver
discovers the method reflectively, so a future minor release will be picked
up automatically. Until then, configuring `--password` on a hardened CPU
emits this warning at Init:
```
[Warning] S7 password is set on driver '<id>' against host '<host>', but
the linked S7netplus library does not expose SendPassword; password is
being ignored at the wire.
```
Init still completes (the COTP handshake itself doesn't require the
password) but the first read against a hardened CPU will surface
`BadDeviceFailure`. See [s7.md "PLC password / protection levels"](v2/s7.md#plc-password--protection-levels)
for the full motivation, the no-log invariant, and the workaround matrix.
### `subscribe` ### `subscribe`
```powershell ```powershell
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@@ -217,3 +217,37 @@ in screen-recorded bug reports.
`--poll-only` polls go through the same cached-handle path as `read`, so `--poll-only` polls go through the same cached-handle path as `read`, so
repeated polls of the same symbol carry only a 4-byte handle on the wire repeated polls of the same symbol carry only a 4-byte handle on the wire
rather than the full symbolic path. rather than the full symbolic path.
### `alarms` (PR 5.1 / #316)
Stream TC3 EventLogger alarms via the driver's `IAlarmSource` bridge.
Subscribes against AMS port 110 (`AMSPORT_EVENTLOG`) on the same target,
prints each event with timestamp / source / severity / message until
Ctrl+C.
```powershell
# All alarms — every event the EventLogger surfaces
otopcua-twincat-cli alarms -n 192.168.1.40.1.1
# Filter by source — only events whose source name matches (case-insensitive)
otopcua-twincat-cli alarms -n 192.168.1.40.1.1 --source Conveyor1.MotorOverload
# Multiple sources — repeat the flag
otopcua-twincat-cli alarms -n 192.168.1.40.1.1 --source Conveyor1 --source Pump3
```
| Flag | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `--source` | (none) | Optional source filter; repeat for multiple |
Output format (one line per event):
```
[HH:mm:ss.fff] <source> sev=<Low|Medium|High|Critical> type=<event-class> cond=<condition-id> "<message>"
```
The verb forces `EnableAlarms=true` on the underlying driver; the
default driver config keeps it off so deployments without an
EventLogger configured pay no cost. See
[`docs/drivers/TwinCAT.md` §Alarms](drivers/TwinCAT.md) for the
full bridge architecture and decode caveats.
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@@ -88,6 +88,18 @@ real PLC latency is not exercised.
S7-1200 vs S7-1500 vs S7-300/400 connection semantics (PG vs OP vs S7-Basic) S7-1200 vs S7-1500 vs S7-300/400 connection semantics (PG vs OP vs S7-Basic)
not differentiated at test time. not differentiated at test time.
**Optimized DB / S7Plus** is the variant-shaped gap with the biggest field
impact. snap7 happens to behave like a classic-S7comm-only PLC, so the
integration suite cannot reproduce the shape that an S7-1500 with default
"Optimized block access" checked would return (`BadDeviceFailure` on every
absolute-offset read). The decision is documented at
[`docs/v2/s7.md` § Optimized DB constraint (S7Plus)](../v2/s7.md#optimized-db-constraint-s7plus)
and tracked in [`docs/featuregaps.md`](../featuregaps.md) row #1; the
project ships **Track 1** (operator unchecks Optimized block access in TIA
Portal) and **Track 3** (bridge via the `OpcUaClient` driver against the
CPU's onboard OPC UA server). A custom S7Plus implementation is out of
scope.
### 5. Data types beyond the scalars ### 5. Data types beyond the scalars
`STRING` with length-prefix quirks, `DTL` / `DATE_AND_TIME`, arrays of `STRING` with length-prefix quirks, `DTL` / `DATE_AND_TIME`, arrays of
@@ -95,6 +107,41 @@ structs — not covered. UDT fan-out IS covered (PR-S7-D2 / #300) via the
`udt_layout` meta-seed in `Docker/profiles/s7_1500.json` and the `udt_layout` meta-seed in `Docker/profiles/s7_1500.json` and the
`Driver_fans_out_udt_into_member_tags` integration test. `Driver_fans_out_udt_into_member_tags` integration test.
### 6. SZL (System Status List) — `@System.*` virtual addresses
PR-S7-E1 / [#302](https://github.com/dohertj2/dohertj2/lmxopcua/issues/302)
adds a virtual `@System.*` address surface (CPU type, firmware, scan-cycle
stats, diagnostic-buffer ring) backed by SZL reads. **snap7 does not
implement SZL** — the simulator answers every SZL request with a function-
not-supported error, so the integration profile exercises only the
not-supported semantics (`@System.CpuType` against snap7 returns
`BadNotSupported`). Live-firmware SZL coverage is parked behind a
`[Fact(Skip = ...)]` until either S7netplus exposes a public `ReadSzlAsync`
or we ship a raw S7comm PDU helper. See
[`docs/v2/s7.md` "CPU diagnostics (SZL)"](../v2/s7.md#cpu-diagnostics-szl)
for the wire-status detail.
### 7. Password / protection levels — not modelled by snap7
PR-S7-E2 / [#303](https://github.com/dohertj2/lmxopcua/issues/303) adds
`Password` + `ProtectionLevel` options that emit a connection-level password
right after `OpenAsync`. **snap7 does not model S7 protection levels** — the
simulator accepts every connection regardless of the password set on the
client, so the integration profile cannot distinguish "password sent
correctly" from "password ignored". Coverage stays at the unit-test seam:
`S7PasswordOptionsTests` injects a fake `IS7PlcAuthGate` to assert the
dispatch contract (Password=null skips the call; Password+SupportsSendPassword
calls the gate; auth-failed wraps to a clean `InvalidOperationException`),
plus the no-log invariant on `S7DriverOptions.ToString()`.
The wire path is also fundamentally limited until S7netplus 0.20 exposes a
public `SendPassword` — the driver currently logs a warning and continues
when the API is missing. See
[`docs/v2/s7.md` "PLC password / protection levels"](../v2/s7.md#plc-password--protection-levels)
for the library-limitation note. Live-firmware coverage of the unlock path
requires a hardened S7-1500 lab rig with TIA Portal "Protection & Security"
configured, which is parked as a follow-up.
## When to trust the S7 tests, when to reach for a rig ## When to trust the S7 tests, when to reach for a rig
| Question | Unit tests | Real PLC | | Question | Unit tests | Real PLC |
@@ -127,6 +174,44 @@ structs — not covered. UDT fan-out IS covered (PR-S7-D2 / #300) via the
runner with the lab rig executes. The classifier branch runner with the lab rig executes. The classifier branch
(`S7PreflightClassifier.IsPutGetDisabled`) is unit-tested without a (`S7PreflightClassifier.IsPutGetDisabled`) is unit-tested without a
network in `S7PreflightTests.Classifier_matches_only_PUT_GET_disabled_error_codes`. network in `S7PreflightTests.Classifier_matches_only_PUT_GET_disabled_error_codes`.
5. **Live-firmware Optimized-block-access toggle (PR-S7-F / [#304](https://github.com/dohertj2/lmxopcua/issues/304)).**
snap7 happens to behave like a classic-S7comm CPU, so the integration
profile cannot reproduce the failure that a default new TIA Portal V14+
project produces (`BadDeviceFailure` on `DB1.DBW0` against an Optimized
DB). A manual smoke test on the lab rig, gated behind `--with-real-plc`,
would close that loop. Suggested checklist on a real S7-1500 V2.5+:
1. Create `DB1` in TIA Portal with three INT members at offsets 0, 2, 4.
Leave **Optimized block access checked** (the default).
2. Compile + download to the PLC.
3. Drive the OtOpcUa S7 driver against `DB1.DBW0` — assert that the read
returns `BadDeviceFailure` (the Track-1-not-applied symptom). This is
the failure shape the docs warn about.
4. Open `DB1`'s properties → **uncheck Optimized block access**
compile → download. Re-run the read; assert it returns the seeded
INT value at offset 0. (Track 1 verified end-to-end.)
5. **Track 3 verification (separate run on the same rig):** with
Optimized access re-enabled on `DB1`, activate the CPU's onboard
OPC UA server in TIA Portal, expose `DB1.<MemberName>` through a
Server interface, register an `OpcUaClient` driver against
`opc.tcp://<plc-ip>:4840`, and assert the symbolic read returns the
same seeded value. This proves the bridge path against a real
Optimized DB without the operator having to disable Optimized
access.
The test must stay manual: TIA Portal compile + download cannot be
automated from CI without a Siemens engineering toolchain license, and
download-with-CPU-stop is destructive on a shared lab rig. Document
results inline in PR descriptions when the rig is available.
6. **PR-S7-E1 — live SZL test against a real S7-1500.** snap7 doesn't
implement SZL at all, and S7netplus 0.20 doesn't expose a public
`ReadSzlAsync`, so the `@System.*` virtual address surface currently
answers `BadNotSupported` against every backend. The parser
(`S7SzlParser`) is unit-tested against golden bytes; flipping the wire
path on requires either an S7netplus PR or a raw-PDU helper. Once that's
in, [`S7_1500SzlTests.System_CpuType_against_live_S7_1500_returns_non_empty_string`](../../tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.IntegrationTests/S7_1500/S7_1500SzlTests.cs)
should be flipped from `[Fact(Skip = ...)]` to env-var-gated against the
self-hosted runner with the lab rig.
Without any of these, S7 driver correctness against real hardware is trusted Without any of these, S7 driver correctness against real hardware is trusted
from field deployments, not from the test suite. from field deployments, not from the test suite.
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@@ -89,7 +89,22 @@ default 1024-element cap (UDT per-member coverage; see
Capability surfaces whose contract is verified: `IDriver`, `IReadable`, Capability surfaces whose contract is verified: `IDriver`, `IReadable`,
`IWritable`, `ITagDiscovery`, `ISubscribable`, `IHostConnectivityProbe`, `IWritable`, `ITagDiscovery`, `ISubscribable`, `IHostConnectivityProbe`,
`IPerCallHostResolver`. `IPerCallHostResolver`, `IAlarmSource` (PR 5.1 / #316, gated behind
`EnableAlarms=true` — see capability matrix below).
## Capability matrix
| Capability | Status | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `IDriver` | yes | Lifecycle + health |
| `IReadable` | yes | Sum-read for scalars; per-tag for bit / array |
| `IWritable` | yes | Sum-write for scalars; per-tag for bit-RMW / array |
| `ITagDiscovery` | yes | Pre-declared + opt-in symbol-table walk |
| `ISubscribable` | yes | Native ADS notifications by default; poll fallback |
| `IHostConnectivityProbe` | yes | `ReadStateAsync` + system-symbol diagnostics |
| `IPerCallHostResolver` | yes | Tag → device hostAddress |
| `IAlarmSource` (PR 5.1 / #316) | partial | Scaffold + unit-tested; live wire decode is best-effort against AMS port 110, see `docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md` |
| `IHistoryProvider` | no | Not in scope for this driver family |
## What it does NOT cover ## What it does NOT cover
@@ -134,11 +149,11 @@ Native ADS notifications fire on the PLC cycle boundary. The fake test
harness assumes notifications fire on a timer the test controls; harness assumes notifications fire on a timer the test controls;
cycle-aligned firing under real PLC control is not verified. cycle-aligned firing under real PLC control is not verified.
### 6. Alarms / history ### 6. History
Driver doesn't implement `IAlarmSource` or `IHistoryProvider` — not in Driver doesn't implement `IHistoryProvider` — not in scope for this
scope for this driver family. TwinCAT 3's TcEventLogger could theoretically driver family. (Alarms now have a dedicated `IAlarmSource` bridge — see
back an `IAlarmSource`, but shipping that is a separate feature. the capability matrix below + `docs/drivers/TwinCAT.md`.)
## When to trust TwinCAT tests, when to reach for a rig ## When to trust TwinCAT tests, when to reach for a rig
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@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
# TwinCAT driver — operator guide
Beckhoff TwinCAT 2 / TwinCAT 3 ADS driver. Talks to the runtime via
`Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads` v6 (managed); requires a reachable AMS router on
the host (local TwinCAT XAR, the standalone `Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads.TcpRouter`
NuGet, or any Windows box with TwinCAT installed and an authorised AMS
route).
## Configuration surface
`TwinCATDriverOptions` (one instance supports N AMS targets, each a
`TwinCATDeviceOptions`). Wire format mirrors the C# class on the JSON
side — every `init`-only property round-trips through
`System.Text.Json` with the default options.
| Option | Type | Default | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `Devices` | `TwinCATDeviceOptions[]` | `[]` | One entry per AMS target. |
| `Tags` | `TwinCATTagDefinition[]` | `[]` | Pre-declared symbol set. |
| `Probe.Enabled` | `bool` | `true` | Per-tick `ReadStateAsync` against the runtime. |
| `Probe.Interval` | `TimeSpan` | `5 s` | |
| `Timeout` | `TimeSpan` | `2 s` | Per-operation timeout. |
| `UseNativeNotifications` | `bool` | `true` | False = fall through to PollGroupEngine. |
| `EnableControllerBrowse` | `bool` | `false` | Walk symbol table on `DiscoverAsync`. |
| `MaxArrayExpansion` | `int` | `1024` | Per-element cutoff during nested-UDT browse. |
| `EnableAlarms` (PR 5.1) | `bool` | `false` | Opt-in TC3 EventLogger bridge — see "Alarms" below. |
## Alarms (TC3 EventLogger bridge, PR 5.1 / #316)
When `EnableAlarms=true`, the driver implements `IAlarmSource` by
opening a second `AdsClient` against AMS port **110**
(`AMSPORT_EVENTLOG`) and adding a device notification on
`ADSIGRP_TCEVENTLOG_ALARMS`. Subscribers receive `OnAlarmEvent`
notifications for every transition the EventLogger surfaces (raise /
clear / acknowledge).
### Decode caveat
Beckhoff doesn't ship a managed wrapper for `TcEventLogger` in the
regular `Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads` v6 NuGet — only the C++ TcCOM headers
exist. The driver therefore decodes the AMS-port-110 binary payload
manually. The current implementation is best-effort: event class GUIDs
and source names usually decode cleanly; some less-common fields may
surface as `"Unknown"` until a follow-up PR lands a complete decoder.
Spike output captured at
[`docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md`](../v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md).
### Wire path
| Layer | What it does |
| --- | --- |
| Primary `AdsClient` | The existing per-device session against the PLC runtime port (default `851`) — handles reads / writes / native subscriptions. |
| Secondary `AdsClient` (alarms) | Opens against AMS port `110` on the same target NetId. Adds one device notification on `ADSIGRP_TCEVENTLOG_ALARMS` with a `length=...` payload covering the full alarm-list shape. |
| `ITwinCATAlarmGate` (driver-internal) | Decodes incoming notifications into `TwinCATAlarmEvent` records (`EventClass`, `Source`, `Severity`, `Message`, `OccurrenceUtc`, `Acked`). |
| `TwinCATAlarmSource` | Projects `TwinCATAlarmEvent` onto the driver-agnostic `IAlarmSource.OnAlarmEvent`. |
### Severity mapping (TC3 → OPC UA AC)
TC3 EventLogger severity is a 0255 `USINT`. The driver maps it onto
the four-bucket `AlarmSeverity` enum the OPC UA AC layer consumes:
| TC3 severity | `AlarmSeverity` |
| --- | --- |
| 064 | `Low` |
| 65128 | `Medium` |
| 129192 | `High` |
| 193255 | `Critical` |
### Acknowledge
`AcknowledgeAsync` round-trips through `ITwinCATAlarmGate.AcknowledgeAsync`,
which writes to the EventLogger ack index group. Best-effort — the wire
format isn't documented in managed code, so individual ack failures don't
poison the batch and the gate returns silently when the EventLogger isn't
configured.
### Disabling
`EnableAlarms=false` (default) returns a sentinel handle from
`SubscribeAlarmsAsync` and never opens the secondary `AdsClient`.
`OnAlarmEvent` simply never fires. Capability negotiation still works,
which is why the driver advertises `IAlarmSource` unconditionally.
## CLI
The `otopcua-twincat-cli` test client exposes an `alarms` subcommand
that wraps the bridge end-to-end:
```powershell
dotnet run --project src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT.Cli -- alarms `
--ams-net-id 5.23.91.23.1.1 --ams-port 851 `
--source Conveyor1.MotorOverload
```
See [`docs/Driver.TwinCAT.Cli.md`](../Driver.TwinCAT.Cli.md) for the
full CLI surface.
## Test coverage
- **Unit**: `TwinCATAlarmSourceTests` covers (a) feature-gating off vs.
on, (b) gate-event projection shape, (c) multi-event ordering, (d)
source-filter matching, (e) acknowledge round-trip, (f) JSON DTO
round-trip.
- **Integration**: `TwinCATAlarmIntegrationTests.Driver_raises_alarm_event_when_PLC_logs_event`
ships build-only in PR 5.1; the GVL + FB_AlarmHarness ship as XAE
stubs at `tests/.../TwinCatProject/PLC/`. Once the XAR project
imports them the test transitions skip → pass.
## See also
- [`docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md`](../v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md)
— spike output for the managed-wrapper question
- [`docs/drivers/TwinCAT-Test-Fixture.md`](TwinCAT-Test-Fixture.md)
— coverage map + capability matrix
- [`docs/Driver.TwinCAT.Cli.md`](../Driver.TwinCAT.Cli.md) — CLI guide
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@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
# Feature gaps — driver-side limitations and decisions
Cross-driver registry of known capability gaps, the workaround we ship, and
whether the gap is on the roadmap. Each row links to the driver-specific
deep-dive document. Closed entries stay in the table for traceability — they
are not deleted, only marked.
| # | Driver | Gap | Status | Workaround / decision | Roadmap | Reference |
|---|--------|-----|--------|-----------------------|---------|-----------|
| 1 | S7 | **Optimized DB / S7Plus** — S7netplus speaks classic S7comm only and cannot read S7-1200 / S7-1500 DBs that have "Optimized block access" checked (the TIA Portal V14+ default). Absolute-offset reads against an Optimized DB return `BadDeviceFailure`. | **Decided — Track 1 + Track 3 (closed by [#304](https://github.com/dohertj2/lmxopcua/issues/304))** | **Track 1 (docs):** operators uncheck "Optimized block access" in TIA Portal on every DB the driver reads, recompile, and download. **Track 3 (bridge):** for shops that won't or can't disable Optimized access, run an `OpcUaClient` driver instance against the S7-1500 V2.5+ CPU's onboard OPC UA server (Siemens runtime OPC UA license required). | **Track 2 (custom S7Plus library) is out of scope** unless a customer funds the ≥4-week initial implementation plus ongoing protocol-revision maintenance. Sharp7 / Snap7Net don't help — they are also classic-S7comm-only. | [`docs/v2/s7.md` § Optimized DB constraint](v2/s7.md#optimized-db-constraint-s7plus) · [`docs/drivers/OpcUaClient.md`](drivers/OpcUaClient.md) |
## How to read this table
- **Status** is one of `Open` (work pending), `Decided` (architectural
decision made; docs reflect it; no code change planned), or
`Closed` (delivered).
- **Roadmap** captures whether the gap is funded for the next phase. A blank
cell means "no roadmap; doc-only outcome."
- The numeric **#** is stable — new rows append at the bottom and keep their
number across deletions/edits so cross-references survive.
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@@ -1,5 +1,190 @@
# Siemens SIMATIC S7 (S7-1200 / S7-1500 / S7-300 / S7-400 / ET 200SP) — Modbus TCP quirks # Siemens SIMATIC S7 (S7-1200 / S7-1500 / S7-300 / S7-400 / ET 200SP) — Modbus TCP quirks
> **Read first: [Optimized DB constraint (S7Plus)](#optimized-db-constraint-s7plus).**
> S7netplus, the wire library this driver is built on, speaks classic S7comm
> only — it cannot read Optimized-block-access DBs on S7-1200 / S7-1500. That
> is the default in TIA Portal V14+ for new projects. If you skip the section
> below, every absolute-offset read against a freshly-created S7-1500 project
> will return `BadDeviceFailure`.
## Optimized DB constraint (S7Plus)
### Symptom
Against a default new S7-1500 TIA Portal project, an absolute-offset read like
`DB1.DBW0` issued by the OtOpcUa S7 driver returns `BadDeviceFailure` (the
S7netplus `PlcException` surfaces as `ErrorCode.WrongVarFormat` /
`ErrorCode.ReadData` depending on firmware revision). No bytes are returned;
the read never reaches the user data; the failure is identical whether
PUT/GET is enabled or not.
### Why
The OtOpcUa S7 driver is built on
[**S7netplus**](https://github.com/S7NetPlus/s7netplus), which implements
**classic S7comm** only — the protocol historically used by S7-300 / S7-400
and the legacy "compatibility" path on S7-1200 / S7-1500. Classic S7comm
addresses DB contents by **absolute byte offset**: `DB1.DBW0` literally means
"give me 2 bytes starting at byte 0 of DB number 1". This works as long as
the byte offsets in the program match the byte offsets on the wire.
S7-1200 V4 and S7-1500 introduced **Optimized block access**. When checked,
the TIA Portal compiler is free to **reorder DB members**, insert padding for
alignment, and store members in CPU-internal memory that the absolute-offset
read protocol cannot reach. There are no fixed byte offsets to address — the
only way to read an Optimized DB is by **symbolic name**, which requires
**S7Plus** (the post-2014 protocol Siemens uses for TIA-Portal-aware tooling
and OPC UA gateways).
S7Plus is undocumented by Siemens. A community Wireshark dissector exists
(`s7comm-plus`), but no production-ready open-source library implements the
write/subscribe surface end-to-end. **S7netplus does not, and is not on a
roadmap to, support S7Plus.** Snap7 v2 / Snap7Net and the various Sharp7
forks are also classic-S7comm-only.
### Default to know about
In **TIA Portal V14 and newer, "Optimized block access" is checked by default
on every newly-created DB**. A customer who clicks "Add new block → Data
block → OK" on a fresh S7-1500 project gets an Optimized DB. The driver
cannot read it.
### Supported workarounds
The OtOpcUa project supports two workarounds. Pick one per deployment.
#### Track 1 — Disable Optimized block access in TIA Portal
Per DB the driver reads:
1. In TIA Portal, open the project tree → `<PLC>`**Program blocks**
right-click the DB → **Properties**.
2. In the **Attributes** tab, **uncheck "Optimized block access"**.
3. **Compile** the program.
4. **Download** to the PLC (download the changed block; the CPU will go into
STOP if the DB layout changed and download-without-reinitialize is
refused — schedule a maintenance window).
After this, `DB1.DBW0` and friends address absolute byte offsets again and
the OtOpcUa S7 driver reads through unmodified.
**Trade-off:** Optimized DBs are slightly faster for *the PLC program
itself* to access (better alignment, sometimes better cache behaviour) and
let the compiler add/remove DB members without renumbering offsets in user
code. Disabling Optimized access trades a tiny amount of CPU-side
performance and a layout-stability guarantee for absolute-offset wire
addressability. For DBs that exist only as a Modbus / S7comm gateway buffer
(common pattern), there is no real downside.
This is the same prerequisite called out in
["Optimized block access — must be off"](#optimized-block-access--must-be-off)
and ["Address / DB Mapping → MB_HOLD_REG"](#address--db-mapping) for the
Modbus-TCP path; the constraint is the same and stems from the same
absolute-offset-only assumption.
#### Track 3 — Bridge via the OpcUaClient driver against the CPU's onboard OPC UA server
S7-1500 firmware **V2.5 and later** ship with an **integrated OPC UA
server** running on the CPU's PROFINET port (default port 4840). Once
enabled in TIA Portal it exposes the entire symbol table — including
Optimized DBs — through standard OPC UA, by symbolic name. There is no S7
protocol involved at all from the OtOpcUa side.
Configure the bridge once:
1. **TIA Portal side**:
- Open the CPU's properties → **OPC UA****General** → check
**Activate OPC UA server**.
- Set the server port (default 4840) and security policy. For a quick
bring-up, allow `None` + `UserName` and create a server certificate;
for production, use Basic256Sha256 with a CA-issued cert.
- Under **OPC UA****Server interfaces**, expose the symbols/tags the
OtOpcUa side should see. (Whole-symbol-table exposure works; a
curated server interface is more secure and faster.)
- Compile and download.
- Note: this requires a **runtime OPC UA license on the CPU**
(Siemens SIMATIC NET OPC UA server license, typically activated via
SIMATIC SUM). The license is per CPU, not per client.
2. **OtOpcUa side** — register an `OpcUaClient` driver instance pointing
at the CPU. Minimal `DriverConfig` JSON:
```json
{
"Driver": "OpcUaClient",
"Name": "PLC1500_Onboard",
"Options": {
"EndpointUrl": "opc.tcp://10.0.0.42:4840",
"SecurityMode": "SignAndEncrypt",
"SecurityPolicy": "Basic256Sha256",
"UserName": "OtOpcUa",
"Password": "<from secret store>",
"WatchModelChanges": true
}
}
```
The driver handles browse, read, write, and subscriptions through the
CPU's symbolic name space. Optimized DBs Just Work — the CPU resolves
names internally, so the wire never sees a byte offset.
See [`docs/drivers/OpcUaClient.md`](../drivers/OpcUaClient.md) for the full
configuration surface (reverse connect, model-change re-import, failover,
aggregate functions, redundancy via `ServerUriArray`, etc.).
**When to use Track 3 over Track 1**:
- The DB layout is owned by an upstream Siemens engineering team that won't
disable Optimized access (legitimate concern: shared-DB constraints,
compile-time member-renumbering, application notes that mandate optimized
blocks).
- The customer already licenses OPC UA on the CPU.
- Symbolic addressing is preferred end-to-end (no byte-offset bookkeeping
in the OtOpcUa tag list; tags survive DB-member additions).
- S7-300 / S7-400 are out of scope on this CPU (the onboard OPC UA server
is S7-1500 V2.5+ only — see V2.5 firmware change list).
**When to use Track 1 over Track 3**:
- The CPU is S7-1200 (no onboard OPC UA server even on the V4 firmware
line) or older S7-1500 firmware (< V2.5).
- The customer won't pay for the SIMATIC NET OPC UA server license on the
CPU.
- The DBs in question exist purely as gateway buffers and have no
significant CPU-program access pattern that would benefit from
Optimized access.
### Track 2 — out of scope
For completeness, the **Track 2** option that was evaluated and rejected:
migrate the OtOpcUa S7 driver off S7netplus to a library that speaks
S7Plus. The candidates were:
- **Snap7 v2 / Snap7Net** — classic S7comm only. Same Optimized-DB
limitation. Not a step forward.
- **Sharp7 community forks** — partial S7-1200 / S7-1500 PUT/GET semantics
but still classic-S7comm wire format. Not a step forward.
- **Custom S7Plus implementation** — possible in principle (the Wireshark
`s7comm-plus` dissector covers the wire format), but estimated **≥4
weeks** of engineering for a minimal read/write/subscribe surface, plus
ongoing maintenance every time Siemens revs the protocol version
(which they do silently with each TIA Portal release).
**Track 2 is not on the OtOpcUa roadmap** unless a specific customer funds
the engineering and ongoing maintenance. Track 1 + Track 3 together cover
every shipping S7 deployment we have visibility into.
### Pre-flight diagnostics
The driver does not currently auto-detect Optimized DBs from the
`BadDeviceFailure` shape (the same error code is returned for "DB doesn't
exist", "DB exists but is too short", etc.). On first encounter of a
device-failure error, check the suspect DB's properties in TIA Portal
**before** chasing wire-level theories. The auto-detect would require an
SZL probe or a symbolic round-trip; tracked but not a v2 deliverable.
---
Siemens S7 PLCs do *not* speak Modbus TCP natively at the OS/firmware level. Every Siemens S7 PLCs do *not* speak Modbus TCP natively at the OS/firmware level. Every
S7 Modbus-TCP-server deployment is either (a) the **`MB_SERVER`** library block S7 Modbus-TCP-server deployment is either (a) the **`MB_SERVER`** library block
running on the CPU's PROFINET port (S7-1200 / S7-1500 / CPU 1510SP-series running on the CPU's PROFINET port (S7-1200 / S7-1500 / CPU 1510SP-series
@@ -1030,7 +1215,11 @@ addresses by absolute offset, including UDT-typed DBs.
If a customer can't disable Optimized access (e.g., shared-DB constraints), If a customer can't disable Optimized access (e.g., shared-DB constraints),
the workaround is to expose the UDT through the symbolic-tag path once that the workaround is to expose the UDT through the symbolic-tag path once that
ships — not in PR-S7-D2. ships — not in PR-S7-D2. See
[Optimized DB constraint (S7Plus)](#optimized-db-constraint-s7plus) at the
top of this document for the project-wide decision (Track 1 disable in TIA
Portal, or Track 3 bridge via the OpcUaClient driver against the CPU's
onboard OPC UA server).
### Validation ### Validation
@@ -1068,6 +1257,211 @@ FB-instance DBs imported via PR-S7-D3 / [#301](https://github.com/dohertj2/lmxop
see [`docs/drivers/S7-TIA-Import.md` "Re-import on FB-interface edit"](../drivers/S7-TIA-Import.md#re-import-on-fb-interface-edit--caveat) see [`docs/drivers/S7-TIA-Import.md` "Re-import on FB-interface edit"](../drivers/S7-TIA-Import.md#re-import-on-fb-interface-edit--caveat)
for the FB-instance-specific workflow. for the FB-instance-specific workflow.
## CPU diagnostics (SZL)
PR-S7-E1 / [#302](https://github.com/dohertj2/lmxopcua/issues/302) — every S7
CPU answers SZL (System Status List) queries with metadata about itself: CPU
type, firmware, order number, scan-cycle min/avg/max, and the diagnostic
buffer ring. The driver surfaces those through a virtual `@System.*` address
space dispatched against the SZL sub-protocol — no DB / merker tag declarations
required.
### Opt-in: `ExposeSystemTags`
Off by default. Set `ExposeSystemTags = true` in `S7DriverOptions` and
`DiscoverAsync` adds a `Diagnostics/` sub-folder under the driver root with
the variables listed below. Knobs:
| Option | Default | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `ExposeSystemTags` | `false` | Master switch. When `false` the SZL surface is invisible — no extra browse nodes, no extra wire traffic. |
| `DiagBufferDepth` | `10` | Number of diagnostic-buffer entries to discover under `DiagBuffer/Entry[N]`. Capped at 50. |
| `SzlCacheTtl` | `5 s` | TTL for the per-driver SZL cache. A burst of `@System.*` reads inside this window reuses one wire response per SZL ID. Set to `TimeSpan.Zero` to disable caching (every read hits the wire). |
### `@System.*` address table
| Address | OPC UA type | SZL ID | Index | What it is |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `@System.CpuType` | `String` | `0x0011` | `0x0000` | CPU friendly name (SZL index 0x0007) or MLFB fallback. |
| `@System.Firmware` | `String` | `0x0011` | `0x0000` | Firmware version, formatted `Vmaj.min.patch`. |
| `@System.OrderNo` | `String` | `0x0011` | `0x0000` | MLFB / order number, e.g. `6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0`. |
| `@System.CycleMs.Min` | `Float64` | `0x0132` | `0x0005` | Shortest scan cycle observed since last reset, in milliseconds. |
| `@System.CycleMs.Max` | `Float64` | `0x0132` | `0x0005` | Longest scan cycle observed since last reset, in milliseconds. |
| `@System.CycleMs.Avg` | `Float64` | `0x0132` | `0x0005` | Rolling average scan-cycle time, in milliseconds. |
| `@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[N]` | `String` | `0x00A0` | `0x0000` | Diagnostic-buffer entry rendered as `<UTC ISO-8601> \| 0x<event id> \| prio=<N> \| <event text>`. `N` ranges from `0` (most recent) through `DiagBufferDepth-1`. |
The diagnostic-buffer entries surface as flat strings rather than a structured
DataType so dashboards / log scrapers can split / grep them without a custom
schema.
### What's wired today vs not-supported
S7netplus 0.20 builds SZL request packages internally
(`SzlReadRequestPackage` / `WriteSzlReadRequest`) but does **not** expose a
public `ReadSzlAsync` API. Until S7netplus catches up (or we ship a raw S7comm
PDU helper that side-steps the library), the production
[`S7NetSzlReader`](../../src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7/Szl/S7NetSzlReader.cs)
returns `null` on every call and every `@System.*` read surfaces as
`BadNotSupported`. The browse tree still lights up — operators can wire
clients against it — only the values come back not-supported.
The parser code (`S7SzlParser`) is fully tested against golden bytes
regardless. Flipping the wire path on is a one-method change in
`S7NetSzlReader` once the upstream surface is available; no parser / dispatch
/ cache changes needed.
snap7 (the simulator backing the integration profile) also doesn't implement
SZL — the integration test
[`S7_1500SzlTests`](../../tests/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.IntegrationTests/S7_1500/S7_1500SzlTests.cs)
asserts the not-supported semantics against snap7 + parks the live-firmware
test behind `[Fact(Skip = ...)]` until the wire path lights up.
### Caching
Diagnostics shouldn't poll faster than `SzlCacheTtl` — a 100 ms HMI
subscription on every `@System.*` tag would otherwise hammer the comms
mailbox for data that doesn't change between scans. The per-driver
[`S7SzlCache`](../../src/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7/Szl/S7SzlCache.cs)
de-dups concurrent reads by `(SzlId, SzlIndex)`; one SZL 0x0011 round-trip
backs `CpuType` + `Firmware` + `OrderNo` for the whole TTL window. Negative
results (SZL not supported) are cached just as aggressively — repeatedly
hammering a CPU that already said "not supported" wouldn't help.
`SzlCacheTtl = TimeSpan.Zero` disables caching entirely; useful for
diagnostics tests where you want every read to hit the wire.
### JSON config example
```json
{
"DriverConfig": {
"Host": "192.168.10.50",
"Port": 102,
"CpuType": "S71500",
"ExposeSystemTags": true,
"DiagBufferDepth": 20,
"SzlCacheTtl": "00:00:05"
}
}
```
## PLC password / protection levels
PR-S7-E2 (issue #303) adds a connection-level password option for hardened
deployments. The driver emits the password to the PLC immediately after
`OpenAsync` succeeds and before the pre-flight PUT/GET probe runs (the same
pre-flight read that would otherwise be the first operation a hardened CPU
refuses).
### Options
| Option | Default | Purpose |
| ----------------- | ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `Password` | `null` | Connection-level password. Secret — never logged. `null` or empty = no password is sent. |
| `ProtectionLevel` | `Auto` | Declarative hint about the PLC's protection scheme. One of `Auto`, `None`, `Level1`, `Level2`, `Level3` (S7-300/400 SFC 109/110 levels), or `ConnectionMechanism` (S7-1200/1500 TIA Portal "Protection & Security" pane). |
### S7-300 / S7-400 protection levels (1, 2, 3)
S7-300/400 firmware exposes three CPU-side protection levels:
* **Level 1** — write protection. Reads work without a password; writes
(parameter, DB, M/Q changes) require an unlock.
* **Level 2** — read and write protection. Both kinds of operation require
the password.
* **Level 3** — full protection. Even online presence detection / status
list reads require the password.
Set `ProtectionLevel = Level1` / `Level2` / `Level3` and supply
`Password` to match the level configured in the CPU's HW Config dialog.
The level value is descriptive — the driver doesn't switch behaviour
between Level1/2/3, since the wire-side `SendPassword` is the same call
in all three cases. The hint surfaces in the driver-diagnostics RPC so a
"PLC said Level 3 but config says Level 1" mismatch is spottable from the
Admin UI.
### S7-1200 / S7-1500 connection mechanism
S7-1200/1500 firmware uses a different gate: TIA Portal's "Protection &
Security" pane has a single **Connection Mechanism** dropdown that, when
set to anything stricter than "No access", requires every PG/HMI/SCADA
connection to authenticate after the COTP handshake. The wire-level
exchange is the same `SendPassword` call but the diagnostic flag is
distinct, so set `ProtectionLevel = ConnectionMechanism` for these
families.
### No-log invariant
`Password` is a secret. The driver MUST NOT include the password value in
log lines, exception messages, or diagnostic surfaces. Specifically:
* `S7DriverOptions.ToString()` redacts the field as `***`.
* `S7Driver`'s success log line is `S7 password sent for {Host}`
identifier-only, no value.
* The "S7netplus does not expose SendPassword" warning logs the host name
and driver instance ID only, never the password.
* Authentication-failure exceptions wrap the inner `S7.Net.PlcException`
but their own message says only "S7 password authentication failed for
host '{Host}'" — no password value.
Any new logging surface that flows an `S7DriverOptions` value MUST
continue to redact. See the FOCAS-F4-d
`docs/v2/focas-deployment.md` § "FOCAS password handling" entry for the
sister no-log discipline on the FOCAS driver.
### Library limitation — S7netplus 0.20
**S7netplus 0.20.0 (the pinned dependency) does not expose a public
`SendPassword` method.** The driver discovers the method reflectively
(checking for `SendPasswordAsync(string, CancellationToken)` first, then
`SendPassword(string)`) so a future minor release that ships the API
will be picked up automatically without a code change here.
Until the upstream lands, configuring `Password` on a hardened CPU
produces this Init-time warning:
```
[Warning] S7 password is set on driver '<DriverInstanceId>' against
host '<Host>', but the linked S7netplus library does not expose
SendPassword; password is being ignored at the wire. Hardened-CPU
connect may fail at first read.
```
Init still completes — the COTP/S7comm handshake itself doesn't require
the password — but the first read against a hardened CPU will surface
`BadDeviceFailure` because PUT/GET-disabled and "level-3 protection"
return identical "function not allowed" PDUs at the wire layer.
If your S7-1200/1500 deployment requires `ConnectionMechanism`, the
near-term workarounds are:
1. **Lower the protection setting** in TIA Portal's Protection & Security
pane to "Full access (no protection)" for the duration of the
evaluation.
2. **Configure a separate non-hardened connection** on a CP module that
the driver can target while keeping the production endpoint hardened.
3. **Track upstream S7netplus** for a `SendPassword` PR (the package owner
has discussed adding it; see issue
<https://github.com/S7NetPlus/s7netplus/issues>).
For S7-300/400 CPUs, levels 1 and 2 leave at least *read* access open
without a password, so most monitoring use cases work without
`SendPassword` until the library catches up — only Level 3 and the
S7-1200/1500 ConnectionMechanism require the wire-level unlock.
### JSON config example
```json
{
"DriverConfig": {
"Host": "192.168.10.50",
"Port": 102,
"CpuType": "S71500",
"Password": "tia-portal-set-password",
"ProtectionLevel": "ConnectionMechanism"
}
}
```
## References ## References
1. Siemens Industry Online Support, *Modbus/TCP Communication between SIMATIC S7-1500 / S7-1200 and Modbus/TCP Controllers with Instructions `MB_CLIENT` and `MB_SERVER`*, Entry ID 102020340, V6 (Feb 2021). https://cache.industry.siemens.com/dl/files/340/102020340/att_118119/v6/net_modbus_tcp_s7-1500_s7-1200_en.pdf 1. Siemens Industry Online Support, *Modbus/TCP Communication between SIMATIC S7-1500 / S7-1200 and Modbus/TCP Controllers with Instructions `MB_CLIENT` and `MB_SERVER`*, Entry ID 102020340, V6 (Feb 2021). https://cache.industry.siemens.com/dl/files/340/102020340/att_118119/v6/net_modbus_tcp_s7-1500_s7-1200_en.pdf
+101
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@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
# TC3 EventLogger spike — managed-wrapper investigation
**Question (b) from the PR 5.1 / #316 plan**: Does Beckhoff publish a
managed `TcEventLogger` wrapper that lets the driver subscribe to
alarms via `EventLogger.AlarmRaised` instead of decoding AMS port 110
notifications by hand?
## TL;DR
**No managed wrapper.** The `Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads` v6 NuGet (the regular
managed SDK the driver already takes a dependency on) ships only the
ADS read/write/notification surface — it does not surface
`TcEventLogger` on the .NET side. The C++ TcCOM headers
(`TcEventLogger.h` etc.) exist in the on-box TwinCAT install
(`%TC_INSTALLPATH%\Components\TcEventLogger\`) but there is no managed
projection of those COM interfaces in any official Beckhoff NuGet as
of TC3 build 4024.x.
Decision: **ship a binary-protocol decode against AMS port 110**
(`AMSPORT_EVENTLOG`) with index group `ADSIGRP_TCEVENTLOG_ALARMS`. The
decoder lands in `AdsTwinCATAlarmGate` (production) and `NullTwinCATAlarmGate`
(default / no-op). Best-effort field decoding — fields the protocol
analyzer hasn't yet identified surface as `"Unknown"`.
## What was checked
| Source | Result |
| --- | --- |
| `Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads` v6.x NuGet, namespace inventory | `TwinCAT.Ads`, `TwinCAT.Ads.SumCommand`, `TwinCAT.Ads.TypeSystem`, `TwinCAT.TypeSystem`. **No** `TcEventLogger` namespace. |
| `Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads.TcpRouter` v6.x NuGet | Router only; no EventLogger surface. |
| Beckhoff Information System (Infosys) → TwinCAT 3 → EventLogger → API reference | Documents only the C++ TcCOM API + the PLC-side `Tc3_EventLogger` library. No managed-language section. |
| TwinCAT install on dev box → `Components\TcEventLogger\` | C++ headers + DLL only; the `.tlb` could be COM-imported via `tlbimp` but that creates a brittle install-path-coupled binding. |
| Public Beckhoff GitHub orgs | `Beckhoff/TwinCAT-Tools-Library` etc. — no managed EventLogger wrapper. |
## Why decode at the wire?
A `tlbimp` projection of the on-box TcCOM `.tlb` would technically work
but introduces three problems:
1. **Install-path coupling** — the `.tlb` lives under
`%TC_INSTALLPATH%`; the driver would need to find / load it at
runtime + ship a per-build interop assembly.
2. **Bitness lock-in** — TcCOM is x86; the driver builds AnyCPU.
3. **No upgrade path** — Beckhoff makes no API-stability guarantees
on the TcCOM surface across TC3 builds.
Direct AMS-port-110 notifications keep the driver coupled to **only**
the `Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads` v6 NuGet's stable wire surface. Trade-off:
the binary protocol is undocumented in managed-code form; we work
around that by:
- Writing a permissive decoder that surfaces unrecognised fields as
`"Unknown"` rather than throwing.
- Gating the entire bridge behind `EnableAlarms=false` so deployments
that don't run TcEventLogger pay no cost.
- Logging the raw payload at TRACE level when a decode partially
succeeds, so operators can hand the bytes to the integration team
for follow-up decoding.
## What ships in PR 5.1
- `ITwinCATAlarmGate` interface — driver-internal seam.
- `NullTwinCATAlarmGate` — default no-op implementation, used when
`EnableAlarms=false` and as the unit-test substitute base.
- `TwinCATAlarmSource` — projects `TwinCATAlarmEvent` onto the
driver's `IAlarmSource` surface; handles subscription bookkeeping
+ source-id filtering.
- `TwinCATDriver` declares `IAlarmSource`; methods short-circuit when
the gate is null (default).
- Production `AdsTwinCATAlarmGate` (with the binary decoder) is
scaffolded — the wire path is best-effort and can be tightened in
a follow-up PR without touching the driver's public surface.
## Open questions for the follow-up PR
1. **Exact byte layout** of the alarm-list notification payload —
needs a wire trace from a known-good TC3 EventLogger configuration
compared against the C++ `TcEventLogger.h` struct definitions.
2. **Acknowledge wire format** — the `AcknowledgeAsync` path writes
to the EventLogger ack index group; the operand layout (event-id
vs. condition-id mapping) is best-effort in PR 5.1.
3. **Multi-language alarm text** — TC3 EventLogger supports localized
message texts. The decoder should pick the runtime's configured
language; PR 5.1 falls back to the first text it finds.
4. **Active-alarm refresh on subscribe** — TC3's `RefreshActive`
semantic is documented in C++ but not exposed through AMS port 110
notifications directly. The follow-up PR should investigate
whether a separate `Read` against the active-alarm-list index
group can backfill the snapshot at subscribe time.
## Why land PR 5.1 anyway
The driver's public `IAlarmSource` surface, the options knob, the unit
tests, the CLI verb, and the integration-test scaffold are all
independent of the wire decoder's completeness. Deferring the entire
PR until decode coverage is 100 % blocks every consumer that just
needs the capability negotiation contract (the OPC UA server's
`DriverNodeManager` checks `driver is IAlarmSource` to decide whether
to expose the alarm subtree). Shipping the gated scaffold now lets
those consumers light up without committing to a specific decoder
quality bar.
@@ -50,6 +50,20 @@ public abstract class S7CommandBase : DriverCommandBase
"the class default under Pg/Op/S7Basic.")] "the class default under Pg/Op/S7Basic.")]
public ushort? RemoteTsap { get; init; } public ushort? RemoteTsap { get; init; }
[CommandOption("password", Description =
"Connection-level password emitted to the PLC right after OpenAsync. Used by hardened " +
"S7-300/400 deployments running protection levels 1-3 and S7-1200/1500 deployments with " +
"a connection-mechanism password set. Default unset. Never logged. NB: S7netplus 0.20 " +
"does not yet expose SendPassword — when the linked library lacks the API the CLI prints " +
"a warning and continues. See docs/v2/s7.md \"PLC password / protection levels\".")]
public string? Password { get; init; }
[CommandOption("protection-level", Description =
"Declarative hint about the PLC's protection scheme: Auto (default), None, Level1, Level2, " +
"Level3 (S7-300/400), or ConnectionMechanism (S7-1200/1500). Diagnostic hint only; the " +
"wire path is driven by --password.")]
public ProtectionLevel ProtectionLevel { get; init; } = ProtectionLevel.Auto;
/// <inheritdoc /> /// <inheritdoc />
public override TimeSpan Timeout public override TimeSpan Timeout
{ {
@@ -75,6 +89,8 @@ public abstract class S7CommandBase : DriverCommandBase
TsapMode = TsapMode, TsapMode = TsapMode,
LocalTsap = LocalTsap, LocalTsap = LocalTsap,
RemoteTsap = RemoteTsap, RemoteTsap = RemoteTsap,
Password = string.IsNullOrEmpty(Password) ? null : Password,
ProtectionLevel = ProtectionLevel,
}; };
protected string DriverInstanceId => $"s7-cli-{Host}:{Port}"; protected string DriverInstanceId => $"s7-cli-{Host}:{Port}";
+330 -3
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
using System.Buffers.Binary; using System.Buffers.Binary;
using System.Collections.Generic; using System.Collections.Generic;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using S7.Net; using S7.Net;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions; using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.SymbolImport; using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.SymbolImport;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7; namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7;
@@ -96,6 +99,68 @@ public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
private DriverHealth _health = new(DriverState.Unknown, null, null); private DriverHealth _health = new(DriverState.Unknown, null, null);
private bool _disposed; private bool _disposed;
// ---- PR-S7-E1 — SZL / @System.* virtual address state ----
//
// SzlReader is the wire surface (interface so tests can substitute fakes); SzlCache
// is the per-driver TTL cache fronting every SZL read so a burst of @System.* reads
// from one OPC UA subscription tick produces exactly one wire request per SZL ID.
// Both are constructed in InitializeAsync once Plc is open; both stay null when
// ExposeSystemTags is false (cheap shortcut on the read path).
private IS7SzlReader? _szlReader;
private S7SzlCache? _szlCache;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — test seam for the SZL wire reader. Setting this overrides the
/// default <see cref="S7NetSzlReader"/> created from the live <see cref="Plc"/>
/// so unit tests can drive <c>@System.*</c> reads with golden-byte payloads
/// without needing a real PLC. Setting before <see cref="InitializeAsync"/> is
/// fine — InitializeAsync only swaps in the production reader when this is null.
/// </summary>
internal IS7SzlReader? SzlReader
{
get => _szlReader;
set => _szlReader = value;
}
/// <summary>Test-only access to the SZL cache for assertions about TTL behaviour.</summary>
internal S7SzlCache? SzlCache => _szlCache;
// ---- PR-S7-E2 / #303 — connection-level password (SendPassword) seam ----
//
// AuthGate wraps the reflective probe over S7.Net.Plc.SendPassword; setting it
// before InitializeAsync lets unit tests inject a fake that reports
// SupportsSendPassword + observes the call without standing up a real PLC.
// Logger is an ILogger seam so the warning ("S7netplus does not expose
// SendPassword") and the success line ("S7 password sent") flow into Serilog
// through the host's default factory; tests inject a capturing logger.
private IS7PlcAuthGate? _authGate;
private ILogger<S7Driver> _logger = NullLogger<S7Driver>.Instance;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 — test seam for the password-send path. Setting before
/// <see cref="InitializeAsync"/> overrides the default reflective gate so unit
/// tests can verify the call site without needing a live PLC. <c>null</c> =
/// production behaviour: <see cref="ReflectionS7PlcAuthGate"/> is constructed
/// once <see cref="Plc"/> is open.
/// </summary>
internal IS7PlcAuthGate? AuthGate
{
get => _authGate;
set => _authGate = value;
}
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 — ILogger seam. Production callers go through the host's DI
/// container to wire a Serilog-backed <see cref="ILoggerFactory"/>; tests
/// inject a capturing logger to assert the warning-vs-info contract on the
/// password path.
/// </summary>
internal ILogger<S7Driver> Logger
{
get => _logger;
set => _logger = value ?? NullLogger<S7Driver>.Instance;
}
// ---- Block-read coalescing diagnostics (PR-S7-B2) ---- // ---- Block-read coalescing diagnostics (PR-S7-B2) ----
// //
// Counters surface through DriverHealth.Diagnostics so the driver-diagnostics // Counters surface through DriverHealth.Diagnostics so the driver-diagnostics
@@ -222,6 +287,21 @@ public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
// CPUs negotiate 240 bytes; CPUs running the extended PDU advertise 480 or 960. // CPUs negotiate 240 bytes; CPUs running the extended PDU advertise 480 or 960.
_negotiatedPduSize = plc.MaxPDUSize; _negotiatedPduSize = plc.MaxPDUSize;
// PR-S7-E1 — wire up the SZL reader + cache. The reader respects an explicit
// test-supplied override (set before InitializeAsync) so unit tests can drive
// @System.* reads with canned payloads; production constructs the live S7netplus-
// backed reader (which currently surfaces every read as "not supported" until
// S7netplus exposes a public ReadSzlAsync).
_szlReader ??= new S7NetSzlReader(plc);
_szlCache = new S7SzlCache(_options.SzlCacheTtl);
// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — connection-level password. After a clean OpenAsync, if the
// operator supplied Password, hand it to the auth gate. The gate is reflective
// over S7.Net.Plc.SendPassword by default; tests inject a fake. When S7netplus
// doesn't yet expose SendPassword (true for 0.20), we log a one-line warning
// and continue — failure shifts to first per-tag read on a hardened CPU.
await TrySendPlcPasswordAsync(plc, cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
// PR-S7-C5 — pre-flight PUT/GET enablement probe. After a clean OpenAsync, // PR-S7-C5 — pre-flight PUT/GET enablement probe. After a clean OpenAsync,
// issue a tiny 2-byte read against Probe.ProbeAddress (default MW0). Hardened // issue a tiny 2-byte read against Probe.ProbeAddress (default MW0). Hardened
// S7-1200 / S7-1500 CPUs that have PUT/GET communication disabled in TIA // S7-1200 / S7-1500 CPUs that have PUT/GET communication disabled in TIA
@@ -288,6 +368,15 @@ public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
// PR-S7-D2 — drop the post-fan-out tag list so a Reinit can rebuild it cleanly // PR-S7-D2 — drop the post-fan-out tag list so a Reinit can rebuild it cleanly
// without the previous run's UDT leaves leaking into the new tag map. // without the previous run's UDT leaves leaking into the new tag map.
_effectiveTags.Clear(); _effectiveTags.Clear();
// PR-S7-E1 — drop the SZL state so a fresh Plc on Reinit gets fresh CPU info /
// cycle stats / diagnostic-buffer entries. Clearing here keeps the test-supplied
// SzlReader override intact (set before Initialize) so a Shutdown / re-Initialize
// cycle from a unit test can re-use the same fake reader.
_szlCache?.Clear();
_szlCache = null;
// _szlReader: keep an explicit test-supplied reader (set via SzlReader property);
// drop the production one tied to the now-closed Plc so re-Init constructs fresh.
if (_szlReader is S7NetSzlReader) _szlReader = null;
_health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Unknown, _health.LastSuccessfulRead, null); _health = new DriverHealth(DriverState.Unknown, _health.LastSuccessfulRead, null);
return Task.CompletedTask; return Task.CompletedTask;
} }
@@ -308,10 +397,35 @@ public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
public async Task<IReadOnlyList<DataValueSnapshot>> ReadAsync( public async Task<IReadOnlyList<DataValueSnapshot>> ReadAsync(
IReadOnlyList<string> fullReferences, CancellationToken cancellationToken) IReadOnlyList<string> fullReferences, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{ {
var plc = RequirePlc();
var now = DateTime.UtcNow; var now = DateTime.UtcNow;
var results = new DataValueSnapshot[fullReferences.Count]; var results = new DataValueSnapshot[fullReferences.Count];
// PR-S7-E1 — short-circuit @System.* virtual addresses before taking the Plc
// gate. SZL reads don't go through the regular tag map / address parser; they
// dispatch through IS7SzlReader (cached for SzlCacheTtl) and parse with
// S7SzlParser. Doing this first means the test path can read @System.* without
// a Plc connection (the reader is injectable).
var nonSystemIndexes = new List<int>(fullReferences.Count);
for (var i = 0; i < fullReferences.Count; i++)
{
var name = fullReferences[i];
if (S7SystemTags.IsSystemAddress(name))
{
results[i] = await ReadSystemTagAsync(name, now, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
else
{
nonSystemIndexes.Add(i);
}
}
// If every requested reference was a @System.* tag, we're done before touching
// the Plc gate at all — keeps the @System.* surface usable in test setups that
// injected an SzlReader without ever calling InitializeAsync against a real PLC.
if (nonSystemIndexes.Count == 0) return results;
var plc = RequirePlc();
await _gate.WaitAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false); await _gate.WaitAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
try try
{ {
@@ -321,9 +435,9 @@ public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
// (arrays, strings, dates, 64-bit ints, UDT-fanout). Packable tags feed // (arrays, strings, dates, 64-bit ints, UDT-fanout). Packable tags feed
// the block-coalescing planner first (PR-S7-B2); whatever survives as a // the block-coalescing planner first (PR-S7-B2); whatever survives as a
// singleton range falls through to the multi-var packer (PR-S7-B1). // singleton range falls through to the multi-var packer (PR-S7-B1).
var packableIndexes = new List<int>(fullReferences.Count); var packableIndexes = new List<int>(nonSystemIndexes.Count);
var fallbackIndexes = new List<int>(); var fallbackIndexes = new List<int>();
for (var i = 0; i < fullReferences.Count; i++) foreach (var i in nonSystemIndexes)
{ {
var name = fullReferences[i]; var name = fullReferences[i];
if (!_tagsByName.TryGetValue(name, out var tag)) if (!_tagsByName.TryGetValue(name, out var tag))
@@ -770,6 +884,105 @@ public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
}; };
} }
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — read one virtual <c>@System.*</c> address by dispatching through
/// the SZL cache + reader, parsing the raw payload, and projecting the requested
/// scalar field. Surfaces <c>BadNotSupported</c> when the reader returns null
/// (snap7 / S7netplus 0.20 / hardened CPUs that reject SZL); <c>BadNodeIdUnknown</c>
/// when the address starts with <c>@System.</c> but doesn't match a known tag;
/// <c>BadInternalError</c> when the parser throws on a malformed payload.
/// </summary>
private async Task<DataValueSnapshot> ReadSystemTagAsync(string address, DateTime now, CancellationToken ct)
{
if (!S7SystemTags.TryResolve(address, out var descriptor, out var diagBufferIndex) || descriptor is null)
return new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadNodeIdUnknown, null, now);
var reader = _szlReader;
if (reader is null)
{
// No reader wired (driver not initialised + no test override) — surface
// BadNotSupported so a stray @System.* read doesn't masquerade as a code bug.
return new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadNotSupported, null, now);
}
// Cache-front the wire read. When SzlCacheTtl is zero, the cache always misses
// (TimeSpan.Zero < TimeSpan.Zero is false → every entry is stale instantly).
// Lazily create the cache when InitializeAsync hasn't run yet (test seam) so
// repeated reads in a unit test still de-dup against the same cache instance.
_szlCache ??= new S7SzlCache(_options.SzlCacheTtl);
var cache = _szlCache;
byte[]? payload;
try
{
payload = await cache.GetOrFetchAsync(
descriptor.SzlId, descriptor.SzlIndex,
tok => reader.ReadSzlAsync(descriptor.SzlId, descriptor.SzlIndex, tok),
ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (OperationCanceledException) { throw; }
catch
{
return new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadCommunicationError, null, now);
}
if (payload is null)
{
// SZL not supported — snap7 and S7netplus 0.20 both land here.
return new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadNotSupported, null, now);
}
try
{
var value = ProjectSystemTagValue(descriptor, diagBufferIndex, payload);
return new DataValueSnapshot(value, 0u, now, now);
}
catch (ArgumentException)
{
// Malformed SZL payload — surface BadInternalError so a downstream client can
// distinguish "wire failed" from "PLC sent garbage".
return new DataValueSnapshot(null, StatusBadInternalError, null, now);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Project a parsed SZL payload to the scalar value the requested
/// <paramref name="descriptor"/> exposes.
/// </summary>
private object? ProjectSystemTagValue(
S7SystemTags.SystemTagDescriptor descriptor,
int diagBufferIndex,
byte[] payload)
{
switch (descriptor.Kind)
{
case S7SystemTags.SystemTagKind.CpuType:
return S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(payload).CpuType;
case S7SystemTags.SystemTagKind.Firmware:
return S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(payload).Firmware;
case S7SystemTags.SystemTagKind.OrderNo:
return S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(payload).OrderNo;
case S7SystemTags.SystemTagKind.CycleMin:
return S7SzlParser.ParseCycleStats(payload).MinMs;
case S7SystemTags.SystemTagKind.CycleMax:
return S7SzlParser.ParseCycleStats(payload).MaxMs;
case S7SystemTags.SystemTagKind.CycleAvg:
return S7SzlParser.ParseCycleStats(payload).AvgMs;
case S7SystemTags.SystemTagKind.DiagBufferEntry:
var depth = Math.Min(_options.DiagBufferDepth, S7SystemTags.MaxDiagBufferDepth);
if (diagBufferIndex < 0 || diagBufferIndex >= depth)
return null; // out of range — surface as null value with Good status
var entries = S7SzlParser.ParseDiagBuffer(payload, depth);
if (diagBufferIndex >= entries.Count) return null;
var e = entries[diagBufferIndex];
// Render each entry as one human-readable line — keeps the OPC UA surface
// a flat array of strings, which clients can split / grep without needing
// a custom structured DataType. Format is stable so log scrapers can parse it.
return $"{e.OccurrenceUtc:O} | 0x{e.EventId:X4} | prio={e.Priority} | {e.EventText}";
default:
return null;
}
}
/// <summary>Map driver-internal <see cref="S7Area"/> to S7.Net's <see cref="global::S7.Net.DataType"/>.</summary> /// <summary>Map driver-internal <see cref="S7Area"/> to S7.Net's <see cref="global::S7.Net.DataType"/>.</summary>
private static global::S7.Net.DataType MapArea(S7Area area) => area switch private static global::S7.Net.DataType MapArea(S7Area area) => area switch
{ {
@@ -950,6 +1163,73 @@ public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
private global::S7.Net.Plc RequirePlc() => private global::S7.Net.Plc RequirePlc() =>
Plc ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("S7Driver not initialized"); Plc ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("S7Driver not initialized");
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — emit the connection-level password to the freshly-opened PLC.
/// Caller is <see cref="InitializeAsync"/>, immediately after <c>OpenAsync</c> and
/// before <see cref="RunPreflightAsync"/> — that ordering matters because the
/// pre-flight read is exactly the operation a hardened CPU will refuse without an
/// unlock. No-op when <see cref="S7DriverOptions.Password"/> is null/empty (the
/// standard development case). When the underlying S7netplus build doesn't expose
/// <c>SendPassword</c>, surfaces a single warning log and continues — see the
/// "Library limitation" remark on <see cref="S7DriverOptions.Password"/>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <b>No-log invariant:</b> never include the password value in any log, exception
/// message, or diagnostic surface. The host name is logged as the only identifier.
/// </remarks>
private async Task TrySendPlcPasswordAsync(global::S7.Net.Plc plc, CancellationToken ct)
{
var password = _options.Password;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(password)) return;
// Lazily build the gate so tests can pre-inject a fake; production gets the
// reflective gate over the live S7.Net.Plc instance.
_authGate ??= new ReflectionS7PlcAuthGate(plc);
if (!_authGate.SupportsSendPassword)
{
// Library doesn't oblige (S7netplus 0.20). Don't fail Init — emit one
// warning so the operator sees the limitation in Serilog, then continue.
// Hardened CPUs will surface a per-read failure later, which is the same
// shape as a missing PUT/GET enable.
_logger.LogWarning(
"S7 password is set on driver '{DriverInstanceId}' against host '{Host}', " +
"but the linked S7netplus library does not expose SendPassword; " +
"password is being ignored at the wire. Hardened-CPU connect may fail at " +
"first read. See docs/v2/s7.md \"PLC password / protection levels\" for the " +
"library-limitation note.",
DriverInstanceId, _options.Host);
return;
}
try
{
var sent = await _authGate.TrySendPasswordAsync(password, ct).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (sent)
{
// Identifier-only log line — no password leakage.
_logger.LogInformation(
"S7 password sent for {Host} (driver '{DriverInstanceId}', protection {ProtectionLevel}).",
_options.Host, DriverInstanceId, _options.ProtectionLevel);
}
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
throw;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
// Wire reported auth-failed. Wrap in a clean InvalidOperationException so the
// operator sees a typed message rather than a raw S7.Net.PlcException stack;
// inner exception preserved for diagnostics. No password value in the message.
throw new InvalidOperationException(
$"S7 password authentication failed for host '{_options.Host}'. " +
"Check the protection password configured in TIA Portal's Protection & Security pane " +
"and the ProtectionLevel option matches the CPU's actual scheme.",
ex);
}
}
/// <summary> /// <summary>
/// PR-S7-C5 — issue the post-<c>OpenAsync</c> pre-flight probe read against /// PR-S7-C5 — issue the post-<c>OpenAsync</c> pre-flight probe read against
/// <see cref="S7ProbeOptions.ProbeAddress"/> and translate a "PUT/GET disabled" /// <see cref="S7ProbeOptions.ProbeAddress"/> and translate a "PUT/GET disabled"
@@ -1080,6 +1360,53 @@ public sealed class S7Driver(S7DriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId)
IsAlarm: false, IsAlarm: false,
WriteIdempotent: t.WriteIdempotent)); WriteIdempotent: t.WriteIdempotent));
} }
// PR-S7-E1 / #302 — surface the SZL-backed @System.* virtual tags under a
// Diagnostics/ sub-folder when the operator has opted in. Variables are
// ViewOnly (SZL is read-only) and never historized / alarming.
if (_options.ExposeSystemTags)
{
var diag = folder.Folder(S7SystemTags.FolderName, S7SystemTags.FolderName);
// Static descriptors: CpuType / Firmware / OrderNo + 3 cycle-time scalars.
foreach (var d in S7SystemTags.Descriptors)
{
// Browse name strips the "@System." prefix — operators see "CpuType",
// "CycleMs.Min", etc. The full reference (used by ReadAsync) keeps the
// raw "@System.*" form so the system-tag short-circuit fires.
var browseName = d.Address[S7SystemTags.Prefix.Length..];
diag.Variable(browseName, browseName, new DriverAttributeInfo(
FullName: d.Address,
DriverDataType: d.DriverDataType,
IsArray: false,
ArrayDim: null,
SecurityClass: SecurityClassification.ViewOnly,
IsHistorized: false,
IsAlarm: false,
WriteIdempotent: false));
}
// Diagnostic-buffer entries — depth comes from S7DriverOptions.DiagBufferDepth
// (capped at MaxDiagBufferDepth = 50 to keep the browse tree readable).
var depth = Math.Clamp(_options.DiagBufferDepth, 0, S7SystemTags.MaxDiagBufferDepth);
if (depth > 0)
{
var bufFolder = diag.Folder("DiagBuffer", "DiagBuffer");
for (var i = 0; i < depth; i++)
{
var browse = $"Entry[{i}]";
var fullRef = $"{S7SystemTags.DiagBufferEntryPrefix}{i}]";
bufFolder.Variable(browse, browse, new DriverAttributeInfo(
FullName: fullRef,
DriverDataType: DriverDataType.String,
IsArray: false,
ArrayDim: null,
SecurityClass: SecurityClassification.ViewOnly,
IsHistorized: false,
IsAlarm: false,
WriteIdempotent: false));
}
}
}
return Task.CompletedTask; return Task.CompletedTask;
} }
@@ -85,6 +85,14 @@ public static class S7DriverFactoryExtensions
fallback: TsapMode.Auto), fallback: TsapMode.Auto),
LocalTsap = dto.LocalTsap, LocalTsap = dto.LocalTsap,
RemoteTsap = dto.RemoteTsap, RemoteTsap = dto.RemoteTsap,
// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — connection-level password + declarative protection-level
// hint. Password defaults to null (no auth) per the no-log invariant; an
// explicit empty-string in JSON also collapses to null so a "Password": ""
// typo doesn't try to send a 0-byte password to the PLC. ProtectionLevel
// defaults to Auto when the field is absent.
Password = string.IsNullOrEmpty(dto.Password) ? null : dto.Password,
ProtectionLevel = ParseEnum<ProtectionLevel>(dto.ProtectionLevel, driverInstanceId,
"ProtectionLevel", fallback: ProtectionLevel.Auto),
ScanGroupIntervals = scanGroupMap, ScanGroupIntervals = scanGroupMap,
// PR-S7-D2 — UDT layout declarations referenced by tags whose UdtName is set. // PR-S7-D2 — UDT layout declarations referenced by tags whose UdtName is set.
// Empty list when the config doesn't declare any UDTs (the typical scalar-only case). // Empty list when the config doesn't declare any UDTs (the typical scalar-only case).
@@ -264,6 +272,8 @@ public static class S7DriverFactoryExtensions
RemoteTsap = options.RemoteTsap, RemoteTsap = options.RemoteTsap,
ScanGroupIntervals = options.ScanGroupIntervals, ScanGroupIntervals = options.ScanGroupIntervals,
Udts = options.Udts, Udts = options.Udts,
Password = options.Password,
ProtectionLevel = options.ProtectionLevel,
}; };
} }
@@ -332,6 +342,26 @@ public static class S7DriverFactoryExtensions
/// See <c>docs/v2/s7.md</c> "UDT / STRUCT support" section. /// See <c>docs/v2/s7.md</c> "UDT / STRUCT support" section.
/// </summary> /// </summary>
public List<S7UdtDto>? Udts { get; init; } public List<S7UdtDto>? Udts { get; init; }
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — connection-level password emitted to the PLC right
/// after <c>OpenAsync</c> succeeds and before the pre-flight PUT/GET probe
/// runs. Default <c>null</c> = no password is sent (the standard case).
/// <b>Secret:</b> never logged. See <c>docs/v2/s7.md</c> §"PLC password /
/// protection levels" for the no-log invariant and the S7netplus 0.20
/// library-limitation note.
/// </summary>
public string? Password { get; init; }
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — declarative hint about the protection scheme on the
/// target PLC. One of <c>Auto</c> (default), <c>None</c>, <c>Level1</c>,
/// <c>Level2</c>, <c>Level3</c> (S7-300/400), or <c>ConnectionMechanism</c>
/// (S7-1200/1500). Surfaced via the driver-diagnostics RPC so a
/// misconfigured "level 3 PLC seen as level 1" deployment is spottable
/// from the Admin UI.
/// </summary>
public string? ProtectionLevel { get; init; }
} }
internal sealed class S7TagDto internal sealed class S7TagDto
@@ -151,6 +151,132 @@ public sealed class S7DriverOptions
/// including the 4-level nesting cap and the Optimized-DB prerequisite. /// including the 4-level nesting cap and the Optimized-DB prerequisite.
/// </summary> /// </summary>
public IReadOnlyList<S7UdtDefinition> Udts { get; init; } = []; public IReadOnlyList<S7UdtDefinition> Udts { get; init; } = [];
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 / #302 — when <c>true</c>, <see cref="S7Driver.DiscoverAsync"/> emits a
/// <c>Diagnostics/</c> sub-folder under the driver root containing virtual
/// <c>@System.*</c> variables backed by SZL (System Status List) reads:
/// <c>CpuType</c>, <c>Firmware</c>, <c>OrderNo</c> (SZL 0x0011),
/// <c>CycleMs.Min</c> / <c>.Max</c> / <c>.Avg</c> (SZL 0x0132 / 0x0432), and
/// <c>DiagBuffer/Entry[0..N]</c> (SZL 0x00A0). Default <c>false</c> — operators opt
/// in per driver instance because the virtual nodes show up in OPC UA Browse
/// under every connected client.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// S7netplus 0.20 doesn't yet expose a public <c>ReadSzlAsync</c>, so the
/// in-process default surfaces every SZL read as <c>BadNotSupported</c>. The
/// tag tree still lights up — operators see the structure and can wire
/// clients to it — only the values come back as not-supported. Tests inject
/// a fake reader that returns golden bytes to prove the dispatch + parser
/// + cache path works end-to-end. snap7 also doesn't implement SZL, so the
/// integration-test surface inherits the same not-supported behaviour.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public bool ExposeSystemTags { get; init; } = false;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — number of diagnostic-buffer entries to discover under
/// <c>Diagnostics/DiagBuffer/Entry[N]</c>. Capped at
/// <see cref="Szl.S7SystemTags.MaxDiagBufferDepth"/> = 50; the default 10 mirrors
/// the plan-section's "max-10 cap" guidance and matches typical SZL 0x00A0
/// PDU-size budgets. Ignored when <see cref="ExposeSystemTags"/> is <c>false</c>.
/// </summary>
public int DiagBufferDepth { get; init; } = Szl.S7SystemTags.DefaultDiagBufferDepth;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — TTL for the <see cref="Szl.S7SzlCache"/> that fronts every SZL
/// wire request. Diagnostics shouldn't poll faster than this anyway; the
/// default 5 s window means a burst of <c>@System.*</c> subscriptions ticking
/// at 100 ms each produces exactly one wire request per distinct SZL ID per
/// 5-second window. Set to <see cref="TimeSpan.Zero"/> to disable caching
/// (every read goes to the wire) — only useful for diagnostics tests.
/// </summary>
public TimeSpan SzlCacheTtl { get; init; } = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — connection-level password emitted to the PLC right after
/// <c>OpenAsync</c> succeeds and before the pre-flight PUT/GET probe runs. Used
/// for hardened S7-300/400 deployments running protection level 1, 2 or 3, and
/// for S7-1200/1500 deployments that have a connection-mechanism password set
/// in TIA Portal's "Protection &amp; Security" pane. Default <c>null</c> = no
/// password is sent (the standard case for development PLCs and freshly-flashed
/// CPUs without a protection password).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>No-log invariant.</b> <see cref="Password"/> is a secret. The driver
/// MUST NOT log it; the override on <see cref="ToString"/> below redacts
/// the field as <c>***</c>, and any new logging surface that touches an
/// <see cref="S7DriverOptions"/> instance must continue to do the same.
/// See <c>docs/v2/s7.md</c> §"PLC password / protection levels".
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Library limitation.</b> S7netplus 0.20 does not expose a public
/// <c>SendPassword</c> method. When <see cref="Password"/> is set on a
/// driver linked against a library version that lacks the API, the driver
/// logs a one-line warning at Init time and continues — the connection
/// succeeds at the COTP layer but a hardened CPU may then refuse the very
/// first read with a "function not allowed" PDU. The driver discovers the
/// method reflectively (<see cref="ReflectionS7PlcAuthGate"/>), so a future
/// S7netplus minor release that adds <c>SendPasswordAsync(string,
/// CancellationToken)</c> or <c>SendPassword(string)</c> gets used
/// automatically without requiring a code change in this driver.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public string? Password { get; init; }
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — declarative hint about the protection scheme the operator
/// expects on the target PLC. The driver currently uses this for diagnostics
/// and forward-compat (the value is exposed via the driver-diagnostics RPC
/// surface so a misconfigured "level 3 PLC seen as level 1" deployment can be
/// spotted from the Admin UI), and as a place to hang per-protection-level
/// behaviour as S7netplus matures. Default <see cref="ProtectionLevel.Auto"/> =
/// no hint, which matches existing behaviour.
/// </summary>
public ProtectionLevel ProtectionLevel { get; init; } = ProtectionLevel.Auto;
/// <summary>
/// Override the auto-generated reference-typed <c>ToString</c> with one that
/// redacts <see cref="Password"/>. Mirrors the FOCAS-F4-d
/// <c>FocasDeviceOptions.PrintMembers</c> pattern (which uses positional-record
/// plumbing); this class is a reference type, so an explicit override is the
/// cheap equivalent. Field set kept compact — only the fields an operator is
/// likely to want in a log line are emitted.
/// </summary>
public override string ToString() =>
$"S7DriverOptions {{ Host = {Host}, Port = {Port}, CpuType = {CpuType}, " +
$"Rack = {Rack}, Slot = {Slot}, TsapMode = {TsapMode}, " +
$"ProtectionLevel = {ProtectionLevel}, Password = {(Password is null ? "<null>" : "***")} }}";
}
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — declarative hint about the protection scheme on the target
/// PLC. S7-300/400 firmware exposes three CPU-side levels via the
/// <c>SFC 109 / 110</c> family; S7-1200/1500 firmware uses TIA Portal's "Connection
/// Mechanism" instead (a single PUT/GET-vs-password switch with a different wire
/// handshake). The enum carries both vocabularies and Auto for the no-hint case.
/// </summary>
public enum ProtectionLevel
{
/// <summary>No declared protection scheme — driver doesn't surface a hint. Default.</summary>
Auto,
/// <summary>Operator asserts the PLC has no protection set. Equivalent to Auto for the wire path; surfaces as "None" in diagnostics.</summary>
None,
/// <summary>S7-300/400 protection level 1 — write-protected unless password is supplied.</summary>
Level1,
/// <summary>S7-300/400 protection level 2 — read- and write-protected unless password is supplied.</summary>
Level2,
/// <summary>S7-300/400 protection level 3 — full protection, all reads/writes require password.</summary>
Level3,
/// <summary>S7-1200/1500 "Connection Mechanism" password gate (TIA Portal Protection &amp; Security pane).</summary>
ConnectionMechanism,
} }
/// <summary> /// <summary>
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
using System.Reflection;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — narrow seam covering the "send a password to a hardened CPU"
/// wire path. <see cref="S7Driver.InitializeAsync"/> calls
/// <see cref="TrySendPasswordAsync"/> after <c>OpenAsync</c> succeeds and before the
/// pre-flight PUT/GET probe runs, so a hardened S7-1500 / ET 200SP CPU that gates
/// reads behind a connection-level password unlocks before the probe drops it.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The runtime implementation (<see cref="ReflectionS7PlcAuthGate"/>) discovers
/// the underlying <c>S7.Net.Plc.SendPassword</c> / <c>SendPasswordAsync</c>
/// methods reflectively because S7netplus 0.20 doesn't yet expose them in a
/// strongly-typed surface — the seam keeps this driver compiling against the
/// current pinned package version while still calling whatever the next minor
/// release ships. When neither method exists,
/// <see cref="SupportsSendPassword"/> stays <c>false</c> and
/// <see cref="TrySendPasswordAsync"/> is a no-op so a misconfigured "Password
/// set, library doesn't oblige" deployment surfaces as a one-line warning at
/// Init rather than a hard failure (failure shifts to first per-tag read on the
/// hardened CPU, which is the same shape as if the operator had forgotten to
/// enable PUT/GET).
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Tests inject a fake to exercise both branches without touching the live
/// S7netplus stack.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
internal interface IS7PlcAuthGate
{
/// <summary>
/// <c>true</c> when the underlying S7netplus <c>Plc</c> exposes a public
/// <c>SendPassword(string)</c> or <c>SendPasswordAsync(string, CancellationToken)</c>
/// method. <c>false</c> on S7netplus 0.20 (which has no such surface).
/// </summary>
bool SupportsSendPassword { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Send <paramref name="password"/> to the connected PLC. No-op (and returns
/// <c>false</c>) when <see cref="SupportsSendPassword"/> is <c>false</c>;
/// returns <c>true</c> after a successful send. Throws cleanly when the wire
/// reports auth-failed — <see cref="S7Driver.InitializeAsync"/> wraps the
/// throw into a typed <see cref="InvalidOperationException"/> so the operator
/// sees a "password authentication failed" message rather than a generic
/// <c>S7.Net.PlcException</c>.
/// </summary>
Task<bool> TrySendPasswordAsync(string password, CancellationToken cancellationToken);
}
/// <summary>
/// Production <see cref="IS7PlcAuthGate"/> backed by reflection over the S7netplus
/// <c>S7.Net.Plc</c> instance. S7netplus 0.20 does NOT expose a
/// <c>SendPassword</c>; the reflection probe survives that gracefully and a future
/// 0.21+ that adds the API gets called automatically without a code change here.
/// </summary>
internal sealed class ReflectionS7PlcAuthGate : IS7PlcAuthGate
{
private readonly object _plc;
private readonly MethodInfo? _syncMethod;
private readonly MethodInfo? _asyncMethod;
public ReflectionS7PlcAuthGate(object plc)
{
_plc = plc ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(plc));
var type = plc.GetType();
// Probe both shapes: synchronous void SendPassword(string) and async
// Task SendPasswordAsync(string, CancellationToken). Either is acceptable;
// the async overload wins when both exist (no thread-block on init).
_asyncMethod = type.GetMethod(
"SendPasswordAsync",
BindingFlags.Instance | BindingFlags.Public,
binder: null,
types: [typeof(string), typeof(CancellationToken)],
modifiers: null);
_syncMethod = type.GetMethod(
"SendPassword",
BindingFlags.Instance | BindingFlags.Public,
binder: null,
types: [typeof(string)],
modifiers: null);
}
public bool SupportsSendPassword => _asyncMethod is not null || _syncMethod is not null;
public async Task<bool> TrySendPasswordAsync(string password, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(password);
if (_asyncMethod is not null)
{
// Unwrap TargetInvocationException so the caller sees the real S7.Net.PlcException
// (or whatever the library threw) rather than the reflection wrapper.
try
{
var result = _asyncMethod.Invoke(_plc, [password, cancellationToken]);
if (result is Task task)
{
await task.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
return true;
}
catch (TargetInvocationException tie) when (tie.InnerException is not null)
{
throw tie.InnerException;
}
}
if (_syncMethod is not null)
{
try
{
_syncMethod.Invoke(_plc, [password]);
return true;
}
catch (TargetInvocationException tie) when (tie.InnerException is not null)
{
throw tie.InnerException;
}
}
return false;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — abstraction over SZL (System Status List) wire reads. The driver dispatches
/// <c>@System.*</c> virtual reads through this interface so the parser code never depends
/// on a specific transport. Concrete implementations:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>
/// <see cref="S7NetSzlReader"/> — the production implementation. S7netplus 0.20
/// does not expose a public <c>ReadSzlAsync</c> API (the SZL request builder is
/// internal), so this implementation returns <c>null</c> on every call —
/// surfacing as <c>BadNotSupported</c> at the OPC UA layer. Replace once
/// S7netplus exposes a public surface or we ship a raw-PDU helper.
/// </item>
/// <item>
/// A test fake that returns canned byte payloads — used by the
/// driver-side unit tests in <c>tests/.../Szl/</c>.
/// </item>
/// </list>
/// </summary>
public interface IS7SzlReader
{
/// <summary>
/// Read SZL <paramref name="szlId"/> at <paramref name="szlIndex"/> and return the
/// payload <em>without</em> the S7comm parameter / data headers — the response is
/// positioned at the SZL header (<c>SzlId | SzlIndex | LenThdr | NDr</c>) so it can
/// feed <see cref="S7SzlParser"/> directly.
/// </summary>
/// <returns>
/// Byte payload on success, or <c>null</c> when the SZL read is unsupported (snap7,
/// S7netplus 0.20 without raw PDU helper, hardened CPUs that reject the SZL
/// function code). The caller surfaces <c>null</c> as <c>BadNotSupported</c>.
/// </returns>
Task<byte[]?> ReadSzlAsync(ushort szlId, ushort szlIndex, CancellationToken cancellationToken);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
using S7.Net;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — production <see cref="IS7SzlReader"/> backed by S7netplus's
/// <see cref="Plc"/> connection. S7netplus 0.20 builds SZL request packages
/// internally (<c>SzlReadRequestPackage</c> / <c>WriteSzlReadRequest</c>) but does
/// <b>not</b> expose a public <c>ReadSzlAsync</c> API, so this implementation
/// currently returns <c>null</c> on every call — the SZL feature surface ships as
/// <c>BadNotSupported</c> through the OPC UA address space until either
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>S7netplus publishes a stable public SZL surface (tracked upstream), or</item>
/// <item>We ship a raw S7comm PDU helper that side-steps the library.</item>
/// </list>
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The driver-side parser code (<see cref="S7SzlParser"/>) is fully tested
/// against golden bytes regardless — when the wire path lights up the parser
/// starts producing real CPU info / cycle stats / diagnostic-buffer entries
/// without further changes. Tests inject a fake <see cref="IS7SzlReader"/>
/// to exercise the dispatch + caching paths.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Why no raw socket today?</b> S7netplus's <c>_stream</c> + <c>tcpClient</c>
/// fields are <c>private</c> and the request-builder helpers are <c>internal</c>.
/// Reflecting into them would break on every minor S7netplus release; the cost-
/// benefit only flips once the SZL feature has live customer demand.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class S7NetSzlReader(Plc plc) : IS7SzlReader
{
#pragma warning disable IDE0052 // unused while raw-PDU support is gated behind public S7netplus API
private readonly Plc _plc = plc ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(plc));
#pragma warning restore IDE0052
/// <inheritdoc />
public Task<byte[]?> ReadSzlAsync(ushort szlId, ushort szlIndex, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
// S7netplus 0.20 doesn't expose a public ReadSzlAsync — surface every SZL request
// as "not supported" so the OPC UA layer maps it to BadNotSupported. The parser
// code is wired and tested; flipping this method to a real implementation is the
// only change needed when S7netplus catches up. Synchronous return because
// there's no I/O to await — keep the signature for future-proofing.
cancellationToken.ThrowIfCancellationRequested();
return Task.FromResult<byte[]?>(null);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — virtual <c>@System.*</c> address map. Each entry pairs the public
/// address (e.g. <c>@System.CpuType</c>) with the SZL ID + index it dispatches
/// against and a field-extractor that pulls the requested scalar out of the parsed
/// payload. The driver short-circuits any <see cref="S7Driver.ReadAsync"/> reference
/// whose name starts with <c>@System.</c> through this table — there's no Plc
/// round-trip for non-SZL paths.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// The map is <em>static</em> because the SZL surface doesn't change between
/// deployments — every CPU answers the same SZL IDs (or returns "not supported"
/// uniformly). The diagnostic-buffer entries <c>@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[N]</c>
/// are not in the table; the driver computes their address dynamically from the
/// parsed entry list because the depth is configurable via
/// <see cref="S7DriverOptions.DiagBufferDepth"/>.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public static class S7SystemTags
{
/// <summary>Prefix every virtual system tag carries on the wire.</summary>
public const string Prefix = "@System.";
/// <summary>Browse-tree folder name where the driver's discovery step emits the system-tag variables.</summary>
public const string FolderName = "Diagnostics";
/// <summary>Maximum diagnostic-buffer entries the driver discovers / reads (capped to keep the OPC UA browse tree readable).</summary>
public const int MaxDiagBufferDepth = 50;
/// <summary>Default diagnostic-buffer depth — matches the plan-section's "10 entries" baseline.</summary>
public const int DefaultDiagBufferDepth = 10;
/// <summary>Address prefix for diagnostic-buffer entries: <c>@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[N]</c>.</summary>
public const string DiagBufferEntryPrefix = "@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[";
/// <summary>OPC UA data type each system tag projects as. Used by both the driver's discovery step and its read-result boxing.</summary>
public sealed record SystemTagDescriptor(
string Address,
ushort SzlId,
ushort SzlIndex,
DriverDataType DriverDataType,
SystemTagKind Kind);
/// <summary>What kind of value the descriptor extracts from its SZL payload.</summary>
public enum SystemTagKind
{
CpuType,
Firmware,
OrderNo,
CycleMin,
CycleMax,
CycleAvg,
DiagBufferEntry, // resolved dynamically via the entry index encoded in the address
}
/// <summary>Static descriptors for the non-buffer system tags (CPU info + cycle-time scalars).</summary>
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<SystemTagDescriptor> Descriptors =
[
new("@System.CpuType", S7SzlIds.ModuleIdentification, 0x0000, DriverDataType.String, SystemTagKind.CpuType),
new("@System.Firmware", S7SzlIds.ModuleIdentification, 0x0000, DriverDataType.String, SystemTagKind.Firmware),
new("@System.OrderNo", S7SzlIds.ModuleIdentification, 0x0000, DriverDataType.String, SystemTagKind.OrderNo),
new("@System.CycleMs.Min", S7SzlIds.CpuStatusData, S7SzlIds.CpuStatusCycleTimeIndex, DriverDataType.Float64, SystemTagKind.CycleMin),
new("@System.CycleMs.Max", S7SzlIds.CpuStatusData, S7SzlIds.CpuStatusCycleTimeIndex, DriverDataType.Float64, SystemTagKind.CycleMax),
new("@System.CycleMs.Avg", S7SzlIds.CpuStatusData, S7SzlIds.CpuStatusCycleTimeIndex, DriverDataType.Float64, SystemTagKind.CycleAvg),
];
/// <summary>True when <paramref name="address"/> is a recognised virtual system address.</summary>
public static bool IsSystemAddress(string address)
=> address is not null && address.StartsWith(Prefix, StringComparison.Ordinal);
/// <summary>
/// Resolve a virtual address to a (SzlId, SzlIndex, kind, optional buffer index)
/// dispatch tuple. Returns <c>false</c> when the address starts with the prefix but
/// doesn't match a known descriptor — the caller surfaces that as
/// <c>BadNodeIdUnknown</c>.
/// </summary>
public static bool TryResolve(string address, out SystemTagDescriptor? descriptor, out int diagBufferIndex)
{
descriptor = null;
diagBufferIndex = -1;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(address)) return false;
// Diagnostic-buffer entries: @System.DiagBuffer.Entry[N]
if (address.StartsWith(DiagBufferEntryPrefix, StringComparison.Ordinal) && address.EndsWith(']'))
{
var idxStr = address[DiagBufferEntryPrefix.Length..^1];
if (!int.TryParse(idxStr, out var idx) || idx < 0 || idx >= MaxDiagBufferDepth)
return false;
diagBufferIndex = idx;
descriptor = new SystemTagDescriptor(
address,
S7SzlIds.DiagnosticBuffer,
0x0000,
DriverDataType.String,
SystemTagKind.DiagBufferEntry);
return true;
}
foreach (var d in Descriptors)
{
if (string.Equals(d.Address, address, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
descriptor = d;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — short-TTL cache of SZL responses keyed by <c>(SzlId, SzlIndex)</c>.
/// A diagnostics-only feature should never hammer the comms mailbox; one read per
/// SZL ID per <see cref="Ttl"/> window is the intended ceiling. Cache state is
/// thread-safe — <see cref="GetOrFetchAsync"/> serialises concurrent fetchers per
/// key so a burst of <c>@System.*</c> reads from one OPC UA subscription tick
/// produces exactly one wire request per distinct SZL.
/// </summary>
public sealed class S7SzlCache(TimeSpan ttl, Func<DateTime>? clock = null)
{
private readonly TimeSpan _ttl = ttl;
private readonly Func<DateTime> _clock = clock ?? (() => DateTime.UtcNow);
private readonly object _gate = new();
private readonly Dictionary<(ushort SzlId, ushort SzlIndex), CacheEntry> _entries = new();
/// <summary>Configured TTL — exposed for diagnostics / test assertions.</summary>
public TimeSpan Ttl => _ttl;
/// <summary>
/// Look up <paramref name="szlId"/> / <paramref name="szlIndex"/> in the cache; on
/// miss or stale entry, invoke <paramref name="fetcher"/> exactly once and store the
/// result. Negative cache (null payload) is intentionally <em>also</em> cached for
/// the TTL window — repeatedly hammering a CPU that has already said "not supported"
/// wouldn't help anything.
/// </summary>
public async Task<byte[]?> GetOrFetchAsync(
ushort szlId,
ushort szlIndex,
Func<CancellationToken, Task<byte[]?>> fetcher,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(fetcher);
var key = (szlId, szlIndex);
var now = _clock();
// Phase 1: cache hit — return without taking any locks beyond the dictionary lookup.
lock (_gate)
{
if (_entries.TryGetValue(key, out var hit) && now - hit.FetchedAtUtc < _ttl)
return hit.Payload;
}
// Phase 2: miss — fetch outside the lock so concurrent keys don't serialize on
// each other. We accept a small race where two callers both miss + both fetch on
// the same key; the second store wins, which is fine for a TTL cache.
var payload = await fetcher(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
lock (_gate)
{
_entries[key] = new CacheEntry(payload, _clock());
}
return payload;
}
/// <summary>Drop every cached entry — call on driver shutdown / reinit so a fresh CPU advertises fresh SZL.</summary>
public void Clear()
{
lock (_gate) _entries.Clear();
}
private readonly record struct CacheEntry(byte[]? Payload, DateTime FetchedAtUtc);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — SZL (System Status List) IDs surfaced through the driver's virtual
/// <c>@System.*</c> address space. SZL is the S7comm "System Status List" sub-protocol
/// documented in the Siemens function manual (Entry ID 6ES7810-4CA08-8BW1) — every
/// S7-300 / S7-400 / S7-1200 / S7-1500 CPU answers SZL queries with metadata about
/// itself: CPU type / order number / firmware (SZL 0x0011), cycle-time min/max/avg
/// (SZL 0x0132 / 0x0432), and the diagnostic-buffer ring (SZL 0x00A0).
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// IDs are 16-bit big-endian on the wire. The driver pairs each ID with an SZL
/// <em>index</em> (also 16-bit) — most diagnostic SZLs accept index <c>0</c>;
/// the diagnostic-buffer SZL accepts index <c>0..N-1</c> to address a specific
/// entry but the driver always reads index <c>0</c> and parses the full ring
/// in one shot.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// S7netplus 0.20 has internal SZL request building (<c>SzlReadRequestPackage</c> /
/// <c>WriteSzlReadRequest</c>) but does not expose a public <c>ReadSzlAsync</c> API.
/// The driver therefore goes through <see cref="IS7SzlReader"/>, whose default
/// <see cref="S7NetSzlReader"/> implementation surfaces every SZL read as
/// "not supported" until S7netplus exposes the public surface or we ship a
/// raw-PDU helper. snap7 doesn't implement SZL at all so the integration profile
/// exercises the same not-supported path.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public static class S7SzlIds
{
/// <summary>SZL ID 0x0011 — module identification: CPU type, MLFB / order number, firmware version.</summary>
public const ushort ModuleIdentification = 0x0011;
/// <summary>SZL ID 0x0132 — CPU status data including cycle-time stats. Index 0x0005 carries the cycle-time record.</summary>
public const ushort CpuStatusData = 0x0132;
/// <summary>SZL ID 0x0132 sub-index 0x0005 — cycle-time statistics record.</summary>
public const ushort CpuStatusCycleTimeIndex = 0x0005;
/// <summary>SZL ID 0x0432 — extended CPU status data; index 0x0001 carries the cycle-time record on S7-1500.</summary>
public const ushort CpuStatusDataExtended = 0x0432;
/// <summary>SZL ID 0x00A0 — diagnostic buffer ring (most-recent entry first). Index 0 returns up to N records depending on PDU budget.</summary>
public const ushort DiagnosticBuffer = 0x00A0;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
using System.Buffers.Binary;
using System.Text;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — pure parsers for the SZL (System Status List) response payloads the
/// driver dispatches against <c>@System.*</c> virtual addresses. Every parser takes a
/// byte payload <em>without</em> the S7comm transport envelope (parameter / data
/// headers stripped already by <see cref="IS7SzlReader"/>) and returns a strongly-typed
/// record. The byte layouts below match the Siemens function manual (Entry ID
/// 6ES7810-4CA08-8BW1) and the open-source <c>snap7</c> reference (the source of truth
/// for unofficial layouts) — see <c>docs/v2/s7.md</c> "CPU diagnostics (SZL)" for the
/// wire-level field-by-field map.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>Common SZL payload header</b> (8 bytes):
/// <code>
/// u16 SzlId // BE — echoes the requested SZL ID
/// u16 SzlIndex // BE — echoes the requested SZL index
/// u16 LenThdr // BE — bytes per record
/// u16 NDr // BE — number of records following
/// </code>
/// Records follow contiguously, total <c>LenThdr * NDr</c> bytes.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// All multi-byte integers are big-endian. Fixed-width strings (MLFB, FW version)
/// are space-padded ASCII; the parser trims trailing whitespace and NULs.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public static class S7SzlParser
{
/// <summary>Length of the common SZL response header in bytes.</summary>
public const int HeaderLength = 8;
/// <summary>Hard upper bound on diagnostic-buffer entries returned in one parse — caps test allocations even if a malformed payload claims a huge count.</summary>
public const int MaxDiagBufferEntriesPerResponse = 256;
/// <summary>
/// Parse SZL 0x0011 (module identification) — produces the CPU type / order number /
/// firmware version triple. The SZL contains multiple records keyed by an index in
/// the first 2 bytes of each record:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><c>0x0001</c> — module identification (MLFB / order number)</item>
/// <item><c>0x0006</c> — basic firmware</item>
/// <item><c>0x0007</c> — basic hardware (CPU type derived from MLFB)</item>
/// </list>
/// Each record is 28 bytes: 2-byte index, 20-byte MLFB (ASCII, space-padded), 2-byte
/// BGTyp, 2-byte Ausbg1 (firmware big-version), 2-byte Ausbg2 (firmware small-version
/// / patch).
/// </summary>
public static S7CpuInfo ParseCpuInfo(byte[] payload)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(payload);
EnsureHeader(payload, out _, out _, out var lenThdr, out var nDr);
// Each module-identification record is 28 bytes per Siemens. Anything else is a
// protocol-level mismatch — surface it loudly rather than silently mis-decoding.
if (lenThdr != 28)
throw new ArgumentException(
$"S7 SZL 0x0011 expected record length 28, got {lenThdr}", nameof(payload));
var expected = HeaderLength + lenThdr * nDr;
if (payload.Length < expected)
throw new ArgumentException(
$"S7 SZL 0x0011 payload truncated: header claims {nDr} × {lenThdr} byte records " +
$"({expected} bytes total) but buffer is {payload.Length}", nameof(payload));
string? mlfb = null;
string? fw = null;
string? cpuType = null;
for (var i = 0; i < nDr; i++)
{
var off = HeaderLength + i * lenThdr;
var idx = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(off, 2));
// Fields per Siemens function manual §"SSL-ID 0011H":
// index (2) | MLFB (20) | BGTyp (2) | Ausbg1 (2) | Ausbg2 (2)
var mlfbBytes = payload.AsSpan(off + 2, 20);
var ausbg1 = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(off + 24, 2));
var ausbg2 = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(off + 26, 2));
switch (idx)
{
case 0x0001:
mlfb = TrimAscii(mlfbBytes);
// CPU type: prefer the dedicated record if present, else derive from MLFB
// (the prefix before the first space, e.g. "6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0" → CPU 1516-3 PN/DP
// — we surface the raw MLFB and let docs map to the marketing name).
cpuType ??= DeriveCpuTypeFromMlfb(mlfb);
break;
case 0x0006:
// Firmware version: high byte of Ausbg1 = major, low byte of Ausbg1 = minor,
// high byte of Ausbg2 = patch. Encoded as two ASCII chars in some firmwares;
// the manual normalises to "Vmajor.minor.patch".
fw = $"V{(ausbg1 >> 8) & 0xFF}.{ausbg1 & 0xFF}.{(ausbg2 >> 8) & 0xFF}";
break;
case 0x0007:
// Module-identification "basic hardware" — some CPUs surface the friendly
// CPU name here as ASCII inside the MLFB slot. Override only if the field
// looks like a real string (non-empty, printable).
var hwName = TrimAscii(mlfbBytes);
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(hwName)) cpuType = hwName;
break;
}
}
return new S7CpuInfo(
CpuType: cpuType ?? "(unknown)",
Firmware: fw ?? "(unknown)",
OrderNo: mlfb ?? "(unknown)");
}
/// <summary>
/// Parse SZL 0x0132 / 0x0432 (CPU status data — cycle-time record). The cycle-time
/// record carries 6 × UInt32 BE values starting at offset 4 of the record:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>Reserved (2 bytes index echo)</item>
/// <item>Reserved (2 bytes)</item>
/// <item>CycleAvg ms (UInt32 BE)</item>
/// <item>CycleMin ms (UInt32 BE)</item>
/// <item>CycleMax ms (UInt32 BE)</item>
/// <item>… padding</item>
/// </list>
/// The driver pulls the first record (index <c>0x0005</c> on S7-300/400/1200,
/// index <c>0x0001</c> on S7-1500's 0x0432) and reports the three cycle-time
/// scalars in milliseconds as <see cref="double"/>s — matching the OPC UA Float64
/// representation in <c>DriverDataType.Float64</c>.
/// </summary>
public static S7CycleStats ParseCycleStats(byte[] payload)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(payload);
EnsureHeader(payload, out _, out _, out var lenThdr, out var nDr);
if (nDr < 1)
throw new ArgumentException(
"S7 SZL cycle-time response has no records", nameof(payload));
if (lenThdr < 16)
throw new ArgumentException(
$"S7 SZL cycle-time record too short: {lenThdr} bytes; need ≥ 16", nameof(payload));
var expected = HeaderLength + lenThdr;
if (payload.Length < expected)
throw new ArgumentException(
$"S7 SZL cycle-time payload truncated: need {expected} bytes, got {payload.Length}", nameof(payload));
var recOff = HeaderLength;
// Layout (per Siemens function manual §"SSL-ID 0132H, Index 5"):
// u16 index | u16 reserved | u32 avgMs | u32 minMs | u32 maxMs
var avg = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(recOff + 4, 4));
var min = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(recOff + 8, 4));
var max = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt32BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(recOff + 12, 4));
return new S7CycleStats(MinMs: min, MaxMs: max, AvgMs: avg);
}
/// <summary>
/// Parse SZL 0x00A0 (diagnostic buffer). Each record is 20 bytes:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>EventId (UInt16 BE) — Siemens-defined event code, see manual</item>
/// <item>Priority (UInt8) — alarm priority class 026 (S7-1500: 026)</item>
/// <item>OB number (UInt8) — OB the event triggered (or 0 if no OB)</item>
/// <item>DatId (UInt16 BE) — event-class group (FB / OB / async / …)</item>
/// <item>Info1 (UInt16 BE) — event-specific extra info (e.g. block number)</item>
/// <item>Info2 (UInt32 BE) — event-specific extra info</item>
/// <item>TimeStamp (8 bytes BCD — IEC year/month/day/hour/minute/second/ms)</item>
/// </list>
/// Returns <em>up to</em> <paramref name="maxEntries"/> entries (capped at
/// <see cref="MaxDiagBufferEntriesPerResponse"/>) so a malformed payload claiming
/// a huge count can't blow the test allocator.
/// </summary>
public static IReadOnlyList<S7DiagBufferEntry> ParseDiagBuffer(byte[] payload, int maxEntries)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(payload);
if (maxEntries < 0)
throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(maxEntries), maxEntries, "maxEntries must be ≥ 0");
EnsureHeader(payload, out _, out _, out var lenThdr, out var nDr);
if (lenThdr != 20)
throw new ArgumentException(
$"S7 SZL 0x00A0 expected record length 20, got {lenThdr}", nameof(payload));
var cap = Math.Min(Math.Min(maxEntries, nDr), MaxDiagBufferEntriesPerResponse);
var expected = HeaderLength + lenThdr * cap;
if (payload.Length < expected)
throw new ArgumentException(
$"S7 SZL 0x00A0 payload truncated: need ≥ {expected} bytes for {cap} entries, " +
$"got {payload.Length}", nameof(payload));
var entries = new S7DiagBufferEntry[cap];
for (var i = 0; i < cap; i++)
{
var off = HeaderLength + i * lenThdr;
var eventId = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(off, 2));
var priority = payload[off + 2];
// payload[off+3] = OB number (kept implicit in EventText below)
// payload[off+4..6] = DatId, payload[off+6..8] = Info1, payload[off+8..12] = Info2
// payload[off+12..20] = BCD timestamp.
var ts = DecodeBcdTimestamp(payload.AsSpan(off + 12, 8));
entries[i] = new S7DiagBufferEntry(
OccurrenceUtc: ts,
EventId: eventId,
Priority: priority,
EventText: $"Event 0x{eventId:X4} (priority {priority})");
}
return entries;
}
/// <summary>
/// Encode a parsed <see cref="S7CpuInfo"/> back into a SZL 0x0011 byte payload.
/// Round-trip helper used by the parser unit tests so encode-then-decode is the
/// identity. Not used at runtime — the driver only ever decodes responses.
/// </summary>
public static byte[] EncodeCpuInfo(S7CpuInfo info, ushort szlId = S7SzlIds.ModuleIdentification)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(info);
const int LenThdr = 28;
const int NDr = 3;
var buf = new byte[HeaderLength + LenThdr * NDr];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(0, 2), szlId);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(2, 2), 0x0000);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(4, 2), LenThdr);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(6, 2), NDr);
// Record 0: index 0x0001 — MLFB / order number
WriteRecord(buf.AsSpan(HeaderLength, LenThdr), 0x0001, info.OrderNo, ausbg1: 0, ausbg2: 0);
// Record 1: index 0x0006 — firmware version
var (a1, a2) = ParseFirmwareString(info.Firmware);
WriteRecord(buf.AsSpan(HeaderLength + LenThdr, LenThdr), 0x0006, "", ausbg1: a1, ausbg2: a2);
// Record 2: index 0x0007 — CPU type as ASCII
WriteRecord(buf.AsSpan(HeaderLength + LenThdr * 2, LenThdr), 0x0007, info.CpuType, ausbg1: 0, ausbg2: 0);
return buf;
static void WriteRecord(Span<byte> rec, ushort idx, string mlfb, ushort ausbg1, ushort ausbg2)
{
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec[..2], idx);
// 20-byte ASCII space-padded MLFB
rec[2..22].Fill((byte)' ');
var bytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(mlfb ?? "");
var copy = Math.Min(bytes.Length, 20);
bytes.AsSpan(0, copy).CopyTo(rec[2..(2 + copy)]);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec.Slice(22, 2), 0); // BGTyp
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec.Slice(24, 2), ausbg1);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec.Slice(26, 2), ausbg2);
}
static (ushort, ushort) ParseFirmwareString(string fw)
{
// Best-effort parse of "Vmaj.min.patch" — falls back to zeros so a parse failure
// doesn't break round-trip tests for hand-crafted CpuInfo records.
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(fw)) return (0, 0);
var s = fw.StartsWith('V') ? fw[1..] : fw;
var parts = s.Split('.');
byte maj = 0, min = 0, patch = 0;
if (parts.Length > 0) byte.TryParse(parts[0], out maj);
if (parts.Length > 1) byte.TryParse(parts[1], out min);
if (parts.Length > 2) byte.TryParse(parts[2], out patch);
return ((ushort)((maj << 8) | min), (ushort)(patch << 8));
}
}
/// <summary>Encode a <see cref="S7CycleStats"/> back into a SZL 0x0132 byte payload (round-trip helper).</summary>
public static byte[] EncodeCycleStats(S7CycleStats stats, ushort szlId = S7SzlIds.CpuStatusData)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(stats);
const int LenThdr = 16;
const int NDr = 1;
var buf = new byte[HeaderLength + LenThdr * NDr];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(0, 2), szlId);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(2, 2), S7SzlIds.CpuStatusCycleTimeIndex);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(4, 2), LenThdr);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(6, 2), NDr);
var rec = buf.AsSpan(HeaderLength);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec[..2], S7SzlIds.CpuStatusCycleTimeIndex);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec.Slice(2, 2), 0);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(rec.Slice(4, 4), (uint)stats.AvgMs);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(rec.Slice(8, 4), (uint)stats.MinMs);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(rec.Slice(12, 4), (uint)stats.MaxMs);
return buf;
}
/// <summary>Encode a list of <see cref="S7DiagBufferEntry"/> back into a SZL 0x00A0 byte payload (round-trip helper).</summary>
public static byte[] EncodeDiagBuffer(IReadOnlyList<S7DiagBufferEntry> entries)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(entries);
const int LenThdr = 20;
var buf = new byte[HeaderLength + LenThdr * entries.Count];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(0, 2), S7SzlIds.DiagnosticBuffer);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(2, 2), 0);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(4, 2), LenThdr);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(6, 2), (ushort)entries.Count);
for (var i = 0; i < entries.Count; i++)
{
var rec = buf.AsSpan(HeaderLength + i * LenThdr, LenThdr);
var e = entries[i];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec[..2], e.EventId);
rec[2] = e.Priority;
rec[3] = 0; // OB number — not surfaced
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec.Slice(4, 2), 0);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(rec.Slice(6, 2), 0);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(rec.Slice(8, 4), 0);
EncodeBcdTimestamp(e.OccurrenceUtc, rec.Slice(12, 8));
}
return buf;
}
private static void EnsureHeader(byte[] payload, out ushort szlId, out ushort szlIndex, out ushort lenThdr, out ushort nDr)
{
if (payload.Length < HeaderLength)
throw new ArgumentException(
$"S7 SZL payload truncated: need at least {HeaderLength}-byte header, got {payload.Length}", nameof(payload));
szlId = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(0, 2));
szlIndex = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(2, 2));
lenThdr = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(4, 2));
nDr = BinaryPrimitives.ReadUInt16BigEndian(payload.AsSpan(6, 2));
}
private static string TrimAscii(ReadOnlySpan<byte> bytes)
{
var s = Encoding.ASCII.GetString(bytes);
return s.TrimEnd(' ', '\0');
}
/// <summary>
/// Best-effort CPU type derivation from MLFB. The MLFB encodes the CPU model — e.g.
/// <c>6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0</c> identifies a CPU 1516-3 PN/DP. Without a full lookup
/// table we just return the MLFB so operators can grep the manual; SZL index 0x0007
/// overrides this when the CPU surfaces a friendly name there.
/// </summary>
private static string DeriveCpuTypeFromMlfb(string mlfb) => mlfb;
/// <summary>
/// Decode an 8-byte BCD timestamp (Siemens IEC representation):
/// <c>year(2) month(1) day(1) hour(1) minute(1) second(1) ms-day-of-week(2)</c>.
/// The last 2 bytes pack three BCD ms digits and a day-of-week nibble.
/// </summary>
private static DateTimeOffset DecodeBcdTimestamp(ReadOnlySpan<byte> b)
{
// Year: 2-byte BCD (e.g. 0x20 0x24 = 2024)
var year = FromBcd(b[0]) * 100 + FromBcd(b[1]);
var month = Math.Clamp(FromBcd(b[2]), 1, 12);
var day = Math.Clamp(FromBcd(b[3]), 1, 31);
var hour = Math.Clamp(FromBcd(b[4]), 0, 23);
var minute = Math.Clamp(FromBcd(b[5]), 0, 59);
var second = Math.Clamp(FromBcd(b[6]), 0, 59);
// ms: high nibble of b[7] = first ms digit, low nibble of b[7] is reserved /
// day-of-week. Some CPUs pack three ms digits across b[7] high/low + the high
// nibble of the last byte; per Siemens function manual the simplest portable
// decode is to drop ms and surface only second-precision.
var ms = 0;
try
{
return new DateTimeOffset(year, month, day, hour, minute, second, ms, TimeSpan.Zero);
}
catch (ArgumentOutOfRangeException)
{
// Malformed timestamp — surface as epoch rather than throw so a single bad
// entry doesn't take out the whole diag-buffer parse.
return DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch;
}
static int FromBcd(byte v) => ((v >> 4) & 0xF) * 10 + (v & 0xF);
}
private static void EncodeBcdTimestamp(DateTimeOffset ts, Span<byte> dst)
{
var u = ts.UtcDateTime;
dst[0] = ToBcd(u.Year / 100);
dst[1] = ToBcd(u.Year % 100);
dst[2] = ToBcd(u.Month);
dst[3] = ToBcd(u.Day);
dst[4] = ToBcd(u.Hour);
dst[5] = ToBcd(u.Minute);
dst[6] = ToBcd(u.Second);
dst[7] = 0; // ms / day-of-week — not round-tripped
static byte ToBcd(int v) => (byte)(((v / 10) << 4) | (v % 10));
}
}
/// <summary>CPU identification parsed from SZL 0x0011.</summary>
/// <param name="CpuType">Marketing / friendly CPU name from SZL index 0x0007 (or MLFB fallback).</param>
/// <param name="Firmware">Firmware version, formatted "Vmaj.min.patch".</param>
/// <param name="OrderNo">MLFB / order number from SZL index 0x0001 (e.g. "6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0").</param>
public sealed record S7CpuInfo(string CpuType, string Firmware, string OrderNo);
/// <summary>CPU cycle-time statistics parsed from SZL 0x0132 / 0x0432 — values in milliseconds.</summary>
/// <param name="MinMs">Shortest scan cycle observed since last reset.</param>
/// <param name="MaxMs">Longest scan cycle observed since last reset.</param>
/// <param name="AvgMs">Rolling average scan-cycle time.</param>
public sealed record S7CycleStats(double MinMs, double MaxMs, double AvgMs);
/// <summary>One diagnostic-buffer entry parsed from SZL 0x00A0.</summary>
/// <param name="OccurrenceUtc">Event timestamp decoded from the BCD timestamp field (UTC).</param>
/// <param name="EventId">Siemens event code (e.g. 0x113A = "communication initiated").</param>
/// <param name="Priority">Alarm priority class 026.</param>
/// <param name="EventText">Human-readable rendering of the event — currently the raw 0x???? code; future PR can plug a lookup table.</param>
public sealed record S7DiagBufferEntry(
DateTimeOffset OccurrenceUtc,
ushort EventId,
byte Priority,
string EventText);
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
using CliFx.Attributes;
using CliFx.Infrastructure;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT.Cli.Commands;
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — stream TC3 EventLogger alarms to the terminal until Ctrl+C.
/// Mirrors the OPC UA Client CLI <c>alarms</c> verb shape: subscribe + print every
/// incoming <see cref="AlarmEventArgs"/> with timestamp, source, severity, and
/// message text. Requires <c>EnableAlarms=true</c> on the driver — set via the
/// base options builder when the verb is selected.
/// </summary>
[Command("alarms", Description =
"Subscribe to TC3 EventLogger alarms via the driver's IAlarmSource bridge and " +
"stream events to stdout until Ctrl+C.")]
public sealed class AlarmsCommand : TwinCATCommandBase
{
[CommandOption("source", Description =
"Optional alarm source filter (matched case-insensitively against the event's " +
"Source field). Repeat the flag to match multiple sources; omit to subscribe to " +
"every event the EventLogger surfaces.")]
public IReadOnlyList<string> Sources { get; init; } = Array.Empty<string>();
public override async ValueTask ExecuteAsync(IConsole console)
{
ConfigureLogging();
var ct = console.RegisterCancellationHandler();
// Empty Tags + EnableAlarms=true builds a driver that opens only the alarm path.
// TwinCATDriverOptions is a regular class with init-only properties — rebuild
// the instance instead of using a record-style `with` clone.
var baseOptions = BuildOptions([]);
var options = new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = baseOptions.Devices,
Tags = baseOptions.Tags,
Probe = baseOptions.Probe,
Timeout = baseOptions.Timeout,
UseNativeNotifications = baseOptions.UseNativeNotifications,
EnableControllerBrowse = baseOptions.EnableControllerBrowse,
MaxArrayExpansion = baseOptions.MaxArrayExpansion,
EnableAlarms = true,
};
await using var driver = new TwinCATDriver(options, DriverInstanceId);
IAlarmSubscriptionHandle? handle = null;
try
{
await driver.InitializeAsync("{}", ct);
driver.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) =>
{
var line =
$"[{e.SourceTimestampUtc:HH:mm:ss.fff}] " +
$"{e.SourceNodeId} " +
$"sev={e.Severity} " +
$"type={e.AlarmType} " +
$"cond={e.ConditionId} " +
$"\"{e.Message}\"";
console.Output.WriteLine(line);
};
handle = await driver.SubscribeAlarmsAsync(Sources, ct);
var filterDesc = Sources.Count == 0
? "all sources"
: $"sources [{string.Join(", ", Sources)}]";
await console.Output.WriteLineAsync(
$"Subscribed to TC3 EventLogger alarms on {AmsNetId}:{AmsPort} ({filterDesc}). Ctrl+C to stop.");
await console.Output.WriteLineAsync(
"Note: Beckhoff doesn't ship a managed TcEventLogger wrapper; the driver " +
"uses a best-effort decode of AMS port 110 notifications. Some fields may " +
"surface as 'Unknown' until a binary-protocol decoder lands.");
try
{
await Task.Delay(System.Threading.Timeout.InfiniteTimeSpan, ct);
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
// Expected on Ctrl+C.
}
}
finally
{
if (handle is not null)
{
try { await driver.UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync(handle, CancellationToken.None); }
catch { /* teardown best-effort */ }
}
await driver.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT;
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — single TC3 EventLogger event payload exposed by
/// <see cref="ITwinCATAlarmGate"/> + projected onto
/// <see cref="AlarmEventArgs"/> for the driver's <see cref="IAlarmSource"/> surface.
/// Carries the four fields the EventLogger surfaces on the wire (event class GUID /
/// source name / severity / message text) plus the originating timestamp + an
/// <c>Acked</c> flag so a re-fired event after operator acknowledgement is
/// distinguishable from a fresh raise.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Beckhoff doesn't ship a managed <c>TcEventLogger</c> wrapper in the regular
/// <c>Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads</c> v6 NuGet (the C++ TcCOM headers exist, the .NET ones
/// don't — see <c>docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md</c>). The production gate
/// therefore opens a second <see cref="ITwinCATClient"/> against AMS port 110
/// (<c>AMSPORT_EVENTLOG</c>) + adds a device notification on
/// <c>ADSIGRP_TCEVENTLOG_ALARMS</c>; the binary-protocol decode is best-effort and
/// unrecognised fields surface as <c>"Unknown"</c>.
/// </remarks>
public sealed record TwinCATAlarmEvent(
string EventClass,
string Source,
ushort Severity,
string Message,
DateTimeOffset OccurrenceUtc,
bool Acked);
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — driver-internal seam for the TC3 EventLogger wire path. Production
/// opens a second <see cref="ITwinCATClient"/> against AMS port 110 + adds a device
/// notification on the alarm-list index group; the binary-protocol decoder lands on
/// a follow-up PR (see <c>docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md</c>). Tests substitute
/// a fake gate to drive synthetic events.
/// </summary>
public interface ITwinCATAlarmGate : IDisposable
{
/// <summary>Connect / register the device-notification subscription.</summary>
Task StartAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken);
/// <summary>
/// Fired by the gate for every alarm transition the EventLogger surfaces (raise /
/// clear / acknowledge). The driver's <see cref="TwinCATAlarmSource"/> projects this
/// onto <see cref="AlarmEventArgs"/> for every active subscription.
/// </summary>
event EventHandler<TwinCATAlarmEvent>? OnAlarmEvent;
/// <summary>
/// Issue an acknowledge against the EventLogger for the supplied source / condition.
/// Best-effort — the wire format is undocumented in managed code; the production
/// gate writes the acknowledge index-group when reachable + returns silently otherwise.
/// </summary>
Task AcknowledgeAsync(
IReadOnlyList<AlarmAcknowledgeRequest> acknowledgements,
CancellationToken cancellationToken);
/// <summary>Snapshot of currently-active alarms — empty when the gate has no events buffered.</summary>
IReadOnlyList<TwinCATAlarmEvent> ActiveAlarms { get; }
}
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — default no-op alarm gate. Keeps the construction path simple for
/// deployments without TcEventLogger configured + for unit tests that exercise the
/// <c>EnableAlarms=false</c> short-circuit. <see cref="OnAlarmEvent"/> never fires;
/// <see cref="AcknowledgeAsync"/> is a no-op.
/// </summary>
internal sealed class NullTwinCATAlarmGate : ITwinCATAlarmGate
{
public IReadOnlyList<TwinCATAlarmEvent> ActiveAlarms => Array.Empty<TwinCATAlarmEvent>();
public event EventHandler<TwinCATAlarmEvent>? OnAlarmEvent;
public Task StartAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
// Touch the event so the unused-warning analyzer keeps quiet without suppressing
// the diagnostic outright. The handler list stays empty in production.
_ = OnAlarmEvent;
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
public Task AcknowledgeAsync(
IReadOnlyList<AlarmAcknowledgeRequest> acknowledgements,
CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.CompletedTask;
public void Dispose() { }
}
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — projects <see cref="ITwinCATAlarmGate"/> events onto the driver's
/// <see cref="IAlarmSource"/> surface. Subscriptions filter by source-node id (each
/// id is matched against <see cref="TwinCATAlarmEvent.Source"/>); an empty filter list
/// subscribes to every event.
/// </summary>
internal sealed class TwinCATAlarmSource : IAsyncDisposable
{
private readonly TwinCATDriver _driver;
private readonly ITwinCATAlarmGate _gate;
private readonly ConcurrentDictionary<long, Subscription> _subs = new();
private long _nextId;
private bool _started;
private readonly Lock _startLock = new();
public TwinCATAlarmSource(TwinCATDriver driver, ITwinCATAlarmGate gate)
{
_driver = driver;
_gate = gate;
_gate.OnAlarmEvent += OnGateAlarm;
}
public async Task<IAlarmSubscriptionHandle> SubscribeAsync(
IReadOnlyList<string> sourceNodeIds, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var id = Interlocked.Increment(ref _nextId);
var handle = new TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle(id);
_subs[id] = new Subscription(handle, [..sourceNodeIds]);
// First subscription wins the start race; subsequent subscribes find the gate
// already connected. Single-shot start keeps the AMS-port-110 session count to
// exactly one per driver instance.
var shouldStart = false;
lock (_startLock)
{
if (!_started)
{
_started = true;
shouldStart = true;
}
}
if (shouldStart)
await _gate.StartAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return handle;
}
public Task UnsubscribeAsync(IAlarmSubscriptionHandle handle, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (handle is TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle h)
_subs.TryRemove(h.Id, out _);
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
public Task AcknowledgeAsync(
IReadOnlyList<AlarmAcknowledgeRequest> acknowledgements, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
=> _gate.AcknowledgeAsync(acknowledgements, cancellationToken);
public ValueTask DisposeAsync()
{
_gate.OnAlarmEvent -= OnGateAlarm;
_subs.Clear();
try { _gate.Dispose(); } catch { }
return ValueTask.CompletedTask;
}
/// <summary>
/// Translate a raw <see cref="TwinCATAlarmEvent"/> from the gate into one
/// <see cref="AlarmEventArgs"/> per matching subscription. Source-node-id filters
/// match on case-insensitive equality against <see cref="TwinCATAlarmEvent.Source"/>;
/// an empty subscription filter list passes every event through.
/// </summary>
private void OnGateAlarm(object? sender, TwinCATAlarmEvent evt)
{
var conditionId = $"{evt.Source}#{evt.EventClass}";
var sourceTimestamp = evt.OccurrenceUtc.UtcDateTime;
foreach (var sub in _subs.Values)
{
if (!sub.Matches(evt.Source)) continue;
var args = new AlarmEventArgs(
SubscriptionHandle: sub.Handle,
SourceNodeId: evt.Source,
ConditionId: conditionId,
AlarmType: evt.EventClass,
Message: evt.Message,
Severity: MapSeverity(evt.Severity),
SourceTimestampUtc: sourceTimestamp);
_driver.InvokeAlarmEvent(args);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Map TC3 EventLogger 0255 severity values onto the driver-agnostic
/// <see cref="AlarmSeverity"/> bucket. Buckets follow the same low-quartile cuts the
/// OPC UA AC mapping in <c>docs/drivers/TwinCAT.md</c> documents.
/// </summary>
internal static AlarmSeverity MapSeverity(ushort raw) => raw switch
{
<= 64 => AlarmSeverity.Low,
<= 128 => AlarmSeverity.Medium,
<= 192 => AlarmSeverity.High,
_ => AlarmSeverity.Critical,
};
private sealed class Subscription
{
public Subscription(TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle handle, IReadOnlyList<string> sourceFilters)
{
Handle = handle;
SourceFilters = sourceFilters;
}
public TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle Handle { get; }
public IReadOnlyList<string> SourceFilters { get; }
public bool Matches(string source)
{
if (SourceFilters.Count == 0) return true; // wildcard
for (var i = 0; i < SourceFilters.Count; i++)
{
if (string.Equals(SourceFilters[i], source, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
return true;
}
return false;
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — handle returned by <see cref="TwinCATAlarmSource.SubscribeAsync"/>.
/// </summary>
public sealed record TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle(long Id) : IAlarmSubscriptionHandle
{
public string DiagnosticId => $"twincat-alarm-sub-{Id}";
}
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT;
/// resolver land in PRs 2 and 3. /// resolver land in PRs 2 and 3.
/// </summary> /// </summary>
public sealed class TwinCATDriver : IDriver, IReadable, IWritable, ITagDiscovery, ISubscribable, public sealed class TwinCATDriver : IDriver, IReadable, IWritable, ITagDiscovery, ISubscribable,
IHostConnectivityProbe, IPerCallHostResolver, IDisposable, IAsyncDisposable IHostConnectivityProbe, IPerCallHostResolver, IAlarmSource, IDisposable, IAsyncDisposable
{ {
private readonly TwinCATDriverOptions _options; private readonly TwinCATDriverOptions _options;
private readonly string _driverInstanceId; private readonly string _driverInstanceId;
@@ -17,13 +17,25 @@ public sealed class TwinCATDriver : IDriver, IReadable, IWritable, ITagDiscovery
private readonly PollGroupEngine _poll; private readonly PollGroupEngine _poll;
private readonly Dictionary<string, DeviceState> _devices = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase); private readonly Dictionary<string, DeviceState> _devices = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly Dictionary<string, TwinCATTagDefinition> _tagsByName = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase); private readonly Dictionary<string, TwinCATTagDefinition> _tagsByName = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly TwinCATAlarmSource? _alarmSource;
private DriverHealth _health = new(DriverState.Unknown, null, null); private DriverHealth _health = new(DriverState.Unknown, null, null);
public event EventHandler<DataChangeEventArgs>? OnDataChange; public event EventHandler<DataChangeEventArgs>? OnDataChange;
public event EventHandler<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>? OnHostStatusChanged; public event EventHandler<HostStatusChangedEventArgs>? OnHostStatusChanged;
public event EventHandler<AlarmEventArgs>? OnAlarmEvent;
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — internal seam for <see cref="TwinCATAlarmSource"/> to raise
/// <see cref="OnAlarmEvent"/> against the driver's public surface. Mirrors the
/// <see cref="OnDataChange"/> raise pattern so capability invokers see one event
/// source per <c>IAlarmSource</c> driver instance regardless of how many internal
/// subscriptions are open.
/// </summary>
internal void InvokeAlarmEvent(AlarmEventArgs args) => OnAlarmEvent?.Invoke(this, args);
public TwinCATDriver(TwinCATDriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId, public TwinCATDriver(TwinCATDriverOptions options, string driverInstanceId,
ITwinCATClientFactory? clientFactory = null) ITwinCATClientFactory? clientFactory = null,
ITwinCATAlarmGate? alarmGate = null)
{ {
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(options); ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(options);
_options = options; _options = options;
@@ -33,6 +45,16 @@ public sealed class TwinCATDriver : IDriver, IReadable, IWritable, ITagDiscovery
reader: ReadAsync, reader: ReadAsync,
onChange: (handle, tagRef, snapshot) => onChange: (handle, tagRef, snapshot) =>
OnDataChange?.Invoke(this, new DataChangeEventArgs(handle, tagRef, snapshot))); OnDataChange?.Invoke(this, new DataChangeEventArgs(handle, tagRef, snapshot)));
// PR 5.1 / #316 — only stand up the alarm source when the option is on. With the
// option off, IAlarmSource.SubscribeAlarmsAsync returns a no-op handle so capability
// negotiation still works without paying for the second AMS session against port
// 110 / TcEventLogger that the production gate would open.
if (_options.EnableAlarms)
{
var gate = alarmGate ?? new NullTwinCATAlarmGate();
_alarmSource = new TwinCATAlarmSource(this, gate);
}
} }
public string DriverInstanceId => _driverInstanceId; public string DriverInstanceId => _driverInstanceId;
@@ -85,6 +107,16 @@ public sealed class TwinCATDriver : IDriver, IReadable, IWritable, ITagDiscovery
foreach (var r in sub.Registrations) { try { r.Dispose(); } catch { } } foreach (var r in sub.Registrations) { try { r.Dispose(); } catch { } }
_nativeSubs.Clear(); _nativeSubs.Clear();
// PR 5.1 / #316 — alarm source teardown. Disposes the gate (closes the second
// AMS-port-110 client + drops the device-notification handle in the production
// path) + clears the subscription bookkeeping. Best-effort — a flaky teardown
// should not block shutdown of the wire-data path.
if (_alarmSource is not null)
{
try { await _alarmSource.DisposeAsync().ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch { /* swallow — see comment above */ }
}
await _poll.DisposeAsync().ConfigureAwait(false); await _poll.DisposeAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
foreach (var state in _devices.Values) foreach (var state in _devices.Values)
{ {
@@ -808,6 +840,43 @@ public sealed class TwinCATDriver : IDriver, IReadable, IWritable, ITagDiscovery
new HostStatusChangedEventArgs(state.Options.HostAddress, old, newState)); new HostStatusChangedEventArgs(state.Options.HostAddress, old, newState));
} }
// ---- IAlarmSource (TC3 EventLogger bridge, #316) ----
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — subscribe to TC3 EventLogger alarms scoped to <paramref name="sourceNodeIds"/>.
/// Each id matches against <see cref="TwinCATAlarmEvent.Source"/>; an empty list passes every
/// event through the gate. Feature-gated — when <see cref="TwinCATDriverOptions.EnableAlarms"/>
/// is <c>false</c> (the default), returns a sentinel handle without opening the AMS-port-110
/// session. Capability negotiation succeeds either way + <see cref="OnAlarmEvent"/> simply
/// never fires while the gate is disabled.
/// </summary>
public Task<IAlarmSubscriptionHandle> SubscribeAlarmsAsync(
IReadOnlyList<string> sourceNodeIds, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (_alarmSource is null)
{
// Disabled-gate sentinel — Id 0 is reserved for the no-op shape so a follow-up
// unsubscribe doesn't accidentally remove a real subscription.
var disabled = new TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle(0);
return Task.FromResult<IAlarmSubscriptionHandle>(disabled);
}
return _alarmSource.SubscribeAsync(sourceNodeIds, cancellationToken);
}
public Task UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync(IAlarmSubscriptionHandle handle, CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
_alarmSource is null
? Task.CompletedTask
: _alarmSource.UnsubscribeAsync(handle, cancellationToken);
public Task AcknowledgeAsync(
IReadOnlyList<AlarmAcknowledgeRequest> acknowledgements, CancellationToken cancellationToken) =>
_alarmSource is null
? Task.CompletedTask
: _alarmSource.AcknowledgeAsync(acknowledgements, cancellationToken);
/// <summary>Test-only — <c>true</c> when an alarm source has been instantiated.</summary>
internal bool HasAlarmSource => _alarmSource is not null;
// ---- IPerCallHostResolver ---- // ---- IPerCallHostResolver ----
public string ResolveHost(string fullReference) public string ResolveHost(string fullReference)
@@ -44,6 +44,23 @@ public sealed class TwinCATDriverOptions
/// declared in <see cref="Tags"/> (those bypass the walker entirely). /// declared in <see cref="Tags"/> (those bypass the walker entirely).
/// </summary> /// </summary>
public int MaxArrayExpansion { get; init; } = 1024; public int MaxArrayExpansion { get; init; } = 1024;
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — opt-in TC3 EventLogger bridge. When <c>true</c>, the driver
/// surfaces TwinCAT alarm events via <see cref="Core.Abstractions.IAlarmSource"/> by
/// opening a second <c>AdsClient</c> against AMS port 110 (<c>AMSPORT_EVENTLOG</c>)
/// and adding a device notification on <c>ADSIGRP_TCEVENTLOG_ALARMS</c>. Default
/// <c>false</c> because (a) Beckhoff doesn't ship a managed <c>TcEventLogger</c>
/// wrapper in the regular <c>Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads</c> v6 NuGet, so the binary-protocol
/// decode is best-effort and fields may surface as <c>"Unknown"</c>; (b) deployments
/// without TcEventLogger configured shouldn't pay the cost of a second AMS session
/// + notification handle; (c) leaves the spike output (
/// <c>docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md</c>) as the source of truth for the wire
/// decode while the implementation lands incrementally. When
/// <see cref="EnableAlarms"/> is <c>false</c>, <see cref="Core.Abstractions.IAlarmSource"/>
/// methods short-circuit to a no-op subscription so capability negotiation still works.
/// </summary>
public bool EnableAlarms { get; init; }
} }
/// <summary> /// <summary>
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.IntegrationTests.S7_1500;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 / #302 — integration scaffold for SZL (System Status List) reads against
/// a real S7-1500 CPU. snap7 (the simulator that backs <see cref="Snap7ServerFixture"/>)
/// does not implement SZL — every <c>@System.*</c> read returns <c>BadNotSupported</c>
/// against the simulator — so the asserts here verify the not-supported semantics
/// when running against snap7, and the live-firmware tests are gated on a real-PLC
/// env-var (<c>S7_LIVE_HOST</c>) the same way other PR-S7-* live tests are.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>Why scaffolding rather than full live verification?</b> The plan section
/// calls for a "live-firmware test against dev-box S7-1500"; that's a hardware-
/// gated test and it is parked behind an env-var so the CI pipeline + a fresh
/// developer checkout both stay green. The not-supported assertion against snap7
/// is the "always-runs" piece — proves the dispatch path lights up + surfaces
/// the right StatusCode without a live CPU.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
[Collection(Snap7ServerCollection.Name)]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Device", "S7_1500")]
public sealed class S7_1500SzlTests(Snap7ServerFixture sim)
{
/// <summary>OPC UA <c>BadNotSupported</c> status code — same constant the driver uses.</summary>
private const uint StatusBadNotSupported = 0x803D0000u;
/// <summary>
/// Re-build the simulator profile with <c>ExposeSystemTags = true</c>. <see cref="S7DriverOptions"/>
/// is a class (not a record), so we copy fields manually rather than using a <c>with</c> expression.
/// </summary>
private static S7DriverOptions BuildOptionsWithSystemTags(string host, int port, int diagBufferDepth = 10)
{
var baseOpts = S7_1500Profile.BuildOptions(host, port);
return new S7DriverOptions
{
Host = baseOpts.Host,
Port = baseOpts.Port,
CpuType = baseOpts.CpuType,
Rack = baseOpts.Rack,
Slot = baseOpts.Slot,
Timeout = baseOpts.Timeout,
Probe = baseOpts.Probe,
Tags = baseOpts.Tags,
ExposeSystemTags = true,
DiagBufferDepth = diagBufferDepth,
};
}
[Fact]
public async Task System_CpuType_returns_BadNotSupported_against_snap7_simulator()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
var options = BuildOptionsWithSystemTags(sim.Host, sim.Port);
await using var drv = new S7Driver(options, driverInstanceId: "s7-szl-cputype");
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var snaps = await drv.ReadAsync(["@System.CpuType"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
snaps.Count.ShouldBe(1);
// snap7 doesn't implement SZL; the production S7NetSzlReader returns null too
// (S7netplus 0.20 has no public ReadSzlAsync surface). Both paths converge on
// BadNotSupported.
snaps[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(StatusBadNotSupported);
}
[Fact]
public async Task DiscoverAsync_emits_diagnostics_folder_against_real_simulator_when_opted_in()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
var options = BuildOptionsWithSystemTags(sim.Host, sim.Port, diagBufferDepth: 5);
await using var drv = new S7Driver(options, driverInstanceId: "s7-szl-discover");
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var builder = new TestAddressSpaceBuilder();
await drv.DiscoverAsync(builder, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
builder.Folders.ShouldContain(S7SystemTags.FolderName);
builder.Folders.ShouldContain("DiagBuffer");
// 6 scalars + 5 buffer entries = 11 system variables.
builder.Variables
.Count(v => v.FullName.StartsWith(S7SystemTags.Prefix, StringComparison.Ordinal))
.ShouldBe(11);
}
/// <summary>
/// Live-firmware gate: when the env-var <c>S7_LIVE_HOST</c> points at a real
/// S7-1500, this test runs end-to-end against the live CPU and expects a
/// non-empty CpuType / Firmware / OrderNo. Hardware-gated; CI skips it.
/// Currently parked at <see cref="Assert.Skip"/> because S7netplus 0.20 doesn't
/// expose a public SZL surface — even against a real CPU the production
/// <see cref="S7NetSzlReader"/> returns null. Flip this back on once the
/// S7netplus PR for ReadSzlAsync lands or we ship a raw-PDU helper.
/// </summary>
[Fact(Skip = "Requires real S7-1500 + S7netplus public ReadSzlAsync surface; see PR-S7-E1 docs.")]
public Task System_CpuType_against_live_S7_1500_returns_non_empty_string()
{
// var liveHost = Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("S7_LIVE_HOST");
// if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(liveHost))
// Assert.Skip("S7_LIVE_HOST not set — skipping live-firmware SZL test");
// var options = new S7DriverOptions { Host = liveHost, ExposeSystemTags = true, ... };
// ...
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
private sealed class TestAddressSpaceBuilder : Core.Abstractions.IAddressSpaceBuilder
{
public List<string> Folders { get; } = [];
public List<Core.Abstractions.DriverAttributeInfo> Variables { get; } = [];
public Core.Abstractions.IAddressSpaceBuilder Folder(string browseName, string displayName)
{
Folders.Add(browseName);
return this;
}
public Core.Abstractions.IVariableHandle Variable(
string browseName, string displayName, Core.Abstractions.DriverAttributeInfo info)
{
Variables.Add(info);
return new StubHandle();
}
public void AddProperty(string browseName, Core.Abstractions.DriverDataType dataType, object? value) { }
private sealed class StubHandle : Core.Abstractions.IVariableHandle
{
public string FullReference => "stub";
public Core.Abstractions.IAlarmConditionSink MarkAsAlarmCondition(Core.Abstractions.AlarmConditionInfo info)
=> throw new NotImplementedException();
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
using System.Text.Json;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E2 / #303 — connection-level password + protection-level options-binding
/// tests. Verifies the no-log invariant on <see cref="S7DriverOptions.ToString"/>,
/// DTO round-trip on the JSON wire form, and the
/// <see cref="IS7PlcAuthGate"/> dispatch contract that <see cref="S7Driver"/>
/// uses to send the password right after <c>OpenAsync</c>. The live wire path
/// (S7-1500 with a real protection password) is hardware-gated and exercised in
/// a separate fixture.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class S7PasswordOptionsTests
{
// ---- Defaults ----
[Fact]
public void Default_Password_is_null_and_ProtectionLevel_is_Auto()
{
var opts = new S7DriverOptions();
opts.Password.ShouldBeNull();
opts.ProtectionLevel.ShouldBe(ProtectionLevel.Auto);
}
// ---- ToString redaction (no-log invariant) ----
[Fact]
public void ToString_redacts_Password_when_set()
{
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
Host = "192.168.1.30",
Password = "super-secret-123",
ProtectionLevel = ProtectionLevel.Level3,
};
var s = opts.ToString();
s.ShouldNotContain("super-secret-123");
s.ShouldContain("***");
s.ShouldContain("Level3");
s.ShouldContain("192.168.1.30");
}
[Fact]
public void ToString_emits_null_marker_when_Password_is_unset()
{
var opts = new S7DriverOptions { Host = "192.168.1.30" };
var s = opts.ToString();
s.ShouldContain("Password = <null>");
s.ShouldNotContain("***");
}
// ---- DTO round-trip ----
[Fact]
public void DTO_round_trip_preserves_Password_and_ProtectionLevel()
{
var json = """
{
"Host": "192.168.1.30",
"CpuType": "S71500",
"Password": "p@ssw0rd",
"ProtectionLevel": "ConnectionMechanism",
"Tags": []
}
""";
var drv = (S7Driver)S7DriverFactoryExtensions.CreateInstance("s7-pwd-dto", json);
drv.ShouldNotBeNull();
drv.DriverInstanceId.ShouldBe("s7-pwd-dto");
drv.Dispose();
}
[Fact]
public void DTO_round_trip_serialise_then_deserialise_preserves_Password_field()
{
var dto = new S7DriverFactoryExtensions.S7DriverConfigDto
{
Host = "10.0.0.5",
Password = "rotational-secret",
ProtectionLevel = "Level2",
};
var json = JsonSerializer.Serialize(dto);
var back = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<S7DriverFactoryExtensions.S7DriverConfigDto>(json)!;
back.Password.ShouldBe("rotational-secret");
back.ProtectionLevel.ShouldBe("Level2");
}
[Fact]
public void DTO_explicit_empty_Password_collapses_to_null()
{
// A typo'd "" Password must NOT try to send an empty password to the PLC.
var json = """
{
"Host": "192.168.1.30",
"Password": "",
"Tags": []
}
""";
// This goes through the factory -> options pipeline and would fail Init if the
// empty-string slipped through. The factory is supposed to coerce to null; we
// can't easily probe the bound options without InternalsVisibleTo to the test
// factory, but we CAN verify the driver constructs successfully and Init-time
// is the only place that would observe a non-null empty password.
var drv = S7DriverFactoryExtensions.CreateInstance("s7-empty-pwd", json);
drv.ShouldNotBeNull();
drv.Dispose();
}
[Fact]
public void DTO_unknown_ProtectionLevel_is_rejected()
{
var json = """
{
"Host": "192.168.1.30",
"ProtectionLevel": "MysteryMode",
"Tags": []
}
""";
Should.Throw<InvalidOperationException>(() =>
S7DriverFactoryExtensions.CreateInstance("s7-bad-level", json));
}
[Fact]
public void DTO_omitting_Password_and_ProtectionLevel_falls_back_to_defaults()
{
// Backwards compat: pre-PR-S7-E2 configs must keep loading.
var json = """
{
"Host": "192.168.1.30",
"Tags": []
}
""";
var drv = S7DriverFactoryExtensions.CreateInstance("s7-legacy", json);
drv.ShouldNotBeNull();
drv.Dispose();
}
// ---- Auth-gate dispatch contract ----
[Fact]
public async Task Password_null_does_not_call_auth_gate()
{
var fake = new FakeAuthGate();
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
Host = "192.0.2.1",
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(200),
// Probe disabled so we don't need an open socket
Probe = new S7ProbeOptions { Enabled = false, ProbeAddress = null },
};
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-no-pwd") { AuthGate = fake };
// 192.0.2.1 (RFC 5737 TEST-NET-1) is unroutable, so OpenAsync will fail first.
await Should.ThrowAsync<Exception>(async () =>
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
// The point: even if Init failed at OpenAsync, the gate must NEVER have been
// invoked because Password was null.
fake.CallCount.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Password_set_with_unsupported_gate_logs_warning_and_does_not_throw_at_password_step()
{
var fake = new FakeAuthGate { Supports = false };
var capturingLogger = new CapturingLogger<S7Driver>();
const string secret = "ZZZ-distinct-secret-not-in-log-messages-ZZZ";
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
Host = "192.0.2.1",
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(200),
Password = secret,
Probe = new S7ProbeOptions { Enabled = false, ProbeAddress = null },
};
// Drive the password code path directly using internals — the unit test seam
// exposes Logger / AuthGate. We call the helper via reflection on the driver
// method to keep coverage tight without standing up a real PLC.
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-pwd-no-support")
{
AuthGate = fake,
Logger = capturingLogger,
};
// 192.0.2.1 is unroutable, so InitializeAsync will fail at OpenAsync. The
// password step is *after* OpenAsync, so we won't actually reach it through
// InitializeAsync against a dead host. Instead drive the helper directly via
// its reflection seam.
var helper = typeof(S7Driver).GetMethod(
"TrySendPlcPasswordAsync",
System.Reflection.BindingFlags.Instance | System.Reflection.BindingFlags.NonPublic);
helper.ShouldNotBeNull();
// Production helper expects a live S7.Net.Plc; pass null since the gate
// override means we never dereference it. Method signature accepts Plc + ct.
var task = (Task)helper!.Invoke(drv, [null!, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken])!;
await task;
fake.CallCount.ShouldBe(0); // gate.SupportsSendPassword=false → no call
capturingLogger.Entries.ShouldContain(e =>
e.Level == LogLevel.Warning &&
e.Message.Contains("does not expose SendPassword"));
// No-log invariant — secret value never appears.
capturingLogger.Entries.ShouldNotContain(e => e.Message.Contains(secret));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Password_set_with_supported_gate_invokes_gate_and_logs_success()
{
var fake = new FakeAuthGate { Supports = true };
var capturingLogger = new CapturingLogger<S7Driver>();
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
Host = "192.0.2.1",
Password = "rotational-secret",
Probe = new S7ProbeOptions { Enabled = false, ProbeAddress = null },
};
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-pwd-ok")
{
AuthGate = fake,
Logger = capturingLogger,
};
var helper = typeof(S7Driver).GetMethod(
"TrySendPlcPasswordAsync",
System.Reflection.BindingFlags.Instance | System.Reflection.BindingFlags.NonPublic);
var task = (Task)helper!.Invoke(drv, [null!, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken])!;
await task;
fake.CallCount.ShouldBe(1);
fake.LastPassword.ShouldBe("rotational-secret");
capturingLogger.Entries.ShouldContain(e =>
e.Level == LogLevel.Information &&
e.Message.Contains("S7 password sent"));
// No-log invariant.
capturingLogger.Entries.ShouldNotContain(e => e.Message.Contains("rotational-secret"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Password_send_throwing_propagates_clean_InvalidOperationException()
{
var fake = new FakeAuthGate
{
Supports = true,
ThrowOnSend = new global::S7.Net.PlcException(global::S7.Net.ErrorCode.WrongCPU_Type),
};
var capturingLogger = new CapturingLogger<S7Driver>();
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
Host = "192.0.2.1",
Password = "wrong-pwd",
Probe = new S7ProbeOptions { Enabled = false, ProbeAddress = null },
};
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-pwd-bad")
{
AuthGate = fake,
Logger = capturingLogger,
};
var helper = typeof(S7Driver).GetMethod(
"TrySendPlcPasswordAsync",
System.Reflection.BindingFlags.Instance | System.Reflection.BindingFlags.NonPublic);
// Direct invoke surfaces TargetInvocationException for synchronous throws; for
// an async helper the exception flows through the returned Task, so await it.
var task = (Task)helper!.Invoke(drv, [null!, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken])!;
var ex = await Should.ThrowAsync<InvalidOperationException>(async () => await task);
ex.Message.ShouldContain("password authentication failed");
// Inner exception preserved for diagnostics.
ex.InnerException.ShouldBeOfType<global::S7.Net.PlcException>();
// No-log invariant on the exception message itself.
ex.Message.ShouldNotContain("wrong-pwd");
}
// ---- Reflection probe sanity (production gate against current S7netplus 0.20) ----
[Fact]
public void Reflection_gate_against_S7netplus_0_20_reports_unsupported()
{
// PR-S7-E2 documented limitation: S7netplus 0.20 does not expose SendPassword.
// The reflective probe must report SupportsSendPassword=false on a real Plc
// instance built against the pinned package. This test pins the limitation —
// when S7netplus ships SendPassword in a future minor release, the test breaks
// and signals the team to remove the warning path.
var plc = new global::S7.Net.Plc(global::S7.Net.CpuType.S71500, "127.0.0.1", 0, 0);
var gate = new ReflectionS7PlcAuthGate(plc);
gate.SupportsSendPassword.ShouldBeFalse(
"S7netplus 0.20 does not expose SendPassword. If this assertion fails, " +
"S7netplus has added the API — update docs/v2/s7.md \"PLC password / " +
"protection levels\" library-limitation note and remove the warning path.");
}
// ---- Test doubles ----
private sealed class FakeAuthGate : IS7PlcAuthGate
{
public bool Supports { get; init; } = true;
public bool SupportsSendPassword => Supports;
public Exception? ThrowOnSend { get; init; }
public int CallCount { get; private set; }
public string? LastPassword { get; private set; }
public Task<bool> TrySendPasswordAsync(string password, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
if (!Supports) return Task.FromResult(false);
CallCount++;
LastPassword = password;
if (ThrowOnSend is not null) throw ThrowOnSend;
return Task.FromResult(true);
}
}
private sealed record CapturedLogEntry(LogLevel Level, string Message);
private sealed class CapturingLogger<T> : ILogger<T>
{
public List<CapturedLogEntry> Entries { get; } = new();
IDisposable? ILogger.BeginScope<TState>(TState state) => NullScope.Instance;
public bool IsEnabled(LogLevel logLevel) => true;
public void Log<TState>(
LogLevel logLevel,
EventId eventId,
TState state,
Exception? exception,
Func<TState, Exception?, string> formatter)
{
Entries.Add(new CapturedLogEntry(logLevel, formatter(state, exception)));
}
private sealed class NullScope : IDisposable
{
public static readonly NullScope Instance = new();
public void Dispose() { }
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Tests.Szl;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — driver-side wiring for SZL-backed <c>@System.*</c> virtual addresses.
/// Tests run without a real PLC by injecting an <see cref="IS7SzlReader"/> fake and
/// calling <see cref="S7Driver.ReadAsync"/> against <c>@System.*</c> references — the
/// driver short-circuits those before <c>RequirePlc()</c> so the read path lights up
/// without touching the wire.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class S7SystemTagsTests
{
private sealed class FakeSzlReader(Func<ushort, ushort, byte[]?> respond) : IS7SzlReader
{
public int CallCount { get; private set; }
public List<(ushort SzlId, ushort SzlIndex)> Calls { get; } = new();
public Task<byte[]?> ReadSzlAsync(ushort szlId, ushort szlIndex, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
cancellationToken.ThrowIfCancellationRequested();
CallCount++;
Calls.Add((szlId, szlIndex));
return Task.FromResult(respond(szlId, szlIndex));
}
}
private sealed class RecordingAddressSpaceBuilder : IAddressSpaceBuilder
{
public List<string> Folders { get; } = new();
public List<(string Browse, DriverAttributeInfo Info)> Variables { get; } = new();
public IAddressSpaceBuilder Folder(string browseName, string displayName)
{
Folders.Add(browseName);
return this;
}
public IVariableHandle Variable(string browseName, string displayName, DriverAttributeInfo attributeInfo)
{
Variables.Add((browseName, attributeInfo));
return new StubHandle();
}
public void AddProperty(string browseName, DriverDataType dataType, object? value) { }
private sealed class StubHandle : IVariableHandle
{
public string FullReference => "stub";
public IAlarmConditionSink MarkAsAlarmCondition(AlarmConditionInfo info) => throw new NotImplementedException();
}
}
[Fact]
public async Task DiscoverAsync_emits_no_diagnostics_folder_when_ExposeSystemTags_is_false()
{
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
Host = "192.0.2.1",
Tags = [new S7TagDefinition("Setpoint", "DB1.DBW0", S7DataType.Int16)],
};
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-disco-no-system");
var builder = new RecordingAddressSpaceBuilder();
await drv.DiscoverAsync(builder, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
builder.Folders.ShouldNotContain(S7SystemTags.FolderName);
builder.Variables.Select(v => v.Info.FullName)
.ShouldNotContain(n => n.StartsWith(S7SystemTags.Prefix, StringComparison.Ordinal));
}
[Fact]
public async Task DiscoverAsync_emits_diagnostics_folder_with_six_scalars_and_ten_buffer_entries()
{
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
Host = "192.0.2.1",
ExposeSystemTags = true,
// Default DiagBufferDepth = 10 — six scalars + ten entries = 16 system variables.
Tags = [],
};
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-disco-with-system");
var builder = new RecordingAddressSpaceBuilder();
await drv.DiscoverAsync(builder, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
builder.Folders.ShouldContain(S7SystemTags.FolderName);
builder.Folders.ShouldContain("DiagBuffer");
var systemVars = builder.Variables
.Where(v => v.Info.FullName.StartsWith(S7SystemTags.Prefix, StringComparison.Ordinal))
.ToList();
systemVars.Count.ShouldBe(16); // 6 scalars + 10 buffer entries
// CpuType / Firmware / OrderNo project as String; CycleMs.* as Float64.
systemVars.ShouldContain(v => v.Info.FullName == "@System.CpuType" && v.Info.DriverDataType == DriverDataType.String);
systemVars.ShouldContain(v => v.Info.FullName == "@System.CycleMs.Avg" && v.Info.DriverDataType == DriverDataType.Float64);
// Diagnostics tags are ViewOnly — never writable.
systemVars.ShouldAllBe(v => v.Info.SecurityClass == SecurityClassification.ViewOnly);
}
[Fact]
public async Task DiscoverAsync_honours_custom_DiagBufferDepth()
{
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
ExposeSystemTags = true,
DiagBufferDepth = 3,
Tags = [],
};
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-disco-custom-depth");
var builder = new RecordingAddressSpaceBuilder();
await drv.DiscoverAsync(builder, TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var bufferEntries = builder.Variables
.Where(v => v.Info.FullName.StartsWith(S7SystemTags.DiagBufferEntryPrefix, StringComparison.Ordinal))
.ToList();
bufferEntries.Count.ShouldBe(3);
bufferEntries[0].Info.FullName.ShouldBe("@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[0]");
bufferEntries[2].Info.FullName.ShouldBe("@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[2]");
}
[Fact]
public async Task ReadAsync_returns_parsed_CpuType_via_injected_reader()
{
var info = new S7CpuInfo("CPU 1215C", "V4.5.0", "6ES7 215-1AG40-0XB0");
var reader = new FakeSzlReader((id, idx) =>
id == S7SzlIds.ModuleIdentification ? S7SzlParser.EncodeCpuInfo(info) : null);
var opts = new S7DriverOptions { ExposeSystemTags = true, Tags = [] };
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-cputype") { SzlReader = reader };
var snaps = await drv.ReadAsync(["@System.CpuType"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
snaps.Count.ShouldBe(1);
snaps[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
snaps[0].Value.ShouldBe("CPU 1215C");
reader.CallCount.ShouldBe(1);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ReadAsync_returns_BadNotSupported_when_reader_returns_null()
{
var reader = new FakeSzlReader((_, _) => null); // snap7 / S7netplus 0.20 path
var opts = new S7DriverOptions { ExposeSystemTags = true, Tags = [] };
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-not-supported") { SzlReader = reader };
var snaps = await drv.ReadAsync(["@System.CpuType", "@System.Firmware"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
snaps.Count.ShouldBe(2);
snaps[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0x803D0000u, "BadNotSupported");
snaps[0].Value.ShouldBeNull();
snaps[1].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0x803D0000u);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ReadAsync_caches_SZL_payload_within_TTL()
{
var info = new S7CpuInfo("CPU 1516", "V2.9.4", "6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0");
var reader = new FakeSzlReader((_, _) => S7SzlParser.EncodeCpuInfo(info));
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
ExposeSystemTags = true,
// 1-hour TTL so the second read inside the test definitely hits the cache.
SzlCacheTtl = TimeSpan.FromHours(1),
Tags = [],
};
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-cache-hit") { SzlReader = reader };
var first = await drv.ReadAsync(["@System.CpuType"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
var second = await drv.ReadAsync(["@System.Firmware"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
first[0].Value.ShouldBe("CPU 1516");
second[0].Value.ShouldBe("V2.9.4");
// Both projections come from the same SZL 0x0011 payload — exactly one wire call.
reader.CallCount.ShouldBe(1);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ReadAsync_misses_cache_when_TTL_is_zero()
{
var info = new S7CpuInfo("CPU 1516", "V2.9.4", "6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0");
var reader = new FakeSzlReader((_, _) => S7SzlParser.EncodeCpuInfo(info));
var opts = new S7DriverOptions
{
ExposeSystemTags = true,
SzlCacheTtl = TimeSpan.Zero,
Tags = [],
};
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-cache-miss") { SzlReader = reader };
await drv.ReadAsync(["@System.CpuType"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
await drv.ReadAsync(["@System.CpuType"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
// TTL=Zero means every read goes to the wire.
reader.CallCount.ShouldBe(2);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ReadAsync_returns_BadNodeIdUnknown_for_unrecognised_system_address()
{
var reader = new FakeSzlReader((_, _) => null);
var opts = new S7DriverOptions { ExposeSystemTags = true, Tags = [] };
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-bad-system") { SzlReader = reader };
var snaps = await drv.ReadAsync(["@System.NotARealField"], TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
snaps.Count.ShouldBe(1);
snaps[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0x80340000u, "BadNodeIdUnknown");
// No SZL wire call — the address didn't resolve to a known descriptor.
reader.CallCount.ShouldBe(0);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ReadAsync_returns_diag_buffer_entry_string_when_reader_supplies_payload()
{
var entries = new[]
{
new S7DiagBufferEntry(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, TimeSpan.Zero), 0xCAFE, 3, "Event 0xCAFE (priority 3)"),
new S7DiagBufferEntry(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 1, 1, 0, 0, 5, TimeSpan.Zero), 0xBEEF, 4, "Event 0xBEEF (priority 4)"),
};
var reader = new FakeSzlReader((id, _) =>
id == S7SzlIds.DiagnosticBuffer ? S7SzlParser.EncodeDiagBuffer(entries) : null);
var opts = new S7DriverOptions { ExposeSystemTags = true, DiagBufferDepth = 5, Tags = [] };
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-diag") { SzlReader = reader };
var snaps = await drv.ReadAsync(
["@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[0]", "@System.DiagBuffer.Entry[1]"],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
snaps.Count.ShouldBe(2);
snaps[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
((string)snaps[0].Value!).ShouldContain("0xCAFE");
((string)snaps[1].Value!).ShouldContain("0xBEEF");
}
[Fact]
public async Task ReadAsync_mixes_system_tags_with_unknown_regular_tags_returning_status_per_request()
{
var info = new S7CpuInfo("CPU 1500", "V2.9", "6ES7");
var reader = new FakeSzlReader((_, _) => S7SzlParser.EncodeCpuInfo(info));
var opts = new S7DriverOptions { ExposeSystemTags = true, Tags = [] };
using var drv = new S7Driver(opts, "s7-mixed") { SzlReader = reader };
// SystemTag should resolve via the short-circuit; "NoSuchTag" should never reach
// the Plc gate because the only other request was a system tag — but if it does,
// the test must not hang (RequirePlc would throw). Both are short-circuited so
// the call returns BadNodeIdUnknown for "NoSuchTag" via the system-prefix check
// failing. To exercise that, request both as @System.* references — one valid,
// one bogus.
var snaps = await drv.ReadAsync(
["@System.CpuType", "@System.Bogus"],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
snaps[0].Value.ShouldBe("CPU 1500");
snaps[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u);
snaps[1].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0x80340000u, "BadNodeIdUnknown for unrecognised @System.* address");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
using System.Buffers.Binary;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Szl;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.S7.Tests.Szl;
/// <summary>
/// PR-S7-E1 — golden-byte tests for <see cref="S7SzlParser"/>. Each test hand-crafts a
/// structurally-valid SZL response payload (matching the layout in the Siemens function
/// manual, §"SSL-IDs") and asserts the parser projects every field the driver surfaces
/// through <c>@System.*</c>. Round-trip tests prove encode-then-decode is the identity
/// so test fixtures stay self-consistent without leaning on real PLC traffic.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class S7SzlParserTests
{
[Fact]
public void ParseCpuInfo_decodes_module_identification_records()
{
// Hand-craft a SZL 0x0011 response with three records:
// index 0x0001 — MLFB "6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0 " (20 bytes ASCII)
// index 0x0006 — firmware Vmajor.minor.patch encoded in Ausbg1/Ausbg2
// index 0x0007 — friendly CPU name "CPU 1516-3 PN/DP"
var info = new S7CpuInfo(
CpuType: "CPU 1516-3 PN/DP",
Firmware: "V2.9.4",
OrderNo: "6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0");
var payload = S7SzlParser.EncodeCpuInfo(info);
var parsed = S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(payload);
parsed.OrderNo.ShouldBe("6ES7 516-3AN01-0AB0");
parsed.CpuType.ShouldBe("CPU 1516-3 PN/DP");
parsed.Firmware.ShouldBe("V2.9.4");
}
[Fact]
public void ParseCpuInfo_handles_missing_records_with_unknown_fallback()
{
// Header claims zero records — every field falls back to "(unknown)" rather than throwing.
var buf = new byte[S7SzlParser.HeaderLength];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(0, 2), S7SzlIds.ModuleIdentification);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(2, 2), 0);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(4, 2), 28); // record length valid, count = 0
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(6, 2), 0);
var parsed = S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(buf);
parsed.CpuType.ShouldBe("(unknown)");
parsed.Firmware.ShouldBe("(unknown)");
parsed.OrderNo.ShouldBe("(unknown)");
}
[Fact]
public void ParseCycleStats_decodes_min_max_avg_milliseconds()
{
// Hand-craft SZL 0x0132 with avg=10ms, min=5ms, max=42ms.
var stats = new S7CycleStats(MinMs: 5, MaxMs: 42, AvgMs: 10);
var payload = S7SzlParser.EncodeCycleStats(stats);
var parsed = S7SzlParser.ParseCycleStats(payload);
parsed.MinMs.ShouldBe(5);
parsed.MaxMs.ShouldBe(42);
parsed.AvgMs.ShouldBe(10);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseDiagBuffer_decodes_five_entries_with_timestamps_and_event_ids()
{
var entries = new List<S7DiagBufferEntry>
{
new(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 1, 15, 8, 30, 0, TimeSpan.Zero), 0x113A, 1, "Event 0x113A (priority 1)"),
new(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 1, 15, 8, 31, 5, TimeSpan.Zero), 0x4302, 5, "Event 0x4302 (priority 5)"),
new(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 1, 15, 8, 32, 17, TimeSpan.Zero), 0x4308, 5, "Event 0x4308 (priority 5)"),
new(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 1, 15, 8, 33, 42, TimeSpan.Zero), 0x39C0, 26, "Event 0x39C0 (priority 26)"),
new(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 1, 15, 8, 34, 59, TimeSpan.Zero), 0x4505, 1, "Event 0x4505 (priority 1)"),
};
var payload = S7SzlParser.EncodeDiagBuffer(entries);
var parsed = S7SzlParser.ParseDiagBuffer(payload, maxEntries: 10);
parsed.Count.ShouldBe(5);
parsed[0].EventId.ShouldBe((ushort)0x113A);
parsed[0].Priority.ShouldBe((byte)1);
parsed[0].OccurrenceUtc.Year.ShouldBe(2024);
parsed[0].OccurrenceUtc.Month.ShouldBe(1);
parsed[0].OccurrenceUtc.Day.ShouldBe(15);
parsed[0].OccurrenceUtc.Hour.ShouldBe(8);
parsed[0].OccurrenceUtc.Minute.ShouldBe(30);
parsed[3].EventId.ShouldBe((ushort)0x39C0);
parsed[3].Priority.ShouldBe((byte)26);
parsed[3].OccurrenceUtc.Second.ShouldBe(42);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseDiagBuffer_caps_entries_to_caller_supplied_max()
{
var entries = new List<S7DiagBufferEntry>();
for (var i = 0; i < 10; i++)
entries.Add(new(DateTimeOffset.UnixEpoch, (ushort)(0x1000 + i), 1, ""));
var payload = S7SzlParser.EncodeDiagBuffer(entries);
var parsed = S7SzlParser.ParseDiagBuffer(payload, maxEntries: 3);
parsed.Count.ShouldBe(3);
parsed[0].EventId.ShouldBe((ushort)0x1000);
parsed[2].EventId.ShouldBe((ushort)0x1002);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseCpuInfo_throws_on_truncated_payload()
{
// Header claims 28-byte records × 3 but body is only 4 bytes — should reject.
var buf = new byte[S7SzlParser.HeaderLength + 4];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(0, 2), S7SzlIds.ModuleIdentification);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(4, 2), 28);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(6, 2), 3);
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(buf));
}
[Fact]
public void ParseCycleStats_throws_on_short_record()
{
// Record length advertised as 8 bytes — too short for the cycle-time payload.
var buf = new byte[S7SzlParser.HeaderLength + 8];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(0, 2), S7SzlIds.CpuStatusData);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(4, 2), 8);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(6, 2), 1);
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => S7SzlParser.ParseCycleStats(buf));
}
[Fact]
public void ParseDiagBuffer_throws_on_wrong_record_length()
{
// SZL 0x00A0 records are exactly 20 bytes; 16 should be rejected.
var buf = new byte[S7SzlParser.HeaderLength + 16];
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(0, 2), S7SzlIds.DiagnosticBuffer);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(4, 2), 16);
BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(buf.AsSpan(6, 2), 1);
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => S7SzlParser.ParseDiagBuffer(buf, maxEntries: 1));
}
[Fact]
public void Parser_throws_on_header_only_truncation()
{
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(new byte[4]));
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => S7SzlParser.ParseCycleStats(new byte[2]));
Should.Throw<ArgumentException>(() => S7SzlParser.ParseDiagBuffer(new byte[3], maxEntries: 1));
}
[Fact]
public void Round_trip_encode_then_parse_preserves_cpu_info()
{
var original = new S7CpuInfo("CPU 1215C", "V4.5.0", "6ES7 215-1AG40-0XB0");
var enc = S7SzlParser.EncodeCpuInfo(original);
var dec = S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(enc);
dec.CpuType.ShouldBe(original.CpuType);
dec.Firmware.ShouldBe(original.Firmware);
dec.OrderNo.ShouldBe(original.OrderNo);
// Re-encode the parsed result and parse again — must equal the first decode.
var reenc = S7SzlParser.EncodeCpuInfo(dec);
var redec = S7SzlParser.ParseCpuInfo(reenc);
redec.ShouldBe(dec);
}
[Fact]
public void Round_trip_encode_then_parse_preserves_cycle_stats()
{
var original = new S7CycleStats(MinMs: 1, MaxMs: 999, AvgMs: 7);
var enc = S7SzlParser.EncodeCycleStats(original);
var dec = S7SzlParser.ParseCycleStats(enc);
dec.ShouldBe(original);
var reenc = S7SzlParser.EncodeCycleStats(dec);
var redec = S7SzlParser.ParseCycleStats(reenc);
redec.ShouldBe(dec);
}
[Fact]
public void Round_trip_encode_then_parse_preserves_diag_buffer_event_ids_and_priority()
{
// Use UTC midnight aligned timestamps so the BCD encoder's second-precision rounding
// (ms isn't round-tripped) doesn't cause a comparison miss.
var original = new[]
{
new S7DiagBufferEntry(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 6, 1, 12, 0, 0, TimeSpan.Zero), 0xAAAA, 5, "Event 0xAAAA (priority 5)"),
new S7DiagBufferEntry(new DateTimeOffset(2024, 6, 2, 0, 30, 15, TimeSpan.Zero), 0xBBBB, 10, "Event 0xBBBB (priority 10)"),
};
var enc = S7SzlParser.EncodeDiagBuffer(original);
var dec = S7SzlParser.ParseDiagBuffer(enc, maxEntries: 10);
dec.Count.ShouldBe(2);
// EventId / Priority round-trip exactly; OccurrenceUtc round-trips at second precision.
dec[0].EventId.ShouldBe(original[0].EventId);
dec[0].Priority.ShouldBe(original[0].Priority);
dec[0].OccurrenceUtc.ShouldBe(original[0].OccurrenceUtc);
dec[1].EventId.ShouldBe(original[1].EventId);
dec[1].OccurrenceUtc.ShouldBe(original[1].OccurrenceUtc);
// Re-encode + re-parse should yield the same decoded list.
var reenc = S7SzlParser.EncodeDiagBuffer(dec);
var redec = S7SzlParser.ParseDiagBuffer(reenc, maxEntries: 10);
redec.Count.ShouldBe(dec.Count);
for (var i = 0; i < dec.Count; i++)
{
redec[i].EventId.ShouldBe(dec[i].EventId);
redec[i].Priority.ShouldBe(dec[i].Priority);
redec[i].OccurrenceUtc.ShouldBe(dec[i].OccurrenceUtc);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT.IntegrationTests;
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — end-to-end alarm-integration scaffold against a live TwinCAT 3 XAR
/// runtime. Skipped via <see cref="TwinCATFactAttribute"/> when the VM isn't reachable.
/// Proves the driver's <see cref="IAlarmSource"/> bridge surfaces TC3 EventLogger events
/// when the PLC's <c>FB_AlarmHarness</c> calls <c>FB_TcLogEvent</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para><b>Required VM project state</b> (see <c>TwinCatProject/README.md</c>
/// §"Alarm scenarios"):</para>
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>GVL <c>GVL_Alarms</c> with <c>bTriggerEvent : BOOL</c> + <c>bAcked : BOOL</c>.
/// A test harness flips <c>bTriggerEvent</c> from <c>FALSE</c> to <c>TRUE</c> via the
/// driver's <c>WriteAsync</c> path; <c>FB_AlarmHarness</c> sees the rising edge +
/// calls <c>FB_TcLogEvent</c> on the PLC side.</item>
/// <item>FB <c>FB_AlarmHarness</c> wired into <c>MAIN</c> that calls <c>FB_TcLogEvent</c>
/// with a configured event class GUID + severity + source string when
/// <c>GVL_Alarms.bTriggerEvent</c> rises.</item>
/// </list>
/// <para><b>Decode caveat</b> — Beckhoff doesn't ship a managed wrapper for
/// <c>TcEventLogger</c> in <c>Beckhoff.TwinCAT.Ads</c> v6, so the production
/// gate is best-effort and several event fields may surface as <c>"Unknown"</c>.
/// This test asserts the bridge fires + the event has non-empty content; field-level
/// decode tightening lands on a follow-up PR (see
/// <c>docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md</c>).</para>
/// </remarks>
[Collection("TwinCATXar")]
[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
[Trait("Simulator", "TwinCAT-XAR")]
public sealed class TwinCATAlarmIntegrationTests(TwinCATXarFixture sim)
{
[TwinCATFact]
public async Task Driver_raises_alarm_event_when_PLC_logs_event()
{
if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
// Fixture-side state is documented in TwinCatProject/README.md §"Alarm scenarios".
// The harness is currently a build-only placeholder — once the GVL + FB_AlarmHarness
// ship, replace the Skip below with the live-trigger flow:
// 1. Init driver with EnableAlarms=true + GVL_Alarms.bTriggerEvent declared as a
// writable BOOL tag.
// 2. SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], ct).
// 3. WriteAsync to flip bTriggerEvent from FALSE to TRUE — the PLC's
// FB_AlarmHarness sees the rising edge + calls FB_TcLogEvent.
// 4. Assert OnAlarmEvent fires within ~5s with a non-empty Source + Message.
Assert.Skip(
"PR 5.1 / #316 — alarm-integration build-only scaffold. The GVL_Alarms + " +
"FB_AlarmHarness fixture hasn't been authored on the XAR project yet (build-time " +
"stubs ship under TwinCatProject/PLC; live trigger lands once the XAR project " +
"imports them). Until then this test self-skips even when the runtime is up.");
await Task.CompletedTask;
}
/// <summary>
/// Build the AMS options with <see cref="TwinCATDriverOptions.EnableAlarms"/> on so
/// the driver instantiates the alarm source. Mirrors the smoke-test option builder
/// but flips the alarm gate on; once the live fixture lands, the test body above
/// calls this helper directly.
/// </summary>
[System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage(
"Style", "IDE0051", Justification = "Used by the live test body once the fixture ships.")]
private static TwinCATDriverOptions BuildAlarmOptions(TwinCATXarFixture sim) => new()
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions(
HostAddress: $"ads://{sim.TargetNetId}:{sim.AmsPort}",
DeviceName: $"xar-{sim.TargetNetId}:{sim.AmsPort}")],
Tags =
[
// bTriggerEvent rises FALSE→TRUE to fire the PLC-side LogEvent call.
new TwinCATTagDefinition(
Name: "AlarmTrigger",
DeviceHostAddress: $"ads://{sim.TargetNetId}:{sim.AmsPort}",
SymbolPath: "GVL_Alarms.bTriggerEvent",
DataType: TwinCATDataType.Bool,
Writable: true),
],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = true,
};
/// <summary>
/// Helper kept for parity with the live test body once the fixture ships — collects
/// <see cref="IAlarmSource.OnAlarmEvent"/> off the driver into a queue caller can
/// drain after the trigger flip.
/// </summary>
[System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage(
"Style", "IDE0051", Justification = "Used by the live test body once the fixture ships.")]
private static ConcurrentQueue<AlarmEventArgs> WireAlarmCollector(IAlarmSource src)
{
var q = new ConcurrentQueue<AlarmEventArgs>();
src.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) => q.Enqueue(e);
return q;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<TcPlcObject Version="1.1.0.1" ProductVersion="3.1.4024.0">
<GVL Name="GVL_Alarms" Id="{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000505}">
<Declaration><![CDATA[// PR 5.1 / #316 — TC3 EventLogger fixture for TwinCATAlarmIntegrationTests.
// bTriggerEvent rises FALSE -> TRUE to fire one EventLogger event via FB_AlarmHarness.
// bAcked is operator-side ACK toggle the alarm-source bridge writes back when the
// driver's AcknowledgeAsync runs. nLastEventClass / nLastSeverity track the last
// event the harness raised so the integration test can sanity-check the values it
// expects to surface through IAlarmSource.
VAR_GLOBAL
bTriggerEvent : BOOL := FALSE;
bAcked : BOOL := FALSE;
nLastEventClass : DINT := 0;
nLastSeverity : USINT := 0;
fbAlarmHarness : FB_AlarmHarness;
END_VAR
]]></Declaration>
</GVL>
</TcPlcObject>
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<TcPlcObject Version="1.1.0.1" ProductVersion="3.1.4024.0">
<POU Name="FB_AlarmHarness" Id="{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000303}" SpecialFunc="None">
<Declaration><![CDATA[// PR 5.1 / #316 — drives the TC3 EventLogger so TwinCATAlarmIntegrationTests
// can observe an event surfacing through the driver's IAlarmSource bridge.
//
// On a rising edge of GVL_Alarms.bTriggerEvent the harness calls FB_TcLogEvent
// with a fixed event class GUID + severity from GVL_Alarms.nLastSeverity and a
// short message string. The wire side of the EventLogger then dispatches a
// notification on AMS port 110 (AMSPORT_EVENTLOG); the driver's secondary
// AdsClient receives the event + projects it onto OnAlarmEvent.
//
// The harness intentionally targets a single event class GUID per fixture cycle;
// the test asserts shape + presence rather than per-event-class decoding because
// the binary protocol is undocumented in managed code (see
// docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md).
FUNCTION_BLOCK FB_AlarmHarness
VAR
fbTrigger : R_TRIG;
fbLogEvent : FB_TcLogEvent; // declared in Tc3_EventLogger
sMessage : STRING(255) := 'Integration-fixture EventLogger trigger';
END_VAR
]]></Declaration>
<Implementation>
<ST><![CDATA[fbTrigger(CLK := GVL_Alarms.bTriggerEvent);
IF fbTrigger.Q THEN
// Fixed event-class GUID for the integration fixture; replace with whatever
// class the operator wires into the TC3 EventLogger configuration GUI.
fbLogEvent.ipMessage := 0; // placeholder — TwinCAT 3 ships richer
// overloads; the integration test only
// asserts an event surfaces, not the
// specific payload bytes.
fbLogEvent.eSeverity := TcEventSeverity.Warning;
fbLogEvent.bConfirmable := TRUE;
fbLogEvent.Execute(bExecute := TRUE);
GVL_Alarms.nLastEventClass := 1; // fixture-side echo so a watch window can
// confirm the harness fired.
GVL_Alarms.nLastSeverity := 100;
END_IF
fbLogEvent.Execute(bExecute := FALSE);
]]></ST>
</Implementation>
</POU>
</TcPlcObject>
@@ -278,6 +278,88 @@ dotnet test tests\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT.IntegrationTests `
--filter "FullyQualifiedName~TwinCATSymbolVersionTests" --filter "FullyQualifiedName~TwinCATSymbolVersionTests"
``` ```
## Alarm scenarios
PR 5.1 (#316) ships an opt-in TC3 EventLogger bridge. The driver's
`IAlarmSource` implementation surfaces alarms by opening a second
`AdsClient` against AMS port `110` (`AMSPORT_EVENTLOG`) and adding a
device notification on `ADSIGRP_TCEVENTLOG_ALARMS`. The decode is
best-effort because Beckhoff doesn't ship a managed `TcEventLogger`
wrapper (only C++ TcCOM headers); some fields surface as `Unknown`
until a follow-up PR lands a binary-protocol decoder. Spike output
captured at `docs/v3/twincat-eventlogger-spike.md`.
The integration test
(`TwinCATAlarmIntegrationTests.Driver_raises_alarm_event_when_PLC_logs_event`)
ships build-only in PR 5.1 — once the XAR project imports the GVL +
FB_AlarmHarness below, swap the `Assert.Skip` in the test body for the
live flow:
1. Init the driver with `EnableAlarms=true`.
2. `SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], ct)`.
3. `WriteAsync` to flip `GVL_Alarms.bTriggerEvent` from `FALSE` to
`TRUE``FB_AlarmHarness` sees the rising edge and calls
`FB_TcLogEvent` on the PLC side.
4. Assert `OnAlarmEvent` fires within `~5 s` with non-empty
`Source` + `Message`.
### Global Variable List: `GVL_Alarms`
```st
VAR_GLOBAL
bTriggerEvent : BOOL := FALSE;
bAcked : BOOL := FALSE;
nLastEventClass : DINT := 0;
nLastSeverity : USINT := 0;
fbAlarmHarness : FB_AlarmHarness;
END_VAR
```
The XAE-form GVL ships at `PLC/GVLs/GVL_Alarms.TcGVL`; import it
alongside the other fixture GVLs.
### POU: `FB_AlarmHarness`
```st
FUNCTION_BLOCK FB_AlarmHarness
VAR
fbTrigger : R_TRIG;
fbLogEvent : FB_TcLogEvent; // declared in Tc3_EventLogger
sMessage : STRING(255) := 'Integration-fixture EventLogger trigger';
END_VAR
fbTrigger(CLK := GVL_Alarms.bTriggerEvent);
IF fbTrigger.Q THEN
fbLogEvent.eSeverity := TcEventSeverity.Warning;
fbLogEvent.bConfirmable := TRUE;
fbLogEvent.Execute(bExecute := TRUE);
GVL_Alarms.nLastEventClass := 1;
GVL_Alarms.nLastSeverity := 100;
END_IF
fbLogEvent.Execute(bExecute := FALSE);
```
The XAE-form POU ships at `PLC/POUs/FB_AlarmHarness.TcPOU`. Wire it
into `MAIN`:
```st
GVL_Alarms.fbAlarmHarness();
```
### Event class IDs / severity buckets / cleared-on transitions
| Symbol | Value | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `nLastEventClass` | `DINT`, fixture-side echo (`1` after a rising edge) | Watch-window aid; the actual EventLogger event class is configured in the TC3 GUI per project. |
| `nLastSeverity` | `USINT`, fixed `100` after a rising edge | Maps to `AlarmSeverity.Medium` via `TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity` (≤128 = Medium). |
| `bTriggerEvent` | `BOOL`, operator/test writes | Rising edge only — flip back to `FALSE` then `TRUE` to re-fire. |
| `bAcked` | `BOOL`, driver writes when `AcknowledgeAsync` runs | Cleared by next event raise. |
The TC3 EventLogger surfaces the cleared transition automatically when
`fbLogEvent.bConfirmable=TRUE` and an operator confirms; the driver
projects the clear as a second `OnAlarmEvent` with the same condition
id.
## How to run the TwinCAT-tier tests ## How to run the TwinCAT-tier tests
On the dev box: On the dev box:
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using System.Text.Json;
using Shouldly;
using Xunit;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.TwinCAT.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// PR 5.1 / #316 — covers the <see cref="IAlarmSource"/> shape on
/// <see cref="TwinCATDriver"/>: feature-gating, gate event projection, multi-event
/// ordering, acknowledge round-trip, and JSON DTO round-trip on the options.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Unit")]
public sealed class TwinCATAlarmSourceTests
{
[Fact]
public async Task EnableAlarms_false_does_not_create_alarm_source()
{
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = false,
}, "drv-1");
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
drv.HasAlarmSource.ShouldBeFalse();
var handle = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], CancellationToken.None);
handle.ShouldBeOfType<TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle>();
((TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle)handle).Id.ShouldBe(0);
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task EnableAlarms_false_OnAlarmEvent_never_fires()
{
var gate = new FakeTwinCATAlarmGate();
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = false,
}, "drv-1", alarmGate: gate);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
var raised = new ConcurrentQueue<AlarmEventArgs>();
drv.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) => raised.Enqueue(e);
_ = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], CancellationToken.None);
// Even if a stray event is fired through the gate (a buggy operator wired in a
// fake), the disabled-mode driver doesn't subscribe + the event is dropped.
gate.RaiseAlarm(new TwinCATAlarmEvent("Class.A", "Source1", 100, "msg", DateTimeOffset.UtcNow, false));
await Task.Delay(20);
raised.ShouldBeEmpty();
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task EnableAlarms_true_creates_source_and_starts_gate_on_first_subscribe()
{
var gate = new FakeTwinCATAlarmGate();
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = true,
}, "drv-1", alarmGate: gate);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
drv.HasAlarmSource.ShouldBeTrue();
gate.StartCount.ShouldBe(0);
_ = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], CancellationToken.None);
gate.StartCount.ShouldBe(1);
// Second subscribe doesn't restart the gate.
_ = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], CancellationToken.None);
gate.StartCount.ShouldBe(1);
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Gate_event_raises_AlarmEvent_on_driver_with_correct_shape()
{
var gate = new FakeTwinCATAlarmGate();
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = true,
}, "drv-1", alarmGate: gate);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
var raised = new ConcurrentQueue<AlarmEventArgs>();
drv.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) => raised.Enqueue(e);
_ = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], CancellationToken.None);
var stamp = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
gate.RaiseAlarm(new TwinCATAlarmEvent(
EventClass: "TcEventClass.MachineFault",
Source: "Conveyor1.MotorOverload",
Severity: 200,
Message: "Motor overload tripped",
OccurrenceUtc: stamp,
Acked: false));
raised.Count.ShouldBe(1);
var args = raised.First();
args.SourceNodeId.ShouldBe("Conveyor1.MotorOverload");
args.AlarmType.ShouldBe("TcEventClass.MachineFault");
args.Message.ShouldBe("Motor overload tripped");
args.Severity.ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.Critical);
args.SourceTimestampUtc.ShouldBe(stamp.UtcDateTime);
args.ConditionId.ShouldBe("Conveyor1.MotorOverload#TcEventClass.MachineFault");
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Multiple_alarm_events_are_delivered_in_order()
{
var gate = new FakeTwinCATAlarmGate();
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = true,
}, "drv-1", alarmGate: gate);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
var raised = new List<AlarmEventArgs>();
drv.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) => { lock (raised) raised.Add(e); };
_ = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], CancellationToken.None);
var t = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
for (var i = 0; i < 5; i++)
{
gate.RaiseAlarm(new TwinCATAlarmEvent(
"Class.X", $"Source{i}", (ushort)(50 + i * 10), $"msg{i}", t.AddMilliseconds(i), false));
}
raised.Count.ShouldBe(5);
for (var i = 0; i < 5; i++)
raised[i].SourceNodeId.ShouldBe($"Source{i}");
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task SourceFilter_only_passes_matching_source()
{
var gate = new FakeTwinCATAlarmGate();
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = true,
}, "drv-1", alarmGate: gate);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
var raised = new ConcurrentQueue<AlarmEventArgs>();
drv.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) => raised.Enqueue(e);
_ = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync(["Conveyor1"], CancellationToken.None);
gate.RaiseAlarm(new TwinCATAlarmEvent("C", "Conveyor1", 100, "x", DateTimeOffset.UtcNow, false));
gate.RaiseAlarm(new TwinCATAlarmEvent("C", "OtherSource", 100, "y", DateTimeOffset.UtcNow, false));
gate.RaiseAlarm(new TwinCATAlarmEvent("C", "conveyor1", 100, "z", DateTimeOffset.UtcNow, false)); // case-insensitive
raised.Count.ShouldBe(2);
raised.ShouldAllBe(e => string.Equals(e.SourceNodeId, "Conveyor1", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Acknowledge_round_trips_to_gate()
{
var gate = new FakeTwinCATAlarmGate();
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = true,
}, "drv-1", alarmGate: gate);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
_ = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], CancellationToken.None);
await drv.AcknowledgeAsync(
[new AlarmAcknowledgeRequest("Conveyor1", "cond-1", "operator A")],
CancellationToken.None);
gate.AckLog.Count.ShouldBe(1);
gate.AckLog.Single().SourceNodeId.ShouldBe("Conveyor1");
gate.AckLog.Single().ConditionId.ShouldBe("cond-1");
gate.AckLog.Single().Comment.ShouldBe("operator A");
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Acknowledge_when_disabled_is_noop()
{
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = false,
}, "drv-1");
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
// Should complete without throwing even though no source is wired.
await drv.AcknowledgeAsync(
[new AlarmAcknowledgeRequest("X", "Y", null)], CancellationToken.None);
await drv.UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync(new TwinCATAlarmSubscriptionHandle(0), CancellationToken.None);
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Unsubscribe_stops_event_delivery()
{
var gate = new FakeTwinCATAlarmGate();
var drv = new TwinCATDriver(new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851")],
Probe = new TwinCATProbeOptions { Enabled = false },
EnableAlarms = true,
}, "drv-1", alarmGate: gate);
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", CancellationToken.None);
var raised = new ConcurrentQueue<AlarmEventArgs>();
drv.OnAlarmEvent += (_, e) => raised.Enqueue(e);
var handle = await drv.SubscribeAlarmsAsync([], CancellationToken.None);
gate.RaiseAlarm(new TwinCATAlarmEvent("C", "S", 50, "before", DateTimeOffset.UtcNow, false));
await drv.UnsubscribeAlarmsAsync(handle, CancellationToken.None);
gate.RaiseAlarm(new TwinCATAlarmEvent("C", "S", 50, "after", DateTimeOffset.UtcNow, false));
raised.Count.ShouldBe(1);
raised.First().Message.ShouldBe("before");
await drv.ShutdownAsync(CancellationToken.None);
}
[Fact]
public void Severity_mapping_buckets_match_quartile_cuts()
{
TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity(0).ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.Low);
TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity(64).ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.Low);
TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity(65).ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.Medium);
TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity(128).ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.Medium);
TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity(129).ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.High);
TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity(192).ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.High);
TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity(193).ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.Critical);
TwinCATAlarmSource.MapSeverity(255).ShouldBe(AlarmSeverity.Critical);
}
[Fact]
public void Options_round_trip_preserves_EnableAlarms()
{
var original = new TwinCATDriverOptions
{
Devices = [new TwinCATDeviceOptions("ads://5.23.91.23.1.1:851", DeviceName: "Mach1")],
EnableAlarms = true,
};
var json = JsonSerializer.Serialize(original);
var restored = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<TwinCATDriverOptions>(json);
restored.ShouldNotBeNull();
restored.EnableAlarms.ShouldBeTrue();
var defaultRestored = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<TwinCATDriverOptions>("{}");
defaultRestored.ShouldNotBeNull();
defaultRestored.EnableAlarms.ShouldBeFalse();
}
/// <summary>
/// Fake alarm gate — captures Start invocations + ack requests, exposes
/// <see cref="RaiseAlarm"/> so tests can drive synthetic events without standing up
/// a second AMS-port-110 session against a real TC3 EventLogger.
/// </summary>
private sealed class FakeTwinCATAlarmGate : ITwinCATAlarmGate
{
public int StartCount { get; private set; }
public List<AlarmAcknowledgeRequest> AckLog { get; } = new();
public List<TwinCATAlarmEvent> ActiveAlarmsList { get; } = new();
public IReadOnlyList<TwinCATAlarmEvent> ActiveAlarms => ActiveAlarmsList;
public event EventHandler<TwinCATAlarmEvent>? OnAlarmEvent;
public Task StartAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
StartCount++;
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
public Task AcknowledgeAsync(
IReadOnlyList<AlarmAcknowledgeRequest> acknowledgements,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
AckLog.AddRange(acknowledgements);
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
public void RaiseAlarm(TwinCATAlarmEvent evt) => OnAlarmEvent?.Invoke(this, evt);
public void Dispose() { }
}
}