4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Joseph Doherty	0c19f26c81	fix(install): cut the swap's stopped window to the swapped-in folder (#905) ... Root cause: the protected-DACL coverage scan, not the ACL writes. Both -Reapply and -Verify walked every denied folder (all of E:\ApiInstall on vd03, nested roots again) with Get-ChildItem -Recurse + Get-Acl per item + a pipeline per item for -Skip, about 3.4 ms an item on PS 5.1, all while the service was stopped. An unchanged deny is read, not rewritten; the re-applied install-folder deny propagates over ~1,400 files in 0.5 s. - Find-OtOpcUaDenyCoverageGap: .NET enumeration, -Skip folders pruned, DACL-only GetAccessControl(Access) (about 0.15 ms an item); reparse points not followed. - Get-OtOpcUaCoverageWalkRoots: each denied folder walked once (outermost only). - Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 -Scope All|InstallRoot|Outside (with -Reapply, -Verify, -PlanOnly). InstallRoot = the folder ACEs a swap drops; Outside = the rest, including the firewall rule (its query costs 3-5 s; its exe path does not change). The two partition the plan. Prints the scan time. - Invoke-OtOpcUaInstallSwap.ps1: -Reapply/-Verify -Scope Outside before the stop (a failure stops before anything moves), -Scope InstallRoot inside the window; preflight checks the candidate carries the worker exe; prints the stopped window and its parts. -NoStart, -NoCarry and the pre-#901 refusal unchanged. windev, vd03-like tree (17,851 items): stopped window 153.1 s -> 6.0 s (PS 5.1), 101.6 s -> 6.2 s (PS 7); the Outside part takes ~23 s with the old build serving. Dry-run harness 101 -> 123 passed; Windows test 72 passed on PS 5.1 and PS 7. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi	2026-11-13 03:51:42 -05:00
Joseph Doherty	2cb8a2c317	fix(install): worker isolation survives a folder swap: recorded settings, -Reapply, -Verify, swap script (#901) ... An upgrade that swaps the install folder dropped the explicit ScriptWorker isolation ACEs on script-worker\, the install folder and a copied-back pki\ (vd03 2026-11-13). Re-applying needed the operator to repeat the arguments. - Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 records its effective settings (InstallRoot, HostServiceAccount, PeCacheDir, HostServiceName, ConfigureHostService) beside DenyPaths under ...\Services\OtOpcUaScriptWorker\Parameters (new plan step SettingsRecord) and locks that key to SYSTEM + Administrators (protected DACL; no secrets recorded). - -Reapply: re-apply from the record, no arguments; prints a summary line (changed/unchanged). - -Verify: check only, [ok]/[MISSING] per step, exit 1 when anything is missing. -Uninstall also works from the record. A node isolated by a pre-#901 installer (DenyPaths only) must run the full-argument install once; both modes say so. - Invoke-OtOpcUaInstallSwap.ps1: preflight -> stop -> move live/candidate -> carry appsettings/pki/logs -> -Reapply -> -Verify -> start; a failed -Verify leaves the service stopped. Also the rollback (-NoCarry). - Tests: dry-run harness 101/101 (record + argument rules; record-key SDDL mutation turns 2 red). The Windows test adds swap -> Verify fails (exactly the 3 lost ACEs) -> Reapply (3 changed) -> Verify ok -> Reapply 12/12 unchanged, PE-cache and firewall negative controls, the swap script, and the pre-#901 refusal; 52/52 on windev under 5.1 and 7, with a scratch local host account and with SYSTEM. Evidence: scripts/validation/opcua-windows-service/evidence/2026-11-13-windev-901-reapply-verify. - Docs: ServiceHosting isolation section; vd03 pack (swap step, rollback, post-deploy gate, one-time full-argument run), the 2026-11-13 vd03 record, and the QA pack (QA swap preceded the isolation install; ACLs checked intact over SMB on vq03/vq04 2026-11-13; next-deploy procedure). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi	2026-11-13 02:06:10 -05:00
Joseph Doherty	f75ee7d089	fix(scripting): ScriptWorker isolation denies the worker every sensitive sibling, not just app\ (#890) ... The installer denied NT SERVICE\OtOpcUaScriptWorker only on -InstallRoot. On the wonder layout the node's keys and secrets sit beside it (E:\ApiInstall\OtOpcUa\pki with the application certificate's private key, data\ with secrets.db and LocalDb), inheriting BUILTIN\Users:RX. Users is a restricting SID of the worker token, so a worker could read them. - Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 -DenyPaths <dir>,...: each folder gets the same inherited deny as InstallRoot (new SensitiveDirDeny steps). Refuses drive/share roots, script-worker\ and the PE cache; folders must exist; a comma/semicolon string works for powershell -File. - The deny is read AND write (0xD0157: ReadData, WriteData, AppendData, WriteEA, DeleteChild, WriteAttributes, Delete, WRITE_DAC, WRITE_OWNER). Traverse/Execute, ReadAttributes, ReadControl and Synchronize stay so the loader still reaches script-worker\. The write half stops a worker planting a cert in pki\trusted\certs where a data drive lets Users create files in subfolders. - The list is recorded under the anchor service's key (Parameters\DenyPaths, step DenyPathRecord): a re-run removes the deny from folders dropped from the list, -Uninstall removes every recorded one without repeating -DenyPaths. -WhatIf/-PlanOnly print every step. - After an apply, WARN for each protected-DACL item under a denied folder that the inherited deny cannot reach; without -DenyPaths, WARN for pki/data/logs/backup/config/secrets siblings of InstallRoot. Tests: - Dry-run harness 46 -> 86 assertions (QA layout plan, mask bits, refusals, stale removal, record-driven rollback, host account never denied). Mutations (no sibling deny, deny->allow, mask back to ReadData, no stale removal, rollback ignoring the record, script-worker not refused) each turn it red. - Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.Windows.ps1 (Windows PowerShell 5.1, windev): 34/34, incl. -DenyPaths apply, 11/11 unchanged re-apply, shorter-list re-apply, uninstall from the record, second uninstall unchanged. - New InstallerLayoutIsolationTests (OTOPCUA_ISOLATION_INSTALLER_E2E=1, elevated Windows): a scratch wonder layout under the real restricted worker token. Before install and after uninstall the token reads pki/data/ logs/backup/appsettings and plants a trust-list file; installed it can do neither, still reads script-worker\, a real worker launched from the layout runs a script, and the host still reads everything. Mutating the -DenyPaths denies to a no-op mask turns it red on pki\own\private\otopcua.pfx (reproduces #890). QA vq03/vq04 are NOT re-applied; the command is in docs/deploy/qa-upgrade-b8b4c18f-to-fea7de0a.md. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi	2026-11-12 17:31:28 -05:00
Joseph Doherty	2a8e2981fe	feat(scripting): ScriptWorker isolation on Windows: restricted worker identity, pipe ACL, firewall + PeCacheDir installer (lmxopcua#780) ... Owner decisions §14 #5/#6 as built (design §12.5): - Scripting:Worker:Identity (default unset, Windows only, fail-closed validation): each worker starts under a restricted token derived from the host's. Every privilege but SeChangeNotify is removed; the restricting SIDs are NT SERVICE\OtOpcUaScriptWorker's SID + Everyone + Users + RESTRICTED; the token and default DACLs are host + SYSTEM + identity + RESTRICTED. The worker is created suspended, put in its Job Object before it runs, inherits only its stdio pipes, gets an ACL'd work dir as TEMP, and runs with DOTNET_EnableDiagnostics=0. The identity is granted on the host's window station and desktop, because USER32 init made coreclr.dll fail with ERROR_DLL_INIT_FAILED on windev. The logon SID is not used because the host's process DACL gives it PROCESS_VM_READ. - The worker pipe on Windows always has an explicit protected DACL: host account + identity only. There is no owner ACE, so an elevated host's Administrators gets no access. - The worker treats access denied on its parent-pid poll as alive; the Job Object covers that case. - scripts/install/Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 + ScriptWorkerIsolation.psm1 are idempotent and support -WhatIf, -Uninstall and -PlanOnly. They create the disabled anchor service, the PeCacheDir ACL (protected, no Users, key and markers host-only, pe\ Modify for the identity), read+execute on script-worker\, a ReadData deny on the install root, the outbound firewall block on the worker exe, and optionally the host-service env. - Tests: the dry-run harness scripts/install/tests/Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 (46 assertions, mutation-checked); ScriptWorkerIdentityTests; WorkerIsolationTests, which cover the pipe ACL, token access and a real restricted worker running a script, all green on windev. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67AEHd2Acv1YPwGfXEoV	2026-11-10 08:46:23 -05:00