Stage 1a of the API-key ACL design. Behaviour-neutral: the trie walker already
matched an opaque string, so only what produces that string changes. No
enforcement is wired by this commit and none of the two live role gates move.
Renamed through the ACL model: NodeAcl.Principal, TrieGrant.Principal,
MatchedGrant.Principal, AuthorizationDecision.Principal,
UserAuthorizationState.Principals, and PermissionTrie.CollectMatches's parameter.
LdapGroupRoleMapping is a DIFFERENT entity that also has an LdapGroup column and
is deliberately untouched — it backs AdminUI login, which keeps LDAP.
The migration is the interesting part. EF scaffolds RenameColumn/RenameIndex, so
rows survive — but it cannot know that dbo.sp_ComputeGenerationDiff checksums
NodeAcl.LdapGroup. That proc is created in V3Initial.StoredProcedures and never
redefined since, and SQL Server does not validate a procedure body when a column
is renamed out from under it: the object keeps reporting healthy and fails at
CALL time with Invalid column name, silently breaking config-drift detection.
Verified against the live dev DB that the deployed proc really does reference the
column. The migration therefore re-emits the proc, as one parameterised template
shared by Up and Down so the two cannot drift.
Prose that describes what is enforced TODAY (fleet-wide LDAP group -> role) is
left alone, because it is still accurate until stage 2 lands.
UserAuthorizationState's refresh machinery is retained unchanged but now carries
a note that it is LDAP-shaped and largely vestigial here: an API-key principal
set cannot change out of band, since keys and ACL rows both ride the deployment
artifact, so the generation stamp rather than the freshness timer is the real
invalidation signal.
41 authorization tests pass; solution builds clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
deferment.md §8.1 asked for a decision: wire IPermissionEvaluator into the node
manager, or say plainly that ACLs are not enforced. Decision: the latter. The
evaluator stays in the tree; #520 tracks the wire-up.
Verifying the claim turned up four things worse than the audit recorded:
- docs/security.md, not ReadWriteOperations.md, was the highest-risk doc. It
claimed an anonymous session is "default-denie[d] any node a session has no
ACL grant for". The opposite holds: anonymous can Browse/Read/Subscribe/
HistoryRead the entire address space, and is refused writes and alarm acks
only because it carries no roles.
- Three of five documented data-plane role strings do nothing.
OpcUaDataPlaneRoles declares exactly WriteOperate and AlarmAck; ReadOnly,
WriteTune and WriteConfigure are compared against nowhere in src/. The doc
called all five "exact, case-insensitive, and code-true".
- ReadWriteOperations.md was fiction beyond the ACL claims. OnReadValue has
zero occurrences in src/ — the documented read path did not exist. Reads
never reach a driver: the node manager is push-model and the SDK serves a
Read from the cached pushed value. WriteAuthzPolicy, _sourceByFullRef,
_writeIdempotentByFullRef and IRoleBearer are likewise zero-hit, and
CapabilityInvoker is not referenced by the OpcUaServer project at all. This
file is rewritten rather than bannered.
- v2-release-readiness.md claimed a whole enforcement layer shipped —
FilterBrowseReferences, GateCallMethodRequests, MapCallOperation,
AuthorizationBootstrap, Node:Authorization:* keys. None exist. Whatever
landed on the v2 branch did not survive into the shipped tree.
The UI change is the operative one: ClusterAcls.razor and AclEdit.razor now
warn that a grant is saved and shipped in every deployment artifact but never
evaluated, so an operator cannot author a deny rule believing it works.
deferment.md gains a §9 execution log tracking §8 remediation.
Final batch of F15.2. After this commit every entity surfaced by the
Phase A-D read views has a matching new/edit/delete form.
- AclEdit.razor /clusters/{id}/acls/{new|aclId}
- NodePermissions [Flags] enum surfaced as per-bit checkboxes plus
one-click bundle buttons (ReadOnly / Operator / Engineer / Admin)
- ScopeKind select + ScopeId free-text target (null = cluster-wide)
- VirtualTagEdit.razor /virtual-tags/{new|virtualTagId}
- Trigger validation: enforces at least one of ChangeTriggered or
TimerIntervalMs is set
- ScriptedAlarmEdit.razor /scripted-alarms/{new|scriptedAlarmId}
- AlarmType select with OPC UA Part 9 subtypes
- MessageTemplate is a textarea (template tokens are server-resolved)
- ScriptEdit.razor /scripts/{new|scriptId}
- SHA-256 hash computed from SourceCode on save (operator never sees
or edits SourceHash directly)
- InputTextArea now; Monaco syntax editor is a future enhancement
List pages (ClusterAcls / VirtualTags / ScriptedAlarms / Scripts) all
gain New + per-row Edit affordances.
Tally: F15.2 shipped CRUD for 11 entities — Cluster, ClusterNode,
UnsArea, UnsLine, Namespace, DriverInstance, Equipment, Tag, NodeAcl,
VirtualTag, ScriptedAlarm, Script.
All 9 integration tests still green.
Per Q3 of the rebuild plan, each v1 ClusterDetail tab becomes a separate
route under /clusters/{id}/<tab>. This batch adds read-only table views
for the six core config entity types; live-edit forms with RowVersion
concurrency land in Phase C.2 once the read-view shape is reviewed.
- ClusterEquipment /clusters/{id}/equipment — joins via DriverInstance
so the cluster scope works
- ClusterUns /clusters/{id}/uns — Areas + Lines tables
- ClusterNamespaces /clusters/{id}/namespaces — Kind + URI + Enabled chip
- ClusterDrivers /clusters/{id}/drivers — collapsed list with JSON
config expandable per Q1
(typed editors deferred)
- ClusterTags /clusters/{id}/tags — first 200 by name + filter
- ClusterAcls /clusters/{id}/acls — LDAP group + scope +
NodePermissions bits
Shared ClusterNav.razor extracted; ClusterOverview + ClusterRedundancy
updated to use it. _Imports.razor adds Components.Shared so the shared
nav is in scope across pages.
Joseph Doherty