- Credential exfiltration (review 2): password references are scoped to
secret:heidenhain/<name> and env:OTOPCUA_HEIDENHAIN_<NAME> only. Enforced by
HeidenhainOptionsParser.TryParseCredentialReference (parser, probe, deploy gate) AND again at
resolve time in HeidenhainCredentials (fail closed without consulting the store or the
environment), so Test Connect can no longer send env:ConnectionStrings__ConfigDb or another
subsystem's secret to an arbitrary Host. The probe also refuses an unsendable password.
- Optional-role credentials (review 6): an unresolvable/NUL/non-Latin-1/>247-byte DNC or DATA
credential never sends a login and never fails the session; the reads needing that role are
BadConfigurationError (capability ConfigurationError) and INSPECT telemetry continues. A
policy refusal inside AcquireAsync is per-tag, not a session teardown.
- Start after DisposeAsync is a no-op (review 3); initial subscription push and Publish are
ordered under one lock (review 4); JSON-null sections are normalised and the acquisition loop
catches every fault (review 5); backoff resets only after a session published a poll batch,
with clamped delays (review 7).
Tests: HeidenhainReviewFixTests + namespace/normalisation tests in HeidenhainConfigTests;
each was confirmed red against the reverted fix.
Real Heidenhain driver (factory-built from a merged config) against the in-process LSV2
simulator inside DriverInstanceActor: subscribe publishes Good, an OPC write is refused by
the runtime (no IWritable) with nothing sent to the control, an outage stamps
BadNoCommunication, recovery re-publishes the identical value Good, and only allowlisted
telegrams ever reach the simulated control.
- HeidenhainDeployChecks (wired into DraftValidator): HeidenhainTagWritable refuses a
ReadWrite access level on any Heidenhain tag, so no node is ever advertised writable;
HeidenhainCredentialPersisted refuses a literal password in DriverConfig/DeviceConfig
(only blank / secret: / env: references; the value is never echoed);
HeidenhainConfigInvalid for out-of-range settings or a tagged device without an endpoint.
- EquipmentTagConfigInspector maps Heidenhain to HeidenhainTagDefinitionFactory.Inspect.
- Driver validates only devices that carry tags (an unconfigured default Device1 no longer
faults the driver).
Native LSV2 TCP transport (default port 19000; no Java/Python/vendor SDK), ported from
the ignitionoee v0.20.3 reference driver:
- Lsv2ReadOnlyPolicy: payload-aware outbound allowlist (A_LG INSPECT/DNC/DATA, R_VR, R_PR,
R_RI 22-28/30-34/51, bounded R_MB, R_DP), applied in Lsv2Codec.Frame before any byte is
written; no public raw-command API.
- Lsv2Client: serialized transactions, one monotonic deadline per transaction, EOF/oversize/
unexpected/trickle close the client; Close never waits on the gate.
- Lsv2Data / HeidenhainBindingCodec: reference decoders, R_PR byte-capacity + element-index
rules, next-area cap, DATA Boolean 00/01/FF, strict non-truncating coercion.
- HeidenhainSession: per-batch wire cache, refusal suppression, provisional DNC denial retry,
alarm cursor (57 = end, overflow = BadOutOfRange), capability strings.
- HeidenhainDeviceRuntime: one loop per control, generation-guarded publication, all-node
BadNoCommunication on comms loss, bounded exponential reconnect.
- HeidenhainDriver: cached ReadAsync, push subscriptions deduped on (value,status), static
catalog discovery (no connect), host status, diagnostics, skipped-tag report. No IWritable.
- Probe (INSPECT login + version) and factory registered in DriverFactoryBootstrap (probe on
admin nodes too); DriverTypeNames.Heidenhain.
Tests: 159 unit tests against an in-process LSV2 simulator incl. the Java fixtures' captured
iTNC 530 replies as golden vectors; env-gated LiveIntegration category for real hardware.
Review of 3d1b86b4: OpcUaPublishActor installs a new authority generation
before applying its address space, and an apply that throws keeps the old one.
A scripted alarm moved from equipment A to B therefore stayed commandable with
A's grant under B's generation (briefly before the rebuild, or indefinitely
after a failed apply).
The generation now carries ScriptedAlarmOwners (ScriptedAlarmId -> EquipmentId,
decoded by ParseDataPlaneAuthority from the artifact's ScriptedAlarms rows, the
same rows the composition materialises from). AuthorizeScriptedCondition denies
unless the node manager's live binding names the same owner as the generation:
a moved alarm is denied under the old owner's, the new owner's and a Cluster
grant until the address space re-binds it; an alarm the generation no longer
deploys is denied. Install/apply order unchanged.
Tests: window (a) generation moved / binding stale => both owners and Cluster
denied, then rebuild under the new owner => new owner allowed, old denied;
window (b) apply failed after install => denied across clock and further
generations, then a successful rebuild restores the new owner only; undeployed
alarm denied; artifact decode of the owner map.
Scripted condition NodeIds are opaque ScriptedAlarmIds, so splitting them as a
topology path could never match an Equipment grant: a narrow equipment grant was
denied while a Cluster grant passed.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager binds each LIVE scripted condition instance to the
EquipmentId it was materialised under (only when it hangs under that folder);
dropped on remove / drop-recreate / equipment-subtree removal / rebuild; a
same-id re-materialise under another equipment re-parents and re-binds.
- DataPlaneAuthoritySnapshot carries EquipmentScopePaths (EquipmentId ->
[uns, Area, Line, Equipment]) decoded from the artifact by the same
AclScopePathResolver call that plants Equipment grants.
- DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeScriptedCondition re-reads key, grant and
generation per call (uncached) and evaluates at the owner path; unbound,
replaced or unplaceable owners deny under every grant. No id-split or
realm-root fallback.
- Native conditions (RawPath) and the ACL-off role gate are unchanged.
NodeIds and AlarmCommand.AlarmId are unchanged.
Sdk2OpaqueScriptedScopeBaselineTests deliberately flipped: it pinned the denial
and now pins owner-grant allow / sibling deny / cluster allow. Follow-up #808
(folder ids + Server-object event visibility for narrow UNS grants).
ShadowModeTests' runaway case asserted "slowest < 250 ms" around evaluations
whose timing included cold Roslyn compile/JIT of new script text, so it failed
on a healthy published path (540-880 ms measured, both SDK baselines).
The test now puts a test-owned barrier runner (GatedShadow) between the real
ShadowScriptRunner and the real worker pool. The runaway's first shadow run is
held before it reaches the pool, then (after it runs away in the worker, the
pool answers T and the worker is KilledDeadline with the runaway as culprit)
its outcome is held before comparison. Published evaluations made while a
barrier is closed must return the in-process values; a Mirror that waited for
its shadow hangs into a 30 s liveness failure (mutation-checked). Output
correctness, pool kill/quarantine, published-side never quarantined, the single
runaway mismatch (sibling is a victim, not compared) and key_busy drops are kept.
The wall-clock number moves to an opt-in Category=Perf case
(Shadow_published_path_latency_while_the_shadow_runs_away, OTOPCUA_SCRIPT_PERF=1)
on warmed evaluators, reporting hardware and load average.
Sibling: ContainmentTests' hard-deadline case timed the runaway's first
(cold-compile) run; it now compiles the runaway's source first with an input
that does not spin.
The 1.5.378.182 StatusAggregateCalculator (vendored as the application's
compatibility baseline) counts Uncertain regions as Good time under
TreatUncertainAsBad = false; 1.5.378.106 counted Good regions only, as Part 13
§5.4.3.31/§5.4.3.33 and Mantis 0006166 require. Our evaluator follows Part 13,
so the oracle moved, not the server: 10 SdkAggregateParityTests failed.
SdkAggregateOracle.Run now answers PercentGood through a subclass of the
baseline StatusAggregateCalculator that counts Good regions only (same bounds,
regions, status/Partial bits and configuration as PercentBad). RunSdkAsIs keeps
the untouched baseline. Rejected the proposed 100 - PercentBad under
TreatUncertainAsBad = true: that flag also changes the region machinery (the
end-of-data 1 ms rule), so it computes over a different total; pinned by a test.
New tests pin the divergence on hand-computed G/U/B/G (50 vs baseline 75) and
all-Uncertain (0/0 vs baseline 100) intervals, forward and reverse, plus a
data-starts-inside interval where oracle == baseline.
Sql.Common.Tests 265/275 -> 280/280.
The AdminUI OPC UA browse picker connected to the EndpointUrl the server
advertised in GetEndpoints verbatim, so behind NAT / a container port
publish it dialled the server's private hostname + internal port and
failed DNS where the runtime driver (which rewrites per #676) connected.
- Move the rewrite to the shared OpcUaEndpointUrlRewriter (.Contracts,
pure Uri logic, no SDK dependency) and the policy+mode selection to
OpcUaEndpointSelection (.Session leaf). Driver and browser both select
through it, so the browse connects exactly where the driver does.
- Policy/mode filter, server certificate and strict browse PKI
(no auto-accept) are unchanged.
- Unit tests: rewrite (host/port differ, same, IPv6 both sides, path
kept, port-less, scheme mismatch untouched), browser selection seam.
- Live NAT tests (Fixture=opc-plc-nat, OPCUA_NAT_ENDPOINT): browse via a
published port with a premise check that the advertised host:port
differs and does not resolve, nsu= round-trip, unreachable endpoint
fails cleanly, SignAndEncrypt reaches the server and is refused
BadCertificateUntrusted. Verified red without the rewrite.
Refs #806
Joseph Doherty