`current & widthMask` was already applied in `WriteBitInWordAsync` by
the -001 High finding fix, making the 16-bit sign-extension hazard fully
neutralised. No further code change required; mark Resolved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Driver.AbLegacy-001 — PCCC bit-index range. AbLegacyAddress.TryParse
accepted a bit index of 0..31 for every file type, but a 16-bit
N/B/I/O/S/A word only has bits 0..15. TryParse now range-checks the
bit index against the file's word width (0..15 for 16-bit element
files, 0..31 for the 32-bit L file, no bits on float files), so
addresses like N7:0/20 are rejected at parse time instead of silently
truncating in the (short) cast. WriteBitInWordAsync reads and writes
an L-file parent word as 32-bit Long and masks the RMW arithmetic to
the native width, so a sign-extended 16-bit decode can no longer
corrupt the high bits.
Driver.AbLegacy-006 — shared-runtime concurrency. A per-tag libplctag
Tag handle is cached and reused by both the server read path and the
poll loop, with no synchronisation around Read/GetStatus/DecodeValue.
Added a per-runtime SemaphoreSlim (DeviceState.GetRuntimeLock, keyed
by tag name); ReadAsync and WriteAsync now hold it across the whole
Read -> GetStatus -> Decode / Encode -> Write -> GetStatus sequence so
no two threads touch the same Tag handle concurrently.
Added xUnit + Shouldly regression coverage: AbLegacyBitIndexRangeTests
(per-file bit-range validation + L-file 32-bit RMW + sign-extension
safety) and AbLegacyRuntimeConcurrencyTests (overlap-detecting fake
proving concurrent read/read and read/write are serialised).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reviewed all 31 src/ production projects against the 10-category
checklist in REVIEW-PROCESS.md. Each module gets its own findings.md;
code-reviews/README.md is regenerated from them.
334 findings: 6 Critical, 46 High, 126 Medium, 156 Low.
Critical findings:
- Server-001: WriteNodeIdUnknown recurses unconditionally — a HistoryRead
on an unresolvable node crashes the process (remote DoS).
- Admin-001/002: app-wide auth bypass (RouteView not AuthorizeRouteView)
plus unauthenticated mutating routes.
- Core.Scripting-001: System.Environment reachable from operator scripts;
Environment.Exit() terminates the server.
- Core.AlarmHistorian-001: rowIds/events parallel-list desync on a corrupt
payload misapplies outcomes — silent alarm-event data loss.
- Driver.Galaxy-001: ReconnectSupervisor is built but never triggered, so
a transient gateway drop permanently kills the event stream.
All findings are Status=Open; resolution is tracked per REVIEW-PROCESS.md
section 4. Review only — no source code changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
