`Security:Acl:Enabled` (default false) makes scoped `NodeAcl` grants decide
data-plane authorization at the three seams that have one, and gives HistoryRead
a check it never had. Read, Browse and Subscribe stay ungated — stage 6.
The ACL decision REPLACES the server-wide role check rather than chaining with
it. Chained, a grant would have to confer the role as well as pass the scope
check, and only Cluster-scoped grants confer a role — so every narrow grant
would have stayed inert and the flag would have looked inert too. The
load-bearing test is an ALLOW: a session carrying no roles at all writing
successfully on the strength of its grant. A deny-only test passes against a
build where the ACL is never consulted, because the role gate denies too.
Found en route: the principal never reached the session. The authenticator
passed it as OpcUaUserAuthResult.DisplayName, but RoleCarryingUserIdentity
derives DisplayName from the presented token — for a key-bearing client that is
the static username `apikey`, identical fleet-wide. So the trie's matching key
was dropped at the identity boundary, and the audit ClientUserId on a rejected
write recorded `apikey` for every consuming system. Principal and ApiKeyId are
now carried explicitly.
Beyond the stage as sketched:
- Revocation reaches an OPEN session. Every decision re-checks the
authenticating key against the current snapshot; without it a key revoked by a
deployment kept its authority until the client chose to reconnect, which for a
machine-to-machine consumer can be indefinitely.
- UserAuthorizationState is built per CALL, not per session. The per-session
shape exists so an LDAP session can re-resolve membership that changed out of
band; nothing can change out of band under API keys, so the generation stamp is
the whole invalidation signal and a per-call record picks it up for free.
IsStale/NeedsRefresh therefore cannot fire here and are documented as vestigial.
- The trie is built inside DataPlaneAuthorityState.Apply, under the same
generation as the snapshot, rather than by a second wiring at the publish
actor. An uninstalled trie denies everything — indistinguishable from working
enforcement. Deleting the install turns 13 of the 22 new tests red.
- The deploy log reports what the BUILD dropped instead of re-deriving it. The
old count agreed with the builder on one of its four drop reasons; a rule with
a blank ScopeId, a retired scope kind, or a path not starting at a realm
vanished with the log reading zero.
Both IApiKeyStore implementations widened to the full grant set. The narrowing
was redundant — ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper applies the same filter itself — and
became a trap once scope was enforced. Pinned by asserting the roles are
unchanged, with the two grants carrying different flags so it cannot pass by
accident.
Falsified by mutation: enforcement never engaging, the write seam ignoring the
ACL, the realm dropped from the scope, the revocation check removed, and the
trie never installed each turn the intended tests red and no others.
Full solution suite green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
A driver-only node has had no ConfigDb since per-cluster mesh Phase 4, so it
registered NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and denied every UserName token. Its keys
now ride the deployment artifact instead.
- ConfigComposer snapshots ApiKeys alongside the NodeAcls it already carried.
Only the peppered HMAC ships, never a secret, and the pepper is node config
that is deliberately not in the artifact.
- DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority decodes both node-side. Grants are
scoped to the node's own cluster; keys are not, because ApiKey carries no
ClusterId — a key is a fleet-wide credential and the ACL rows are what bind it.
- OpcUaPublishActor installs them on DataPlaneAuthorityState on every apply,
BEFORE its plan.IsEmpty early-return: an artifact that only revokes a key
produces an empty address-space plan, so feeding after that return would leave
the revoked key working until an unrelated structural change redeployed.
- ArtifactApiKeyStore serves them to session activation; a node with a ConfigDb
keeps ConfigDbApiKeyStore, whose per-request read is what makes revocation
immediate there.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager gains DataPlaneAuthority — the cluster identity blocker #4
named. NodeScope.ClusterId is required and the evaluator fails closed on a
mismatch, so until now no scope it built could have evaluated. Nothing reads it
until stages 5/6.
The generation is a node-local COUNTER driven by the RevisionHash, not derived
from its bits. PermissionTrieCache treats the highest GenerationId as current, so
a generation taken from hash bytes would install a lower number about half the
time and the cache would go on serving the previous deployment's ACLs, silently.
Sessions are not stamped with it yet — that belongs with the first seam that
reads a UserAuthorizationState, in stage 5, rather than being built now and
consulted by nothing.
Live-gated on docker-dev against site-a-1 (driver-only, no ConfigDb): key
authenticates, wrong secret denied, both halves of the revocation asymmetry
observed, and a SITE-A grant confirmed not to reach site-b-1. Key minted with an
independent Python HMAC so the verifier was checked against something other than
itself. Rig left clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
HistorianGateway is now the sole historian backend (read + alarm SendEvent +
continuous WriteLiveValues). Document the final state and retire the Wonderware
sidecar from the docs/config/labels:
- CLAUDE.md: rewrite the Historian section — ServerHistorian /
ContinuousHistorization / AlarmHistorian config keys, the IHistorianProvisioning
EnsureTags hook, the GatewayAlarmHistorianWriter SendEvent path + ReadEvents
dependency on gateway RuntimeDb:EventReadsEnabled=true, gateway-side
prerequisites (RuntimeDb flags + historian:read/write/tags:write scopes),
migration note, and two KNOWN-LIMITATION callouts (live-validation gate +
empty historized-ref-set recorder follow-on).
- appsettings.json: fix the stale ServerHistorian block (Host/Port/SharedSecret/
ServerCertThumbprint -> Endpoint/ApiKey/UseTls/AllowUntrustedServerCertificate/
CaCertificatePath/CallTimeout, keep MaxTieClusterOverfetch); add a disabled
ContinuousHistorization block; prune the orphaned Wonderware keys from
AlarmHistorian (keep the SQLite knobs). ApiKey env-supplied via
ServerHistorian__ApiKey (commented; valid strict JSON via _comment keys).
- README.md + docs (Historian.md, AlarmHistorian.md, Configuration.md,
ServiceHosting.md, DriverLifecycle.md, drivers/README.md, Uns.md, VirtualTags.md,
AlarmTracking.md, Client.UI.md, README.md, TestConnectProbes.md): retire the
Wonderware historian backend from current-backend descriptions; fix the stale
ServerHistorian/AlarmHistorian config tables (now gateway shape); convert
drivers/Historian.Wonderware.md to a retired stub pointing at the gateway.
- Source/UI labels (descriptive text only, no behavior change):
OtOpcUaServerHostedService.cs, HistoryPaging.cs, OtOpcUaSdkServer.cs,
HistorianAdapterActor.cs, VirtualTagModal.razor, ScriptedAlarmModal.razor,
AlarmsHistorian.razor now name the HistorianGateway backend.
Build clean (0 errors); AdminUI.Tests green (514 passed).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012SDSQ3AcaXqPcBtDESBRii
Wire the materialised AlarmConditionState method handlers so a client calling
Acknowledge/Confirm/Shelve/AddComment is gated on the AlarmAck data-plane role
and, when allowed, routed back to the scripted-alarm engine via a new
`alarm-commands` DistributedPubSub topic.
- Commons: new AlarmCommand DTO (AlarmId/Operation/User/Comment/UnshelveAtUtc).
- ScriptedAlarmHostActor: add AlarmCommandsTopic const.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager: settable AlarmCommandRouter + wire OnAcknowledge/OnConfirm/
OnAddComment/OnShelve/OnTimedUnshelve. Each resolves the principal off
ISessionOperationContext.UserIdentity as RoleCarryingUserIdentity, fails closed
(BadUserAccessDenied) when the AlarmAck role is absent or no identity, else maps
+ routes an AlarmCommand and returns Good. OnShelve discriminates OneShotShelve/
TimedShelve/Unshelve from the SDK flags; TimedShelve expiry = UtcNow + ms.
No Akka/IActorRef handle — only the Action<AlarmCommand> delegate. T20 de-dup
note left; WriteAlarmCondition untouched.
- OpcUaServer.Security: OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.AlarmAck shared const (the role was a
bare string everywhere; introduced one symbol for the gate + tests).
- OtOpcUaSdkServer: SetAlarmCommandRouter pass-through.
- Host: boot wiring publishes each command via mediator.Tell(Publish(...)) using a
lazy ActorSystem accessor (mirrors DpsScriptLogPublisher).
- Tests: 11 new gate + mapping tests (OpcUaServer.Tests 88->99, all green).
OtOpcUaNodeManager + SdkAddressSpaceSink: the v2 IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink
seam now has a production adapter against a real Opc.Ua.Server
CustomNodeManager2. Writes through OpcUaPublishActor's sink materialise
as real OPC UA Variable updates that subscribed clients see via the
standard ClearChangeMasks notification path.
OtOpcUaNodeManager (CustomNodeManager2):
- Owns a ConcurrentDictionary<string, BaseDataVariableState> under a
single namespace (https://zb.com/otopcua/ns) hung off Objects/.
- WriteValue lazy-creates the variable on first write, sets Value +
StatusCode (mapped from OpcUaQuality severity bits) + SourceTimestamp,
then ClearChangeMasks to notify subscribers.
- WriteAlarmState surfaces a [active, acknowledged] pair on a
dedicated node id — full AlarmConditionState/event firing comes
with #85 F14b (EquipmentNodeWalker SDK integration).
- RebuildAddressSpace tears down every registered variable + clears
the dictionary so the next write-pass starts fresh.
- Address-space root folder is materialised in CreateAddressSpace.
SdkAddressSpaceSink: thin IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink → OtOpcUaNodeManager
bridge. Production DI binding (#108) constructs this once the host's
StandardServer has booted.
OtOpcUaSdkServer (StandardServer subclass): overrides
CreateMasterNodeManager to inject OtOpcUaNodeManager via the
MasterNodeManager additionalManagers ctor. NodeManager property
exposes the live instance so OpcUaApplicationHost callers can wrap
it in a sink.
Tests: OpcUaServer 20 -> 24 (+4):
- WriteValue creates + updates variables in the manager
- WriteAlarmState creates a node distinct from value writes
- RebuildAddressSpace clears everything; subsequent writes start fresh
- NullOpcUaAddressSpaceSink no-op sanity
Each test boots a real OpcUaApplicationHost on a free port with the
SDK certificate auto-create flow (F13a) intact — full integration
slice on macOS.
All 6 v2 test suites green: 167 tests passing.
F10 status updated to reflect SDK binding shipped. Residuals:
- #109 OpcUaPublishActor.RebuildAddressSpace → Phase7Applier wiring
- #108 Host DI default to SdkAddressSpaceSink when hasDriver
- #85 F14b EquipmentNodeWalker integration (proper AlarmConditionState
+ folder hierarchy)
- IServiceLevelPublisher SDK binding (writes Server.ServiceLevel node)
Joseph Doherty