b39bb6794de685928f31846b509d65a7e5922c46
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Joseph Doherty
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290117660d |
docs: truth sweep — reconcile stale deferment/archreview/plan records with shipped state
- deferment.md: node ACLs no longer authored-but-inert (#520 shipped through stage 7, opt-in Security:Acl:Enabled); failure-visibility trio mostly closed (01/S-1 + 03/S4 fixed, 06/S-1 partial); bulkhead + WriteIdempotentAttribute closed by R2-02; Sql Postgres+Oracle dialects shipped ( |
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Joseph Doherty
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4bdce91002 |
docs(historian): live gate for #537 and #538 — both PASSED
Ran on the docker-dev central pair against the local HistorianGateway container talking to the real
AVEVA Historian on wonder-sql-vd03 (VPN up), with the host image rebuilt at
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Joseph Doherty
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e7fbe97759 |
fix(historian): gate historization capture on the Primary, quarantine a poison tag (#537, #538)
Both defects were found by #491's live gate against a real HistorianGateway and filed rather than fixed at the time, because each one's fix is a design decision rather than a patch. #537 — both nodes of a redundant pair captured every value, so the historian received duplicate live samples for every historized tag (measured: the gateway's write counter advanced twice per value and halved when one central was stopped). The recorder now reads a capture gate per value, fed from the new PrimaryGatePolicy.ShouldRecordHistorizedValues through IHistorizationRoleView — a third verdict on the same RedundancyRoleView object, registered unconditionally on driver nodes rather than alongside the alarm section's IRedundancyRoleView (which only exists when that section is enabled; piggybacking is the #511 registration accident). Two things are deliberate and easy to get backwards: * It gates the CAPTURE, not the drain — the opposite of the alarm sink. That queue is in LocalDb and replicates, so the Secondary already holds the Primary's rows. The historization outbox is a node-local FasterLog replicating to nobody, so a drain-only gate would leave the standby appending forever to a queue no one empties: unbounded disk, then a flood of stale duplicates the moment it is promoted. Entries a node already captured are still drained by that node. * The peer it stands down for must RECORD THE SAME REFS, not merely hold the same rows — a Primary in this node's own per-cluster mesh. A node carrying no cluster-scoped role cannot establish that and never stands down: under a fleet-wide election the elected Primary is usually running a different cluster's configuration, and deferring to it would end this cluster's historization silently, with the drain reporting success on an empty outbox forever. That is the scope mismatch that once suspended the alarm drain on every node of the rig. An unknown role captures, matching the alarm drain — a duplicate sample is recoverable, a hole in the trend is not. #538 — the drain writes every per-tag group and then acks all-or-nothing (deliberate: RemoveAsync truncates THROUGH an id, so partial acking could drop older unwritten entries). One permanently failing tag therefore pinned the FIFO head while every healthy tag in the batch was re-submitted to the historian on every pass, indefinitely — duplicate samples and an outbox that never truncated, observed live at 8.3 MB from a single unprovisionable tag. The drain now tracks consecutive failures per historian tag and abandons that tag's entries once it exceeds MaxWriteAttempts (new, default 5), so the head advances. The counter only advances on a pass where some OTHER tag wrote successfully: that is what separates "this tag is poison" from "the backend is down". A count-only quarantine looks identical on the poison-tag case and silently discards the whole backlog during an ordinary gateway restart, turning a duplicate-samples bug into a lost-history one. Abandonment is also deferred until every failing tag is over budget, so nothing is discarded on a pass that could not have advanced the head anyway. Each abandonment logs a Warning naming the tag; the total rides RecorderStatus.AbandonedEntries. Capacity also gains a non-zero default (500,000 entries) as the disk backstop for the one case the quarantine deliberately cannot resolve — a historian refusing every write, where retaining is correct. Set 0 to restore unbounded retention. Every new test was falsified by reverting the production change it guards, and each one reddens alone: * drop the backend-reachable evidence -> only A_backend_that_fails_every_tag_abandons_nothing * never abandon -> only A_permanently_failing_tag_is_abandoned_so_healthy_tags_stop_being_rewritten * latch the capture gate at construction -> only The_capture_gate_is_re_read_per_value... * treat any Primary as a scope peer -> only the two scope-mismatch cases Full suite green. (Four OpcUaClient.Browser failures during the run were the opc-plc fixture being down on the shared Docker host; brought it back up and they pass.) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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e77ea4aa73 |
docs(historian): close #491 — read-back and EnsureTags proven against wonder-sql-vd03
The 2026-08-01 run closed every leg except read-back, which no reachable historian could
serve that day (the LAN instance accepts writes but serves no reads under a licence tag-count
violation; the licensed one needed the VPN). With the VPN up the run was repeated against
wonder-sql-vd03 and the remaining legs pass:
- EnsureTags provisioning: ensured=2, failed=0 — the path the LAN box could not exercise at
all (it is RemoteGrpc-only and that CAP was not listening).
- Read-back: two Modbus registers carrying DISTINCT NON-ZERO constants were historized, and
each read back as its own value (HR20 -> 8224, HR3 -> 120, quality 192). A first attempt
read back 0, which proves nothing — the same trap #536 recorded, so the proof was rebuilt
on values a crossed or fabricated answer could not fake.
Found during the run and FILED rather than fixed:
- #538 — one permanently-failing tag re-writes every healthy tag on every drain pass, forever.
DrainOnceAsync writes EVERY per-tag group and then acks all-or-nothing, so a tag whose
historian tag does not exist stops the FIFO head advancing while the healthy tags' values
are re-submitted every drain interval; the outbox never truncates (Capacity defaults to 0 =
unbounded, observed at 8.3 MB). The all-or-nothing ack is deliberate — RemoveAsync truncates
THROUGH an id, so partial acking could drop older unwritten entries — so the fix changes the
outbox contract and does not belong in this commit.
Also re-confirmed live: EnsureTags provisioning fires only for newly-ADDED historized tags, so
flipping an existing tag's historianTagname provisions nothing (Issue 5 of
2026-06-27-historian-gateway-integration-issues.md).
No production code changes — the recorder fix shipped in
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Joseph Doherty
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ad74473452 |
fix(historian): the recorder died on its first value — live gate for continuous historization (#491)
Ran #491's live gate against a real ZB.MOM.WW.HistorianGateway talking to a real AVEVA Historian, and it found a production-fatal defect on the first value it ever saw. ContinuousHistorizationRecorder.OnValueChangedAsync touched `Self` after awaiting IHistorizationOutbox.AppendAsync(...).ConfigureAwait(false). ConfigureAwait(false) discards Akka's ActorTaskScheduler synchronization context, so `Self` — which reads ActorBase.Context — threw NotSupportedException. The throw escaped into supervision, which RESTARTED the actor; because production seeds an EMPTY ref set (the deployed set arrives later via UpdateHistorizedRefs), the restart silently discarded every historized ref. Net effect: one value captured, then nothing, with no further error to show for it. Fixed by capturing `IActorRef self = Self` before the await — the idiom the GetStatus handler already applied to Sender. Thirteen unit tests missed it because InMemoryOutbox.AppendAsync returned ValueTask.CompletedTask: a completed ValueTask never yields, so the continuation ran inline with the context still installed. The production FasterLog outbox fsyncs per entry and does yield. The first regression test was itself vacuous — `await Task.Yield()` posts back to the CAPTURED context, so the append still completed on the actor thread and reverting the fix left the test green. The fake must complete on a POOL thread (Task.Delay(1).ConfigureAwait(false)), as a real fsync does; with that, reverting the fix reddens exactly one test. The rig could not run this gate at all: docker-dev carried ServerHistorian__* but no ContinuousHistorization__* keys, so the recorder could never spawn. Both centrals now carry them (default OFF — the recorder needs ContinuousHistorization:Enabled AND ServerHistorian:Enabled), with the outbox on the per-node named volume so it survives a container recreate. ServerHistorian__UseTls was hard-coded true and is now parameterized; a plaintext h2c gateway was unreachable without it. Gate results: outbox append, drain, WriteLiveValues accepted by a real historian, and restart convergence (capture resumes after a restart with no new deployment) all pass. The read-back hop is NOT proven — the LAN historian accepts writes but serves no reads under a "License violation: Database tag count exceeds license tag count", and the licensed corporate one needs the VPN. EnsureTags provisioning is likewise unexercised there (RemoteGrpc-only, and that CAP is not listening). #491 stays open for the read-back hop alone. Also recorded, not fixed: the recorder has NO Primary gate, unlike the alarm store-and-forward sink, so both nodes of a redundant pair send duplicate live values. Gating it would introduce a failover window with no capture — that is a design decision, not a cleanup. Evidence: docs/plans/2026-08-01-continuous-historization-live-gate.md Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |