ac4c4d40dcfd9433ae04114f619f148fa07b6ec0
24 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Joseph Doherty
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489664d105 |
fix(acl): folder event verdict invalidation reaches orphaned items, decides on the live instance, skips ACL-off; alarm-bearing reference map (#826 review)
1. Orphaned subscriptions (session closed without deleting subs) have Session == null, so the public MonitoredNode2.InvalidatePermissionCacheForSession never reached their items: a cached allow survived a deploy, the moved alarm's events were queued and delivered on TransferSubscriptions. Each notifier's cache is now cleared whole through the SDK's private MonitoredNode2.InvalidatePermissionCaches (reflection, guard-tested; fallback = per-session drop + Remove/Add of session-less items). 2. The verdict is decided on the condition LIVE under the event's NodeId, not the event's own instance: the SDK key has no instance identity, so a replaced instance's late event cached a deny its successor inherited until the next invalidation. 3. Invalidation is skipped while enforcement is off (forced across an on/off authorizer transition) and is one O(cache) clear per node instead of a whole-cache scan per item. 4. TagReferencingEquipment carries alarm-bearing raw tags only (TagConfigIntent.Alarm); the snapshot adopts an OrdinalIgnoreCase set instead of copying it again. Tests (each fails with its fix reverted): FolderEventVerdictInvalidationTests (orphan + deploy + transfer; replaced instance's late event; ACL-off skip; SDK private-method guard), DeploymentArtifactScopePathTests (alarm-bearing projection). |
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Joseph Doherty
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8e1e73f93c |
fix(acl): per-event visibility for direct folder event items; generation-checked native wiring (#826)
Event items on an equipment / raw device folder were fed by the SDK's MonitoredNode2 fan-out with no ACL decision, so after a deploy moved a scripted alarm (or dropped the reference projecting a native alarm into an equipment) the OLD folder's subscribers kept receiving it - EventId included - until the rebuild landed, indefinitely after a failed apply. - OtOpcUaNodeManager re-implements INodeManager3 so ValidateEventRolePermissions (the SDK's per-event, per-item hook; base not virtual) adds IsNotifierEventVisibleTo: live condition instance, notifier still a legitimate notifier of it, and the #586/#808 Server-object rule (IsConditionVisibleTo over ConditionVisibilityScopes). - The SDK memoizes that verdict per (item, event type, SourceNode): InvalidateFolderEventVerdicts runs on the authority/authorizer setters, RevalidateMonitoredItems (deploy + timer) and CompleteAddressSpaceApply. - ConditionRefresh on direct items goes through RefreshDirectItems (base loop + the same decision). - New generation field TagReferencingEquipment (RawPath -> EquipmentIds, from the artifact's UnsTagReferences via AclScopePathResolver.ResolveTagRawPath): a native alarm's wired equipment folder only counts (folder delivery AND Server-object scopes) while the current generation still references it. - Secondary #808 edge: UNS variables wired UNS->Raw Organizes by AddReference are tracked and always placed as reference variables (an Area named like its equipment's id no longer narrows them). Tests: UnsFolderScopeWireTests (moved alarm on a folder item + ConditionRefresh + rebuild; area named like equipment id), NativeAlarmFolderEventAclWireTests (dropped reference: folder + Server object + refresh + restore), DeploymentArtifactScopePathTests (projection). Rig/event tests now supply tag references. |
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Joseph Doherty
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af5c9744b7 |
fix(acl): place opaque-id UNS folders, virtual tags and scripted conditions for every operation (#808)
UNS Area/Line/Equipment folders are minted under their opaque entity ids (s=UA-/UL-/EQ-...), virtual tags under s=EQ-.../Name and scripted conditions (+ #629 children) under s=<ScriptedAlarmId>[/...], while every UNS grant is planted at a NAME path. DataPlaneAuthorizer split those ids, so with Security:Acl:Enabled a narrow (Area/Line/Equipment) grant could not Browse, Read, subscribe or HistoryRead them, and Server-object delivery never reached it — so a narrow key never held the EventId Ack/Confirm/AddComment need. - The generation carries UnsFolderScopes (folderId -> path + id chain), built by DeploymentArtifact from the same AclScopePathResolver as the grants; ids two entity kinds share are dropped; plumbed through IDataPlaneAuthoritySink. - OtOpcUaNodeManager.ResolveUnsAclSubject reports live facts (folder id ancestry / scripted owner binding); attached by the Authorizer setter. - Evaluate places the subject against the CURRENT generation before the decision cache, which now caches the walk keyed on the resolved scope. Folders require live chain == generation chain (a moved equipment is denied under old and new line until the rebuild). Owned nodes (vtags, conditions, children) get owner path + a reserved segment, so Tag grants and their Browse transit never expose them. Conditions share TryPlaceScriptedCondition with the #797 command gate. - Server-object visibility of a scripted condition is decided on the condition alone, so a moved alarm cannot reach its old owner there. Tests: UnsFolderScopeWireTests (opaque ids, end-to-end browse -> EventId -> Acknowledge on an Equipment grant; sibling denied; Tag-only grant; moved alarm and moved equipment stale windows). Rig tests now install folder scopes explicitly (ServerEventRig.FolderScopes); the #797 recreate test deliberately asserts the moved alarm is invisible to the Cluster observer in the window. |
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Joseph Doherty
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4620e542e8 |
fix(acl): require the live scripted-alarm owner to match the generation's deployed owner (#797)
Review of
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Joseph Doherty
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3d1b86b451 |
fix(acl): authorize scripted alarm commands at their owning equipment's scope (#797)
Scripted condition NodeIds are opaque ScriptedAlarmIds, so splitting them as a topology path could never match an Equipment grant: a narrow equipment grant was denied while a Cluster grant passed. - OtOpcUaNodeManager binds each LIVE scripted condition instance to the EquipmentId it was materialised under (only when it hangs under that folder); dropped on remove / drop-recreate / equipment-subtree removal / rebuild; a same-id re-materialise under another equipment re-parents and re-binds. - DataPlaneAuthoritySnapshot carries EquipmentScopePaths (EquipmentId -> [uns, Area, Line, Equipment]) decoded from the artifact by the same AclScopePathResolver call that plants Equipment grants. - DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeScriptedCondition re-reads key, grant and generation per call (uncached) and evaluates at the owner path; unbound, replaced or unplaceable owners deny under every grant. No id-split or realm-root fallback. - Native conditions (RawPath) and the ACL-off role gate are unchanged. NodeIds and AlarmCommand.AlarmId are unchanged. Sdk2OpaqueScriptedScopeBaselineTests deliberately flipped: it pinned the denial and now pins owner-grant allow / sibling deny / cluster allow. Follow-up #808 (folder ids + Server-object event visibility for narrow UNS grants). |
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Joseph Doherty
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826312befe |
docs: fill missing XML docs and strip tracking IDs from src comments
Clears CommentChecker findings in src/ (3,280 -> 209, the remainder being false positives like PLC-5/IEEE-754/M0.0) by adding missing summaries/params/returns, normalising inheritdoc usage, and removing Gitea/review tracking IDs while keeping the rationale they annotated. Comment-only: comment-stripped sources are identical to the parent commit. |
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Joseph Doherty
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894444376e | feat(security): register TimeProvider + S18/S19 option knobs (archreview 03/S18,S19) | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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00aa486677 |
feat(security): enforce node ACLs on read, browse and subscribe (#520 stage 6)
Completes data-plane enforcement behind Security:Acl:Enabled. Read (every attribute, not just Value), Browse, TranslateBrowsePath, CreateMonitoredItems, SubscribeToEvents and SetMonitoringMode now consult scoped NodeAcl grants. With the flag off nothing changes. Four things went beyond the stage as written, each because leaving it out would have made the feature look like it worked: - Browse needed ancestor visibility. The trie inherits downward, and a client reaches a deep node by browsing the nodes above it, so without this every grant narrower than the cluster was authored, shipped and unreachable. It is a separate non-inheriting marker, NOT a synthesized Browse grant on each ancestor: the additive downward walk would carry such a grant from Plant onto Plant/Siemens/dev9 and every other sibling subtree. Pinned by a test that goes through the evaluator — probing the trie helper directly passes against the broken design, because a sibling is absent from the trie either way. - Revocation had to reach LIVE subscriptions. Every other operation re-asks per request; a subscription is authorized once and then streams, and streaming is how machine consumers actually read this server — so stopping only the re-asking operations would have made revocation close to cosmetic. IDataPlaneAuthoritySource gained a Changed event. A denied item is queued BadUserAccessDenied and then DETACHED from its MonitoredNode2 fan-out, not set MonitoringMode.Disabled. Disabling discards the item's queued notifications, so the client is silenced without ever being told why. The over-the-wire test caught this; the unit-level path reports the item as stood down either way. Detaching is also reversible, so a restored grant resumes the feed with no client action. - The decision cache holds the grant WALK, not the decision. Grants and the trie are fixed for a generation; a key's ExpiresUtc passes with the clock, so caching the whole decision would let an expired key keep working until the next deploy — the stage-5 open-session hole in a subtler form. - TranslateBrowsePath is gated, without which browse filtering is decorative: a client refused a browse asks TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds for the same path. Found en route: UserAuthorizationState's staleness ceiling couples two clocks. MembershipResolvedUtc is stamped from DataPlaneAuthorizer's TimeProvider while IsStale is evaluated against TriePermissionEvaluator's; they are the same instance in production and diverge the moment anything injects a test clock, at which point the evaluator denies EVERYTHING with a verdict indistinguishable from "no grant matched". Stage 5's claim that these predicates cannot fire was accidentally true; they are now disabled explicitly. Also fixed: ContinuationPoint.NodeToBrowse is the manager HANDLE, not a NodeState. The declared type is object, so the wrong cast compiled cleanly and silently yielded null — skipping the browse source gate entirely. Falsified: disabling the transit marking reddens exactly the three tests that assert transit works; implementing transit as an ancestor grant reddens the sibling-leak test; skipping the fan-out detach reddens the revocation test. Full solution suite green. The stage 8 live gate has NOT run yet. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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f692f6afe4 |
feat(security): enforce node ACLs on write, alarms and HistoryRead (#520 stage 5)
`Security:Acl:Enabled` (default false) makes scoped `NodeAcl` grants decide data-plane authorization at the three seams that have one, and gives HistoryRead a check it never had. Read, Browse and Subscribe stay ungated — stage 6. The ACL decision REPLACES the server-wide role check rather than chaining with it. Chained, a grant would have to confer the role as well as pass the scope check, and only Cluster-scoped grants confer a role — so every narrow grant would have stayed inert and the flag would have looked inert too. The load-bearing test is an ALLOW: a session carrying no roles at all writing successfully on the strength of its grant. A deny-only test passes against a build where the ACL is never consulted, because the role gate denies too. Found en route: the principal never reached the session. The authenticator passed it as OpcUaUserAuthResult.DisplayName, but RoleCarryingUserIdentity derives DisplayName from the presented token — for a key-bearing client that is the static username `apikey`, identical fleet-wide. So the trie's matching key was dropped at the identity boundary, and the audit ClientUserId on a rejected write recorded `apikey` for every consuming system. Principal and ApiKeyId are now carried explicitly. Beyond the stage as sketched: - Revocation reaches an OPEN session. Every decision re-checks the authenticating key against the current snapshot; without it a key revoked by a deployment kept its authority until the client chose to reconnect, which for a machine-to-machine consumer can be indefinitely. - UserAuthorizationState is built per CALL, not per session. The per-session shape exists so an LDAP session can re-resolve membership that changed out of band; nothing can change out of band under API keys, so the generation stamp is the whole invalidation signal and a per-call record picks it up for free. IsStale/NeedsRefresh therefore cannot fire here and are documented as vestigial. - The trie is built inside DataPlaneAuthorityState.Apply, under the same generation as the snapshot, rather than by a second wiring at the publish actor. An uninstalled trie denies everything — indistinguishable from working enforcement. Deleting the install turns 13 of the 22 new tests red. - The deploy log reports what the BUILD dropped instead of re-deriving it. The old count agreed with the builder on one of its four drop reasons; a rule with a blank ScopeId, a retired scope kind, or a path not starting at a realm vanished with the log reading zero. Both IApiKeyStore implementations widened to the full grant set. The narrowing was redundant — ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper applies the same filter itself — and became a trap once scope was enforced. Pinned by asserting the roles are unchanged, with the two grants carrying different flags so it cannot pass by accident. Falsified by mutation: enforcement never engaging, the write seam ignoring the ACL, the realm dropped from the scope, the revocation check removed, and the trie never installed each turn the intended tests red and no others. Full solution suite green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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06c56d7719 |
fix(cluster,acl): OTOPCUA_ROLES fallback + one string-identity rule (#532, #533)
Two independent defects surfaced in review of #520 stage 3.
#532 — Cluster:Roles had no OTOPCUA_ROLES fallback, despite two doc sites
promising one. A node configured only through the env var — which drives ALL of
Program.cs's conditional wiring, so it reads as the authoritative knob — bound an
empty Roles array and joined the cluster carrying no Akka roles at all. It ran,
served, and logged nothing wrong, while central reported "no driver-role nodes
are Up" and every deployment to it timed out. Not hypothetical: the field fix on
wonder-app-vd03 was to hand-add Cluster__Roles__0/1 to a Windows service's
registry environment. Anyone reading the code to diagnose that box would have
concluded from the XML doc that the fallback was already applied.
AddOtOpcUaCluster now post-configures AkkaClusterOptions through the shared
RoleParser.ResolveEffectiveRoles, so BuildClusterOptions (Akka's own member
roles), ClusterRoleInfo, the ControlPlane singleton scope and
ConfigDbApiKeyStore's ClusterId all see one answer. Two sibling validators
(ConfigSource, Telemetry) read Cluster:Roles directly and were exempting the
exact node they exist for — an env-only driver-only node has no ConfigDb and
could sit on ConfigSource:Mode=Direct unchallenged. They resolve the same way now.
Also collapsed the four open-coded `Roles.FirstOrDefault(IsClusterRole)` +
ClusterIdFromRole copies into RoleParser.ClusterIdFromRoles. They had drifted:
three classified the cluster role ordinally, so a verbatim-bound `Cluster-SITE-A`
yielded a null ClusterId — and a null ClusterId applies NO cluster filter, which
made #528's cross-cluster over-grant guard fail OPEN. IsClusterRole is now
case-insensitive; the ClusterId suffix keeps its authored spelling, because
normalizing it would silently rename the Akka role of a running deployment.
#533 — three string-identity rules in one authorization path. AclScopeRef used
default (ordinal) equality while the trie builder filtered ClusterId and hashed
principals OrdinalIgnoreCase; the deploy gate's cross-cluster check was ordinal
too, which was the worse half — it could reject a whole deploy over a ClusterId
case difference the runtime would have accepted. It only worked because resolver
and builder were handed the same NodeAcl instances.
The rule is now stated once, on AclScopeRef, and applied throughout:
identifiers (ScopeId, ClusterId, Principal) compare OrdinalIgnoreCase; path
segments compare Ordinal. AclScopePathResolver re-keys its own maps rather than
documenting a comparer contract for callers, so the two independent producers —
EF at the gate, artifact JSON on the node — cannot diverge from the outside.
PermissionTrieNode.Children stays Ordinal: those are browse names, and Speed /
speed are two nodes that can coexist under one device.
Split PermissionTrieBuildDiagnosticReason.RetiredScopeKind out of
UnresolvedScope. A legacy FolderSegment row and a typo'd id had the same message
and different remedies.
Falsified: five mutations, each reddening only its own guard — remove the
PostConfigure (3 tests), revert IsClusterRole to ordinal (3), revert AclScopeRef
equality (1), revert the resolver's map comparer (6), revert the gate's
comparisons (2), remove the FolderSegment short-circuit (1).
Test isolation: OTOPCUA_ROLES is process-global and xUnit runs classes in
parallel, so the three validator suites that now resolve effective roles share a
non-parallel collection. Without it, cases passing no roles would intermittently
observe another class's env var.
Full solution build clean; full suite green apart from two pre-existing failures
confirmed identical on
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Joseph Doherty
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3a6b2a1daf |
feat(acl): variable-depth scope model + the scopePaths producer (#520 stage 3)
Makes the /raw device tree addressable by an ACL rule, and builds the
scope-path producer PermissionTrieBuilder has accepted since it was written
but which had no caller anywhere.
The plan for this stage said "add NodeHierarchyKind.Raw, whose path is the
RawPath segments Folder/Driver/Device/TagGroup/Tag". That shape is wrong.
RawFolder.ParentRawFolderId and TagGroup.ParentTagGroupId are both
self-referencing, so folders and tag groups each nest without bound and a real
RawPath is folder…/Driver/Device/group…/Tag. NodeScope was fixed-arity and
PermissionTrie.CollectMatches was five hardcoded steps, so the scope model
could not address a real raw tree at all. NodeScope is now {ClusterId, Kind,
Segments} and the walk is a segment loop. The trie STRUCTURE was already
variable-depth (NodeAclPath.Segments is a list, Children is a recursive
dictionary), so only the walker and the scope record had to change.
Four decisions worth keeping:
- The namespace level became the realm. Level 1 gated on NodeScope.NamespaceId,
but v3 has no Namespace entity — the snapshot was retired when the address
space went dual-namespace, and the identifier appears nowhere in production
outside NodeScope. So the level could only ever fail to match, which silently
made every sub-cluster grant unreachable while cluster grants kept working.
It is now a realm token derived from the scope's Kind, not carried on it, so
the walk and the producer cannot disagree about its spelling.
- Provenance comes from the granting row's own ScopeKind, recorded on TrieGrant
at build time. Depth-derived provenance could not name a raw level at all,
since the depth of "Device" varies with folder nesting.
- The trie comparer moved from OrdinalIgnoreCase to Ordinal. Raw sibling-name
uniqueness is ordinal, so Speed and speed can both exist under one device and
a grant on either would have matched both.
- The null-scopePaths "deterministic test mode" is deleted. It planted
unresolvable rows at a direct child of the trie root, a position the walker
cannot reach, so the grant looked placed and could never match — and every
test using that mode proved nothing about production placement. scopePaths is
now required, and a row that does not resolve is dropped with a diagnostic.
A scope resolves to a LIST of paths: a raw tag projected into N equipments is
reachable at N+1 NodeIds and a write through any of them lands on the same
driver reference, so a Tag-scoped grant covering only the raw node would be
bypassable through a UNS one. The lookup is keyed on (ScopeKind, ScopeId), not
ScopeId alone — ScopeId has no FK and no type discriminator, so an id collision
across entity types would hand a grant the wrong node's paths.
Also closed here, all found by review rather than asked for:
- NodeAcl rows had no deploy-time validation of any kind and were not reachable
from DraftValidator at all (DraftSnapshot carried no NodeAcls). They are now
gated for dangling ids, cross-cluster scopes, blank/contradictory ScopeId, the
retired FolderSegment kind, and undefined ordinals.
- ConfigDbApiKeyStore conferred roles from Cluster-scoped grants authored in ANY
cluster, because it filtered on scope kind with no ClusterId predicate while
ArtifactApiKeyStore read an already-cluster-filtered snapshot. On a fused
admin+driver node that was a cross-cluster over-grant. Its doc comment claimed
the two stores matched.
- The two AdminUI ACL banners still said enforcement was LDAP-group -> role
mapping, which stages 1/2 made false in both directions.
- The /apikeys page was never classified in PageAuthorizationGuardTests, so that
test has been red since the key-minting commit merged — I did not run
AdminUI.Tests before merging stage 4.
Falsified rather than assumed: 8 mutations against the trie tests, 5 against the
deploy gate (including one proving a cross-cluster row is not silently
mis-diagnosed as unresolved), a staged red->green for the over-grant regression,
and the realm gate, the comparer and the malformed-path guard each broken
individually to confirm only their own tests go red.
Node ACLs are still not ENFORCED — nothing constructs a NodeScope or calls the
evaluator yet. That is stages 5 and 6; this stage makes the model able to
express what those will enforce.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
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Joseph Doherty
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a438ac1640 |
feat(acl): keys + ACLs reach driver-only nodes via the artifact (#520 stage 4)
A driver-only node has had no ConfigDb since per-cluster mesh Phase 4, so it registered NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and denied every UserName token. Its keys now ride the deployment artifact instead. - ConfigComposer snapshots ApiKeys alongside the NodeAcls it already carried. Only the peppered HMAC ships, never a secret, and the pepper is node config that is deliberately not in the artifact. - DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority decodes both node-side. Grants are scoped to the node's own cluster; keys are not, because ApiKey carries no ClusterId — a key is a fleet-wide credential and the ACL rows are what bind it. - OpcUaPublishActor installs them on DataPlaneAuthorityState on every apply, BEFORE its plan.IsEmpty early-return: an artifact that only revokes a key produces an empty address-space plan, so feeding after that return would leave the revoked key working until an unrelated structural change redeployed. - ArtifactApiKeyStore serves them to session activation; a node with a ConfigDb keeps ConfigDbApiKeyStore, whose per-request read is what makes revocation immediate there. - OtOpcUaNodeManager gains DataPlaneAuthority — the cluster identity blocker #4 named. NodeScope.ClusterId is required and the evaluator fails closed on a mismatch, so until now no scope it built could have evaluated. Nothing reads it until stages 5/6. The generation is a node-local COUNTER driven by the RevisionHash, not derived from its bits. PermissionTrieCache treats the highest GenerationId as current, so a generation taken from hash bytes would install a lower number about half the time and the cache would go on serving the previous deployment's ACLs, silently. Sessions are not stamped with it yet — that belongs with the first seam that reads a UserAuthorizationState, in stage 5, rather than being built now and consulted by nothing. Live-gated on docker-dev against site-a-1 (driver-only, no ConfigDb): key authenticates, wrong secret denied, both halves of the revocation asymmetry observed, and a SITE-A grant confirmed not to reach site-b-1. Key minted with an independent Python HMAC so the verifier was checked against something other than itself. Rig left clean. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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087a969ee6 |
feat(acl): API key minting — AdminUI page + admin service (#520)
Pulled forward from stage 7 because without it the feature is unusable and un-live-gateable: there was no way to create a key short of hand-inserting a row and computing an HMAC by hand. The minting logic is an IApiKeyAdminService in Core.Authorization, NOT logic in the Razor page — this repo has no bUnit, so anything only a page can reach is untestable, and minting credentials is not where that belongs. The page is a thin shell over it. Moved to Core.Authorization so both ends can reach them: ApiKeyOptions (was in Host) and OpcUaPrincipals (was in OpcUaServer.Security). The OPC UA server resolves principals; the AdminUI must refuse to mint a key claiming a reserved one. OpcUaServer already gained a Core reference in stage 1b, so no new edge — AdminUI gains one. ApiKeyOptions is now bound UNCONDITIONALLY rather than in the driver branch: a driver node needs the pepper to VERIFY keys and an admin node needs it to MINT them, and getting that wrong on either side is a silent authentication failure rather than a startup error. Validation rules, all covered: the reserved 'anonymous' principal is refused case-insensitively (so "ANONYMOUS" cannot slip past into a distinct principal that the evaluator would then match case-INsensitively against anonymous's grants); blank name/principal; a principal longer than the column, rejected rather than truncated, because silent truncation yields a key that authenticates and is granted nothing with no visible cause; a past expiry. Generation runs BEFORE the DbContext is opened so an unconfigured pepper surfaces as a clear error instead of a stored row whose hash nothing can verify. The page shows the plaintext ONCE and says so; it is held in component state and written nowhere else, because the server keeps only a hash. Revocation is flagged in the UI as taking effect only after the next deployment — driver-only nodes have no ConfigDb, so keys ride the artifact. FleetAdmin-only (Administrator), not ConfigEditor: this mints credentials. Core.Tests 68 green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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f88eb49bd1 |
feat(acl): ApiKey entity + key format, and put Core on the server's graph (#520)
Stage 1b. Still no enforcement wired — this adds the credential model the identity cutover (stage 2) will read. ApiKey holds one principal per key, deliberately. The reason to separate keys from principals is so many keys share a grant set and rotating a key never touches an ACL row, and that holds with one principal per key since nothing stops two keys naming the same principal. A key belonging to several principals at once buys little and costs a join table. UserAuthorizationState.Principals stays a list, so adding it later needs no ACL-side change. ApiKeySecret is the security-critical half and is pure, so it is tested on its own: otua_<keyId>_<secret>, peppered HMAC-SHA256, FixedTimeEquals. Notes why a plain HMAC rather than an iterated KDF (the secret is 32 bytes of CSPRNG, and the call runs inline on session activation, which the SDK serializes server-wide behind its SessionManager event lock), and fails closed on an unset pepper rather than hashing under an empty key. Found and fixed a bug in my own first draft: the key id was url-safe base64, whose alphabet maps '/' to '_' — the very character TryParse splits on. Roughly one key in five would have had its id truncated at a random position, an intermittent auth failure reproducing only for SOME keys. The id is hex now, and the guard is falsified: reverting the alphabet reds both The_generated_key_id_never_contains_the_separator and, as a bonus signal, Two_generated_keys_never_collide, because truncated ids collide. ApiKeyId is NOT NULL, unlike the nullable NodeAclId precedent whose filtered unique index would admit two NULL ids. Fine for a config row, not for a credentials lookup key. OpcUaServer.csproj now references Core. Until now it did not, so IPermissionEvaluator was literally uncallable from the node manager — the place enforcement has to happen. No new transitive package surface. Schema doc updated for both, and its NodeAcl block flagged for pre-existing drift (it still documents the GenerationId column v3 dropped) without fixing it here. Core 247, OpcUaServer 364, Configuration 128 — all green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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4d376f727f |
refactor(acl): NodeAcl.LdapGroup -> Principal, with the proc that reads it (#520)
Stage 1a of the API-key ACL design. Behaviour-neutral: the trie walker already matched an opaque string, so only what produces that string changes. No enforcement is wired by this commit and none of the two live role gates move. Renamed through the ACL model: NodeAcl.Principal, TrieGrant.Principal, MatchedGrant.Principal, AuthorizationDecision.Principal, UserAuthorizationState.Principals, and PermissionTrie.CollectMatches's parameter. LdapGroupRoleMapping is a DIFFERENT entity that also has an LdapGroup column and is deliberately untouched — it backs AdminUI login, which keeps LDAP. The migration is the interesting part. EF scaffolds RenameColumn/RenameIndex, so rows survive — but it cannot know that dbo.sp_ComputeGenerationDiff checksums NodeAcl.LdapGroup. That proc is created in V3Initial.StoredProcedures and never redefined since, and SQL Server does not validate a procedure body when a column is renamed out from under it: the object keeps reporting healthy and fails at CALL time with Invalid column name, silently breaking config-drift detection. Verified against the live dev DB that the deployed proc really does reference the column. The migration therefore re-emits the proc, as one parameterised template shared by Up and Down so the two cannot drift. Prose that describes what is enforced TODAY (fleet-wide LDAP group -> role) is left alone, because it is still accurate until stage 2 lands. UserAuthorizationState's refresh machinery is retained unchanged but now carries a note that it is LDAP-shaped and largely vestigial here: an API-key principal set cannot change out of band, since keys and ACL rows both ride the deployment artifact, so the generation stamp rather than the freshness timer is the real invalidation signal. 41 authorization tests pass; solution builds clean. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo |
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Joseph Doherty
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9cad9ed0fc |
docs(xmldoc): fill missing XML docs + strip tracking-ID comments across src
v2-ci / build (push) Failing after 41s
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Adds <summary>/<param>/<returns>/<inheritdoc> where missing and removes project bookkeeping IDs (task/tracking refs) from shipped code comments, so the docs read cleanly and CommentChecker is quiet except for known false positives (PLC/protocol terms, event/IEqualityComparer inheritdoc). Doc/comment-only; no logic changed; solution builds clean. |
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Joseph Doherty
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c236263e8d | fix(authz): give HistoryUpdate its own NodePermissions bit (was aliased to HistoryRead) [H2] | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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b4b7cd7d0f | feat(authz): remove SystemPlatform scope + permission-trie walk (Galaxy resolves via Equipment) | ||
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Joseph Doherty
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64e3fbe035 |
docs: backfill XML documentation across 756 files
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Adds <summary>, <param>, <typeparam>, and <inheritdoc/> tags to public members surfaced by commentchecker — resolves 5,847 of 5,869 issues (99.6%) across three /fixdocs passes. |
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Joseph Doherty
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8be6afbda4 |
fix(core): resolve Low code-review findings (Core-004,008,009,010,011,012)
- Core-004: add ConfigureAwait(false) to DriverHost.RegisterAsync / UnregisterAsync / DisposeAsync. - Core-008: rewrite the BuildAddressSpaceAsync XML doc to correctly name the caller (OpcUaApplicationHost.PopulateAddressSpaces) that owns the per-driver isolation. - Core-009: snapshot DriverResilienceOptions once per non-idempotent write in CapabilityInvoker.ExecuteWriteAsync. - Core-010: switch DriverResilienceOptions.Resolve to TryGetValue with a diagnostic error message when a tier table is missing a capability. - Core-011: add an optional diagnostic callback to PermissionTrieBuilder so production callers can surface scope-path mismatches. - Core-012: correct the stale WedgeDetector ctor summary and add the Reconnecting row to DriverHealthReport's state matrix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Joseph Doherty
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debe163f4d |
fix(core): resolve Medium code-review finding (Core-005)
Change ClusterEntry from sealed record to sealed class so TryUpdate uses reference equality for the CAS comparison. Prune now uses a read-compute-TryUpdate retry loop that restarts when a concurrent Install updates the entry between the read and the write, preventing a race that could silently drop the just-installed newest generation. Two regression tests added to PermissionTrieCacheTests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Joseph Doherty
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09cd579220 |
fix(core): resolve Medium code-review finding (Core-003)
Add FolderSegment member to NodeAclScopeKind; update WalkSystemPlatform to report NodeAclScopeKind.FolderSegment (not Equipment) for each visited Galaxy folder level, so MatchedGrant.Scope in AuthorizationDecision.Provenance correctly distinguishes Galaxy folder grants from UNS Equipment grants in the audit trail and Admin UI diagnostics. Three regression tests added to PermissionTrieTests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Joseph Doherty
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abbf49141c |
fix(core): resolve High code-review findings (Core-001, Core-002)
Core-001: swap the authorization-cache defaults so MembershipFreshnessInterval (5 min, inner re-resolve trigger) is strictly less than AuthCacheMaxStaleness (15 min, fail-closed ceiling), so NeedsRefresh's warm-refresh path is reachable. Core-002: TriePermissionEvaluator.Authorize now compares the trie's GenerationId against the session's AuthGenerationId and re-fetches the session's bound generation on mismatch, failing closed when that generation has been pruned. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Joseph Doherty
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a25593a9c6 |
chore: organize solution into module folders (Core/Server/Drivers/Client/Tooling)
Group all 69 projects into category subfolders under src/ and tests/ so the Rider Solution Explorer mirrors the module structure. Folders: Core, Server, Drivers (with a nested Driver CLIs subfolder), Client, Tooling. - Move every project folder on disk with git mv (history preserved as renames). - Recompute relative paths in 57 .csproj files: cross-category ProjectReferences, the lib/ HintPath+None refs in Driver.Historian.Wonderware, and the external mxaccessgw refs in Driver.Galaxy and its test project. - Rebuild ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.slnx with nested solution folders. - Re-prefix project paths in functional scripts (e2e, compliance, smoke SQL, integration, install). Build green (0 errors); unit tests pass. Docs left for a separate pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |