Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Joseph Doherty
4886a5783f Phase 3 PR 31 — Live-LDAP integration test + Active Directory compatibility. Closes LMX follow-up #4 with 6 live-bind tests in Server.Tests/LdapUserAuthenticatorLiveTests.cs against the dev GLAuth instance at localhost:3893 (skipped cleanly when unreachable via Assert.Skip + a clear SkipReason — matches the GalaxyRepositoryLiveSmokeTests pattern). Coverage: valid credentials bind + surface DisplayName; wrong password fails; unknown user fails; empty credentials fail pre-flight without touching the directory; writeop user's memberOf maps through GroupToRole to WriteOperate (the exact string WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed expects); admin user surfaces all four mapped roles (WriteOperate + WriteTune + WriteConfigure + AlarmAck) proving memberOf parsing doesn't stop after the first match. While wiring this up, the authenticator's hard-coded user-lookup filter 'uid=<name>' didn't match GLAuth (which keys users by cn and doesn't populate uid) — AND it doesn't match Active Directory either, which uses sAMAccountName. Added UserNameAttribute to LdapOptions (default 'uid' for RFC 2307 backcompat) so deployments override to 'cn' / 'sAMAccountName' / 'userPrincipalName' as the directory requires; authenticator filter now interpolates the configured attribute. The default stays 'uid' so existing test fixtures and OpenLDAP installs keep working without a config change — a regression guard in LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests.LdapOptions_default_UserNameAttribute_is_uid_for_rfc2307_compat pins this so a future 'helpful' default change can't silently break anyone.
Active Directory compatibility. LdapOptions xml-doc expanded with a cheat-sheet covering Server (DC FQDN), Port 389 vs 636, UseTls=true under AD LDAP-signing enforcement, dedicated read-only service account DN, sAMAccountName vs userPrincipalName vs cn trade-offs, memberOf DN shape (CN=Group,OU=...,DC=... with the CN= RDN stripped to become the GroupToRole key), and the explicit 'nested groups NOT expanded' call-out (LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN / tokenGroups is a future authenticator enhancement, not a config change). docs/security.md §'Active Directory configuration' adds a complete appsettings.json snippet with realistic AD group names (OPCUA-Operators → WriteOperate, OPCUA-Engineers → WriteConfigure, OPCUA-AlarmAck → AlarmAck, OPCUA-Tuners → WriteTune), LDAPS port 636, TLS on, insecure-LDAP off, and operator-facing notes on each field. LdapUserAuthenticatorAdCompatTests (5 unit guards): ExtractFirstRdnValue parses AD-style 'CN=OPCUA-Operators,OU=...,DC=...' DNs correctly (case-preserving — operators' GroupToRole keys stay readable); also handles mixed case and spaces in group names ('Domain Users'); also works against the OpenLDAP ou=<group>,ou=groups shape (GLAuth) so one extractor tolerates both memberOf formats common in the field; EscapeLdapFilter escapes the RFC 4515 injection set (\, *, (, ), \0) so a malicious login like 'admin)(cn=*' can't break out of the filter; default UserNameAttribute regression guard.
Test posture — Server.Tests Unit: 43 pass / 0 fail (38 prior + 5 new AD-compat guards). Server.Tests LiveLdap category: 6 pass / 0 fail against running GLAuth (would skip cleanly without). Server build clean, 0 errors, 0 warnings.
Deferred: the session-identity end-to-end check (drive a full OPC UA UserName session, then read a 'whoami' node to verify the role landed on RoleBasedIdentity). That needs a test-only address-space node and is scoped for a separate PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 15:23:22 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
ed88835d34 Phase 3 PR 28 — Admin UI cert-trust management page. New /certificates route (FleetAdmin-only) surfaces the OPC UA server's PKI store rejected + trusted certs and gives operators Trust / Delete / Revoke actions so rejected client certs can be promoted without touching disk. CertTrustService reads $PkiStoreRoot/{rejected,trusted}/certs/*.der files directly via X509CertificateLoader — no Opc.Ua dependency in the Admin project, which keeps the Admin host runnable on a machine that doesn't have the full Server install locally (only needs the shared PKI directory reachable; typical deployment has Admin + Server side-by-side on the same box and PkiStoreRoot defaults match so a plain-vanilla install needs no override). CertTrustOptions bound from the Admin's 'CertTrust:PkiStoreRoot' section, default %ProgramData%\OtOpcUa\pki (matches OpcUaServerOptions.PkiStoreRoot default). Trust action moves the .der from rejected/certs/ to trusted/certs/ via File.Move(overwrite:true) — idempotent, tolerates a concurrent operator doing the same move. Delete wipes the file. Revoke removes from trusted/certs/ (Opc.Ua re-reads the Directory store on each new client handshake, so no explicit reload signal is needed; operators retry the rejected connection after trusting). Thumbprint matching is case-insensitive because X509Certificate2.Thumbprint is upper-case hex but operators copy-paste from logs that sometimes lowercase it. Malformed files in the store are logged + skipped — a single bad .der can't take the whole management page offline. Missing store directories produce empty lists rather than exceptions so a pristine install (Server never run yet, no rejected/trusted dirs yet) doesn't crash the page.
Razor page layout: two tables (Rejected / Trusted) with Subject / Issuer / Thumbprint / Valid-window / Actions columns, status banner after each action with success or warning kind ('file missing' = another admin handled it), FleetAdmin-only via [Authorize(Roles=AdminRoles.FleetAdmin)]. Each action invokes LogActionAsync which Serilog-logs the authenticated admin user + thumbprint + action for an audit trail — DB-level ConfigAuditLog persistence is deferred because its schema is cluster-scoped and cert actions are cluster-agnostic; Serilog + CertTrustService's filesystem-op info logs give the forensic trail in the meantime. Sidebar link added to MainLayout between Reservations and the future Account page.
Tests — CertTrustServiceTests (9 new unit cases): ListRejected parses Subject + Thumbprint + store kind from a self-signed test cert written into rejected/certs/; rejected and trusted stores are kept separate; TrustRejected moves the file and the Rejected list is empty afterwards; TrustRejected with a thumbprint not in rejected returns false without touching trusted; DeleteRejected removes the file; UntrustCert removes from trusted only; thumbprint match is case-insensitive (operator UX); missing store directories produce empty lists instead of throwing DirectoryNotFoundException (pristine-install tolerance); a junk .der in the store is logged + skipped and the valid certs still surface (one bad file doesn't break the page). Full Admin.Tests Unit suite: 23 pass / 0 fail (14 prior + 9 new). Full Admin build clean — 0 errors, 0 warnings.
lmx-followups.md #3 marked DONE with a cross-reference to this PR and a note that flipping AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates to false as the production default is a deployment-config follow-up, not a code gap — the Admin UI is now ready to be the trust gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:37:55 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
6b04a85f86 Phase 3 PR 26 — server-layer write authorization gating by role. Per the user's ACL-at-server-layer directive (saved as feedback_acl_at_server_layer.md in memory), write authorization is enforced in DriverNodeManager.OnWriteValue and never delegated to the driver or to driver-specific auth (the v1 Galaxy-provided security path is explicitly not part of v2 — drivers report SecurityClassification as discovery metadata only). New WriteAuthzPolicy static class in Server/Security/ maps SecurityClassification → required role per the table documented in docs/Configuration.md: FreeAccess = no role required (anonymous sessions can write), Operate + SecuredWrite = WriteOperate, Tune = WriteTune, VerifiedWrite + Configure = WriteConfigure, ViewOnly = deny regardless of roles. Role matching is case-insensitive and role requirements do NOT cascade — a session with WriteConfigure can write Configure attributes but needs WriteOperate separately to write Operate attributes; this is deliberate so escalation is an explicit LDAP group assignment, not a hierarchy the policy silently grants. DriverNodeManager gains a _securityByFullRef Dictionary populated during Variable() registration (parallel to the existing _variablesByFullRef) so OnWriteValue can look up the classification in O(1) on the hot path. OnWriteValue casts the session's context.UserIdentity to the new IRoleBearer interface (implemented by OtOpcUaServer.RoleBasedIdentity from PR 19) — empty Roles collection when the session is anonymous; the same WriteAuthzPolicy.IsAllowed check then either short-circuits true (FreeAccess), false (ViewOnly), or walks the roles list looking for the required one. On deny, OnWriteValue logs 'Write denied for {FullRef}: classification=X userRoles=[...]' at Information level (readable trail for operator complaints) and returns BadUserAccessDenied without touching IWritable.WriteAsync — drivers never see a request we'd have refused. IRoleBearer kept as a minimal server-side interface rather than reusing some abstraction from Core.Abstractions because the concept is OPC-UA-session-scoped and doesn't generalize (the driver side has no notion of a user session). Tests — WriteAuthzPolicyTests (17 new cases): FreeAccess allows write with empty role set + arbitrary roles; ViewOnly denies write even with every role; Operate requires WriteOperate; role match is case-insensitive; Operate denies empty role set + wrong role; SecuredWrite shares Operate's requirement; Tune requires WriteTune; Tune denies WriteOperate-only (asserts roles don't cascade — this is the test that catches a future regression where someone 'helpfully' adds a role-escalation table); Configure requires WriteConfigure; VerifiedWrite shares Configure's requirement; multi-role session allowed when any role matches; unrelated roles denied; RequiredRole theory covering all 5 classified-and-mapped rows + null for FreeAccess/ViewOnly special cases. lmx-followups.md follow-up #2 marked DONE with a back-reference to this PR and the memory note. Full Server.Tests Unit suite: 38 pass / 0 fail (17 new WriteAuthz + 14 SecurityConfiguration from PR 19 + 2 NodeBootstrap + 5 others). Server.Tests Integration (Category=Integration) 2 pass — existing PR 17 anonymous-endpoint smoke tests stay green since the read path doesn't hit OnWriteValue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 13:01:01 -04:00
Joseph Doherty
860deb8e0d Phase 3 PR 20 — lmx-followups.md: track remaining Galaxy-bridge tasks after PR 19 (HistoryReadAtTime/Events Proxy wiring, write-gating by role, Admin UI cert trust, live-LDAP integration test, full-stack Galaxy smoke, multi-driver test, per-host dashboard). Documents what each item depends on, the shipped surface it builds on, and the minimal to-do so a future session can pick any one off in isolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 11:43:15 -04:00