The previous Admin-006 commit added <AntiforgeryToken /> to the logout form
and updated the comment on the endpoint, but did not update LogoutAsync to
actually call IAntiforgery.ValidateRequestAsync. Blazor's UseAntiforgery()
middleware does not automatically validate minimal-API endpoints, so a
tokenless POST still succeeded. This commit injects IAntiforgery into the
handler, wraps ValidateRequestAsync in a try/catch, and returns 400 on
AntiforgeryValidationException. The endpoint keeps .DisableAntiforgery() to
prevent the middleware from also trying to read the body (which would cause
a double-read). The regression test is updated to log in first (to get an
authenticated session) before asserting 400 on a tokenless logout POST.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Emit <AntiforgeryToken /> in the MainLayout sign-out form and remove
.DisableAntiforgery() from the /auth/logout endpoint so UseAntiforgery()
validates the token. A tokenless POST now returns 400, preventing CSRF-logout.
Regression-guarded by AuthEndpointsTests.Logout_without_antiforgery_token_is_rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admin-003 — SignalR hubs were anonymously reachable: an unauthenticated
client could open /hubs/fleet, /hubs/alerts and /hubs/script-log and
stream fleet state, alert detail text and server script-log contents.
Added [Authorize] to FleetStatusHub, AlertHub and ScriptLogHub, and
chained .RequireAuthorization() onto all three MapHub() calls as a
belt-and-braces backstop.
Admin-004 — appsettings.json committed live-looking secrets (the `sa`
ConfigDb password and the LDAP ServiceAccountPassword) in plaintext.
Replaced both with empty placeholders sourced from user-secrets (dev) or
the ConnectionStrings__ConfigDb / Authentication__Ldap__ServiceAccountPassword
environment variables (prod); added a UserSecretsId to the Admin csproj
and a fail-fast guard in Program.cs when ConfigDb is empty/missing.
Admin-005 — Login.razor performed SignInAsync from an interactive Blazor
circuit, where the original HTTP response has long completed so the auth
cookie was not emitted. Rewrote it as a static-rendered plain HTML form
(data-enhance="false") posting to a new AuthEndpoints.MapAuthEndpoints()
minimal-API handler (/auth/login, /auth/logout) that does the LDAP bind,
grant resolution, cookie SignInAsync and redirect while the endpoint
still owns the response. Includes an open-redirect guard on returnUrl.
Added xUnit + Shouldly regression tests: AuthEndpointsTests (login cookie
issuance, failed-bind redirect, open-redirect rejection, logout, anonymous
hub negotiate rejection) and AppSettingsSecretHygieneTests (no committed
secrets). All 26 auth-related tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
