The /apikeys page claimed revocation "takes effect on a node only after the next
deployment". The live gate showed that is wrong for the node the operator is
most likely looking at: revoking through the UI denied the key on the VERY NEXT
request against the fused admin+driver node, because ConfigDbApiKeyStore reads
per request. The deployment delay applies only to driver-only nodes, whose keys
ride the artifact.
Reworded to say both, and to tell an operator to assume the slower behaviour when
revoking a compromised key — which is the decision the warning exists to inform.
Found by doing the thing rather than reasoning about it: the previous wording
looked obviously correct until the revoked key was actually re-presented.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Pulled forward from stage 7 because without it the feature is unusable and
un-live-gateable: there was no way to create a key short of hand-inserting a row
and computing an HMAC by hand.
The minting logic is an IApiKeyAdminService in Core.Authorization, NOT logic in
the Razor page — this repo has no bUnit, so anything only a page can reach is
untestable, and minting credentials is not where that belongs. The page is a thin
shell over it.
Moved to Core.Authorization so both ends can reach them: ApiKeyOptions (was in
Host) and OpcUaPrincipals (was in OpcUaServer.Security). The OPC UA server
resolves principals; the AdminUI must refuse to mint a key claiming a reserved
one. OpcUaServer already gained a Core reference in stage 1b, so no new edge —
AdminUI gains one.
ApiKeyOptions is now bound UNCONDITIONALLY rather than in the driver branch: a
driver node needs the pepper to VERIFY keys and an admin node needs it to MINT
them, and getting that wrong on either side is a silent authentication failure
rather than a startup error.
Validation rules, all covered: the reserved 'anonymous' principal is refused
case-insensitively (so "ANONYMOUS" cannot slip past into a distinct principal
that the evaluator would then match case-INsensitively against anonymous's
grants); blank name/principal; a principal longer than the column, rejected
rather than truncated, because silent truncation yields a key that authenticates
and is granted nothing with no visible cause; a past expiry. Generation runs
BEFORE the DbContext is opened so an unconfigured pepper surfaces as a clear
error instead of a stored row whose hash nothing can verify.
The page shows the plaintext ONCE and says so; it is held in component state and
written nowhere else, because the server keeps only a hash. Revocation is flagged
in the UI as taking effect only after the next deployment — driver-only nodes
have no ConfigDb, so keys ride the artifact.
FleetAdmin-only (Administrator), not ConfigEditor: this mints credentials.
Core.Tests 68 green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
Joseph Doherty