fix(opcua): credential lockout counts per credential identity, ignores transient denials (#844, #845)
#844: a success cleared the whole per-client count, so a client holding a valid key could make four guesses at another key id, sign in with its own, and repeat forever. Failures are now charged to the (client, credential identity) pair -- IOpcUaUserAuthenticator.DescribeCredential, key:<keyId> for API keys -- and to the client as a whole. A success clears only its own identity's count; the per-identity threshold locks that identity; a new per-client cap (OpcUa:CredentialLockout:MaxFailedAttemptsPerClient, default 2 x MaxFailedAttempts) that a success never resets bounds spraying across key ids and locks every credential. Slots are bounded on both counts; a waiter whose identity has room is not held behind one whose identity has none. #845: (1) store timeouts, miss-budget refusals, store/authenticator exceptions, an unset pepper and cancellation are reported Transient (OpcUaUserAuthResult.Unavailable) and released uncounted, so a ConfigDb stall can no longer lock every keyed client out; the client still sees the same opaque denial. (2) a full 4096-entry table defers its next prune until the earliest entry could age out instead of rescanning under the lock per failure. (3) ApplicationUri deliberately NOT added to the key: on a None channel it is a free string, so it would let an attacker reset the count per guess -- documented. (4) wire tests: distinct client certificates on a Sign endpoint are locked out separately; the ApplicationConfigPath branch keeps the SDK lockout off (falsified by removing the loaded-branch disable).
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@@ -107,8 +107,11 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyOpcUaUserAuthenticator : IOpcUaUserAuthenticator
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{
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// The contract forbids throwing: an exception here escapes into the SDK's session-activation
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// path and surfaces as BadInternalError. A store outage denies, it does not crash.
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// lmxopcua#845: a store timeout, miss-budget refusal or outage says nothing about the credential, so it
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// is reported Transient and the failed-credential lockout does not count it (a ConfigDb stall must not
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// lock every keyed client out). The client still sees the same opaque denial.
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_log.LogError(ex, "ApiKeyAuth: key store threw for key id {ApiKeyId}", apiKeyId);
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return OpcUaUserAuthResult.Deny(DenyMessage);
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return OpcUaUserAuthResult.Unavailable(DenyMessage);
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}
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if (lookup is null)
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@@ -129,7 +132,7 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyOpcUaUserAuthenticator : IOpcUaUserAuthenticator
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_log.LogError(ex,
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"ApiKeyAuth: {Section}:Pepper is not configured — every key will be rejected until it is",
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ApiKeyOptions.SectionName);
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return OpcUaUserAuthResult.Deny(DenyMessage);
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return OpcUaUserAuthResult.Unavailable(DenyMessage); // a deployment error, not a bad credential (#845)
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}
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if (!verified)
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@@ -161,6 +164,13 @@ public sealed class ApiKeyOpcUaUserAuthenticator : IOpcUaUserAuthenticator
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return OpcUaUserAuthResult.AllowKey(lookup.Key.Principal, roles, apiKeyId);
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}
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/// <inheritdoc />
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// lmxopcua#844 — the key id is public (it is the lookup index, never the secret), so guesses at different keys
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// are counted apart and a client's own successful key cannot clear the count of a key it is guessing at.
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// A credential that is not a well-formed key falls back to the username (all such guesses share one count).
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public string DescribeCredential(string username, string password) =>
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ApiKeySecret.TryParse(password, out var apiKeyId, out _) ? "key:" + apiKeyId : "user:" + username;
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/// <inheritdoc />
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// Resolves the <c>anonymous</c> principal's grants through the same mapper a key's principal
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// goes through, so anonymous is authorized by ordinary ACL rows rather than by a special case.
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