fix(opcua): credential lockout counts per credential identity, ignores transient denials (#844, #845)

#844: a success cleared the whole per-client count, so a client holding a valid
key could make four guesses at another key id, sign in with its own, and repeat
forever. Failures are now charged to the (client, credential identity) pair --
IOpcUaUserAuthenticator.DescribeCredential, key:<keyId> for API keys -- and to
the client as a whole. A success clears only its own identity's count; the
per-identity threshold locks that identity; a new per-client cap
(OpcUa:CredentialLockout:MaxFailedAttemptsPerClient, default 2 x
MaxFailedAttempts) that a success never resets bounds spraying across key ids
and locks every credential. Slots are bounded on both counts; a waiter whose
identity has room is not held behind one whose identity has none.

#845: (1) store timeouts, miss-budget refusals, store/authenticator exceptions,
an unset pepper and cancellation are reported Transient
(OpcUaUserAuthResult.Unavailable) and released uncounted, so a ConfigDb stall
can no longer lock every keyed client out; the client still sees the same
opaque denial. (2) a full 4096-entry table defers its next prune until the
earliest entry could age out instead of rescanning under the lock per failure.
(3) ApplicationUri deliberately NOT added to the key: on a None channel it is a
free string, so it would let an attacker reset the count per guess --
documented. (4) wire tests: distinct client certificates on a Sign endpoint are
locked out separately; the ApplicationConfigPath branch keeps the SDK lockout
off (falsified by removing the loaded-branch disable).
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-11-11 03:47:10 -05:00
parent 481985e20b
commit ffba75bb93
13 changed files with 1150 additions and 208 deletions
+7 -1
View File
@@ -244,7 +244,13 @@ Two things to know before relying on any of this:
separate record let a parallel burst through. At most `max − failures` verify at once; the rest WAIT (never refused
for parallelism — ScadaBridge opens many keyed sessions from one IP), refused only on lockout or, uncounted, after
`SlotWaitSeconds`. An expired lockout resets the count. On
`None` endpoints the key is effectively IP-only (NAT neighbours share it, UserName only). `docs/security.md`
`None` endpoints the key is effectively IP-only (NAT neighbours share it, UserName only). ⚠️ **Two counts (#844):**
per (client, credential identity = `IOpcUaUserAuthenticator.DescribeCredential`, `key:<keyId>` / `user:<name>`),
cleared by a success with THAT identity, locks that identity; per client (`MaxFailedAttemptsPerClient`, default
2 × max) — **never reset by a success** (else a valid key launders guesses at another key id) — locks every
credential. ⚠️ **Only definite bad credentials count (#845):** store timeout / miss-budget / store throw / unset
pepper / authenticator throw / cancel ⇒ `OpcUaUserAuthResult.Unavailable` (`Transient`) ⇒ `Abandon`, uncounted.
ApplicationUri is deliberately NOT in the key (free string on `None` ⇒ trivial evasion). `docs/security.md`
§"Failed-credential lockout".
- **Keys reach a driver-only node inside the deployment artifact** (stage 4). `ConfigComposer` snapshots
the `ApiKey` rows — the peppered HMAC only, never a secret, and the pepper is node config that is