fix(scripting): ScriptWorker isolation denies the worker every sensitive sibling, not just app\ (#890)
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The installer denied NT SERVICE\OtOpcUaScriptWorker only on -InstallRoot. On the wonder layout the node's keys and secrets sit beside it (E:\ApiInstall\OtOpcUa\pki with the application certificate's private key, data\ with secrets.db and LocalDb), inheriting BUILTIN\Users:RX. Users is a restricting SID of the worker token, so a worker could read them. - Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 -DenyPaths <dir>,...: each folder gets the same inherited deny as InstallRoot (new SensitiveDirDeny steps). Refuses drive/share roots, script-worker\ and the PE cache; folders must exist; a comma/semicolon string works for powershell -File. - The deny is read AND write (0xD0157: ReadData, WriteData, AppendData, WriteEA, DeleteChild, WriteAttributes, Delete, WRITE_DAC, WRITE_OWNER). Traverse/Execute, ReadAttributes, ReadControl and Synchronize stay so the loader still reaches script-worker\. The write half stops a worker planting a cert in pki\trusted\certs where a data drive lets Users create files in subfolders. - The list is recorded under the anchor service's key (Parameters\DenyPaths, step DenyPathRecord): a re-run removes the deny from folders dropped from the list, -Uninstall removes every recorded one without repeating -DenyPaths. -WhatIf/-PlanOnly print every step. - After an apply, WARN for each protected-DACL item under a denied folder that the inherited deny cannot reach; without -DenyPaths, WARN for pki/data/logs/backup/config/secrets siblings of InstallRoot. Tests: - Dry-run harness 46 -> 86 assertions (QA layout plan, mask bits, refusals, stale removal, record-driven rollback, host account never denied). Mutations (no sibling deny, deny->allow, mask back to ReadData, no stale removal, rollback ignoring the record, script-worker not refused) each turn it red. - Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.Windows.ps1 (Windows PowerShell 5.1, windev): 34/34, incl. -DenyPaths apply, 11/11 unchanged re-apply, shorter-list re-apply, uninstall from the record, second uninstall unchanged. - New InstallerLayoutIsolationTests (OTOPCUA_ISOLATION_INSTALLER_E2E=1, elevated Windows): a scratch wonder layout under the real restricted worker token. Before install and after uninstall the token reads pki/data/ logs/backup/appsettings and plants a trust-list file; installed it can do neither, still reads script-worker\, a real worker launched from the layout runs a script, and the host still reads everything. Mutating the -DenyPaths denies to a no-op mask turns it red on pki\own\private\otopcua.pfx (reproduces #890). QA vq03/vq04 are NOT re-applied; the command is in docs/deploy/qa-upgrade-b8b4c18f-to-fea7de0a.md. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
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@@ -1301,6 +1301,23 @@ Owner decisions §14 #5 and #6, as built. Operator reference: `docs/ServiceHosti
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No account, firewall rule or persistent ACL was created there.
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- **Not verified live:** the installer on a real node. That is the QA deploy gate on lmxopcua#780's follow-up (see
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that issue for the checklist).
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- **lmxopcua#890 (2026-11-12): sensitive siblings.** The QA deploy found the deny covered `InstallRoot` (`app\`) only, while the
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wonder layout keeps `pki\` (application certificate private key) and `data\` (`secrets.db`, LocalDb) **beside** it, inheriting
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`BUILTIN\Users:RX` from `E:\`. Users is a restricting SID, so a worker could read them. The installer now:
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- takes `-DenyPaths` (the deployment folder around `InstallRoot` plus each key/secret folder) and gives each the same
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inherited deny as `InstallRoot`;
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- widens the deny from ReadData to read **and write** (`0xD0157`: ReadData, WriteData, AppendData, WriteEA, DeleteChild,
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WriteAttributes, Delete, WRITE_DAC, WRITE_OWNER). Traverse/Execute, ReadAttributes, ReadControl and Synchronize stay
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allowed, so the loader still reaches `script-worker\`. The write half closes a planted trust-list certificate, since
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a data drive lets Users create files in subfolders;
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- records the list under the anchor service's key, so a re-run drops stale denies and `-Uninstall` removes exactly the
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recorded ones;
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- WARNs about protected-DACL items under a denied folder that the inherited deny cannot reach.
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Proof: `InstallerLayoutIsolationTests` on windev, a scratch wonder layout under a real restricted token. Before the install
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and after the uninstall, the token reads every file and plants a trust-list file. Installed, it cannot do either, still reads
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`script-worker\`, and a real worker launched from the layout runs a script. With the `-DenyPaths` denies mutated to a no-op
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mask, the test goes red on `pki\own\private\*.pfx`, which reproduces #890.
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### 12.6 lmxopcua#789 host CPU on Windows: blocking pipe I/O off the completion port (2026-11-11)
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