fix(scripting): ScriptWorker isolation denies the worker every sensitive sibling, not just app\ (#890)
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The installer denied NT SERVICE\OtOpcUaScriptWorker only on -InstallRoot. On the wonder layout the node's keys and secrets sit beside it (E:\ApiInstall\OtOpcUa\pki with the application certificate's private key, data\ with secrets.db and LocalDb), inheriting BUILTIN\Users:RX. Users is a restricting SID of the worker token, so a worker could read them. - Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 -DenyPaths <dir>,...: each folder gets the same inherited deny as InstallRoot (new SensitiveDirDeny steps). Refuses drive/share roots, script-worker\ and the PE cache; folders must exist; a comma/semicolon string works for powershell -File. - The deny is read AND write (0xD0157: ReadData, WriteData, AppendData, WriteEA, DeleteChild, WriteAttributes, Delete, WRITE_DAC, WRITE_OWNER). Traverse/Execute, ReadAttributes, ReadControl and Synchronize stay so the loader still reaches script-worker\. The write half stops a worker planting a cert in pki\trusted\certs where a data drive lets Users create files in subfolders. - The list is recorded under the anchor service's key (Parameters\DenyPaths, step DenyPathRecord): a re-run removes the deny from folders dropped from the list, -Uninstall removes every recorded one without repeating -DenyPaths. -WhatIf/-PlanOnly print every step. - After an apply, WARN for each protected-DACL item under a denied folder that the inherited deny cannot reach; without -DenyPaths, WARN for pki/data/logs/backup/config/secrets siblings of InstallRoot. Tests: - Dry-run harness 46 -> 86 assertions (QA layout plan, mask bits, refusals, stale removal, record-driven rollback, host account never denied). Mutations (no sibling deny, deny->allow, mask back to ReadData, no stale removal, rollback ignoring the record, script-worker not refused) each turn it red. - Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.Windows.ps1 (Windows PowerShell 5.1, windev): 34/34, incl. -DenyPaths apply, 11/11 unchanged re-apply, shorter-list re-apply, uninstall from the record, second uninstall unchanged. - New InstallerLayoutIsolationTests (OTOPCUA_ISOLATION_INSTALLER_E2E=1, elevated Windows): a scratch wonder layout under the real restricted worker token. Before install and after uninstall the token reads pki/data/ logs/backup/appsettings and plants a trust-list file; installed it can do neither, still reads script-worker\, a real worker launched from the layout runs a script, and the host still reads everything. Mutating the -DenyPaths denies to a no-op mask turns it red on pki\own\private\otopcua.pfx (reproduces #890). QA vq03/vq04 are NOT re-applied; the command is in docs/deploy/qa-upgrade-b8b4c18f-to-fea7de0a.md. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GT67ACmpMR7b9LGRPLijMi
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@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ dotnet muxer. See `docs/VirtualTags.md` §"Out-of-process runner".
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### Worker isolation on Windows (`Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1`, design §14 #5/#6)
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`scripts/install/Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 -InstallRoot <dir> -HostServiceAccount <account> [-ConfigureHostService]`
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`scripts/install/Install-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1 -InstallRoot <dir> -HostServiceAccount <account> [-DenyPaths <dir>,…] [-ConfigureHostService]`
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(idempotent; `-WhatIf` prints every change; `-Uninstall` rolls back; `-PlanOnly` prints the plan on any OS) sets up:
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| Step | Change |
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@@ -114,10 +114,14 @@ dotnet muxer. See `docs/VirtualTags.md` §"Out-of-process runner".
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| `Scripting:Worker:Identity` | With `NT SERVICE\OtOpcUaScriptWorker` set (by `-ConfigureHostService`, or in appsettings), the host starts every worker under a **restricted token** derived from its own: every privilege but `SeChangeNotifyPrivilege` removed, and restricting SIDs = the identity + `Everyone` + `BUILTIN\Users` + `RESTRICTED`. Every access the worker makes must pass for the host account **and** for that set. The token's default DACL is host + SYSTEM + identity; the worker is created suspended and put in its Job Object before it runs; `TEMP`/`TMP` point at its per-launch working directory (ACL: host + SYSTEM full, identity Modify); `DOTNET_EnableDiagnostics=0`. The host also adds the identity to its own window station and desktop DACL (enumerate/read, and create-window on the desktop), once per process. USER32 connects to them in its DllMain and the runtime imports USER32, so without the grant `coreclr.dll` fails to load (`ERROR_DLL_INIT_FAILED`, measured on windev). The grant lives on the session's kernel objects and ends with the session; nothing persistent changes. The logon SID, which those objects normally grant, is deliberately not a restricting SID: the host's process DACL gives it `PROCESS_VM_READ`. Windows cannot start an ad-hoc child process *as* a virtual account (only the SCM can, for a service), and a separate local user would need a stored password plus `SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege` on the host account; a restricted copy of the host's own token needs neither. Startup refuses the key off Windows or when malformed. |
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| Pipe ACL | On Windows the worker pipe always carries an explicit, protected DACL: the host account and (with an identity) the worker identity, read/write, nobody else. No SYSTEM, no Administrators, no Everyone. The owner is the host token's owner, so the worker's `CurrentUserOnly` check of the server end still holds. |
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| `PeCacheDir` | Created with a protected ACL: SYSTEM, Administrators and the host account full control, no Users. `pe\` grants the identity Modify (workers compile and write entries). The HMAC key and `workers\` markers are host-only. |
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| Install folder | The identity is **denied** ReadData on `<InstallRoot>` (inherited), so the worker cannot read `appsettings*.json`, logs or host binaries even where `Users` can. `script-worker\` grants it read + execute. |
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| Install folder | The identity is **denied** read and write on `<InstallRoot>` (inherited: ReadData/List, WriteData/AddFile, AppendData/AddSubdirectory, write attributes/EA, Delete, DeleteChild, ChangePermissions, TakeOwnership; Traverse/Execute, ReadAttributes and ReadPermissions stay so the loader reaches `script-worker\`). The worker cannot read `appsettings*.json`, logs or host binaries even where `Users` can. `script-worker\` grants it read + execute. |
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| Sensitive folders (`-DenyPaths`, lmxopcua#890) | The same inherited deny on every listed folder. **Name every folder outside `<InstallRoot>` that holds keys, secrets, stores, logs or backups**: the worker's restricting SIDs include `Everyone` and `BUILTIN\Users`, so anything Users can read is otherwise readable to it (and a data drive usually lets Users create files in subfolders, e.g. a certificate in `pki\trusted\certs`). Name the deployment folder around `<InstallRoot>` (one ACE covers `pki\`, `data\`, `logs\`, `backup\`, old `app.bak.*`) **and** `pki\` and `data\` themselves, so the deny holds even on a folder whose DACL does not inherit. Drive and share roots, `script-worker\` and the PE cache are refused; each folder must exist. The list is recorded under `HKLM\…\Services\OtOpcUaScriptWorker\Parameters` (`DenyPaths`): a re-run removes the deny from folders dropped from the list, and `-Uninstall` removes every recorded one without repeating `-DenyPaths`. After an apply the installer WARNs about any item under a denied folder whose DACL is protected and has no deny of its own (the inherited deny does not reach it); without `-DenyPaths` it WARNs about `pki`/`data`/`logs`/`backup`/`config`/`secrets` siblings of `<InstallRoot>`. Wonder layout: `-InstallRoot E:\ApiInstall\OtOpcUa\app -DenyPaths E:\ApiInstall\OtOpcUa,E:\ApiInstall\OtOpcUa\pki,E:\ApiInstall\OtOpcUa\data`. |
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| Firewall | Outbound **block** rule `OtOpcUa-ScriptWorker-BlockOutbound` on `script-worker\ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ScriptWorker.exe`, every profile. It covers the self-contained apphost the Windows installs run. A framework-dependent worker runs under `dotnet.exe` and is not covered, so there the analyzer's `System.Net` ban is the only network control. |
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The plan is pure data asserted by `scripts/install/tests/Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.ps1` (`pwsh -File …`, any OS).
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`Test-ScriptWorkerIsolation.Windows.ps1` applies it for real in a scratch folder (elevated), and
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`InstallerLayoutIsolationTests` (ScriptWorker.Tests, `OTOPCUA_ISOLATION_INSTALLER_E2E=1`, elevated) proves under the real
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restricted token that a worker cannot read `pki\`/`data\`/`logs\`/`backup\` of a scratch wonder layout and still runs.
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Re-run the installer after a deploy that replaces the install folder: a rename/swap drops the folder ACEs, but files
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copied into the existing folder inherit them. Rollback: `-Uninstall -ConfigureHostService`, then restart the host.
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