docs: source-verified deferment register + correct 17 drifted docs

Adds deferment.md — a source-verified inventory of new-driver status, all 17
open issues, in-code deferrals, open live gates and plan bookkeeping. Every
claim was checked against src/ and git, not against documentation.

Headline finding: three subsystems are authored, persisted and shipped but
never executed —
  * Node ACLs: IPermissionEvaluator/TriePermissionEvaluator have zero
    production consumers and OtOpcUaNodeManager never references them, yet
    ClusterAcls.razor authors NodeAcl rows and ConfigComposer.cs:51 ships them
    in every artifact. An authored deny rule has no effect.
  * IRediscoverable / IHostConnectivityProbe raise into the void (#518/#507);
    nothing ever writes a DriverHostStatus row.
  * DriverTypeRegistry is vestigial, so no factory passes a tier and every
    driver runs Tier A with the Tier-C protections dormant.

Also records the Calculation driver as picker-visible but unauthorable
(DriverConfigModal has no case) — the "registered but unauthorable" class
recurring after the Sql picker defect — and notes that no parity test guards
DriverConfigModal/DeviceModal, which is why it survived review.

Documentation corrections (source-verified):
  * ReadWriteOperations.md claimed "a denied read never hits the driver" via
    four types that do not exist in src/. Bannered + struck through; a security
    review reading that page would have concluded a per-node ACL gate exists.
  * CLAUDE.md: the Change Detection sentence was false (DriverHost consumes
    nothing); the mesh Phase 4 and Phase 5 live gates and the auto-down 1-vs-1
    gate had all PASSED; the ScriptedAlarmState table was already dropped.
  * driver-expansion tracking: Modbus RTU and SQL poll are merged, not
    pending — its command table would have made someone rebuild two shipped
    drivers in a fresh worktree.
  * drivers/README.md: dead DriverTypeRegistry paragraph, retired
    SystemPlatform namespace kind, missing Sql + Calculation rows, missing
    Modbus RTU-over-TCP transport.
  * TwinCAT.md/Galaxy.md promised an address-space rebuild that never happens.
  * Historian.md gained the #491 unproven-value-capture pointer.
  * IncrementalSync.md and AddressSpace.md bannered as wholesale v2-era (the
    rewrite is recorded as still owed, not done here); four v2 status docs
    bannered as historical; three wrong-name-for-a-live-type fixes.

Left deliberately untouched: the secrets NoOpSecretReplicator line, which
makes a security claim and needs the real behaviour identified rather than a
rename.

docs/OpcUaServer.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ In v2 the Server and Admin processes were fused into a single role-gated `ZB.MOM
 - `CreateMasterNodeManager` constructs one `OtOpcUaNodeManager` (`src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer/OtOpcUaNodeManager.cs`) — a `CustomNodeManager2` subclass that owns the writable address space under the namespace `https://zb.com/otopcua/ns` and a single `OtOpcUa` root folder organized under the standard `Objects` folder. It is wrapped in a `MasterNodeManager` with no additional core managers.
 - `OtOpcUaSdkServer.NodeManager` exposes the live node manager after `StartAsync`, so the hosting layer can wrap it in a `SdkAddressSpaceSink` (`src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer/SdkAddressSpaceSink.cs`) and hand it to `OpcUaPublishActor`.
 
-Address-space population is push-driven: drivers stream discovery and data-change events through the Akka actor system (`DriverInstanceActor` → `OpcUaPublishActor`), and `OpcUaPublishActor` writes them into the node manager through the `IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink` seam. `OtOpcUaNodeManager.EnsureFolder` / `EnsureVariable` materialize the UNS folder + variable hierarchy; `WriteValue` / `WriteAlarmState` push runtime values and fire `ClearChangeMasks` so subscribed clients see updates.
+Address-space population is push-driven: drivers stream discovery and data-change events through the Akka actor system (`DriverInstanceActor` → `OpcUaPublishActor`), and `OpcUaPublishActor` writes them into the node manager through the `IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink` seam. `OtOpcUaNodeManager.EnsureFolder` / `EnsureVariable` materialize the UNS folder + variable hierarchy; `WriteValue` / `WriteAlarmCondition` push runtime values and fire `ClearChangeMasks` so subscribed clients see updates.
 
 The driver-agnostic walk that turns a driver's discovery into folder/variable calls lives in `GenericDriverNodeManager` (`src/Core/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core/OpcUa/GenericDriverNodeManager.cs`): it walks `ITagDiscovery.DiscoverAsync` into an `IAddressSpaceBuilder`, captures alarm-condition sinks for variables flagged via `IVariableHandle.MarkAsAlarmCondition`, subscribes to `IAlarmSource.OnAlarmEvent`, and routes each alarm transition to the sink registered for its `SourceNodeId`.
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ The server binds a TCP endpoint at `opc.tcp://{PublicHostname}:{OpcUaPort}/OtOpc
 
 `OpcUaApplicationHost` subscribes to `SessionManager.ImpersonateUser` after `ApplicationInstance.Start`. The handler (`HandleImpersonation`) deals with the token types as follows:
 
-- `UserNameIdentityToken` → the password is decrypted, then `IOpcUaUserAuthenticator.AuthenticateUserNameAsync` validates the credential (`LdapUserAuthenticator` in production, a stub in tests). On success a `UserIdentity` carrying the token is attached and the LDAP-derived roles are logged; on failure `ImpersonateEventArgs.IdentityValidationError` is set to `BadIdentityTokenRejected`.
+- `UserNameIdentityToken` → the password is decrypted, then `IOpcUaUserAuthenticator.AuthenticateUserNameAsync` validates the credential (`LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticator` in production, a stub in tests). On success a `UserIdentity` carrying the token is attached and the LDAP-derived roles are logged; on failure `ImpersonateEventArgs.IdentityValidationError` is set to `BadIdentityTokenRejected`.
 - `AnonymousIdentityToken` and X.509 tokens → the handler returns without intervening, so the SDK's default validation stands.
 
 Decryption failures and authenticator exceptions also map to `BadIdentityTokenRejected`.