Merge branch 'fix/r3-01-mesh-grpc-allowanonymous' — R3-01: mesh gRPC + LocalDb sync endpoints opt out of the AdminUI cookie FallbackPolicy (PSK interceptors are the gate); real-auth-stack boundary tests + map-convention guard; rig DisableLogin parameterised (archreview 03/S14 Critical)

src/Server/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host/Program.cs

@@ -695,48 +695,12 @@ if (hasAdmin)
     app.MapOtOpcUaDeployApi(app.Configuration);
 }
 
-// Passive LocalDb sync endpoint. Gated on the same port check that bound the listener, so a
-// default-OFF or admin-only graph carries no sync surface whatsoever. Mapping it would be safe
-// even unauthenticated — LocalDbSyncAuthInterceptor fail-closes with no ApiKey configured — but
-// not mapping it at all is the stronger default.
-if (hasDriver && syncListenPort > 0)
-{
-    app.MapZbLocalDbSync();
-}
-
-// Central config-serve artifact endpoint (per-cluster mesh Phase 3). Mapped only on admin-role
-// nodes (which hold the central SQL connection) and only when a dedicated h2c port is bound. The
-// ConfigServeAuthInterceptor is the ONLY inbound auth and fail-closes with no ConfigServe:ApiKey.
-if (hasAdmin && configServeGrpcPort > 0)
-{
-    app.MapGrpcService<DeploymentArtifactGrpcService>();
-
-    // Central command ingress (mesh gRPC command plane): the node→central deployment ack. It
-    // rides the SAME listener rather than claiming a port of its own — a second cleartext h2c port
-    // would buy nothing but another firewall rule, and both endpoints are admin-role and dialled by
-    // the same driver nodes. Deliberately NOT gated on MeshTransport:Mode: mapping it under Dps
-    // costs nothing (nothing dials it) whereas gating it would mean flipping the mode on a running
-    // fleet requires a central restart before any node can ack — the same reasoning that registers
-    // CentralCommunicationActor in both modes. CentralCommandAuthInterceptor (added at AddGrpc
-    // above) is the ONLY inbound auth and fail-closes per cluster.
-    app.MapGrpcService<CentralCommandGrpcService>();
-}
-
-// Driver-node live-telemetry stream (per-cluster mesh Phase 5). Central dials in; gated by
-// TelemetryStreamAuthInterceptor (fail-closed on empty Telemetry:ApiKey).
-//
-// The node-side command endpoint (mesh gRPC command plane, Phase 1) rides the SAME driver-role
-// h2c listener rather than claiming a fourth port: central already dials this node here, both
-// directions are per-cluster-keyed, and a separate port would be one more thing to open on every
-// site firewall for no isolation gain. Mapping it is what makes MeshCommandAuthInterceptor live —
-// it is registered above and is a pass-through until a call matches this service's method prefix.
-// It fail-closes with no MeshTransport:GrpcPsk, so an operator who maps the service without setting
-// a key gets a closed endpoint, not an open one.
-if (hasDriver && telemetryListenPort > 0)
-{
-    app.MapGrpcService<TelemetryStreamGrpcService>();
-    app.MapGrpcService<NodeCommandGrpcService>();
-}
+// Mesh gRPC ingress: the LocalDb passive sync endpoint, the ConfigServe artifact + central
+// command endpoints, and the telemetry-stream + node-command endpoints. Extracted to
+// MeshGrpcEndpoints so a standing census test drives the SAME production mapping (see that
+// file's remarks — archreview 03/S14).
+app.MapOtOpcUaMeshGrpcServices(
+    hasAdmin, hasDriver, syncListenPort, configServeGrpcPort, telemetryListenPort);
 
 app.MapOtOpcUaHealth();
 app.MapOtOpcUaMetrics();