feat(historian): Part 11 modified-value history on SqlServer + QuestDB (#668)

Every HistoryUpdate a SQL backend applies now leaves a modification trail
(prior value, principal, Part 11 update type, modification time), and
HistoryReadRaw with IsReadModified=true serves it as HistoryModifiedData.

- Core: HistoryUpdateContext threaded into all three IHistorianDataUpdater
  methods; IHistorianDataSource.ReadModifiedAsync (default NotSupported =>
  BadHistoryOperationUnsupported on Gateway/Null); HistoryModified* contracts.
- SqlServer: schema v2 (002_sample_modified.sql, RequiredVersion=2, docs copy);
  trail written by OUTPUT ... INTO on the same MERGE/DELETE statement, so a
  failed update leaves no audit row; retention purges SampleModified per tag on
  the source-time cutoff; ReadModifiedAsync keyed on (SourceTimeUtc, ModifiedId).
- QuestDB: append-only {prefix}sample_modified (TTL like samples), trail row
  written BEFORE the change (orphan-on-crash, never an untracked change);
  existence reads now carry the prior value; ReadModifiedAsync.
- Node manager: modified reads dispatch + page via the #669 continuation store
  (HistoryContinuationState gains HistoryCursorKind + LastModifiedId), gated by
  the existing HistoryRead decision; session principal / key id passed to the
  updater. IsDeleteModified stays unsupported.
- Client.CLI: historyread --modified.
- Tests: node-manager dispatch/paging/cursor binding/principal threading,
  over-the-wire HistoryModifiedData, shared ModifiedValueConformance on both
  backends, SqlServer atomicity (forced trail failure => no change) + v1->v2
  upgrade + retention trail purge.
- Docs: Historian.md (Modified-value history section, schema v2 upgrade note),
  security.md, Client.CLI.md, CLAUDE.md.

docs/security.md

@@ -884,6 +884,12 @@ HistoryUpdate rewrites recorded history, so unlike HistoryRead it is gated **wha
 - **Flag off (default):** the session's API key is re-checked on the call (`DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeKeyUsable`, Gitea #563 — an expired or disabled key loses its activation-time roles), then the session must carry the **`HistoryUpdate` role** (`OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.HistoryUpdate`). `ApiKeyInterimRoleMapper` confers it **only from a `Cluster`-scoped grant** carrying `NodePermissions.HistoryUpdate` — narrower-scoped grants confer nothing, for the same reason as `WriteOperate` (honouring a flag without honouring its scope would widen it). A key holding only `WriteOperate` is denied `BadUserAccessDenied`.
 - **Flag on:** `DataPlaneAuthorizer.Authorize(identity, OpcUaOperation.HistoryUpdate, nodeId, realm)` decides per node and **replaces** the role check (never chained) — a session with no roles succeeds on the strength of a scoped `HistoryUpdate` grant, and a `WriteOperate` grant does not help.
 - **Availability is separate from authorization.** A node accepts HistoryUpdate only if it is historized **and** the selected historian backend has an updater when the node materialises (the `HistoryWrite` AccessLevel bit). `Backend=Gateway` has none, so it answers `BadHistoryOperationUnsupported` for every node whatever the grant. Operations, result codes and unsupported cases: [`docs/Historian.md` §HistoryUpdate](Historian.md#historyupdate).
+- **Every applied change is attributed (Part 11 modified-value history, Gitea #668).** The session's principal (the API key's
+  `NodeAcl` principal, or the reserved `anonymous`) and key id are passed to the backend with every HistoryUpdate and recorded in the
+  modification trail next to the prior value; a modified-value HistoryRead (`IsReadModified = true`) returns it as
+  `ModificationInfo.UserName`. Reading the trail is gated by the **same `HistoryRead` decision** as a raw read — there is no separate
+  permission — so with `Security:Acl:Enabled` off it is as ungated as any HistoryRead, and anyone who may read a node's history can see
+  who rewrote it and what it held before. See [`docs/Historian.md` §Modified-value history](Historian.md#modified-value-history-part-11).
 
 ### Evaluator — `PermissionTrie`