docs(archreview): R2-01 S7 fault-path hardening complete — STAB-14/15 fixed, STAB-8 seam documented (task 12)
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@@ -167,6 +167,13 @@ are the new STAB-14..17 below.
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### 1. Stability
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> **REMEDIATED by R2-01 (branch `r2/01-s7-fault-hardening`).** Connect-timeout now surfaces as a
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> `TimeoutException` at the `EnsureConnectedAsync`/`InitializeAsync` source (not an escaping OCE), plus
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> `when (token.IsCancellationRequested)` filters on the read/write ensure-wrappers (`:488`/`:1000`) and all
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> three poll-loop OCE catches — so a non-teardown OCE degrades/backs-off instead of killing the loop. Unit
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> guards T1–T4 (`S7DriverReconnectTests`, incl. the poll-loop-survival regression). Live gate
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> `S7_1500ConnectTimeoutOutageTests` (env-gated SYN-blackhole, `deferred-live`).
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**STAB-14 — High — NEW — S7's reconnect wrapper rethrows connect-timeout
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cancellation, and the poll loop's bare OCE catch then permanently kills the
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subscription.** `EnsureConnectedAsync` bounds the reopen with a linked
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@@ -192,6 +199,14 @@ degrade-to-`BadCommunicationError` path), and filter the poll loop's OCE
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catches on `ct.IsCancellationRequested`; add a fake-factory unit test where
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`OpenAsync` honours a token that only the `CancelAfter` fires.
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> **REMEDIATED by R2-01 (branch `r2/01-s7-fault-hardening`).** `IsS7ConnectionFatal` broadened to the
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> ISO-on-TCP framing surface (`TPKTInvalidException`/`TPDUInvalidException`/`WrongNumberOfBytesException` +
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> `PlcException{WrongNumberReceivedBytes}`; deliberately NOT `InvalidDataException` — that is the driver's own
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> config-mismatch decode backstop on a healthy socket). Cancellation observed mid-PDU on read + write now
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> marks `_plcDead` before propagating; the probe restructured to classify + mark dead under `_gate` so the next
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> tick reopens a lying/hung handle. Unit guards T5–T9 (`S7DriverReconnectTests`) + negative control
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> `Read_does_not_reopen_on_a_data_address_error`.
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**STAB-15 — High — NEW — S7's connection-fatal classification misses
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framing/desync errors and cancellation-during-I/O, reproducing Modbus's
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STAB-3 desync; and the probe never marks the handle dead.**
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@@ -340,6 +355,12 @@ S7's `ComputeBackoffDelay`, `S7Driver.cs:1447`) and a small connect-attempt
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throttle to the lazy-reconnect drivers (S7's `EnsureConnectedAsync` is now
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the natural home for a last-attempt timestamp).
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> **SEAM DOCUMENTED by R2-01 (branch `r2/01-s7-fault-hardening`).** The S7 connect-throttle is left to
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> R2-09 (fleet-wide reconnect-backoff), not implemented driver-locally. `EnsureConnectedAsync`'s `<remarks>`
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> now names itself as the single gate-serialized choke-point where a last-failed-attempt timestamp plugs in.
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> (Note: R2-01's STAB-14/15 fixes already *reduce* dead-PLC cost — poll ticks that used to die now back off to
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> `PollBackoffCap`, and connect-timeouts no longer escape as anomalous OCEs.)
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**STAB-9 — Medium — `PollGroupEngine`'s `onError` sink is dead code: no
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driver passes it.** All five consumers construct the engine without the
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error callback (`ModbusDriver.cs:115`, `AbCipDriver.cs:133`,
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