feat(opcuaclient): opt-in server-certificate host-name check; NAT fixture keeps its PKI (#816, #818)
#816 finding: the SDK checks that the server certificate names the host only when a session is created with checkDomain:true. The driver, the AdminUI browser and Client.Shared all called the 8-argument DefaultSessionFactory.CreateAsync, which forwards checkDomain:false — so no host-name check ever ran (why a trusted NAT cert for *.invalid browsed fine over an IP in #813). When enabled the SDK (Session.OpenAsync -> ValidateDomains -> FindDomain) compares ConfiguredEndpoint.EndpointUrl.IdnHost — the CONFIGURED host, because OpcUaEndpointSelection/EndpointSelector rewrote the advertised one — against the cert's DNS/IP SANs; secured sessions only, and the auto-accept handler accepts a mismatch. Policy: certificateValidation.validateServerHostName, tri-state. Unset = OpcUaCertificateValidationOptions.DefaultValidateServerHostName = false, the pre-#816 behaviour, so nothing changes on upgrade; true = validate the configured host; false = explicit NAT/port-publish opt-out. Threaded into the driver, the AdminUI browser (same JSON) and the AdminUI form (a select that keeps "unset" unset), Client.Shared ConnectionSettings.ValidateServerHostName and the CLI --validate-host-name. A driver refusal names the opt-out. #818: the NAT fixture's /app/pki is on the opc-plc-nat-pki volume (verified: same thumbprint across --force-recreate), its PUBLIC cert is committed as Docker/nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der, and NatPublishedEndpointBrowseTests run every secure browse on a throwaway PKI (internal browser seam): refusal with nothing trusted, positive with the cert trusted (unset/false host check), and a BadCertificateHostNameInvalid refusal with the check on. The trusted cert is OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT or the committed one (skip on thumbprint mismatch); OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT_TRUSTED is retired. CI exports its throwaway NAT container's public cert. ServerHostNameValidationTests pin the driver against the plain opc-plc. MIN_EXECUTED not raised (needs a hosted run): +6 in v2-integration (440 -> 446), documented in scripts/ci/README.md.
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@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ here since opc-plc ships pre-containerized.
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| File | Purpose |
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|---|---|
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| [`docker-compose.yml`](docker-compose.yml) | Service definition for `otopcua-opc-plc` — image pin, port map, command flags. |
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| [`nat/docker-compose.yml`](nat/docker-compose.yml) | `otopcua-opc-plc-nat` — a SEPARATE stack (`/opt/otopcua-opcuaclient-nat` on the shared host): opc-plc advertising a private `.invalid` host on internal port 50000, published on 50010. For `NatPublishedEndpointBrowseTests` (`OPCUA_NAT_ENDPOINT=opc.tcp://10.100.0.35:50010`, #806/#813); see the compose file's header. |
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| [`nat/docker-compose.yml`](nat/docker-compose.yml) | `otopcua-opc-plc-nat` — a SEPARATE stack (`/opt/otopcua-opcuaclient-nat` on the shared host): opc-plc advertising a private `.invalid` host on internal port 50000, published on 50010. For `NatPublishedEndpointBrowseTests` (`OPCUA_NAT_ENDPOINT=opc.tcp://10.100.0.35:50010`, #806/#813); see the compose file's header. Its PKI is on a volume (#818). |
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| [`nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der`](nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der) | The NAT stack's **public** server certificate (no key), trusted by the positive secure / host-name NAT tests in a throwaway browse PKI. Refresh it when the stack's certificate is rolled (`docker compose down -v`); expires 2027-11-10. |
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| (this file) | How to run it. |
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## Install
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@@ -34,7 +35,8 @@ docker compose up
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```
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First run pulls the image (~250 MB). Startup takes ~5-10 seconds; the
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healthcheck in the compose file surfaces ready state in `docker ps`.
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healthcheck in the compose file surfaces ready state in `docker ps` (a bash `/dev/tcp` probe —
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the image has no `netstat`, which kept the old check permanently "unhealthy", #817).
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To run detached (CI pattern):
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