feat(opcuaclient): opt-in server-certificate host-name check; NAT fixture keeps its PKI (#816, #818)
#816 finding: the SDK checks that the server certificate names the host only when a session is created with checkDomain:true. The driver, the AdminUI browser and Client.Shared all called the 8-argument DefaultSessionFactory.CreateAsync, which forwards checkDomain:false — so no host-name check ever ran (why a trusted NAT cert for *.invalid browsed fine over an IP in #813). When enabled the SDK (Session.OpenAsync -> ValidateDomains -> FindDomain) compares ConfiguredEndpoint.EndpointUrl.IdnHost — the CONFIGURED host, because OpcUaEndpointSelection/EndpointSelector rewrote the advertised one — against the cert's DNS/IP SANs; secured sessions only, and the auto-accept handler accepts a mismatch. Policy: certificateValidation.validateServerHostName, tri-state. Unset = OpcUaCertificateValidationOptions.DefaultValidateServerHostName = false, the pre-#816 behaviour, so nothing changes on upgrade; true = validate the configured host; false = explicit NAT/port-publish opt-out. Threaded into the driver, the AdminUI browser (same JSON) and the AdminUI form (a select that keeps "unset" unset), Client.Shared ConnectionSettings.ValidateServerHostName and the CLI --validate-host-name. A driver refusal names the opt-out. #818: the NAT fixture's /app/pki is on the opc-plc-nat-pki volume (verified: same thumbprint across --force-recreate), its PUBLIC cert is committed as Docker/nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der, and NatPublishedEndpointBrowseTests run every secure browse on a throwaway PKI (internal browser seam): refusal with nothing trusted, positive with the cert trusted (unset/false host check), and a BadCertificateHostNameInvalid refusal with the check on. The trusted cert is OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT or the committed one (skip on thumbprint mismatch); OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT_TRUSTED is retired. CI exports its throwaway NAT container's public cert. ServerHostNameValidationTests pin the driver against the plain opc-plc. MIN_EXECUTED not raised (needs a hosted run): +6 in v2-integration (440 -> 446), documented in scripts/ci/README.md.
This commit is contained in:
+4
-2
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ here since opc-plc ships pre-containerized.
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| File | Purpose |
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|---|---|
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| [`docker-compose.yml`](docker-compose.yml) | Service definition for `otopcua-opc-plc` — image pin, port map, command flags. |
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| [`nat/docker-compose.yml`](nat/docker-compose.yml) | `otopcua-opc-plc-nat` — a SEPARATE stack (`/opt/otopcua-opcuaclient-nat` on the shared host): opc-plc advertising a private `.invalid` host on internal port 50000, published on 50010. For `NatPublishedEndpointBrowseTests` (`OPCUA_NAT_ENDPOINT=opc.tcp://10.100.0.35:50010`, #806/#813); see the compose file's header. |
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| [`nat/docker-compose.yml`](nat/docker-compose.yml) | `otopcua-opc-plc-nat` — a SEPARATE stack (`/opt/otopcua-opcuaclient-nat` on the shared host): opc-plc advertising a private `.invalid` host on internal port 50000, published on 50010. For `NatPublishedEndpointBrowseTests` (`OPCUA_NAT_ENDPOINT=opc.tcp://10.100.0.35:50010`, #806/#813); see the compose file's header. Its PKI is on a volume (#818). |
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| [`nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der`](nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der) | The NAT stack's **public** server certificate (no key), trusted by the positive secure / host-name NAT tests in a throwaway browse PKI. Refresh it when the stack's certificate is rolled (`docker compose down -v`); expires 2027-11-10. |
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| (this file) | How to run it. |
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## Install
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@@ -34,7 +35,8 @@ docker compose up
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```
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First run pulls the image (~250 MB). Startup takes ~5-10 seconds; the
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healthcheck in the compose file surfaces ready state in `docker ps`.
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healthcheck in the compose file surfaces ready state in `docker ps` (a bash `/dev/tcp` probe —
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the image has no `netstat`, which kept the old check permanently "unhealthy", #817).
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To run detached (CI pattern):
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+21
-2
@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@
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# ssh dohertj2@10.100.0.35 'cd /opt/otopcua-opcuaclient-nat && docker compose up -d'
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# OPCUA_NAT_ENDPOINT=opc.tcp://10.100.0.35:50010 dotnet test \
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# tests/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Browser.IntegrationTests --filter Fixture=opc-plc-nat
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#
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# #818: the server's PKI (/app/pki — own cert + private key, and the client certs --aa accepted) lives in the
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# named volume `opc-plc-nat-pki`, so recreating the container keeps the SAME server certificate. Its PUBLIC half is
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# committed next to this file (opc-plc-nat-server.der) and the secure tests trust it in a throwaway browse PKI. The
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# private key never leaves the volume. To roll the certificate deliberately (e.g. at expiry, 2027-11-10):
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# ssh dohertj2@10.100.0.35 'cd /opt/otopcua-opcuaclient-nat && docker compose down -v && docker compose up -d'
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# ssh dohertj2@10.100.0.35 'docker exec otopcua-opc-plc-nat bash -c "cat /app/pki/own/certs/*.der"' \
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# > tests/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.IntegrationTests/Docker/nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der
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# (until the committed copy is refreshed the positive secure tests SKIP on a thumbprint mismatch — they never pass
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# against a certificate other than the committed one).
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services:
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opc-plc-nat:
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image: mcr.microsoft.com/iotedge/opc-plc:2.14.10
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@@ -40,11 +50,20 @@ services:
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# --aa: accept the browser's self-signed client cert. Trust in the OTHER direction (the browser trusting
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# this server's cert) is deliberately not automatic — that is what the secure test pins.
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- "--aa"
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volumes:
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- opc-plc-nat-pki:/app/pki
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# The image runs as uid 1654 ("app") and ships no /app/pki, so Docker creates the volume mount point root-owned
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# and opc-plc could not write its certificate there. A throwaway test simulator: run it as root rather than add a
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# chown init container.
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user: "0"
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healthcheck:
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# The image ships no netstat (the sibling ../docker-compose.yml healthcheck is permanently "unhealthy" for that
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# reason); bash's /dev/tcp is there.
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# The image ships no netstat (the sibling ../docker-compose.yml healthcheck was permanently "unhealthy" for that
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# reason until #817 switched it to this probe too); bash's /dev/tcp is there.
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test: ["CMD", "bash", "-c", "exec 3<>/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/50000"]
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interval: 5s
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timeout: 2s
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retries: 10
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start_period: 10s
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volumes:
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opc-plc-nat-pki:
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BIN
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+108
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
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using Opc.Ua;
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using Shouldly;
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using Xunit;
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namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.IntegrationTests;
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/// <summary>
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/// Gitea #816 — does the driver check the server certificate's host name? Against the plain opc-plc fixture, whose
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/// certificate names only its container hostname (e.g. <c>DNS:1fc1de3fcb21</c>) while the driver dials the docker
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/// host's address, so a host check MUST fail if it runs at all.
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/// <para>Before #816 the driver called the SDK's 8-argument <c>DefaultSessionFactory.CreateAsync</c>, which hard-codes
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/// <c>checkDomain: false</c>: the mismatch was never noticed. Now <c>certificateValidation.validateServerHostName</c>
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/// decides; unset keeps the old behaviour.</para>
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/// <para>Each test trusts the server's certificate in a THROWAWAY PKI (the driver's <c>PkiRootOverride</c>) with
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/// auto-accept OFF — auto-accept also accepts a host-name mismatch and would hide the check. The certificate is
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/// taken from the server's own GetEndpoints answer: what is under test is the host check, not how trust was
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/// established.</para>
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/// </summary>
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[Collection(OpcPlcCollection.Name)]
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[Trait("Category", "Integration")]
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[Trait("Simulator", "opc-plc")]
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public sealed class ServerHostNameValidationTests(OpcPlcFixture sim) : IDisposable
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{
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private readonly string _pkiRoot = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "otopcua-816-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
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/// <inheritdoc />
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public void Dispose()
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{
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try { Directory.Delete(_pkiRoot, recursive: true); } catch { /* best-effort temp cleanup */ }
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}
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private OpcUaClientDriverOptions SecureOptions(bool? validateHostName) => OpcPlcProfile.BuildOptions(sim.EndpointUrl) with
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{
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SecurityPolicy = OpcUaSecurityPolicy.Basic256Sha256,
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SecurityMode = OpcUaSecurityMode.SignAndEncrypt,
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AutoAcceptCertificates = false,
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CertificateValidation = new OpcUaCertificateValidationOptions { ValidateServerHostName = validateHostName },
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};
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/// <summary>Trust the fixture's server certificate (as advertised on its secure endpoint) in the throwaway PKI.</summary>
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private async Task TrustServerCertificateAsync(CancellationToken ct)
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{
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var appConfig = new ApplicationConfiguration(DefaultTelemetry.Create(_ => { }))
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{
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ApplicationName = "OtOpcUa #816 trust",
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ApplicationType = ApplicationType.Client,
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SecurityConfiguration = new SecurityConfiguration(),
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TransportQuotas = new TransportQuotas(),
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ClientConfiguration = new ClientConfiguration(),
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DisableHiResClock = true,
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};
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using var discovery = await DiscoveryClient.CreateAsync(appConfig, new Uri(sim.EndpointUrl), DiagnosticsMasks.None, ct);
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var endpoints = await discovery.GetEndpointsAsync(default, ct);
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var secure = endpoints.ToList().First(e => e.SecurityPolicyUri == SecurityPolicies.Basic256Sha256);
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var der = secure.ServerCertificate.ToArray();
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der.ShouldNotBeEmpty("the secure endpoint must carry the server certificate");
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var certs = Path.Combine(_pkiRoot, "trusted", "certs");
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Directory.CreateDirectory(certs);
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await File.WriteAllBytesAsync(Path.Combine(certs, "opc-plc.der"), der, ct);
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}
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private async Task<OpcUaClientDriver> InitializeAsync(bool? validateHostName, string id, CancellationToken ct)
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{
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var drv = new OpcUaClientDriver(SecureOptions(validateHostName), driverInstanceId: id) { PkiRootOverride = _pkiRoot };
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try
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{
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await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", ct);
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return drv;
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}
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catch
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{
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await drv.DisposeAsync();
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throw;
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}
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}
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[Theory]
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[InlineData(null)] // unset = the pre-#816 behaviour every existing deployment has
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[InlineData(false)] // the explicit NAT / IP-addressed opt-out
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public async Task Without_host_name_validation_a_trusted_certificate_for_another_host_connects(bool? validate)
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{
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if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
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var ct = TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
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await TrustServerCertificateAsync(ct);
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await using var drv = await InitializeAsync(validate, $"opcua-816-off-{validate}", ct);
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var snapshots = await drv.ReadAsync([OpcPlcProfile.StepUpRef], ct);
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snapshots[0].StatusCode.ShouldBe(0u, "the secured session must read once the server certificate is trusted");
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}
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[Fact]
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public async Task With_host_name_validation_the_certificate_is_checked_against_the_configured_host()
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{
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if (sim.SkipReason is not null) Assert.Skip(sim.SkipReason);
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var ct = TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
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await TrustServerCertificateAsync(ct);
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var ex = await Should.ThrowAsync<Exception>(() => InitializeAsync(true, "opcua-816-on", ct));
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TestContext.Current.TestOutputHelper?.WriteLine($"refused: {ex}");
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// The driver's failover aggregate keeps per-endpoint failures as text. The SDK message names the host it
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// checked: the CONFIGURED one (the endpoint URL was rewritten to it), not whatever the server advertised.
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var configuredHost = new Uri(sim.EndpointUrl).IdnHost;
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var text = ex.ToString();
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text.ShouldContain($"The domain '{configuredHost}' is not listed in the server certificate");
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text.ShouldContain("validateServerHostName=false", Case.Sensitive, "the refusal must name the opt-out");
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}
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}
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