feat(opcuaclient): opt-in server-certificate host-name check; NAT fixture keeps its PKI (#816, #818)
#816 finding: the SDK checks that the server certificate names the host only when a session is created with checkDomain:true. The driver, the AdminUI browser and Client.Shared all called the 8-argument DefaultSessionFactory.CreateAsync, which forwards checkDomain:false — so no host-name check ever ran (why a trusted NAT cert for *.invalid browsed fine over an IP in #813). When enabled the SDK (Session.OpenAsync -> ValidateDomains -> FindDomain) compares ConfiguredEndpoint.EndpointUrl.IdnHost — the CONFIGURED host, because OpcUaEndpointSelection/EndpointSelector rewrote the advertised one — against the cert's DNS/IP SANs; secured sessions only, and the auto-accept handler accepts a mismatch. Policy: certificateValidation.validateServerHostName, tri-state. Unset = OpcUaCertificateValidationOptions.DefaultValidateServerHostName = false, the pre-#816 behaviour, so nothing changes on upgrade; true = validate the configured host; false = explicit NAT/port-publish opt-out. Threaded into the driver, the AdminUI browser (same JSON) and the AdminUI form (a select that keeps "unset" unset), Client.Shared ConnectionSettings.ValidateServerHostName and the CLI --validate-host-name. A driver refusal names the opt-out. #818: the NAT fixture's /app/pki is on the opc-plc-nat-pki volume (verified: same thumbprint across --force-recreate), its PUBLIC cert is committed as Docker/nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der, and NatPublishedEndpointBrowseTests run every secure browse on a throwaway PKI (internal browser seam): refusal with nothing trusted, positive with the cert trusted (unset/false host check), and a BadCertificateHostNameInvalid refusal with the check on. The trusted cert is OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT or the committed one (skip on thumbprint mismatch); OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT_TRUSTED is retired. CI exports its throwaway NAT container's public cert. ServerHostNameValidationTests pin the driver against the plain opc-plc. MIN_EXECUTED not raised (needs a hosted run): +6 in v2-integration (440 -> 446), documented in scripts/ci/README.md.
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@@ -100,9 +100,12 @@ when it isn't running. Bring one up, `dotnet test`, tear down. Repo compose live
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> `NatPublishedEndpointBrowseTests` (Browser.IntegrationTests, `Fixture=opc-plc-nat`) use it, and each asserts that
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> premise before testing the shared `OpcUaEndpointUrlRewriter` (configured host:port win, advertised path kept):
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> `OPCUA_NAT_ENDPOINT=opc.tcp://10.100.0.35:50010 dotnet test tests/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Browser.IntegrationTests --filter Fixture=opc-plc-nat`.
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> A separate stack so it never touches `otopcua-opc-plc`; it carries the `project: lmxopcua` label. The secure case
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> turns positive with `OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT_TRUSTED=1` once the container's cert is in the browse PKI
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> (`docs/drivers/OpcUaClient.md` §"Endpoint address"). CI runs its own throwaway copy (`otopcua-ci-opcplc-nat`, §10).
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> A separate stack so it never touches `otopcua-opc-plc`; it carries the `project: lmxopcua` label. Its PKI is on the
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> `opc-plc-nat-pki` volume (#818), so its certificate survives a recreate; the PUBLIC half is committed as
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> `Docker/nat/opc-plc-nat-server.der` and the positive secure / #816 host-name cases trust it in a throwaway browse PKI
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> (they skip if the server presents a different one; `OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT=<file>` overrides). `docker compose down -v`
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> rolls the certificate — refresh the committed copy then (`docs/drivers/OpcUaClient.md` §"Endpoint address"). CI runs
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> its own throwaway copy (`otopcua-ci-opcplc-nat`, §10) and exports its certificate as `OPCUA_NAT_SERVER_CERT`.
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> **MTConnect is a TWO-service stack.** The `mtconnect/agent` image ships no simulator, so a lone
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> Agent answers `/probe` and reports every observation `UNAVAILABLE` forever. The `adapter` service
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