docs(security): correct revocation latency (activation vs open session) + S18/S19 knobs

2026-08-20 10:04:03 -04:00
parent dfab7f614d
commit a9b592aeb8
5 changed files with 129 additions and 21 deletions
@@ -79,12 +79,15 @@ The checked-in `appsettings*.json` files are deliberately thin: they carry only
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `Username` | string | `apikey` | The fixed username a key-bearing client sends in its OPC UA UserName token. Carries no information — the key identifies the principal — but is checked rather than ignored so a typo is an explicit denial. |
 | `Pepper` | string | `""` | Server-side pepper for the stored key hashes. **Supply via `Security__ApiKeys__Pepper` or `${secret:}` — never commit it.** No default on purpose: an empty pepper still hashes "successfully", so `ApiKeySecret.ComputeHash` throws on one rather than producing a deployment with none of the protection it believes it has. Rotating it invalidates every existing key. |
+| `StoreTimeoutMs` | int | `2000` | Hard per-call deadline on the API-key store lookup that runs inline on session activation (arch-review 03/S18). Exceeding it **denies** the activation, logs a distinct Warning and meters `otopcua.opcua.apikey_store.bounded{outcome=timeout}`. `≤ 0` disables the deadline — do not, on a node with a ConfigDb: the SDK holds a `SessionManager`-wide lock across that lookup, so an unanswered query stalls **every** session activation on the server. Applies only to `ConfigDbApiKeyStore`; the in-memory artifact store on a driver-only node is not wrapped. |
+| `StoreCacheSeconds` | int | `5` | TTL of the read-through cache in front of that store, so a burst of activations costs one round trip. `0` disables it (a store read per activation). Bounds how long an `Enabled` revocation authored in the ConfigDb takes to reach a **new** activation; it has no effect on already-open sessions (those re-check the artifact snapshot) and cannot delay an `ExpiresUtc` — a cached hit that has since expired is re-read rather than served. |

 **`Security:Acl`** key fields (`AclOptions`):

 | Key | Type | Default | Meaning |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `Enabled` | bool | `false` | `true` makes scoped `NodeAcl` grants decide **write**, **alarm-command** and **HistoryRead** authorization, *replacing* the server-wide `WriteOperate` / `AlarmAck` role checks. `false` keeps those role checks and leaves HistoryRead ungated — byte-for-byte the pre-stage-5 behaviour. Read, Browse and Subscribe are ungated either way. |
+| `RevalidationIntervalSeconds` | int | `60` | How often live monitored items are re-authorized against the clock, in addition to on every deployment (arch-review 03/S19). A key's `ExpiresUtc` passes with the clock, so without this an expired key kept feeding a live subscription until a deployment happened to land — indefinitely on a fleet deployed once and left running. `0` disables the timer (deploy-triggered only). **Inert while `Enabled` is false**, since the pass early-returns when enforcement is off. An affected session is silenced with `BadUserAccessDenied`, **not closed**, and recovers on re-activation. |

 > **Flipping `Security:Acl:Enabled` is a config change, not a redeploy** — both paths are wired in both modes (the node builds its permission trie on every deploy regardless), the same dark-switch discipline as [`MeshTransport`](#meshtransport), [`ConfigSource`](#configsource) and [`Telemetry`](#telemetry). It defaults off because the first deployment carrying the code would otherwise start denying every client that has no key, **including ScadaBridge's Data Connection Layer, which consumes this address space from another repo.** Enforcement fails closed on every unresolvable case, so a wiring or config mistake presents as *everything denied* — check the `OpcUaPublish: data-plane authority generation N installed` line for a non-zero grant count before debugging an individual rule. See [`security.md` § Node ACL enforcement](security.md#node-acl-enforcement-securityaclenabled).