feat(acl): keys + ACLs reach driver-only nodes via the artifact (#520 stage 4)

A driver-only node has had no ConfigDb since per-cluster mesh Phase 4, so it
registered NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and denied every UserName token. Its keys
now ride the deployment artifact instead.

- ConfigComposer snapshots ApiKeys alongside the NodeAcls it already carried.
  Only the peppered HMAC ships, never a secret, and the pepper is node config
  that is deliberately not in the artifact.
- DeploymentArtifact.ParseDataPlaneAuthority decodes both node-side. Grants are
  scoped to the node's own cluster; keys are not, because ApiKey carries no
  ClusterId — a key is a fleet-wide credential and the ACL rows are what bind it.
- OpcUaPublishActor installs them on DataPlaneAuthorityState on every apply,
  BEFORE its plan.IsEmpty early-return: an artifact that only revokes a key
  produces an empty address-space plan, so feeding after that return would leave
  the revoked key working until an unrelated structural change redeployed.
- ArtifactApiKeyStore serves them to session activation; a node with a ConfigDb
  keeps ConfigDbApiKeyStore, whose per-request read is what makes revocation
  immediate there.
- OtOpcUaNodeManager gains DataPlaneAuthority — the cluster identity blocker #4
  named. NodeScope.ClusterId is required and the evaluator fails closed on a
  mismatch, so until now no scope it built could have evaluated. Nothing reads it
  until stages 5/6.

The generation is a node-local COUNTER driven by the RevisionHash, not derived
from its bits. PermissionTrieCache treats the highest GenerationId as current, so
a generation taken from hash bytes would install a lower number about half the
time and the cache would go on serving the previous deployment's ACLs, silently.

Sessions are not stamped with it yet — that belongs with the first seam that
reads a UserAuthorizationState, in stage 5, rather than being built now and
consulted by nothing.

Live-gated on docker-dev against site-a-1 (driver-only, no ConfigDb): key
authenticates, wrong secret denied, both halves of the revocation asymmetry
observed, and a SITE-A grant confirmed not to reach site-b-1. Key minted with an
independent Python HMAC so the verifier was checked against something other than
itself. Rig left clean.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-07-31 14:37:18 -04:00
parent c1771dc271
commit a438ac1640
21 changed files with 1505 additions and 48 deletions
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Commons.Interfaces;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Commons.OpcUa;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Abstractions;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Authorization;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.AlarmHistorian;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.ScriptedAlarms;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Scripting;
@@ -467,6 +468,11 @@ public static class ServiceCollectionExtensions
loggerFactory.CreateLogger<AddressSpaceApplier>(),
provisioning: provisioning,
historizedSubscriptions: historizedSubscriptions);
// #520 stage 4 — the sink that receives each applied artifact's API keys + ACL grants, so OPC
// UA session activation can authenticate. Optional: GetService (not GetRequiredService), because
// a node with no driver role never registers it and test harnesses build this graph without it;
// the actor treats null as "nothing consumes authorization inputs" and skips the decode.
var dataPlaneAuthority = resolver.GetService<IDataPlaneAuthoritySink>();
var publishActor = system.ActorOf(
OpcUaPublishActor.Props(
sink: addressSpaceSink,
@@ -475,7 +481,8 @@ public static class ServiceCollectionExtensions
dbFactory: dbFactory,
applier: applier,
dbHealthProbe: dbHealth,
dbLess: dbFactory is null),
dbLess: dbFactory is null,
dataPlaneAuthority: dataPlaneAuthority),
OpcUaPublishActorName);
registry.Register<OpcUaPublishActorKey>(publishActor);