fix(opcua): credential lockout review fixes (#833)

- Reserve an in-flight slot per client before authenticating (TryBegin /
  Complete / Abandon under one lock); refuse once recorded failures +
  in-flight attempts reach MaxFailedAttempts, so a parallel burst cannot
  pass the check before its first failure is recorded.
- An expired lockout resets the count (LockoutSeconds < FailureWindowSeconds
  relocked on every single failure after the first lockout).
- Validate OpcUa:CredentialLockout at host start: disabled, or both
  durations > 0.
- Log the first refusal of a lockout episode at Information, the rest at
  Debug.
- Document that on None endpoints the key is effectively IP-only (NAT
  neighbours share a UserName count) and a null peer shares one key.
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-11-11 02:32:40 -05:00
parent 0856261ef8
commit 988927c8ac
8 changed files with 386 additions and 70 deletions
@@ -29,5 +29,14 @@ public sealed class OpcUaApplicationHostOptionsValidator : OptionsValidatorBase<
// IReadOnlyCollection<T>, so it can't bind to MinCount's IReadOnlyCollection<T> parameter
// directly. ToList() bridges to the shared primitive while preserving the count (and message).
builder.MinCount(o.EnabledSecurityProfiles?.ToList(), 1, "OpcUa:EnabledSecurityProfiles");
// #833 review: an enabled credential lockout needs positive durations — a zero LockoutSeconds would lock
// nothing, a zero FailureWindowSeconds would never accumulate. MaxFailedAttempts <= 0 disables it.
var lockout = o.CredentialLockout;
builder.RequireThat(lockout is null || lockout.MaxFailedAttempts <= 0
|| (lockout.LockoutSeconds > 0 && lockout.FailureWindowSeconds > 0),
"OpcUa:CredentialLockout:LockoutSeconds and OpcUa:CredentialLockout:FailureWindowSeconds must both be "
+ "greater than 0 while OpcUa:CredentialLockout:MaxFailedAttempts is greater than 0 (set "
+ "MaxFailedAttempts to 0 to disable the lockout)");
}
}