feat(security): register TimeProvider + S18/S19 option knobs (archreview 03/S18,S19)

2026-08-20 09:36:04 -04:00
parent dd7f495432
commit 894444376e
9 changed files with 266 additions and 54 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Extensions;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Cluster;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Authorization;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.OpcUa;
+using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.Security;
+
+namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.Configuration;
+
+/// <summary>
+///     Composition of the OPC UA data-plane authentication + authorization seams (#520), extracted from
+///     <c>Program.cs</c> so the role-conditional branches are reachable from a test.
+/// </summary>
+/// <remarks>
+///     A store decorator registered in one branch of a role conditional is exactly the
+///     "built but never wired" shape, and <c>Program.cs</c>'s top-level statements cannot be driven by a
+///     test — so the wiring moved here rather than the guard being written against a comment. The
+///     branches are unchanged from the ones that lived inline; see <c>ApiKeyStoreRegistrationTests</c>.
+/// </remarks>
+public static class DataPlaneAuthRegistration
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     Registers the shared clock, the node-scoped ACL gate and the role-appropriate API-key store +
+    ///     user authenticator.
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <param name="services">The service collection.</param>
+    /// <param name="hasAdmin">Whether this node carries the <c>admin</c> role (and therefore a ConfigDb).</param>
+    /// <param name="hasDriver">Whether this node carries the <c>driver</c> role.</param>
+    /// <returns>The same collection, for chaining.</returns>
+    public static IServiceCollection AddOtOpcUaDataPlaneAuth(
+        this IServiceCollection services, bool hasAdmin, bool hasDriver)
+    {
+        ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(services);
+
+        // ONE clock for the whole authorization surface. The authorizer, the key-store bound and the
+        // revalidation timer all read time, and DataPlaneAuthorizer already documents what a second,
+        // diverging clock costs: every request denied, with a verdict indistinguishable from "no grant
+        // matched". TryAdd so a test (or a future host) can substitute one before this runs.
+        services.TryAddSingleton(TimeProvider.System);
+
+        // #520 stage 5 — the node-scoped ACL gate. Registered on EVERY node, not just driver ones, because
+        // OtOpcUaServerHostedService takes it as a constructor parameter and the built-in container resolves
+        // constructors by whether every parameter is registered, not by whether the parameter type is nullable.
+        // That is the same trap the IOpcUaUserAuthenticator and IDataPlaneAuthoritySource registrations below
+        // both carry a comment about; an absent registration is a node that will not start.
+        services.AddSingleton<IPermissionEvaluator>(sp =>
+            new TriePermissionEvaluator(sp.GetRequiredService<PermissionTrieCache>()));
+        services.AddSingleton(sp => new DataPlaneAuthorizer(
+            sp.GetRequiredService<IDataPlaneAuthoritySource>(),
+            sp.GetRequiredService<IPermissionEvaluator>(),
+            sp.GetRequiredService<IOptions<AclOptions>>().Value.Enabled,
+            sp.GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>().CreateLogger<DataPlaneAuthorizer>(),
+            sp.GetRequiredService<TimeProvider>()));
+
+        if (hasAdmin)
+        {
+            // A node WITH a ConfigDb reads keys straight from it, which is what makes revocation take effect
+            // on the very next activation rather than on the next deployment. Preferred wherever it is
+            // available, including on a fused admin+driver node.
+            // The ClusterId confines the grants this node honours to its OWN cluster — the ConfigDb holds
+            // the whole fleet's ACL rows, unlike the artifact a driver-only node reads, which
+            // ParseDataPlaneAuthority already scoped. Taken from AkkaClusterOptions (pure configuration),
+            // NOT from IClusterRoleInfo: that depends on the ActorSystem, and the same options-not-services
+            // rule is what keeps the redundancy-singleton registration in Program.cs from recursing into
+            // ActorSystem construction. Null on a node with no cluster-{ClusterId} role ⇒ no filter.
+            services.AddSingleton<IApiKeyStore>(sp => new ConfigDbApiKeyStore(
+                sp.GetRequiredService<IDbContextFactory<OtOpcUaConfigDbContext>>(),
+                ConfigDbApiKeyStore.ResolveClusterId(sp.GetRequiredService<IOptions<AkkaClusterOptions>>().Value)));
+            services.AddSingleton<IOpcUaUserAuthenticator, ApiKeyOpcUaUserAuthenticator>();
+
+            // Minting surface for the AdminUI. Same node condition as the store above: both need a ConfigDb.
+            services.AddSingleton<IApiKeyAdminService>(sp => new ApiKeyAdminService(
+                sp.GetRequiredService<IDbContextFactory<OtOpcUaConfigDbContext>>(),
+                sp.GetRequiredService<IOptions<ApiKeyOptions>>().Value.Pepper));
+        }
+        else if (hasDriver)
+        {
+            // Phase 4 left a driver-only node with no ConfigDb, so its keys ride the deployment artifact.
+            // Before stage 4 this node fell through to NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator and denied EVERY UserName
+            // token — safe, but it meant no machine client could authenticate against a site node at all.
+            // Deliberately NOT wrapped by the S18 bound: the artifact store is two dictionary probes on an
+            // in-memory snapshot, so it can neither hang nor be worth caching.
+            services.AddSingleton<IApiKeyStore, ArtifactApiKeyStore>();
+            services.AddSingleton<IOpcUaUserAuthenticator, ApiKeyOpcUaUserAuthenticator>();
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            // Neither role: nothing serves a data plane here. MUST be registered explicitly, not left absent —
+            // OtOpcUaServerHostedService takes IOpcUaUserAuthenticator as a REQUIRED constructor parameter, so
+            // an unregistered seam is not a quiet fallback to deny-all; it fails DI and the node does not start.
+            services.AddSingleton<IOpcUaUserAuthenticator>(NullOpcUaUserAuthenticator.Instance);
+        }
+
+        return services;
+    }
+}