Merge branches 'worktree-agent-a41f08fe289ebe7a8', 'worktree-agent-a21d19bd14da138e7' and 'worktree-agent-a8d85b6d5ef424006'

docs/drivers/OpcUaClient.md

@@ -75,7 +75,10 @@ measurements; they are not fresh SDK 2.0.1 interoperability evidence.
 `EndpointUrls` (a list) takes precedence over the single-URL `EndpointUrl` and
 provides ordered **failover** — the driver tries each candidate in turn at every
 `InitializeAsync` (including the comms-loss watchdog's re-initialise), and the first to connect wins (e.g. a hot-standby pair on
-4840 / 4841). See
+4840 / 4841). Each candidate gets `PerEndpointConnectTimeout` (default 3 s) for discovery + secure channel + session. That
+budget includes **client-side** work (certificate load/validation, the asymmetric handshake), so a cold process on a busy
+host can exceed it against a healthy server; an expiry is reported as `TimeoutException: … PerEndpointConnectTimeout (3 s)`
+(#910 — the SDK alone says `BadRequestInterrupted`, which reads like a server fault). See
 `src/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Contracts/OpcUaClientDriverOptions.cs`
 for every field (security policy/mode, auth type, session timeout, keep-alive,
 browse root, node/depth caps). `ReconnectPeriod` was **deleted** (#676 — unused since #670 removed the SDK reconnect

src/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient/OpcUaClientDriver.cs

@@ -1053,8 +1053,33 @@ public sealed class OpcUaClientDriver : IDriver, ITagDiscovery, IReadable, IWrit
         using var cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(ct);
         cts.CancelAfter(_options.PerEndpointConnectTimeout);
 
+        try
+        {
+            return await OpenSessionWithinBudgetAsync(appConfig, endpointUrl, policy, mode, identity, cts.Token)
+                .ConfigureAwait(false);
+        }
+        catch (Exception ex) when (cts.IsCancellationRequested && !ct.IsCancellationRequested)
+        {
+            // Gitea #910: the SDK reports a wait cut short by this budget as BadRequestInterrupted (or a bare
+            // TaskCanceledException), which reads like a server or network fault. Name the budget instead. It also
+            // covers CLIENT-side work (loading the application certificate, validating the server's, the asymmetric
+            // crypto of OpenSecureChannel), so a cold process on a busy host can exceed it with a healthy server.
+            throw new TimeoutException(
+                "The connect did not complete within PerEndpointConnectTimeout " +
+                $"({_options.PerEndpointConnectTimeout.TotalSeconds:0.###} s); the SDK reported: {ex.Message}", ex);
+        }
+    }
+
+    private async Task<ISession> OpenSessionWithinBudgetAsync(
+        ApplicationConfiguration appConfig,
+        string endpointUrl,
+        OpcUaSecurityPolicy policy,
+        OpcUaSecurityMode mode,
+        UserIdentity identity,
+        CancellationToken budget)
+    {
         var selected = await SelectMatchingEndpointAsync(
-            appConfig, endpointUrl, policy, mode, cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
+            appConfig, endpointUrl, policy, mode, budget).ConfigureAwait(false);
         var endpointConfig = EndpointConfiguration.Create(appConfig);
         endpointConfig.OperationTimeout = (int)_options.Timeout.TotalMilliseconds;
         var endpoint = new ConfiguredEndpoint(null, selected, endpointConfig);
@@ -1073,7 +1098,7 @@ public sealed class OpcUaClientDriver : IDriver, ITagDiscovery, IReadable, IWrit
             (uint)_options.SessionTimeout.TotalMilliseconds,
             identity,
             default,                                            // preferredLocales
-            cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
+            budget).ConfigureAwait(false);
 
         session.KeepAliveInterval = (int)_options.KeepAliveInterval.TotalMilliseconds;
         return session;

tests/Core/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.ScriptedAlarms.Tests/ScriptedAlarmEngineRunGuardTests.cs

@@ -45,9 +45,13 @@ public sealed class ScriptedAlarmEngineRunGuardTests
         eng.OnEvent += (_, e) => { lock (events) events.Add(e); };
 
         // The load itself evaluates once (startup recovery) — that is the first, abandoned run.
+        // The healthy predicate deliberately spins ~100 ms (well inside the 500 ms budget) so every run of it
+        // is observably in flight for a while. That keeps the #911 window open on EVERY run of this test
+        // instead of only under CPU load: the guard counts a run on StartedRunCount AND InFlightCount the
+        // moment it is admitted, but releases InFlightCount only when the run finishes.
         await eng.LoadAsync(
             [Alarm("runaway", $"var t = ctx.GetTag(\"Temp\"); {SpinPredicate}"),
-             Alarm("healthy", """return (int)ctx.GetTag("Temp").Value > 100;""")],
+             Alarm("healthy", $$"""{{HealthySpin}} return (int)ctx.GetTag("Temp").Value > 100;""")],
             TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
 
         // N more pushes while the orphan runs: every one is refused (a refusal is not a strike — I1), and
@@ -59,24 +63,41 @@ public sealed class ScriptedAlarmEngineRunGuardTests
             var expected = i + 1;
             await WaitForAsync(() => eng.RunGuard.RefusedWhileRunningCount >= expected);
         }
-        await WaitForAsync(() => eng.RunGuard.StartedRunCount >= 1 + 1 + pushes);
+
+        // #911: wait for the sibling's last run to FINISH, not merely to start. StartedRunCount reaching 6 only
+        // proves the healthy alarm's 4th-push run was admitted — it is still executing (InFlightCount 2: the
+        // orphan plus that run) until its finally releases the slot. Waiting on the started count and then
+        // asserting the in-flight count was the race.
+        await WaitForAsync(() => eng.RunGuard.StartedRunCount >= 1 + 1 + pushes && eng.RunGuard.InFlightCount == 1);
 
         eng.RunGuard.IsQuarantined("runaway", out _).ShouldBeFalse("refusals are not strikes");
         eng.RunGuard.StartedRunCount.ShouldBe(1 + 1 + pushes, "one dispatch for the runaway alarm, one per evaluation for the healthy one");
-        eng.RunGuard.InFlightCount.ShouldBe(1);
+        eng.RunGuard.InFlightCount.ShouldBe(1, "exactly one orphan, never one per push");
-
-        // The frozen condition is annotated Bad out of band — the operator sees WHY it is not moving —
-        // exactly once across the whole run of non-completions.
-        ScriptedAlarmEvent[] snapshot;
-        lock (events) snapshot = events.ToArray();
-        var quality = snapshot.Where(e => e.AlarmId == "runaway" && e.Emission == EmissionKind.QualityChanged).ToArray();
-        quality.Length.ShouldBe(1);
-        quality[0].WorstInputStatusCode.ShouldBe(StatusBadInternalError);
         eng.GetState("runaway")!.Active.ShouldBe(AlarmActiveState.Inactive, "state is held, never invented");
 
-        // Positive control: the healthy sibling still transitions on the same engine.
+        // Positive control: the healthy sibling still transitions on the same engine. The same push re-evaluates
+        // the runaway alarm too, and it must be refused once more — proving the single in-flight run counted
+        // above is the runaway's orphan (still holding its slot), not a leftover healthy run.
         up.Push("Temp", 150);
-        await WaitForAsync(() => eng.GetState("healthy")!.Active == AlarmActiveState.Active);
+        await WaitForAsync(() => SnapshotOf(events).Any(e => e.AlarmId == "healthy" && e.Emission == EmissionKind.Activated));
+        eng.RunGuard.RefusedWhileRunningCount.ShouldBe(pushes + 1);
+        eng.RunGuard.StartedRunCount.ShouldBe(1 + 1 + pushes + 1, "only the healthy alarm was dispatched");
+
+        // The frozen condition is annotated Bad out of band — the operator sees WHY it is not moving —
+        // exactly once across the whole run of non-completions. Checked only AFTER the healthy Activated event
+        // arrived: the single drainer fires each pass's events in push order, so every earlier refusal's
+        // emissions have already been delivered and a per-push re-annotation could not still be in transit.
+        var quality = SnapshotOf(events).Where(e => e.AlarmId == "runaway" && e.Emission == EmissionKind.QualityChanged).ToArray();
+        quality.Length.ShouldBe(1);
+        quality[0].WorstInputStatusCode.ShouldBe(StatusBadInternalError);
+    }
+
+    private const string HealthySpin =
+        "var spinUntil = System.DateTime.UtcNow.AddMilliseconds(100); while (System.DateTime.UtcNow < spinUntil) { }";
+
+    private static ScriptedAlarmEvent[] SnapshotOf(List<ScriptedAlarmEvent> events)
+    {
+        lock (events) return events.ToArray();
     }
 
     /// <summary>I3 — a QUARANTINED predicate is re-attempted on every push and refused before dispatch; the

tests/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.IntegrationTests/ServerHostNameValidationTests.cs

@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ public sealed class ServerHostNameValidationTests(OpcPlcFixture sim) : IDisposab
         SecurityMode = OpcUaSecurityMode.SignAndEncrypt,
         AutoAcceptCertificates = false,
         CertificateValidation = new OpcUaCertificateValidationOptions { ValidateServerHostName = validateHostName },
+        // Gitea #910: the default 3 s per-endpoint budget covers client-side work too — loading the fresh throwaway
+        // certificate, validating the server's, the first Basic256Sha256 handshake in a cold test process. The first
+        // test in this assembly (the validate:null case) paid that cold cost, and in the full-solution run it ran out:
+        // opc-plc answered OpenSecureChannel at once, but the client reached it only after 3 s of local work and
+        // cancelled 48 ms later (BadRequestInterrupted). What is under test is the host check, not connect latency.
+        PerEndpointConnectTimeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15),
     };
 
     /// <summary>Trust the fixture's server certificate (as advertised on its secure endpoint) in the throwaway PKI.</summary>

tests/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Tests/OpcUaClientFailoverTests.cs

@@ -83,4 +83,30 @@ public sealed class OpcUaClientFailoverTests
         ex.Message.ShouldContain("127.0.0.1:3");
         drv.GetHealth().State.ShouldBe(DriverState.Faulted);
     }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    ///     Gitea #910: an endpoint that accepts TCP but never answers runs out the per-endpoint budget. The SDK reports
+    ///     that as BadRequestInterrupted / a bare cancellation; the failover aggregate must name the budget instead.
+    /// </summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task A_per_endpoint_budget_expiry_is_reported_as_that_budget()
+    {
+        using var silent = new System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener(System.Net.IPAddress.Loopback, 0);
+        silent.Start(); // accepts (kernel backlog) but never reads or replies
+        var port = ((System.Net.IPEndPoint)silent.LocalEndpoint).Port;
+        var opts = new OpcUaClientDriverOptions
+        {
+            EndpointUrl = $"opc.tcp://127.0.0.1:{port}",
+            PerEndpointConnectTimeout = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(400),
+            Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
+            AutoAcceptCertificates = true,
+        };
+        using var drv = new OpcUaClientDriver(opts, "opcua-budget");
+
+        var ex = await Should.ThrowAsync<AggregateException>(async () =>
+            await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
+
+        ex.Message.ShouldContain("TimeoutException");
+        ex.Message.ShouldContain("PerEndpointConnectTimeout (0.4 s)");
+    }
 }