Merge branches 'worktree-agent-a41f08fe289ebe7a8', 'worktree-agent-a21d19bd14da138e7' and 'worktree-agent-a8d85b6d5ef424006'
v2-ci / unit-tests (push) Failing after 1h32m12s

This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-11-13 12:43:14 -05:00
5 changed files with 97 additions and 16 deletions
+4 -1
View File
@@ -75,7 +75,10 @@ measurements; they are not fresh SDK 2.0.1 interoperability evidence.
`EndpointUrls` (a list) takes precedence over the single-URL `EndpointUrl` and
provides ordered **failover** — the driver tries each candidate in turn at every
`InitializeAsync` (including the comms-loss watchdog's re-initialise), and the first to connect wins (e.g. a hot-standby pair on
4840 / 4841). See
4840 / 4841). Each candidate gets `PerEndpointConnectTimeout` (default 3 s) for discovery + secure channel + session. That
budget includes **client-side** work (certificate load/validation, the asymmetric handshake), so a cold process on a busy
host can exceed it against a healthy server; an expiry is reported as `TimeoutException: … PerEndpointConnectTimeout (3 s)`
(#910 — the SDK alone says `BadRequestInterrupted`, which reads like a server fault). See
`src/Drivers/ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Driver.OpcUaClient.Contracts/OpcUaClientDriverOptions.cs`
for every field (security policy/mode, auth type, session timeout, keep-alive,
browse root, node/depth caps). `ReconnectPeriod` was **deleted** (#676 — unused since #670 removed the SDK reconnect
@@ -1053,8 +1053,33 @@ public sealed class OpcUaClientDriver : IDriver, ITagDiscovery, IReadable, IWrit
using var cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(ct);
cts.CancelAfter(_options.PerEndpointConnectTimeout);
try
{
return await OpenSessionWithinBudgetAsync(appConfig, endpointUrl, policy, mode, identity, cts.Token)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception ex) when (cts.IsCancellationRequested && !ct.IsCancellationRequested)
{
// Gitea #910: the SDK reports a wait cut short by this budget as BadRequestInterrupted (or a bare
// TaskCanceledException), which reads like a server or network fault. Name the budget instead. It also
// covers CLIENT-side work (loading the application certificate, validating the server's, the asymmetric
// crypto of OpenSecureChannel), so a cold process on a busy host can exceed it with a healthy server.
throw new TimeoutException(
"The connect did not complete within PerEndpointConnectTimeout " +
$"({_options.PerEndpointConnectTimeout.TotalSeconds:0.###} s); the SDK reported: {ex.Message}", ex);
}
}
private async Task<ISession> OpenSessionWithinBudgetAsync(
ApplicationConfiguration appConfig,
string endpointUrl,
OpcUaSecurityPolicy policy,
OpcUaSecurityMode mode,
UserIdentity identity,
CancellationToken budget)
{
var selected = await SelectMatchingEndpointAsync(
appConfig, endpointUrl, policy, mode, cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
appConfig, endpointUrl, policy, mode, budget).ConfigureAwait(false);
var endpointConfig = EndpointConfiguration.Create(appConfig);
endpointConfig.OperationTimeout = (int)_options.Timeout.TotalMilliseconds;
var endpoint = new ConfiguredEndpoint(null, selected, endpointConfig);
@@ -1073,7 +1098,7 @@ public sealed class OpcUaClientDriver : IDriver, ITagDiscovery, IReadable, IWrit
(uint)_options.SessionTimeout.TotalMilliseconds,
identity,
default, // preferredLocales
cts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
budget).ConfigureAwait(false);
session.KeepAliveInterval = (int)_options.KeepAliveInterval.TotalMilliseconds;
return session;
@@ -45,9 +45,13 @@ public sealed class ScriptedAlarmEngineRunGuardTests
eng.OnEvent += (_, e) => { lock (events) events.Add(e); };
// The load itself evaluates once (startup recovery) — that is the first, abandoned run.
// The healthy predicate deliberately spins ~100 ms (well inside the 500 ms budget) so every run of it
// is observably in flight for a while. That keeps the #911 window open on EVERY run of this test
// instead of only under CPU load: the guard counts a run on StartedRunCount AND InFlightCount the
// moment it is admitted, but releases InFlightCount only when the run finishes.
await eng.LoadAsync(
[Alarm("runaway", $"var t = ctx.GetTag(\"Temp\"); {SpinPredicate}"),
Alarm("healthy", """return (int)ctx.GetTag("Temp").Value > 100;""")],
Alarm("healthy", $$"""{{HealthySpin}} return (int)ctx.GetTag("Temp").Value > 100;""")],
TestContext.Current.CancellationToken);
// N more pushes while the orphan runs: every one is refused (a refusal is not a strike — I1), and
@@ -59,24 +63,41 @@ public sealed class ScriptedAlarmEngineRunGuardTests
var expected = i + 1;
await WaitForAsync(() => eng.RunGuard.RefusedWhileRunningCount >= expected);
}
await WaitForAsync(() => eng.RunGuard.StartedRunCount >= 1 + 1 + pushes);
// #911: wait for the sibling's last run to FINISH, not merely to start. StartedRunCount reaching 6 only
// proves the healthy alarm's 4th-push run was admitted — it is still executing (InFlightCount 2: the
// orphan plus that run) until its finally releases the slot. Waiting on the started count and then
// asserting the in-flight count was the race.
await WaitForAsync(() => eng.RunGuard.StartedRunCount >= 1 + 1 + pushes && eng.RunGuard.InFlightCount == 1);
eng.RunGuard.IsQuarantined("runaway", out _).ShouldBeFalse("refusals are not strikes");
eng.RunGuard.StartedRunCount.ShouldBe(1 + 1 + pushes, "one dispatch for the runaway alarm, one per evaluation for the healthy one");
eng.RunGuard.InFlightCount.ShouldBe(1);
// The frozen condition is annotated Bad out of band — the operator sees WHY it is not moving —
// exactly once across the whole run of non-completions.
ScriptedAlarmEvent[] snapshot;
lock (events) snapshot = events.ToArray();
var quality = snapshot.Where(e => e.AlarmId == "runaway" && e.Emission == EmissionKind.QualityChanged).ToArray();
quality.Length.ShouldBe(1);
quality[0].WorstInputStatusCode.ShouldBe(StatusBadInternalError);
eng.RunGuard.InFlightCount.ShouldBe(1, "exactly one orphan, never one per push");
eng.GetState("runaway")!.Active.ShouldBe(AlarmActiveState.Inactive, "state is held, never invented");
// Positive control: the healthy sibling still transitions on the same engine.
// Positive control: the healthy sibling still transitions on the same engine. The same push re-evaluates
// the runaway alarm too, and it must be refused once more — proving the single in-flight run counted
// above is the runaway's orphan (still holding its slot), not a leftover healthy run.
up.Push("Temp", 150);
await WaitForAsync(() => eng.GetState("healthy")!.Active == AlarmActiveState.Active);
await WaitForAsync(() => SnapshotOf(events).Any(e => e.AlarmId == "healthy" && e.Emission == EmissionKind.Activated));
eng.RunGuard.RefusedWhileRunningCount.ShouldBe(pushes + 1);
eng.RunGuard.StartedRunCount.ShouldBe(1 + 1 + pushes + 1, "only the healthy alarm was dispatched");
// The frozen condition is annotated Bad out of band — the operator sees WHY it is not moving —
// exactly once across the whole run of non-completions. Checked only AFTER the healthy Activated event
// arrived: the single drainer fires each pass's events in push order, so every earlier refusal's
// emissions have already been delivered and a per-push re-annotation could not still be in transit.
var quality = SnapshotOf(events).Where(e => e.AlarmId == "runaway" && e.Emission == EmissionKind.QualityChanged).ToArray();
quality.Length.ShouldBe(1);
quality[0].WorstInputStatusCode.ShouldBe(StatusBadInternalError);
}
private const string HealthySpin =
"var spinUntil = System.DateTime.UtcNow.AddMilliseconds(100); while (System.DateTime.UtcNow < spinUntil) { }";
private static ScriptedAlarmEvent[] SnapshotOf(List<ScriptedAlarmEvent> events)
{
lock (events) return events.ToArray();
}
/// <summary>I3 — a QUARANTINED predicate is re-attempted on every push and refused before dispatch; the
@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ public sealed class ServerHostNameValidationTests(OpcPlcFixture sim) : IDisposab
SecurityMode = OpcUaSecurityMode.SignAndEncrypt,
AutoAcceptCertificates = false,
CertificateValidation = new OpcUaCertificateValidationOptions { ValidateServerHostName = validateHostName },
// Gitea #910: the default 3 s per-endpoint budget covers client-side work too — loading the fresh throwaway
// certificate, validating the server's, the first Basic256Sha256 handshake in a cold test process. The first
// test in this assembly (the validate:null case) paid that cold cost, and in the full-solution run it ran out:
// opc-plc answered OpenSecureChannel at once, but the client reached it only after 3 s of local work and
// cancelled 48 ms later (BadRequestInterrupted). What is under test is the host check, not connect latency.
PerEndpointConnectTimeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15),
};
/// <summary>Trust the fixture's server certificate (as advertised on its secure endpoint) in the throwaway PKI.</summary>
@@ -83,4 +83,30 @@ public sealed class OpcUaClientFailoverTests
ex.Message.ShouldContain("127.0.0.1:3");
drv.GetHealth().State.ShouldBe(DriverState.Faulted);
}
/// <summary>
/// Gitea #910: an endpoint that accepts TCP but never answers runs out the per-endpoint budget. The SDK reports
/// that as BadRequestInterrupted / a bare cancellation; the failover aggregate must name the budget instead.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public async Task A_per_endpoint_budget_expiry_is_reported_as_that_budget()
{
using var silent = new System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener(System.Net.IPAddress.Loopback, 0);
silent.Start(); // accepts (kernel backlog) but never reads or replies
var port = ((System.Net.IPEndPoint)silent.LocalEndpoint).Port;
var opts = new OpcUaClientDriverOptions
{
EndpointUrl = $"opc.tcp://127.0.0.1:{port}",
PerEndpointConnectTimeout = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(400),
Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30),
AutoAcceptCertificates = true,
};
using var drv = new OpcUaClientDriver(opts, "opcua-budget");
var ex = await Should.ThrowAsync<AggregateException>(async () =>
await drv.InitializeAsync("{}", TestContext.Current.CancellationToken));
ex.Message.ShouldContain("TimeoutException");
ex.Message.ShouldContain("PerEndpointConnectTimeout (0.4 s)");
}
}