docs: document OPC UA 2.0 compatibility and rollout
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@@ -36,6 +36,37 @@ Transport security and OPC UA authentication are per-node concerns configured in
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## Transport Security
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### SDK 2.0.1 compatibility (#782)
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The application targets exact OPC Foundation SDK **2.0.1**, replacing **1.5.378.182**.
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The upgrade retains the existing host, security profiles, anonymous-admission setting,
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API-key authentication and ACL flag semantics. It adds no companion-specification or
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PubSub capability. Release evidence and operator gates are linked from the
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[rollout runbook](plans/2026-11-10-opcua-sdk-2-rollout.md); source changes alone do not establish release approval.
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SDK role augmentation preserves the application's principal, API-key id and application
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roles. A rejected API key must remain rejected rather than falling through to another
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identity provider. Per-IP authentication miss accounting uses the public transport-observed
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`SecureChannelContext.PeerAddress` during activation; an unknown peer retains the existing
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process-wide budget fallback. This is accounting evidence, not a client-supplied address or
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a new IP admission policy.
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SDK event receive checks compose with application ACL filtering. For the application's
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rejected-write `AuditWriteUpdateEvent` only, a temporary validation context supplies
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`ReceiveEvents` to the recipient's SDK roles after the current source variable, effective
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identity, source `Read` grant and audit/encryption guard are checked. It expires before
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queueing; shared role-permission metadata is not widened. Prior permission callback
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errors veto delivery. SDK-generated audits retain SDK defaults. This does not enable
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auditing or grant a general audit feed.
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Certificate configuration uses the SDK certificate manager, and certificate ownership
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lasts through the owning host/session's lifetime. Preserve the existing application
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certificate, private key, issuer/peer stores and filesystem permissions during rollout;
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verify key access and CA usage under the service identity. Do not rotate certificates,
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enable auto-accept, add `None`, or relax revocation checks to get the candidate running.
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Continuation points remain session-owned and bound to node/topology and current authority;
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restart requires fresh sessions and fresh points.
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### Overview
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The OtOpcUa Server supports configurable OPC UA transport security profiles that control how data is protected on the wire between OPC UA clients and the server.
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