feat(mesh): per-cluster PSK provider + central interceptor

This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-08-06 03:43:05 -04:00
parent fbda015c6e
commit 68a416e4fc
6 changed files with 1000 additions and 5 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Cluster;
using ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Abstractions;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ControlPlane.Communication;
/// <summary>
/// Central's per-cluster pre-shared key lookup for the gRPC command plane. A node holds exactly
/// one key (<c>MeshTransport:GrpcPsk</c>, its own cluster's); central talks to every cluster, so
/// it needs one key per <c>Cluster</c> — both to authenticate itself when dialling a node and to
/// verify an inbound deployment ack.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>Fail-closed by contract.</b> Every failure — unknown cluster, absent secret, blank
/// value, a store that throws — is reported as "no key" (<c>false</c>), and the caller
/// denies the inbound call or skips the outbound dial. There is no arm on which a caller may
/// proceed unauthenticated; a missing key must cost delivery, not authentication.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The <c>Invalidate</c> hooks exist because central's cluster set is DB-dynamic. They are
/// deliberately unconsumed at Phase 0 — Phase 1A wires them to the contact refresh, which is
/// the point at which central learns a cluster's membership (and so possibly its key) has
/// changed.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public interface IMeshPskProvider
{
/// <summary>Gets the pre-shared key for one application <c>Cluster</c>.</summary>
/// <param name="clusterId">The application <c>Cluster</c> id, matched case-insensitively.</param>
/// <param name="psk">The key, or <c>null</c> when none could be established.</param>
/// <returns><c>true</c> when a usable key was found; otherwise <c>false</c>.</returns>
bool TryGetPsk(string clusterId, [NotNullWhen(true)] out string? psk);
/// <summary>Drops any cached key for one cluster, so the next lookup re-reads the store.</summary>
/// <param name="clusterId">The application <c>Cluster</c> id, matched case-insensitively.</param>
void Invalidate(string clusterId);
/// <summary>Drops every cached key.</summary>
void InvalidateAll();
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public sealed class MeshPskProvider : IMeshPskProvider
{
/// <summary>
/// Prefix of the secret holding a cluster's key — the full name is
/// <c>OT-MESH-PSK-{clusterId}</c>. The same name a node's
/// <c>${secret:OT-MESH-PSK-&lt;clusterId&gt;}</c> reference expands, so central and the node
/// read one row rather than two conventions that drift.
/// </summary>
public const string SecretNamePrefix = "OT-MESH-PSK-";
private readonly IOptions<MeshTransportOptions> _options;
private readonly ISecretResolver _secretResolver;
private readonly ILogger<MeshPskProvider> _logger;
/// <summary>
/// Cached store resolutions, keyed by cluster id. Holds <b>only</b> values that came from the
/// Secrets store: the config map is re-read on every lookup (it is an in-memory dictionary),
/// which is what keeps the override unconditional rather than merely first-past-the-post.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <see cref="Lazy{T}"/> under <see cref="LazyThreadSafetyMode.ExecutionAndPublication"/> so a
/// burst of concurrent inbound acks for one cluster resolves the secret once instead of
/// stampeding the store. Negatives are never retained — see <see cref="TryGetPsk"/>.
/// </remarks>
private readonly ConcurrentDictionary<string, Lazy<string?>> _cache =
new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>Creates the provider.</summary>
/// <param name="options">Mesh transport options; <c>ClusterPsks</c> is the override map.</param>
/// <param name="secretResolver">The shared secret store read seam.</param>
/// <param name="logger">Logger for lookup-failure diagnostics.</param>
public MeshPskProvider(
IOptions<MeshTransportOptions> options,
ISecretResolver secretResolver,
ILogger<MeshPskProvider> logger)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(options);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(secretResolver);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(logger);
_options = options;
_secretResolver = secretResolver;
_logger = logger;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public bool TryGetPsk(string clusterId, [NotNullWhen(true)] out string? psk)
{
psk = null;
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(clusterId))
{
_logger.LogWarning(
"Mesh PSK lookup was asked for a blank cluster id; refusing rather than resolving a "
+ "key that would belong to no cluster.");
return false;
}
// Config map first, on every call. Blank counts as absent: an empty
// MeshTransport__ClusterPsks__<id> is an unset environment variable, not an operator
// deciding this cluster has an empty key.
if (_options.Value.ClusterPsks.TryGetValue(clusterId, out var configured)
&& !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(configured))
{
psk = configured;
return true;
}
var entry = _cache.GetOrAdd(
clusterId,
static (id, self) => new Lazy<string?>(
() => self.ResolveFromStore(id), LazyThreadSafetyMode.ExecutionAndPublication),
this);
var resolved = entry.Value;
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(resolved))
{
// Never retain a negative. A store that was briefly unreachable would otherwise stay
// "no key" for this cluster until something called Invalidate — and at Phase 0 nothing
// does, so a transient fault would present as a permanent, silent command outage.
_cache.TryRemove(new KeyValuePair<string, Lazy<string?>>(clusterId, entry));
return false;
}
psk = resolved;
return true;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public void Invalidate(string clusterId)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(clusterId))
return;
_cache.TryRemove(clusterId, out _);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public void InvalidateAll() => _cache.Clear();
/// <summary>
/// Reads <c>OT-MESH-PSK-{clusterId}</c> from the Secrets store, converting every failure mode
/// into <c>null</c>.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="clusterId">The application <c>Cluster</c> id.</param>
/// <returns>The stored key, or <c>null</c> when it could not be established.</returns>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// Blocking on the async resolver is deliberate. The consumer is a gRPC server
/// interceptor, whose <c>Authorize</c> is synchronous in all four sibling interceptors,
/// and making this seam async would push that shape onto every one of them. The block
/// happens at most once per cluster per process — every later lookup is a dictionary hit
/// — and the store is a node-local SQLite file, not a network call.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The catch is broad on purpose: this is an authentication boundary, and the set of
/// exceptions a secret store can raise (missing KEK, corrupt row, IO) is neither closed
/// nor interesting here. Anything other than a usable key is "no key".
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
private string? ResolveFromStore(string clusterId)
{
SecretName name;
try
{
name = new SecretName(SecretNamePrefix + clusterId);
}
catch (ArgumentException ex)
{
// Cluster ids are operator-authored and may carry characters SecretName's allow-list
// rejects. Log the id — it is not sensitive — and never the key.
_logger.LogWarning(
ex,
"Cluster {ClusterId} cannot be expressed as a secret name, so its mesh PSK cannot be "
+ "resolved from the store. Supply it through MeshTransport:ClusterPsks instead, or "
+ "rename the cluster to [a-z0-9._/-].",
clusterId);
return null;
}
try
{
return _secretResolver.GetAsync(name, CancellationToken.None).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogWarning(
ex,
"Failed to resolve the mesh PSK for cluster {ClusterId} from secret {SecretName}. "
+ "Commands to that cluster and acks from it are refused until it resolves.",
clusterId,
name.Value);
return null;
}
}
}
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
Google.Protobuf + Grpc.Core.Api flow transitively from Commons (the generated client). -->
<PackageReference Include="Grpc.Net.Client"/>
<PackageReference Include="ZB.MOM.WW.Audit"/>
<!-- ClusterClient→gRPC: MeshPskProvider resolves OT-MESH-PSK-{clusterId} from the shared
secret store when MeshTransport:ClusterPsks carries no override. Abstractions only —
the concrete store is the host's choice (SecretsRegistration), not the control plane's. -->
<PackageReference Include="ZB.MOM.WW.Secrets.Abstractions"/>
<!-- For ClusterActiveNode — the shared "oldest Up member of role X" primitive. The control
plane and the /health/active tier must give the SAME answer for which node is in charge,
or the tier reports one node active while the Primary-gated data plane runs on another;
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using Grpc.Core;
using Grpc.Core.Interceptors;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ControlPlane.Communication;
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.Configuration;
/// <summary>
/// Gates the central-side command endpoint (ClusterClient→gRPC migration). The
/// <c>CentralCommandService.ReportApply</c> RPC is how a node tells central its deployment
/// applied; the coordinator counts those acks, so anything able to reach central's command port
/// could otherwise forge a fleet-wide "everything applied". This interceptor is the ONLY inbound
/// auth on that endpoint.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// <para>
/// <b>Scoped by method path.</b> Only calls under
/// <c>/mesh_transport.v1.CentralCommandService/</c> are gated; every other method on the
/// shared gRPC pipeline (config-serve, and on a fused node sync + telemetry + the node
/// command service) passes through untouched, so this shares one <c>AddGrpc</c> registration
/// with its siblings.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Per-cluster key, not one server key.</b> Unlike the four sibling interceptors there is
/// no single expected token: central talks to N site clusters, each with its own PSK. The
/// caller names its cluster in <c>x-otopcua-cluster</c> and the bearer is verified against
/// <i>that</i> cluster's key via <see cref="IMeshPskProvider"/>. The header is therefore a
/// claim the caller must then prove, not a credential — choosing a different cluster only
/// changes which key it is graded against. A single fleet-wide key would let one compromised
/// site node forge acks on behalf of every other site.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Fail-closed.</b> A missing or blank cluster header, and a cluster whose key cannot be
/// established (unseeded, blank, or a secret store that is down), are both denied. There is
/// deliberately no "try every known key" fallback: it would restore exactly the fleet-wide
/// key this design exists to avoid.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Comparison is <see cref="CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals"/> over UTF-8 bytes, so a
/// wrong key cannot be recovered byte-by-byte from response timing. Length differences are
/// unavoidably observable and are not sensitive.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>All three denials return the same status text</b>, unlike the sibling interceptors,
/// which distinguish "no key configured" from "authentication failed". Here that distinction
/// would be an enumeration oracle: the caller supplies the cluster id, so a distinguishable
/// "no key for that cluster" reply would let an unauthenticated caller map which clusters
/// central holds keys for. The operator-facing detail goes to the log instead.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Exactly one public constructor.</b> <c>Grpc.AspNetCore</c> silently stops invoking an
/// interceptor that has more than one public ctor — see
/// <c>CentralCommandAuthInterceptorTests.HasExactlyOnePublicConstructor</c>.
/// </para>
/// </remarks>
public sealed class CentralCommandAuthInterceptor : Interceptor
{
private const string ServicePrefix = "/mesh_transport.v1.CentralCommandService/";
private const string AuthorizationHeader = "authorization";
private const string ClusterHeader = "x-otopcua-cluster";
private const string BearerPrefix = "Bearer ";
private readonly IMeshPskProvider _pskProvider;
private readonly ILogger<CentralCommandAuthInterceptor> _logger;
/// <summary>Creates the interceptor.</summary>
/// <param name="pskProvider">Supplies the expected bearer token for a given cluster.</param>
/// <param name="logger">Logger for denial diagnostics.</param>
public CentralCommandAuthInterceptor(
IMeshPskProvider pskProvider,
ILogger<CentralCommandAuthInterceptor> logger)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(pskProvider);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(logger);
_pskProvider = pskProvider;
_logger = logger;
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override Task<TResponse> UnaryServerHandler<TRequest, TResponse>(
TRequest request,
ServerCallContext context,
UnaryServerMethod<TRequest, TResponse> continuation)
{
Authorize(context);
return continuation(request, context);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override Task DuplexStreamingServerHandler<TRequest, TResponse>(
IAsyncStreamReader<TRequest> requestStream,
IServerStreamWriter<TResponse> responseStream,
ServerCallContext context,
DuplexStreamingServerMethod<TRequest, TResponse> continuation)
{
Authorize(context);
return continuation(requestStream, responseStream, context);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override Task<TResponse> ClientStreamingServerHandler<TRequest, TResponse>(
IAsyncStreamReader<TRequest> requestStream,
ServerCallContext context,
ClientStreamingServerMethod<TRequest, TResponse> continuation)
{
Authorize(context);
return continuation(requestStream, context);
}
/// <inheritdoc />
public override Task ServerStreamingServerHandler<TRequest, TResponse>(
TRequest request,
IServerStreamWriter<TResponse> responseStream,
ServerCallContext context,
ServerStreamingServerMethod<TRequest, TResponse> continuation)
{
Authorize(context);
return continuation(request, responseStream, context);
}
/// <summary>
/// Throws <see cref="RpcException"/> with <see cref="StatusCode.PermissionDenied"/> if this is
/// a central-command call that does not name a cluster, names one with no resolvable key, or
/// does not carry that cluster's bearer token. Non-command calls return immediately.
/// </summary>
private void Authorize(ServerCallContext context)
{
if (!context.Method.StartsWith(ServicePrefix, StringComparison.Ordinal))
return;
var clusterId = ExtractHeader(context.RequestHeaders, ClusterHeader);
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(clusterId))
{
_logger.LogWarning(
"Rejected a central command call to {Method}: no {Header} header, so there is no "
+ "cluster whose pre-shared key the caller could be graded against.",
context.Method,
ClusterHeader);
throw new RpcException(new Status(
StatusCode.PermissionDenied,
"Central command authentication failed."));
}
if (!_pskProvider.TryGetPsk(clusterId, out var expected))
{
_logger.LogWarning(
"Rejected a central command call to {Method} claiming cluster {ClusterId}: no "
+ "pre-shared key could be established for it. Seed the secret "
+ "OT-MESH-PSK-<clusterId> on this node, or set "
+ "MeshTransport:ClusterPsks:<clusterId> on a rig.",
context.Method,
clusterId);
throw new RpcException(new Status(
StatusCode.PermissionDenied,
"Central command authentication failed."));
}
var presented = ExtractBearerToken(context.RequestHeaders);
if (presented is null || !FixedTimeEquals(presented, expected))
{
_logger.LogWarning(
"Rejected a central command call to {Method} claiming cluster {ClusterId}: {Reason}.",
context.Method,
clusterId,
presented is null ? "no bearer token presented" : "bearer token did not match");
throw new RpcException(new Status(
StatusCode.PermissionDenied,
"Central command authentication failed."));
}
}
private static string? ExtractBearerToken(Metadata headers)
{
var value = ExtractHeader(headers, AuthorizationHeader);
return value is not null && value.StartsWith(BearerPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
? value[BearerPrefix.Length..]
: null;
}
private static string? ExtractHeader(Metadata headers, string name)
{
// gRPC lowercases header keys on the wire; compare case-insensitively anyway so a hand-built
// Metadata in a test behaves the same as a real request.
foreach (var entry in headers)
{
if (string.Equals(entry.Key, name, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
return entry.Value;
}
return null;
}
private static bool FixedTimeEquals(string presented, string expected)
=> CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals(
Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(presented), Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(expected));
}
+19 -5
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Commons.Interfaces;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Services;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ControlPlane;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ControlPlane.Communication;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.ControlPlane.Redundancy;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Commons.OpcUa;
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Commons.Engines;
@@ -526,6 +527,13 @@ if (hasAdmin)
// hosted service has built the system).
builder.Services.TryAddSingleton<Func<ActorSystem>>(sp => () => sp.GetRequiredService<ActorSystem>());
builder.Services.AddSingleton<IManualFailoverService, ManualFailoverService>();
// Per-cluster mesh PSKs (ClusterClient→gRPC). Admin-only, and singleton because its whole job is
// to hold a cache: central talks to N clusters and would otherwise re-read the secret store on
// every inbound ack. A node needs nothing of this — it holds exactly its own MeshTransport:GrpcPsk
// — so registering it fleet-wide would give a driver-only node a lookup it can never use.
// Depends on ISecretResolver, which AddOtOpcUaSecrets registers unconditionally below (DI
// registration order is irrelevant; resolution order is not).
builder.Services.AddSingleton<IMeshPskProvider, MeshPskProvider>();
}
// Registered unconditionally: driver-role nodes resolve Layer-B DriverConfig secrets and have no auth/DP/AdminUI.
@@ -548,11 +556,14 @@ builder.Services.AddOtOpcUaObservability(builder.Configuration);
// Registered whenever either role is present so an admin-only node still serves config and a
// driver-only node still gates sync + telemetry.
//
// MeshCommandAuthInterceptor (ClusterClient→gRPC migration) joins on the same terms: it gates the
// node-side NodeCommandService and is registered NOW, a pure pass-through until Phase 1 maps that
// service — an interceptor whose service is unmapped never sees a matching path. Registering it
// alongside the service it gates would put a security gate's wiring in the same commit as the write
// surface it protects; doing it here means the gate cannot be forgotten when that surface lights up.
// The two mesh-command interceptors (ClusterClient→gRPC migration) join on the same terms:
// MeshCommandAuthInterceptor gates the node-side NodeCommandService (driver-role, one key — this
// node's own), CentralCommandAuthInterceptor gates the central-side CentralCommandService
// (admin-role, one key per cluster via IMeshPskProvider). Both are registered NOW and are pure
// pass-throughs until Phase 1 maps those services — an interceptor whose service is unmapped never
// sees a matching path. Registering them alongside the services they gate would put a security
// gate's wiring in the same commit as the write surface it protects; doing it here means the gate
// cannot be forgotten when that surface lights up.
if (hasDriver || hasAdmin)
{
builder.Services.AddGrpc(o =>
@@ -564,7 +575,10 @@ if (hasDriver || hasAdmin)
o.Interceptors.Add<MeshCommandAuthInterceptor>();
}
if (hasAdmin)
{
o.Interceptors.Add<ConfigServeAuthInterceptor>();
o.Interceptors.Add<CentralCommandAuthInterceptor>();
}
});
}