fix(mqtt): pin the CA accept path, honour presented intermediates, classify the dispose race
Review follow-ups on MqttConnection (Task 3): - Every certificate test asserted rejection, so the accept branch was unreachable-by-regression. Adds a leaf genuinely issued by the pinned CA and asserts acceptance. - ValidateAgainstPinnedCa never seeded ChainPolicy.ExtraStore from the incoming chain, so a leaf behind an intermediate delivered during the handshake failed despite a legitimate path to the pinned root. Seeds from both the incoming chain's elements and its ExtraStore; CustomRootTrust still means only the pinned roots may terminate the chain. - A DisposeAsync racing an in-flight connect escaped as an unclassified exception; it now folds into ObjectDisposedException. - Promotes the single-caller concurrency invariant into the type remarks, with the accurate blast radius (a leaked live connection, not a benign throw). Serialising the lifecycle remains Task 4's job. - X509Chain.Build can throw; an exception escaping a TLS validation callback is an opaque handshake crash, so it is caught and refused. - Adds a connect-retry test (Task 4's reconnect loop reuses the instance) and a disposed-then-connect test. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GASWkNEi68FSCtvr6rLoEW
This commit is contained in:
@@ -89,6 +89,45 @@ public sealed class MqttConnectionTests
|
||||
await Should.ThrowAsync<TimeoutException>(async () => await conn.ConnectAsync(CancellationToken.None));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Task 4's reconnect loop retries connect on the SAME instance, reusing the
|
||||
/// <c>IMqttClient</c> held across failures. A failed attempt must therefore leave the
|
||||
/// connection usable rather than poisoned.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task ConnectAsync_CanBeRetriedOnTheSameInstanceAfterAFailedAttempt()
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var blackhole = new BlackholeBroker();
|
||||
var opts = new MqttDriverOptions
|
||||
{
|
||||
Host = "127.0.0.1", Port = blackhole.Port, UseTls = false, ConnectTimeoutSeconds = 1,
|
||||
};
|
||||
await using var conn = new MqttConnection(opts, driverId: "t", logger: null);
|
||||
|
||||
await Should.ThrowAsync<TimeoutException>(async () => await conn.ConnectAsync(CancellationToken.None));
|
||||
|
||||
// Second attempt reaches the broker again and fails the same way — not ObjectDisposed,
|
||||
// not a null client, not a silently-swallowed no-op.
|
||||
await Should.ThrowAsync<TimeoutException>(async () => await conn.ConnectAsync(CancellationToken.None));
|
||||
conn.IsConnected.ShouldBeFalse();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Connecting a disposed instance is an <see cref="ObjectDisposedException"/> — the same
|
||||
/// classification the in-flight dispose race folds into. Dispose is idempotent.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task ConnectAsync_AfterDispose_ThrowsObjectDisposed_AndDisposeIsIdempotent()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var opts = new MqttDriverOptions { Host = "127.0.0.1", Port = 1, UseTls = false, ConnectTimeoutSeconds = 1 };
|
||||
var conn = new MqttConnection(opts, driverId: "t", logger: null);
|
||||
|
||||
await conn.DisposeAsync();
|
||||
await conn.DisposeAsync();
|
||||
|
||||
await Should.ThrowAsync<ObjectDisposedException>(async () => await conn.ConnectAsync(CancellationToken.None));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>Never log or throw credentials — the plan's cross-cutting secrets rule.</summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task ConnectAsync_Failure_DoesNotLeakPasswordIntoExceptionMessage()
|
||||
@@ -153,21 +192,76 @@ public sealed class MqttConnectionTests
|
||||
var tls = built.ChannelOptions.ShouldBeOfType<MqttClientTcpOptions>().TlsOptions;
|
||||
|
||||
tls.CertificateValidationHandler.ShouldNotBeNull();
|
||||
tls.CertificateValidationHandler(SelfSignedValidationArgs(built)).ShouldBeFalse();
|
||||
using var stranger = SelfSignedLeaf(Host);
|
||||
tls.CertificateValidationHandler(ValidationArgs(built, stranger)).ShouldBeFalse();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>An untrusted, unpinned server certificate is rejected — the pin actually validates.</summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public void BuildClientOptions_CaPin_RejectsCertificateNotIssuedByThePinnedCa()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var caPath = WriteTempPemCa();
|
||||
using var ca = IssueCa(issuer: null, "otopcua-test-ca", validDays: 30);
|
||||
var caPath = WritePem(ca);
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var opts = new MqttDriverOptions { Host = Host, Port = 8883, UseTls = true, CaCertificatePath = caPath };
|
||||
var built = MqttConnection.BuildClientOptions(opts, clientIdSuffix: null);
|
||||
var tls = built.ChannelOptions.ShouldBeOfType<MqttClientTcpOptions>().TlsOptions;
|
||||
|
||||
tls.CertificateValidationHandler!(SelfSignedValidationArgs(built)).ShouldBeFalse();
|
||||
using var stranger = SelfSignedLeaf(Host);
|
||||
tls.CertificateValidationHandler!(ValidationArgs(built, stranger)).ShouldBeFalse();
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally
|
||||
{
|
||||
File.Delete(caPath);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// The accept path. Without this every certificate test asserts rejection, so deleting the
|
||||
/// <c>return true</c> — or getting <c>TrustMode</c> / <c>CustomTrustStore</c> wrong — would
|
||||
/// leave the suite green while no broker could ever connect.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public void BuildClientOptions_CaPin_AcceptsLeafIssuedByThePinnedCa()
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var ca = IssueCa(issuer: null, "otopcua-test-ca", validDays: 30);
|
||||
using var leaf = IssueLeaf(ca, Host, validDays: 20);
|
||||
var caPath = WritePem(ca);
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var opts = new MqttDriverOptions { Host = Host, Port = 8883, UseTls = true, CaCertificatePath = caPath };
|
||||
var built = MqttConnection.BuildClientOptions(opts, clientIdSuffix: null);
|
||||
var tls = built.ChannelOptions.ShouldBeOfType<MqttClientTcpOptions>().TlsOptions;
|
||||
|
||||
tls.CertificateValidationHandler!(ValidationArgs(built, leaf)).ShouldBeTrue();
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally
|
||||
{
|
||||
File.Delete(caPath);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// The common real-world broker topology: the leaf is signed by an intermediate that chains
|
||||
/// to the pinned root, and the intermediate is delivered in the handshake rather than being
|
||||
/// installed locally. Only the pinned ROOT is written to the CA file — the intermediate must
|
||||
/// be picked up from what the broker presented.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public void BuildClientOptions_CaPin_AcceptsLeafBehindAnIntermediateThatTheBrokerPresented()
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var root = IssueCa(issuer: null, "otopcua-test-root", validDays: 30);
|
||||
using var intermediate = IssueCa(root, "otopcua-test-intermediate", validDays: 25);
|
||||
using var leaf = IssueLeaf(intermediate, Host, validDays: 20);
|
||||
var caPath = WritePem(root);
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var opts = new MqttDriverOptions { Host = Host, Port = 8883, UseTls = true, CaCertificatePath = caPath };
|
||||
var built = MqttConnection.BuildClientOptions(opts, clientIdSuffix: null);
|
||||
var tls = built.ChannelOptions.ShouldBeOfType<MqttClientTcpOptions>().TlsOptions;
|
||||
|
||||
tls.CertificateValidationHandler!(ValidationArgs(built, leaf, intermediate)).ShouldBeTrue();
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -290,29 +384,87 @@ public sealed class MqttConnectionTests
|
||||
=> MqttConnection.BuildClientOptions(opts, clientIdSuffix: null)
|
||||
.ChannelOptions.ShouldBeOfType<MqttClientTcpOptions>().TlsOptions;
|
||||
|
||||
private static MqttClientCertificateValidationEventArgs SelfSignedValidationArgs(MqttClientOptions built)
|
||||
private static readonly DateTimeOffset NotBefore = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(-1);
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>A CA certificate, self-signed when <paramref name="issuer"/> is null.</summary>
|
||||
private static X509Certificate2 IssueCa(X509Certificate2? issuer, string commonName, int validDays)
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var rsa = RSA.Create(2048);
|
||||
var request = new CertificateRequest($"CN={Host}", rsa, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1);
|
||||
var cert = request.CreateSelfSigned(DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(-1), DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(1));
|
||||
return new MqttClientCertificateValidationEventArgs(
|
||||
cert,
|
||||
new X509Chain(),
|
||||
SslPolicyErrors.RemoteCertificateChainErrors,
|
||||
built.ChannelOptions);
|
||||
using var key = RSA.Create(2048);
|
||||
var request = new CertificateRequest($"CN={commonName}", key, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1);
|
||||
request.CertificateExtensions.Add(new X509BasicConstraintsExtension(true, false, 0, true));
|
||||
request.CertificateExtensions.Add(
|
||||
new X509KeyUsageExtension(X509KeyUsageFlags.KeyCertSign | X509KeyUsageFlags.CrlSign, true));
|
||||
request.CertificateExtensions.Add(new X509SubjectKeyIdentifierExtension(request.PublicKey, false));
|
||||
|
||||
if (issuer is null)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return request.CreateSelfSigned(NotBefore, NotBefore.AddDays(validDays));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Create() drops the private key; an intermediate needs it back to sign its own children.
|
||||
using var issued = request.Create(issuer, NotBefore, NotBefore.AddDays(validDays), NextSerial());
|
||||
return issued.CopyWithPrivateKey(key);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private static string WriteTempPemCa()
|
||||
/// <summary>A server (end-entity) certificate signed by <paramref name="issuer"/>.</summary>
|
||||
private static X509Certificate2 IssueLeaf(X509Certificate2 issuer, string commonName, int validDays)
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var key = RSA.Create(2048);
|
||||
var request = new CertificateRequest($"CN={commonName}", key, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1);
|
||||
request.CertificateExtensions.Add(new X509BasicConstraintsExtension(false, false, 0, true));
|
||||
request.CertificateExtensions.Add(
|
||||
new X509KeyUsageExtension(X509KeyUsageFlags.DigitalSignature | X509KeyUsageFlags.KeyEncipherment, true));
|
||||
request.CertificateExtensions.Add(
|
||||
new X509EnhancedKeyUsageExtension([new Oid("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1")], false)); // serverAuth
|
||||
request.CertificateExtensions.Add(new X509SubjectKeyIdentifierExtension(request.PublicKey, false));
|
||||
|
||||
return request.Create(issuer, NotBefore, NotBefore.AddDays(validDays), NextSerial());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>A self-signed leaf that chains to nothing — the "stranger" a pin must reject.</summary>
|
||||
private static X509Certificate2 SelfSignedLeaf(string commonName)
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var key = RSA.Create(2048);
|
||||
var request = new CertificateRequest($"CN={commonName}", key, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1);
|
||||
return request.CreateSelfSigned(NotBefore, NotBefore.AddDays(20));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private static byte[] NextSerial() => RandomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(8);
|
||||
|
||||
private static string WritePem(params X509Certificate2[] certificates)
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var rsa = RSA.Create(2048);
|
||||
var request = new CertificateRequest("CN=otopcua-test-ca", rsa, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256, RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1);
|
||||
request.CertificateExtensions.Add(new X509BasicConstraintsExtension(true, false, 0, true));
|
||||
using var ca = request.CreateSelfSigned(DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(-1), DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(1));
|
||||
var path = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-mqtt-ca-{Guid.NewGuid():N}.pem");
|
||||
File.WriteAllText(path, ca.ExportCertificatePem());
|
||||
File.WriteAllText(path, string.Join(Environment.NewLine, certificates.Select(c => c.ExportCertificatePem())));
|
||||
return path;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Mimics what <c>SslStream</c> hands a validation callback: the presented leaf plus a chain
|
||||
/// carrying whatever intermediates the peer supplied. The chain is built (and allowed to
|
||||
/// fail) purely so <c>ChainElements</c> is populated the way the platform would populate it.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
private static MqttClientCertificateValidationEventArgs ValidationArgs(
|
||||
MqttClientOptions built,
|
||||
X509Certificate2 leaf,
|
||||
params X509Certificate2[] presentedIntermediates)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var chain = new X509Chain();
|
||||
chain.ChainPolicy.RevocationMode = X509RevocationMode.NoCheck;
|
||||
chain.ChainPolicy.VerificationFlags = X509VerificationFlags.AllFlags;
|
||||
foreach (var intermediate in presentedIntermediates)
|
||||
{
|
||||
chain.ChainPolicy.ExtraStore.Add(intermediate);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
chain.Build(leaf);
|
||||
|
||||
return new MqttClientCertificateValidationEventArgs(
|
||||
leaf,
|
||||
chain,
|
||||
SslPolicyErrors.RemoteCertificateChainErrors,
|
||||
built.ChannelOptions);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Accepts the TCP connection and then says nothing — the client sends CONNECT and waits
|
||||
/// forever for a CONNACK that never comes. This is the frozen-peer shape; a closed port is
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user