docs+ui(security): state plainly that node ACLs are not enforced (§8.1, #520)

deferment.md §8.1 asked for a decision: wire IPermissionEvaluator into the node
manager, or say plainly that ACLs are not enforced. Decision: the latter. The
evaluator stays in the tree; #520 tracks the wire-up.

Verifying the claim turned up four things worse than the audit recorded:

- docs/security.md, not ReadWriteOperations.md, was the highest-risk doc. It
  claimed an anonymous session is "default-denie[d] any node a session has no
  ACL grant for". The opposite holds: anonymous can Browse/Read/Subscribe/
  HistoryRead the entire address space, and is refused writes and alarm acks
  only because it carries no roles.
- Three of five documented data-plane role strings do nothing.
  OpcUaDataPlaneRoles declares exactly WriteOperate and AlarmAck; ReadOnly,
  WriteTune and WriteConfigure are compared against nowhere in src/. The doc
  called all five "exact, case-insensitive, and code-true".
- ReadWriteOperations.md was fiction beyond the ACL claims. OnReadValue has
  zero occurrences in src/ — the documented read path did not exist. Reads
  never reach a driver: the node manager is push-model and the SDK serves a
  Read from the cached pushed value. WriteAuthzPolicy, _sourceByFullRef,
  _writeIdempotentByFullRef and IRoleBearer are likewise zero-hit, and
  CapabilityInvoker is not referenced by the OpcUaServer project at all. This
  file is rewritten rather than bannered.
- v2-release-readiness.md claimed a whole enforcement layer shipped —
  FilterBrowseReferences, GateCallMethodRequests, MapCallOperation,
  AuthorizationBootstrap, Node:Authorization:* keys. None exist. Whatever
  landed on the v2 branch did not survive into the shipped tree.

The UI change is the operative one: ClusterAcls.razor and AclEdit.razor now
warn that a grant is saved and shipped in every deployment artifact but never
evaluated, so an operator cannot author a deny rule believing it works.

deferment.md gains a §9 execution log tracking §8 remediation.

docs/v2/v2-release-readiness.md

@@ -37,11 +37,27 @@ This doc is the single view of where v2 stands against its release criteria. Upd
 
 All code-path release blockers are closed. The remaining items are live-hardware / manual validations listed under exit criteria.
 
-### ~~Security — Phase 6.2 dispatch wiring~~ (task #143 — **CLOSED** 2026-04-19, PR #94)
+### ~~Security — Phase 6.2 dispatch wiring~~ (task #143 — marked CLOSED 2026-04-19, PR #94)
+
+> ⚠️ **THIS CLOSURE DOES NOT HOLD (re-verified against source 2026-07-27).** Every type named in this
+> subsection — `AuthorizationGate`, `NodeScopeResolver`, `AuthorizationBootstrap`, `WriteAuthzPolicy`,
+> `DriverNodeManager`, `FilterBrowseReferences`, `GateCallMethodRequests`, `MapCallOperation`,
+> `EquipmentNamespaceContent`, and the `Node:Authorization:*` config keys — has **zero occurrences in
+> `src/`**. There is no `OnReadValue` hook, no `Browse` override, no `CreateMonitoredItems` override and
+> no `Call` override in the live node manager, and no HistoryRead path consults any gate.
+>
+> Whatever landed on the v2 branch did not survive into the shipped tree. The **only** data-plane
+> authorization today is two server-wide role checks (`WriteOperate` for writes, `AlarmAck` for alarm
+> methods); reads, browses, subscriptions and history reads are ungated, and `NodeAcl` rows are
+> authored and deployed but never evaluated. See [`../security.md`](../security.md) §
+> Data-Plane Authorization and `deferment.md` §3.1.
+>
+> The text below is retained as the historical record of what was *believed* closed. **Read none of it
+> as current behaviour.**
 
 **Closed**. `AuthorizationGate` + `NodeScopeResolver` thread through `OpcUaApplicationHost → OtOpcUaServer → DriverNodeManager`. `OnReadValue` + `OnWriteValue` + all four HistoryRead paths call `gate.IsAllowed(identity, operation, scope)` before the invoker. Production deployments activate enforcement by constructing `OpcUaApplicationHost` with an `AuthorizationGate(StrictMode: true)` + populating the `NodeAcl` table.
 
-Remaining Stream C surfaces (hardening, not release-blocking):
+Remaining Stream C surfaces (hardening, not release-blocking) — **none of these shipped either**:
 
 - ~~Browse + TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds gating with ancestor-visibility logic per `acl-design.md` §Browse.~~ **Partial, 2026-04-24.** `DriverNodeManager.Browse` override post-filters the `ReferenceDescription` list via a new `FilterBrowseReferences` helper — denied nodes disappear silently per OPC UA convention. Ancestor-visibility implication (Read-grant at `Line/Tag` implying Browse on `Line`) still to ship; needs a subtree-has-any-grant query on the trie evaluator. `TranslateBrowsePathsToNodeIds` surface not yet wired.
 - ~~CreateMonitoredItems + TransferSubscriptions gating with per-item `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` stamp so revoked grants surface `BadUserAccessDenied` within one publish cycle (decision #153).~~ **Partial, 2026-04-24.** `DriverNodeManager.CreateMonitoredItems` override pre-gates each request and pre-populates `BadUserAccessDenied` into the errors slot for denied items (the base stack honours pre-set errors and skips those items). Decision #153's per-item `(AuthGenerationId, MembershipVersion)` stamp for detecting mid-subscription revocation is still to ship — needs subscription-layer plumbing. TransferSubscriptions not yet wired (same pattern).