docs: ServerHistorian HistoryRead knobs + Security:Ldap resilience keys; R2-08 status (03/S2, 03/S3)
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This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
2026-07-13 12:21:33 -04:00
parent 3cebfae417
commit 354d74d370
5 changed files with 36 additions and 2 deletions
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@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ what the unit leg cannot; (c) migrate the 3 xunit v2 holdouts once Akka ships an
| **R2-02** | 01/S-6 (High, rank 2), 01/U-6, 01/S-8=03/S12 (rank 4), 04/C-7, 01/S-7=03/S13 | `r2/02-resilience-config-hardening` (off `1676c8f4`) | `4be13429``dd82e740` (17 task commits) | **Code-complete, offline-verified.** **S-6:** parser clamps timeout/retry/breaker overrides (timeout≤0→tier default, breaker==1→2, caps) with diagnostics + belt-and-braces `Build` clamp so pipeline construction can never throw Polly `ValidationException` (new `ResiliencePolicyRanges` in Core.Abstractions); brick-repro + `Build_NeverThrows_ForHostileDirectOptions` + factory-seam wiring proof; AdminUI `Validate()` range warnings. **S-8:** parser forces Write/AlarmAck retry→0 (spec invariant) **and** dispatch flips to `isIdempotent:false` (RED-first on the Runtime wiring test); non-idempotent arm caches the no-retry snapshot once/invoker (01/P-4) + tracker in-flight accounting; `WriteIdempotentAttribute` false claim corrected; retry cells disabled. **U-6:** bulkhead knob deleted end-to-end (migration-free; stored keys ignored) + `Options_properties_are_exactly_the_pipeline_wired_set` inertness guard. **C-7:** `ResilienceFormModel` JsonObject-bag round-trip preserves unknown keys; malformed JSON → `ParseFailed` lock + verbatim `ToJson` + discard button. **S-7:** per-`Create` `Interlocked` options-generation in the pipeline-cache key kills the respawn stale-pipeline race. Core resilience 121/121, AdminUI form 10/10, Analyzers 32/32, Runtime 364/364; 0 production OTOPCUA0001. **Deferred (T15/T18):** docker-dev `:9200` `/run` (warning banner, input lockout, unknown-key survival) + whole-solution sweep. |
| **R2-10** | 03/U10=04/U-5 (Medium/Low, action #10) | `r2/10-resilience-observability` (off `46fedda3`) | `205d3980``<docs>` (11 task commits) | **Code-complete, offline-verified.** The resilience status tracker now has a production reader, mirroring the driver-health flow. Core truthfulness: `RecordBreakerClose` + derived `IsBreakerOpen` (breaker-open state derivable), `OnClosed` records the close, and `RecordSuccess` wired onto the invoker success paths (`ConsecutiveFailures` is a true consecutive counter, not stuck-forever). Transport: `DriverResilienceStatusChanged` Commons contract → periodic 5 s full-snapshot publisher `DriverResilienceStatusPublisherService` (driver nodes, registered in `AddOtOpcUaDriverFactories` with wiring guard `ResilienceStatusReaderRegistrationTests` — closes the built-but-never-wired class) → `driver-resilience-status` DPS topic → per-admin-node `DriverResilienceStatusBridge``IDriverResilienceStatusStore` → resilience chips (breaker-OPEN / consecutive-failures / in-flight / staleness) on `DriverStatusPanel.razor`, read in-process (self-HubConnection ban honored). Core.Tests resilience 31/31 (incl. deterministic breaker-close via a controllable TimeProvider), Host.IntegrationTests publisher+guard 6/6, AdminUI.Tests store 5/5; full-solution build clean. **Deferred (T10):** docker-dev live-`/run` — S7 dead-endpoint breaker-open observed on BOTH centrals + recovery-clear + staleness-dim (also the first live sighting of the #10 `circuit-breaker OPENED` log line, closing FOLLOWUP-10's behavioral gate). |
| **R2-08** | 03/S2 (High, action #8), 03/S3 (High) | `r2/08-ldap-historyread-async` (off `1a698cbb`) | `ce6d9e21``<docs>` (14 task commits) | **Code-complete, offline-verified.** **S2 (LDAP async/timeout):** the SDK raises the impersonation callback synchronously under a `SessionManager`-wide `m_eventLock` (verified vs. 1.5.378 — a hung bind serializes ALL activations), so the fix is entirely at the `LdapOpcUaUserAuthenticator` boundary: five new `Security:Ldap` keys (`ConnectionTimeoutMs`=10000 projected into the shared lib, `AuthTimeoutMs`=15000 hard whole-flow `WaitAsync` bound → fail-closed "timed out", `MaxConcurrentAuthentications`=8 `SemaphoreSlim` with release-on-core-completion so orphaned binds still count, `OutageFailureThreshold`=3/`OutageCooldownSeconds`=15 directory-outage circuit → fast-deny "unavailable", half-open probe) + `LdapAuthResult.IsSystemFailure` seam (mapped from `ServiceAccountBindFailed`) distinguishing outage from credential-deny + `LdapOptionsValidator` rules + `HandleImpersonation` contract doc + `docs/security.md`. Stall-repro RED→GREEN; offline outage-sim through the real `HandleImpersonation` against an unroutable host. **S3 (HistoryRead fan-out):** all four HistoryRead arms async-ified (`ServeNodeAsync`/`ServeRawPagedAsync`/`ServeEventsAsync`, OCE→`BadTimeout`) then bounded per-node fan-out (`RunBounded` semaphore + single arm-boundary bridge) + per-request deadline CTS (`HistoryReadDeadline`=60s) + process-wide lazy batch limiter (`MaxConcurrentHistoryReadBatches`=16 → flood degrades to `BadTooManyOperations`); 16×4=64 in-flight cap; three new `ServerHistorian` keys + node-manager props + hosted-service wiring + `docs/Historian.md`/CLAUDE.md tables. Sequential-serving RED→GREEN. Host.IntegrationTests (LDAP resilience) 13/13, Security.Tests 11/11, Runtime.Tests options 11/11, OpcUaServer.Tests HistoryRead 30/30. **Deferred (live):** S2 docker-dev unreachable-LDAP + GLAuth outage/recovery cycle; S3 `Category=LiveIntegration` gateway soak. |
| **R2-11** | 01/C-1, 01/P-1 + 05/CONV-2, UNDER-1, UNDER-6 | `r2/11-tagconfig-consolidation` (off `46fedda3`) | first `2e14fe1f` … (24 task commits) | **Code-complete, offline-verified.** **Part 1 (C-1/P-1):** single `TagConfigIntent.Parse` + `DeviceConfigIntent` in Commons replace the four byte-parity TagConfig parse copies (composer/artifact/walker/DraftValidator) — composer now parses once per tag (P-1); a permanent `Runtime.Tests/TagConfigCorpusParityTests` (30-blob corpus) guards compose≡decode; `grep "MUST parse identically" src/` = 0. **Part 2 (CONV-2):** shared strict-capable `TagConfigJson` readers in Core.Abstractions replace the six copy-pasted `ReadEnum`s; all six driver parsers gain `Inspect()` warnings + honour the `writable` key (FOCAS **forced read-only**, 05/UNDER-1); FOCAS equipment tags run the capability-matrix pre-flight (05/UNDER-6); Modbus probe parses the factory DTO shape (`timeoutMs` no longer dropped). New `EquipmentTagConfigInspector` in ControlPlane + `AdminOperationsActor` deploy-gate wiring with `Deployment:TagConfigValidationMode` (**Warn default | Error opt-in**), proven through the actor (F10b consuming test). AdminUI: `writable` checkbox in the six typed editors. **Phase-C follow-up (deferred, recorded here):** flip the runtime parsers to strict (typo'd enum ⇒ `BadNodeIdUnknown` instead of wrong-width `Good`) once fleets have run `Error` mode clean — behavior change deliberately not shipped in this plan. **Deferred (T22/T24):** docker-dev `/run` of one typed editor's Writable checkbox + whole-solution serial sweep. |
**Report anchor drifts to fold into the next report refresh** (from the R2-02 verification pass): (1)