#519 — a driver's OPC UA status code now reaches a client with its sub-code intact. DriverInstanceActor projected the driver's uint onto a 3-state Good/Uncertain/Bad enum and OtOpcUaNodeManager re-expanded Bad to a bare 0x80000000, so BadNoCommunication, BadTypeMismatch and BadNotSupported were indistinguishable on the wire and every driver's status constants (incl. the 16 #497 had just corrected) were diagnostic in logs only. Resolved by option (b): the raw uint rides AttributeValuePublished -> AttributeValueUpdate -> IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink.WriteValue, OpcUaQuality is deleted, and severity classification is a helper (OpcUaStatus.IsGood/IsUncertain/IsBad). The surface was wider than the issue costed (41 files, not "the sink and 3 implementations"): OpcUaQuality had non-driver producers with no uint to carry. Each got its natural code — BadInternalError for a failed virtual-tag script, BadNoCommunication for driver comms loss — and ScriptedAlarmHostActor's pair of mutually-inverse uint<->enum mappers is deleted, having round-tripped a code the engine already held. AddressSpaceApplier's removal writes deliberately keep the generic Bad: not losing a code the driver had is this issue; inventing one for the deploy path is a separate call. Behaviour change: WriteAlarmQuality fires its Part 9 event on a status-code change rather than a severity-bucket change. While the annotation was 3-state those were the same predicate; now a move between two Bad reasons changes what a subscriber reads. New SDK-free named constants live on Commons.OpcUa.OpcUaStatus, and StatusCodeParityTests is widened to cover them — that guard is reflection-driven, so it can only see a named constant, never an inline literal. #517 — the symptom is real but the issue named the wrong path and its fix was unsafe. ShutdownAsync cannot race: DriverInstanceActor calls it from PostStop, after the mailbox drains. (Core/Hosting/DriverHost, the one class with a concurrent GetHealth, has no production call site.) InitializeAsync can: it runs on a fire-and-forget Task.Run, and MTConnectDriver writes Healthy then starts loops that can throw into a catch which disposes the client before writing Faulted. Moving the write earlier, as suggested, inverts the terminal state — teardown drains in-flight loops that write health as they unwind, so a late loop could leave Healthy at rest with every connection closed. The fix is a bracket (conservative before, terminal after), applied to MTConnect's init-failure path only; shutdown keeps its single trailing write, and the rule plus the reachability table are documented on IDriver.ShutdownAsync. CalculationDriver.GetHealth returned a hard-coded Healthy that consulted nothing — Healthy before initialize, after shutdown and after dispose. Now derived from _running. Its test, named Health_is_always_Connected, asserted the defect and is replaced. Every new guard was falsified by breaking the production code and watching it go red. The two sub-code tests each assert two different Bad codes, since a single-code assertion could pass against a hard-coded constant under the old projection. Pre-existing failures, verified unchanged on a stashed tree and not chased: 4 in Driver.AbLegacy.IntegrationTests (slc500/micrologix/plc5 fixtures not up) and 3 in Host.IntegrationTests. Closes #517 Closes #519 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
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@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ public sealed class AddressSpaceApplier
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else
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{
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// Plain value variable → terminal Bad so an in-flight MonitoredItem sees the removal.
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SafeWriteValue(nodeId, null, OpcUaQuality.Bad, ts, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
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SafeWriteValue(nodeId, null, OpcUaStatus.Bad, ts, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
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if (!SafeRemoveVariable(surgical, nodeId, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns)) return false;
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}
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}
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@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ public sealed class AddressSpaceApplier
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foreach (var v in plan.RemovedEquipmentVirtualTags.Where(t => NotSubsumed(t.EquipmentId)))
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{
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var nodeId = UnsEquipmentVar(v.EquipmentId, v.FolderPath, v.Name);
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SafeWriteValue(nodeId, null, OpcUaQuality.Bad, ts, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
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SafeWriteValue(nodeId, null, OpcUaStatus.Bad, ts, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
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if (!SafeRemoveVariable(surgical, nodeId, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns)) return false;
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}
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@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ public sealed class AddressSpaceApplier
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// ref only reaches here on a genuine dereference (the equipment dropped the reference).
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foreach (var v in plan.RemovedUnsReferenceVariables)
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{
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SafeWriteValue(v.NodeId, null, OpcUaQuality.Bad, ts, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
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SafeWriteValue(v.NodeId, null, OpcUaStatus.Bad, ts, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
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if (!SafeRemoveVariable(surgical, v.NodeId, AddressSpaceRealm.Uns)) return false;
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}
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@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ public sealed class AddressSpaceApplier
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}
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else
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{
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SafeWriteValue(t.NodeId, null, OpcUaQuality.Bad, ts, AddressSpaceRealm.Raw);
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SafeWriteValue(t.NodeId, null, OpcUaStatus.Bad, ts, AddressSpaceRealm.Raw);
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if (!SafeRemoveVariable(surgical, t.NodeId, AddressSpaceRealm.Raw)) return false;
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}
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}
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@@ -365,11 +365,16 @@ public sealed class AddressSpaceApplier
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}
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/// <summary>Write a value, swallowing (and Warning-logging) any sink fault — used for the terminal Bad
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/// on a removed variable so an in-flight MonitoredItem observes the removal.</summary>
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/// on a removed variable so an in-flight MonitoredItem observes the removal.
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/// <para>Every caller passes the generic <see cref="OpcUaStatus.Bad"/>, which is exactly what the
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/// retired 3-state projection produced here. A removal could say something more specific (the node is
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/// about to stop existing, so <c>BadNodeIdUnknown</c> would be truer), but #519 was about not LOSING a
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/// sub-code the driver already had — inventing a new one for the deploy path is a separate call, so
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/// this deliberately stays behaviour-identical.</para></summary>
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/// <returns><c>true</c> when the write landed; <c>false</c> when the sink threw.</returns>
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private bool SafeWriteValue(string nodeId, object? value, OpcUaQuality quality, DateTime ts, AddressSpaceRealm realm)
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private bool SafeWriteValue(string nodeId, object? value, uint statusCode, DateTime ts, AddressSpaceRealm realm)
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{
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try { _sink.WriteValue(nodeId, value, quality, ts, realm); return true; }
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try { _sink.WriteValue(nodeId, value, statusCode, ts, realm); return true; }
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catch (Exception ex) { _logger.LogWarning(ex, "AddressSpaceApplier: WriteValue threw for {Node}", nodeId); return false; }
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}
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