#519 — a driver's OPC UA status code now reaches a client with its sub-code intact. DriverInstanceActor projected the driver's uint onto a 3-state Good/Uncertain/Bad enum and OtOpcUaNodeManager re-expanded Bad to a bare 0x80000000, so BadNoCommunication, BadTypeMismatch and BadNotSupported were indistinguishable on the wire and every driver's status constants (incl. the 16 #497 had just corrected) were diagnostic in logs only. Resolved by option (b): the raw uint rides AttributeValuePublished -> AttributeValueUpdate -> IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink.WriteValue, OpcUaQuality is deleted, and severity classification is a helper (OpcUaStatus.IsGood/IsUncertain/IsBad). The surface was wider than the issue costed (41 files, not "the sink and 3 implementations"): OpcUaQuality had non-driver producers with no uint to carry. Each got its natural code — BadInternalError for a failed virtual-tag script, BadNoCommunication for driver comms loss — and ScriptedAlarmHostActor's pair of mutually-inverse uint<->enum mappers is deleted, having round-tripped a code the engine already held. AddressSpaceApplier's removal writes deliberately keep the generic Bad: not losing a code the driver had is this issue; inventing one for the deploy path is a separate call. Behaviour change: WriteAlarmQuality fires its Part 9 event on a status-code change rather than a severity-bucket change. While the annotation was 3-state those were the same predicate; now a move between two Bad reasons changes what a subscriber reads. New SDK-free named constants live on Commons.OpcUa.OpcUaStatus, and StatusCodeParityTests is widened to cover them — that guard is reflection-driven, so it can only see a named constant, never an inline literal. #517 — the symptom is real but the issue named the wrong path and its fix was unsafe. ShutdownAsync cannot race: DriverInstanceActor calls it from PostStop, after the mailbox drains. (Core/Hosting/DriverHost, the one class with a concurrent GetHealth, has no production call site.) InitializeAsync can: it runs on a fire-and-forget Task.Run, and MTConnectDriver writes Healthy then starts loops that can throw into a catch which disposes the client before writing Faulted. Moving the write earlier, as suggested, inverts the terminal state — teardown drains in-flight loops that write health as they unwind, so a late loop could leave Healthy at rest with every connection closed. The fix is a bracket (conservative before, terminal after), applied to MTConnect's init-failure path only; shutdown keeps its single trailing write, and the rule plus the reachability table are documented on IDriver.ShutdownAsync. CalculationDriver.GetHealth returned a hard-coded Healthy that consulted nothing — Healthy before initialize, after shutdown and after dispose. Now derived from _running. Its test, named Health_is_always_Connected, asserted the defect and is replaced. Every new guard was falsified by breaking the production code and watching it go red. The two sub-code tests each assert two different Bad codes, since a single-code assertion could pass against a hard-coded constant under the old projection. Pre-existing failures, verified unchanged on a stashed tree and not chased: 4 in Driver.AbLegacy.IntegrationTests (slc500/micrologix/plc5 fixtures not up) and 3 in Host.IntegrationTests. Closes #517 Closes #519 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015p7wGqy3YpZNCpDzTpGMKo
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@@ -28,6 +28,25 @@ invoker is real, but it lives on the **driver-actor** side wrapping the poll/sub
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1. The SDK resolves the NodeId in the Raw (`ns=2`) or UNS (`ns=3`) namespace.
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2. It returns the cached `DataValue` — value, `StatusCode` and source timestamp as last pushed.
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### Status codes reach the client intact (Gitea #519)
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The driver's OPC UA status code — **sub-code included** — is what a client reads. A driver that maps
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an unreachable device to `BadNoCommunication` surfaces exactly that, distinguishable from
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`BadTypeMismatch` or `BadNotSupported`.
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This was not always true. Until #519 the publish path projected the driver's `uint` onto a 3-state
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`Good`/`Uncertain`/`Bad` enum in `DriverInstanceActor`, and `OtOpcUaNodeManager` re-expanded `Bad` to
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a bare `StatusCodes.Bad` (`0x80000000`). Every driver's diagnostic intent survived in logs only —
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including the 16 status constants #497 had just corrected across six drivers. The value path now
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carries the raw `uint` end to end (`AttributeValuePublished` → `AttributeValueUpdate` →
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`IOpcUaAddressSpaceSink.WriteValue`), and severity classification is a helper
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(`OpcUaStatus.IsGood`/`IsUncertain`/`IsBad`) rather than a lossy projection.
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**Writing a status code in engine code:** use a named constant on
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`ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Commons.OpcUa.OpcUaStatus`, never an inline literal. Commons and Runtime are
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deliberately SDK-free, so nothing but `StatusCodeParityTests` checks a literal against the name it is
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commented with — and that guard works by reflection, so it can only see a **named** constant.
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3. **No authorization check runs.** Not a per-node ACL, not a role check, nothing. Any admitted
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session — including an Anonymous one — can read every node in the address space. The only gating is
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the `AccessLevels` bitmask set at materialization, which is a per-node *capability* declaration, not
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