fix(acl): revalidate event/alarm subscriptions on both triggers; key-usability check on role gates (#562, #563)
#562: direct event (alarm) monitored items are now tracked in a second map (_eventItems, fed by the SubscribeToEvents override) and re-authorized by RevalidateMonitoredItems on both triggers (DataPlaneAuthorityState.Changed and AclRevalidationTimer). A denied item is detached via the SDK's own protected SubscribeToEvents(unsubscribe: true) - never MonitoringMode.Disabled - and re-attached on restore; a client delete of a stood-down item is absorbed. Over-the-wire tests: revoke -> stop (positive control on a still-granted notifier) -> restore -> resume; clock-driven expiry via the real timer with a control session; delete-while-stood-down is not resurrected; unexpired negative control. Server-object (all-events) subscriptions are documented as outside the ACL (observed over the wire). #563: DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeKeyUsable runs the FindUsableKey probe on the WriteOperate and AlarmAck role gates regardless of Security:Acl:Enabled, so an expired or deployment-disabled key loses its activation-time roles on its open session. Anonymous (no key id) is unaffected; reads/subscriptions stay ungated with the flag off. No new flag. Docs: docs/security.md and the CLAUDE.md API-key/ACL section. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ef2ozxS7QPanGT8uoATbTe
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Doherty
@@ -859,6 +859,15 @@ Two things to know before relying on any of this:
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browse, subscribe and HistoryRead are ungated for any admitted session including Anonymous**. With the
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flag **on** (`DataPlaneAuthorizer`), scoped grants decide **every** data-plane operation: write and
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alarm commands and HistoryRead (stage 5), read and browse and subscription creation (stage 6).
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- **The two role gates re-check the session's KEY on every call, flag off or on (Gitea #563).** Roles
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are resolved once at activation, so an expired / deployment-disabled key used to keep `WriteOperate` /
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`AlarmAck` on its open session until the client disconnected. `DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeKeyUsable`
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runs the same `FindUsableKey` probe against the same snapshot + clock as the ACL path (one dictionary
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lookup, no I/O) and denies `BadUserAccessDenied` before the role check. **Only those two gates** —
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reads/subscriptions stay ungated with the flag off, by design. Anonymous carries no key and is
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unaffected. No flag: a dead key keeping write authority is a defect, not a rollout choice. ⚠️ On a
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fused node a key minted after the last deploy authenticates (ConfigDb) but cannot write/ack until a
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deployment carries it — the flag-on path always behaved this way.
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- ⚠️ **The ACL decision REPLACES the role check — the two are never chained.** Chained, a grant would
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have to confer the server-wide role *as well as* pass the scope check, and only `Cluster`-scoped
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grants confer a role, so every narrow grant would stay inert and the flag would appear to do
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@@ -910,6 +919,15 @@ Two things to know before relying on any of this:
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`Security:Acl:Enabled` is false), runs the same pass on the clock — because `ExpiresUtc` passes with
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the clock, not with a deployment. The pass's verdict memo is **pass-local and must stay that way**;
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hoisting it across ticks would serve an expiry that landed between two ticks the earlier tick's allow.
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**Event/alarm items ride both triggers too (Gitea #562)** — a second map (`_eventItems`), fed by the
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`SubscribeToEvents` override, holds every *direct* notifier subscription; a denied one is detached via
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the SDK's own protected `SubscribeToEvents(…, unsubscribe: true)` (what a client delete does) and
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re-attached with `unsubscribe: false` on restore — again never `Disabled`. Unlike a data item it is
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**not told** (no value slot for a status; the feed goes quiet), and a client delete of a stood-down
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item is absorbed by the override (the SDK would otherwise remove an item that is not attached).
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⚠️ **Server-object (`i=2253`) event subscriptions are outside the ACL entirely** — fanned out by
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`SubscribeToAllEvents` + the core node manager's Server notifier, which our creation gate never sees;
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live-observed: a grantless anonymous session receives every alarm through one. Open residual.
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- **Anonymous is a normal grantable principal**, not a bypass. `OpcUa:AllowAnonymous` (default `true`,
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preserving today's behaviour) controls *admission*; when admitted the session authenticates as the
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reserved principal `anonymous` and gets roles from `NodeAcl` rows naming it, arriving at the gates as
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@@ -932,8 +950,9 @@ Two things to know before relying on any of this:
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**Expiry is the exception**: `FindUsableKey` compares `ExpiresUtc` against the authorizer's clock on every
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call, so it is immediate everywhere — and since arch-review 03/S19 it reaches live subscriptions too, on
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the host's `Security:Acl:RevalidationIntervalSeconds` timer (default 60 s; the session is **silenced with
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`BadUserAccessDenied`, not closed**, and recovers on re-activation). ⚠️ Event/alarm monitored items are
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revalidated by neither trigger — pre-existing, and a named residual.
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`BadUserAccessDenied`, not closed**, and recovers on re-activation). Direct event/alarm subscriptions
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are revalidated on both triggers as well (#562); with the flag **off**, expiry and revocation reach the
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two role gates (#563) but not reads or subscriptions.
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- ⚠️ **The activation lookup is BOUNDED (arch-review 03/S18).** The SDK raises impersonation synchronously
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under a `SessionManager`-wide lock, so a ConfigDb that is *slow* rather than *refusing* stalled **every**
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session activation on the server, Anonymous and X.509 included. `BoundedApiKeyStore` wraps the ConfigDb
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+45
-3
@@ -406,6 +406,27 @@ Both gates fail closed — a session with no identity or no matching role gets
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the constants in `OpcUaDataPlaneRoles`, derived from the principal's cluster-scoped `NodeAcl` grants
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(see [Role grant source](#role-grant-source-data-plane)).
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**Both gates also re-check the session's API key on every call, flag off or on** (Gitea #563). A
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session's roles are resolved once, at activation, so before this an open session kept `WriteOperate` /
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`AlarmAck` after its key's `ExpiresUtc` passed — or after a deployment disabled or removed the key —
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until the client chose to disconnect, which on a machine-to-machine data plane can be never. Now each
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write and each Part 9 method call first asks `DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeKeyUsable`: the same
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`FindUsableKey` probe, against the same deployed snapshot and the same clock, that the ACL path makes
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(one dictionary lookup, no I/O). An unusable key gets `BadUserAccessDenied` (logged as
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`AclGate: denied … key … is no longer enabled or has expired`), checked *before* the "no gateway ⇒
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`BadNotWritable`" availability answer. Things to know:
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- **Only these two gates.** Read, Browse, Subscribe and HistoryRead stay ungated with the flag off —
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that is the flag-off posture, and an expired key's session can still read and keep its subscriptions.
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Turn `Security:Acl:Enabled` on to have expiry reach those too.
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- **Anonymous is unaffected.** It carries no key id, so there is nothing to expire; its roles stay what
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activation resolved from the `anonymous` principal's grants.
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- **No flag.** An expired or disabled key keeping write authority is a defect, not a rollout choice.
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- ⚠️ **On a fused admin+driver node a key minted after the last deployment authenticates (the ConfigDb
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store is read at activation) but its writes and acks are refused until a deployment carries it** — the
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check reads the deployed snapshot, which is also what the flag-on path has always done. Deploy after
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minting a key.
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**What has no authorization check at all:**
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- **Read, Browse, TranslateBrowsePaths** — no override, no handler. Any admitted session, including
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@@ -496,9 +517,30 @@ Behaviours worth knowing before enabling it:
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no reconnect** — closing the session instead would force a full reconnect-and-resubscribe on every
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machine consumer in the fleet at once when a shared key expired.
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⚠️ **Event/alarm monitored items are revalidated by neither trigger.** The live-item map is fed only
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from data-change items, so an alarm subscription is gated at creation and never again. Pre-existing —
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the deployment trigger has the same hole — and tracked as a residual of arch-review 03/S19.
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**Event/alarm monitored items are revalidated by both triggers too** (Gitea #562). A direct event
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subscription — one on an equipment or device folder's event notifier — is tracked in a second map
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alongside the data-change items and re-asked the creation gate's question (`Subscribe` on the
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notifier's scope, for the identity of the session that created it). A denied item is **detached** from
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the notifier's event fan-out through the SDK's own unsubscribe — exactly what the client's delete would
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do — never set `MonitoringMode.Disabled`, so restoring its authority re-attaches it and alarms resume
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with no client action. Events raised while it was stood down are not replayed. Two differences from a
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data-change item:
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- **The client is not told.** An event item has no value slot to carry `BadUserAccessDenied`, and a
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fabricated "access denied" event would land in every alarm consumer's stream, so the feed simply goes
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quiet. The operator-facing signal is the `AclGate: RevalidateEventSubscriptions withheld N of M` log line.
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- **A client may delete a stood-down item** normally; the delete is absorbed (the item is already off
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the fan-out) and a later restoring deployment does not resurrect it.
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⚠️ **Server-object (all-events) event subscriptions are outside the ACL entirely — at creation and at
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revalidation.** A subscription to `i=2253` (the Server object) is fanned out by the SDK through
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`SubscribeToAllEvents` and through the Server object's own notifier, which the core node manager owns —
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our node manager's creation gate never sees it, and an equipment folder with no direct subscriber
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forwards its events to the Server object regardless of what our node manager attaches. So with the flag
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on, a session subscribed to the Server object still receives every alarm in the address space (observed
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over the wire 2026-10-07: an anonymous session holding no grant at all received a native alarm through a
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Server-object event item). Scope
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alarm consumers by subscribing to the equipment/device folders, and treat Server-object event access as
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ungated until this is closed.
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- **An ancestor of a granted node is browsable**, or no narrow grant would be reachable: a client
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arrives at a deep node by browsing its ancestors, and the trie otherwise inherits downward only. Note
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what this necessarily discloses — the *names* of the folders on the path to a granted node are visible
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@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2
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{
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Volatile.Read(ref _dataPlaneAuthority).Changed -= OnAuthorityChanged;
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_liveItems.Clear();
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_eventItems.Clear();
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}
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base.Dispose(disposing);
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@@ -357,7 +358,9 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2
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/// The node-scoped ACL gate (#520 stage 5), or <c>null</c> when none is wired. Consulted by the
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/// write, alarm-command and HistoryRead seams <b>only while
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/// <see cref="Security.DataPlaneAuthorizer.Enabled"/> is true</b>; otherwise each keeps its
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/// server-wide role check and behaviour is identical to before this stage.
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/// server-wide role check and behaviour is identical to before this stage — with one exception: the
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/// two role gates consult <see cref="Security.DataPlaneAuthorizer.AuthorizeKeyUsable"/> in either
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/// mode, so an expired or revoked key loses its activation-time roles (Gitea #563).
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// Null means "not wired" and is treated as not-enabled, not as deny-all. That looks like the wrong
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@@ -1595,6 +1598,12 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2
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identity, AlarmOperationFor(operation), condition.NodeId, RealmOf(condition.NodeId));
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}
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// Gitea #563: the activation-time AlarmAck role is honoured only while the key that earned it is
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// still usable — an expired or deployment-disabled key loses it on its open session.
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var keyVeto = _authorizer?.AuthorizeKeyUsable(
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identity, AlarmOperationFor(operation), condition.NodeId);
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if (keyVeto is not null) return keyVeto;
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// Fail closed: no role / no identity ⇒ veto. Returning a bad ServiceResult aborts the SDK's
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// state change and surfaces the status to the client; we never route or mutate.
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return identity is null
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@@ -1670,10 +1679,14 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2
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// #520 stage 5. With ACLs enforced the scoped decision REPLACES the server-wide WriteOperate role
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// check — see AclOptions for why chaining them would leave every narrow grant inert. The
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// gateway-wired check applies either way: it is an availability fact, not an authorization one.
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// With the flag off, Gitea #563: the activation-time WriteOperate role is honoured only while the
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// session's key is still usable — checked first, so an expired key reads as denied rather than as
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// "writes unavailable" on a node with no gateway.
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var gate = AclEnforced
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? _authorizer!.Authorize(identity, OpcUaOperation.WriteOperate, node.NodeId, RealmOf(node.NodeId))
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?? (gatewayWired ? null : new ServiceResult(StatusCodes.BadNotWritable, "writes unavailable"))
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: EvaluateEquipmentWriteGate(identity, gatewayWired);
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: _authorizer?.AuthorizeKeyUsable(identity, OpcUaOperation.WriteOperate, node.NodeId)
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?? EvaluateEquipmentWriteGate(identity, gatewayWired);
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if (gate is not null) return gate;
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// Item A (synchronous structural fail-fast): reject a structurally-invalid write INLINE — return Bad
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@@ -3222,7 +3235,58 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2
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return StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied;
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}
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return base.SubscribeToEvents(context, sourceId, subscriptionId, monitoredItem, unsubscribe);
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if (unsubscribe)
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{
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// Gitea #562: an item RevalidateMonitoredItems stood down is ALREADY off its notifier's fan-out.
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// Handing its delete to the SDK would make it remove an item that is not there — at best a
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// spurious BadNodeIdUnknown on the client's delete, at worst a NullReferenceException inside
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// MonitoredNode2.Remove when the node's event list has gone null. Checked and dropped under the
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// same Lock the revalidation pass re-attaches under, so the two cannot interleave into
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// re-attaching an item the client has just deleted.
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lock (Lock)
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{
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if (_eventItems.TryRemove(monitoredItem, out var stoodDown) && stoodDown.Suppressed)
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return ServiceResult.Good;
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}
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return base.SubscribeToEvents(context, sourceId, subscriptionId, monitoredItem, unsubscribe);
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}
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var result = base.SubscribeToEvents(context, sourceId, subscriptionId, monitoredItem, unsubscribe);
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TrackLiveEventItem(sourceId, monitoredItem);
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return result;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Starts (or refreshes) tracking a direct event subscription for revalidation (Gitea #562).
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="sourceId">The manager handle the item subscribed through.</param>
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/// <param name="monitoredItem">The event item.</param>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// Only items the SDK actually attached are tracked — a subscribe the SDK refused (a source that
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/// is not an event notifier, an unknown node) has nothing to stand down. The SDK reports an item
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/// that was already attached (a <c>ModifyMonitoredItems</c> re-subscribe) as a non-Good status
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/// while having re-attached it anyway, so attachment is read off the fan-out list itself rather
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/// than inferred from the status the subscribe returned.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// A re-subscribe of an item that was stood down is the client re-asking, and it has just passed
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/// the creation gate above, so the entry is replaced with a live one.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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private void TrackLiveEventItem(object sourceId, IEventMonitoredItem monitoredItem)
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{
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if (IsHandleInNamespace(sourceId) is not { } handle || !OwnsNamespace(handle.NodeId)) return;
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lock (Lock)
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{
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if (MonitoredNodes.TryGetValue(handle.NodeId, out var monitored)
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&& monitored.EventMonitoredItems?.Contains(monitoredItem) == true)
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{
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_eventItems[monitoredItem] = new LiveEventItem(handle);
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}
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}
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}
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/// <inheritdoc />
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@@ -3293,6 +3357,54 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2
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public bool Suppressed { get; set; }
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Live <b>event</b> monitored items subscribed directly to a notifier this manager owns (Gitea #562),
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/// the event-side twin of <see cref="_liveItems"/>.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// A second map because the SDK keeps the two kinds apart: a data-change item reaches this
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/// manager through <see cref="OnMonitoredItemCreated"/>, an event item only through
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/// <see cref="SubscribeToEvents(OperationContext, object, uint, IEventMonitoredItem, bool)"/>, and
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/// they hang off different lists of <see cref="MonitoredNode2"/>. Before #562 nothing tracked event
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/// items at all, so an alarm feed authorized at creation survived every later revocation.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// Maintained by that override's subscribe/unsubscribe arms — the SDK routes every create, modify
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/// and delete of a direct event item through it, subscription teardown included. Mutated under
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/// <c>Lock</c>, so the membership check the revalidation pass makes before re-attaching an item
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/// cannot race a client deleting it.
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// ⚠️ <b>Server-object (all-events) subscriptions are not in this map</b>, because they are not
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/// authorized by this manager in the first place: the SDK fans them out through
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/// <c>SubscribeToAllEvents</c> and through the Server object's own notifier, which the core node
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/// manager owns. See <c>docs/security.md</c> § Data-Plane Authorization.
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/// </para>
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/// </remarks>
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private readonly ConcurrentDictionary<IEventMonitoredItem, LiveEventItem> _eventItems = new();
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/// <summary>
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/// How many event items are attached to the event fan-out of nodes this manager owns. Test
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/// observability for Gitea #562: an item resurrected onto a notifier after its client deleted it is
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/// invisible to that client, so only the server side can show it.
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/// </summary>
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internal int AttachedEventItemCount
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{
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get
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{
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lock (Lock) return MonitoredNodes.Values.Sum(n => n.EventMonitoredItems?.Count ?? 0);
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}
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}
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/// <summary>A tracked event item: the notifier it subscribed to, and whether we have stood it down.</summary>
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/// <param name="Handle">The notifier's handle; its <see cref="NodeHandle.Node"/> is what the item is attached to.</param>
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private sealed record LiveEventItem(NodeHandle Handle)
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{
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/// <summary>True while the item has been detached from its notifier's event fan-out for want of a grant.</summary>
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public bool Suppressed { get; set; }
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Re-authorizes every live monitored item against the current generation, standing down the ones
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/// whose grant has gone.
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@@ -3346,7 +3458,7 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2
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/// </remarks>
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public void RevalidateMonitoredItems()
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{
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if (!AclEnforced || _liveItems.IsEmpty) return;
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if (!AclEnforced || (_liveItems.IsEmpty && _eventItems.IsEmpty)) return;
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var now = DateTime.UtcNow;
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var stoodDown = 0;
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@@ -3391,11 +3503,83 @@ public sealed class OtOpcUaNodeManager : CustomNodeManager2
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stoodDown++;
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}
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var (eventsStoodDown, eventsRestored) = RevalidateEventItems(verdicts);
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if (stoodDown > 0 || restored > 0)
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{
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_authorizer!.LogFiltered(
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"RevalidateSubscriptions", principal: null, stoodDown, _liveItems.Count);
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}
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if (eventsStoodDown > 0 || eventsRestored > 0)
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{
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_authorizer!.LogFiltered(
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"RevalidateEventSubscriptions", principal: null, eventsStoodDown, _eventItems.Count);
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}
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// The event-item half of <see cref="RevalidateMonitoredItems"/> (Gitea #562): re-authorizes every
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/// tracked direct event subscription against its notifier, standing down the denied ones and
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/// re-attaching the restored ones.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="verdicts">The pass-local memo shared with the data-change half.</param>
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/// <returns>How many items were stood down and how many restored.</returns>
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/// <remarks>
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/// <para>
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/// The verdict is the same question the creation gate in
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/// <see cref="SubscribeToEvents(OperationContext, object, uint, IEventMonitoredItem, bool)"/>
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/// asks — <c>Subscribe</c> on the notifier's scope, for the identity of the session that created
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/// the item — so an event feed is held to exactly the authority it was admitted under, re-asked on
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/// both triggers (a deployment, and the host's <c>AclRevalidationTimer</c>).
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/// </para>
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/// <para>
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/// ⚠️ <b>Detached through the SDK's own unsubscribe, never <see cref="MonitoringMode.Disabled"/>.</b>
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/// Same reason as the data-change half: a disabled item can only be re-enabled by the client, and
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/// a machine consumer will never try, so a revocation reversed by the next deployment would leave
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/// the feed dead. The stand-down is the SDK's protected <c>SubscribeToEvents(…, unsubscribe:
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/// true)</c> — precisely what the client's own delete does to the notifier's
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/// <see cref="MonitoredNode2"/> fan-out — and the restore is the same call with
|
||||
/// <c>unsubscribe: false</c>, so neither leaves the fan-out in a shape a client could not have
|
||||
/// produced. The item itself stays in the client's subscription untouched.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// <b>The client is not told.</b> Unlike a data-change item, an event item has no value slot to
|
||||
/// carry a <c>BadUserAccessDenied</c>: its notifications are event field lists, and inventing an
|
||||
/// event to say "access denied" would put a fabricated event in front of every alarm consumer. The
|
||||
/// feed goes quiet, and the operator-facing signal is the summary line this pass logs.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// Membership is re-checked under <c>Lock</c> immediately before each attach/detach: the walk is
|
||||
/// over a concurrent snapshot, and re-attaching an item the client deleted mid-pass would leave it
|
||||
/// on the notifier's fan-out with no owner and no way to remove it.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
private (int StoodDown, int Restored) RevalidateEventItems(
|
||||
Dictionary<(string Session, AddressSpaceRealm Realm, string Node), bool> verdicts)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var stoodDown = 0;
|
||||
var restored = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
foreach (var (item, tracked) in _eventItems)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var permitted = IsSubscriptionStillPermitted(
|
||||
item.EffectiveIdentity as RoleCarryingUserIdentity, tracked.Handle.NodeId, verdicts);
|
||||
if (permitted != tracked.Suppressed) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
lock (Lock)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!_eventItems.TryGetValue(item, out var current) || !ReferenceEquals(current, tracked)) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
SubscribeToEvents(SystemContext, tracked.Handle.Node, item, unsubscribe: !permitted);
|
||||
tracked.Suppressed = !permitted;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (permitted) restored++;
|
||||
else stoodDown++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return (stoodDown, restored);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -201,6 +201,44 @@ public sealed class DataPlaneAuthorizer
|
||||
AddressSpaceRealm realm)
|
||||
=> Evaluate(identity, operation, nodeId, realm, cached: false);
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Whether the API key behind <paramref name="identity"/> is still usable — consulted by the two
|
||||
/// server-wide role gates (<c>WriteOperate</c>, <c>AlarmAck</c>) <b>regardless of
|
||||
/// <see cref="Enabled"/></b> (Gitea #563).
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// With the flag off a session's roles are resolved once, at activation, so before this check a
|
||||
/// key that expired by the clock — or that a deployment disabled or removed — kept
|
||||
/// <c>WriteOperate</c> / <c>AlarmAck</c> on its open session until the client disconnected. With
|
||||
/// the flag on, <see cref="Authorize"/> already makes the identical check first thing, so the role
|
||||
/// gates call this only on the flag-off path and the two postures agree on key usability.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// It is the same <see cref="DataPlaneAuthoritySnapshot.FindUsableKey"/> probe against the same
|
||||
/// snapshot and the same clock as <see cref="Authorize"/>: one dictionary lookup, no I/O, so it is
|
||||
/// safe on the SDK's synchronous write and method-call threads. A session carrying <b>no</b> key id —
|
||||
/// Anonymous, or a legacy identity — has nothing that can expire and always passes; its roles stay
|
||||
/// exactly what activation resolved. A key absent from the snapshot denies, as it does with the flag
|
||||
/// on: on a driver-only node the artifact is the only key source there is, so "absent" means
|
||||
/// "removed by a deployment".
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
/// <param name="identity">The role-carrying identity off the SDK context, or null.</param>
|
||||
/// <param name="operation">The operation being attempted, for the denial log.</param>
|
||||
/// <param name="nodeId">The target node, for the denial log.</param>
|
||||
/// <returns><c>null</c> to proceed to the role check; otherwise the veto to return to the SDK.</returns>
|
||||
public ServiceResult? AuthorizeKeyUsable(
|
||||
RoleCarryingUserIdentity? identity, OpcUaOperation operation, NodeId nodeId)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (identity?.ApiKeyId is not { Length: > 0 } keyId) return null;
|
||||
|
||||
var snapshot = _authority.Current;
|
||||
return snapshot.FindUsableKey(keyId, _time.GetUtcNow().UtcDateTime) is null
|
||||
? DenyRevokedKey(operation, nodeId, identity.Principal, keyId, snapshot.GenerationId, cached: false)
|
||||
: null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// The decision itself. Ordered so the cached seams reach their answer having allocated nothing:
|
||||
/// every check that must run per call comes first, the memoized verdict is consulted next, and the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
|
||||
<!-- R2-08 (03/S2): the outage-sim integration test drives the internal static
|
||||
OpcUaApplicationHost.HandleImpersonation against the real LDAP library. -->
|
||||
<InternalsVisibleTo Include="ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.IntegrationTests"/>
|
||||
<!-- Gitea #562: the over-the-wire event-revalidation test asserts the server-side fan-out, because a
|
||||
deleted item resurrected onto a notifier is invisible to the client that deleted it. -->
|
||||
<InternalsVisibleTo Include="ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.IntegrationTests"/>
|
||||
</ItemGroup>
|
||||
|
||||
</Project>
|
||||
|
||||
+549
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
|
||||
using System.Net;
|
||||
using System.Net.Sockets;
|
||||
using System.Text;
|
||||
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
|
||||
using Opc.Ua;
|
||||
using Opc.Ua.Client;
|
||||
using Shouldly;
|
||||
using Xunit;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Commons.OpcUa;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Entities;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Enums;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Authorization;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Host.OpcUa;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.Security;
|
||||
|
||||
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.IntegrationTests;
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Gitea #562 over the wire — an <b>alarm</b> (event) subscription is re-authorized by both revalidation
|
||||
/// triggers, exactly as a data-change subscription is: a deployment that removes its grant, and the host's
|
||||
/// clock-driven <see cref="AclRevalidationTimer"/> once the session's key expires.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// Before #562 an event monitored item was gated at creation and never again, so an alarm feed
|
||||
/// survived the revocation of the authority it was admitted under until the client disconnected.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// Over the wire for the reason <c>AclSubscriptionEnforcementTests</c> gives: whether an event item
|
||||
/// can recover the identity of the session that created it, and whether detaching it from the SDK's
|
||||
/// event fan-out really stops delivery (and re-attaching really resumes it), are assumptions about SDK
|
||||
/// behaviour that fail silently if wrong.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// Every absence assertion is paired with a <b>positive control on the same event</b>: one condition is
|
||||
/// wired to two equipment notifiers (or watched by two sessions), so a single transition must reach the
|
||||
/// still-authorized item before the denied one's silence counts for anything.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
public sealed class AclEventSubscriptionEnforcementTests
|
||||
{
|
||||
private const string Cluster = "SITE-A";
|
||||
private const string RawDeviceFolder = "Plant/Modbus/dev1";
|
||||
private const string RawAlarmPath = "Plant/Modbus/dev1/temp_hi";
|
||||
private const string EqA = "EqA";
|
||||
private const string EqB = "EqB";
|
||||
private const string KeyPrincipal = "expiry-probe";
|
||||
private const string KeyId = "k-event-expiry";
|
||||
|
||||
// [0]=EventId, [1]=Message — the message is each transition's discriminator.
|
||||
private const int MessageFieldIndex = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
private static readonly DateTime Start = new(2026, 10, 7, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// The deployment axis, end to end: revoke → the alarm feed stops (while the still-granted control
|
||||
/// item receives the same event) → restore → the feed resumes with no client action.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// The restore leg is the reason the stand-down is a detach rather than
|
||||
/// <c>MonitoringMode.Disabled</c>: a disabled item can only be re-enabled by the client, and a machine
|
||||
/// consumer never will.
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task Revoking_then_restoring_a_grant_stops_then_resumes_a_live_alarm_subscription()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ct = TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
|
||||
var rig = await Rig.StartAsync("AclEventRevoke", ct);
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var state = rig.Enforce(EquipmentGrant(EqA), EquipmentGrant(EqB));
|
||||
rig.Materialise();
|
||||
|
||||
using var session = await rig.ConnectAsync(anonymous: true, ct);
|
||||
var collector = new EventCollector();
|
||||
var subscription = await CreateSubscriptionAsync(session, collector, ct);
|
||||
var onA = AddEventItem(subscription, rig.UnsNodeId(session, EqA));
|
||||
var onB = AddEventItem(subscription, rig.UnsNodeId(session, EqB));
|
||||
await subscription.ApplyChangesAsync(ct);
|
||||
onA.Status.Error.ShouldBeNull();
|
||||
onB.Status.Error.ShouldBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
// Baseline: both items receive the transition.
|
||||
rig.Transition("t1", active: true);
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => collector.Has(onA, "t1") && collector.Has(onB, "t1"));
|
||||
|
||||
// The next deployment carries only EqB's grant.
|
||||
state.Apply(Cluster, "rev-2", [], [EquipmentGrant(EqB)], ScopePaths());
|
||||
rig.AttachedEventItems.ShouldBe(1);
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Transition("t2", active: false);
|
||||
// Positive control: the same event reached the still-granted item, so it was fired and published…
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => collector.Has(onB, "t2"));
|
||||
// …and settle past a publishing interval so a late copy for EqA would have arrived too.
|
||||
await Task.Delay(TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(700), ct);
|
||||
collector.Has(onA, "t2").ShouldBeFalse("the revoked item must not receive events after the deployment");
|
||||
|
||||
// A deployment that restores the grant brings the feed back on its own.
|
||||
state.Apply(Cluster, "rev-3", [], [EquipmentGrant(EqA), EquipmentGrant(EqB)], ScopePaths());
|
||||
rig.AttachedEventItems.ShouldBe(2);
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Transition("t3", active: true);
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => collector.Has(onA, "t3") && collector.Has(onB, "t3"));
|
||||
collector.Has(onA, "t2").ShouldBeFalse("nothing withheld while stood down is replayed on restore");
|
||||
|
||||
await subscription.DeleteAsync(true, ct);
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await rig.DisposeAsync(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// A client may delete an item while it is stood down: the delete succeeds, and a later deployment
|
||||
/// that would have restored it does not resurrect it onto the notifier's fan-out.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// The SDK's own unsubscribe would try to remove an item that is no longer attached, so the node
|
||||
/// manager short-circuits it. Asserted over the wire because the failure — an exception inside the
|
||||
/// SDK's delete path, or a ghost item still receiving events — is only observable there.
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task A_stood_down_alarm_item_can_be_deleted_and_is_not_resurrected()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ct = TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
|
||||
var rig = await Rig.StartAsync("AclEventDelete", ct);
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var state = rig.Enforce(EquipmentGrant(EqA), EquipmentGrant(EqB));
|
||||
rig.Materialise();
|
||||
|
||||
using var session = await rig.ConnectAsync(anonymous: true, ct);
|
||||
var collector = new EventCollector();
|
||||
var subscription = await CreateSubscriptionAsync(session, collector, ct);
|
||||
var onA = AddEventItem(subscription, rig.UnsNodeId(session, EqA));
|
||||
var onB = AddEventItem(subscription, rig.UnsNodeId(session, EqB));
|
||||
await subscription.ApplyChangesAsync(ct);
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Transition("t1", active: true);
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => collector.Has(onA, "t1") && collector.Has(onB, "t1"));
|
||||
|
||||
rig.AttachedEventItems.ShouldBe(2);
|
||||
state.Apply(Cluster, "rev-2", [], [EquipmentGrant(EqB)], ScopePaths());
|
||||
rig.AttachedEventItems.ShouldBe(1);
|
||||
|
||||
subscription.RemoveItem(onA);
|
||||
await subscription.ApplyChangesAsync(ct);
|
||||
onA.Status.Error.ShouldBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
// A restoring deployment must not re-attach the deleted item. The client could never see that
|
||||
// happen — it has deleted the item — so the server-side fan-out is what is asserted.
|
||||
state.Apply(Cluster, "rev-3", [], [EquipmentGrant(EqA), EquipmentGrant(EqB)], ScopePaths());
|
||||
rig.AttachedEventItems.ShouldBe(1, "the deleted item must not be resurrected onto EqA's fan-out");
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Transition("t2", active: false);
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => collector.Has(onB, "t2"));
|
||||
await Task.Delay(TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(700), ct);
|
||||
collector.Has(onA, "t2").ShouldBeFalse();
|
||||
|
||||
await subscription.DeleteAsync(true, ct);
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await rig.DisposeAsync(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// The clock axis: the key behind a session's alarm subscription expires, one revalidation tick runs
|
||||
/// through the host's own <see cref="AclRevalidationTimer"/>, and that session stops receiving alarms
|
||||
/// — with no deployment anywhere in the run — while an independent session on the same notifier keeps
|
||||
/// receiving the same event.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task An_expired_key_stops_a_live_alarm_subscription_with_no_deploy()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ct = TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
|
||||
var rig = await Rig.StartAsync("AclEventExpiry", ct);
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var key = new ApiKey
|
||||
{
|
||||
ApiKeyId = KeyId,
|
||||
Name = KeyId,
|
||||
SecretHash = "hash",
|
||||
Principal = KeyPrincipal,
|
||||
Enabled = true,
|
||||
CreatedUtc = Start.AddDays(-1),
|
||||
ExpiresUtc = Start.AddMinutes(10),
|
||||
};
|
||||
var state = rig.Enforce(
|
||||
[key], ClusterGrant(KeyPrincipal, "acl-key"), ClusterGrant(OpcUaPrincipals.Anonymous, "acl-anon"));
|
||||
rig.Materialise();
|
||||
|
||||
using var keySession = await rig.ConnectAsync(anonymous: false, ct);
|
||||
using var controlSession = await rig.ConnectAsync(anonymous: true, ct);
|
||||
|
||||
var keyEvents = new EventCollector();
|
||||
var keySubscription = await CreateSubscriptionAsync(keySession, keyEvents, ct);
|
||||
var keyItem = AddEventItem(keySubscription, rig.UnsNodeId(keySession, EqA));
|
||||
await keySubscription.ApplyChangesAsync(ct);
|
||||
keyItem.Status.Error.ShouldBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
var controlEvents = new EventCollector();
|
||||
var controlSubscription = await CreateSubscriptionAsync(controlSession, controlEvents, ct);
|
||||
var controlItem = AddEventItem(controlSubscription, rig.UnsNodeId(controlSession, EqA));
|
||||
await controlSubscription.ApplyChangesAsync(ct);
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Transition("t1", active: true);
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => keyEvents.Has(keyItem, "t1") && controlEvents.Has(controlItem, "t1"));
|
||||
|
||||
// Only the clock moves.
|
||||
rig.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(20));
|
||||
rig.TickRevalidation();
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Transition("t2", active: false);
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => controlEvents.Has(controlItem, "t2"));
|
||||
await Task.Delay(TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(700), ct);
|
||||
keyEvents.Has(keyItem, "t2").ShouldBeFalse("the expired key's alarm feed must stop on the tick");
|
||||
state.Current.GenerationId.ShouldBe(1);
|
||||
|
||||
await controlSubscription.DeleteAsync(true, ct);
|
||||
await keySubscription.DeleteAsync(true, ct);
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await rig.DisposeAsync(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// The negative control for the clock axis: the same run with the clock advanced but not past
|
||||
/// <c>ExpiresUtc</c> keeps the alarm feed live across a tick.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// Without it the test above also passes on a build whose tick stands down every event item it sees,
|
||||
/// which would silence every alarm consumer in the fleet once a minute.
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task An_unexpired_key_keeps_its_alarm_subscription_across_a_tick()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ct = TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
|
||||
var rig = await Rig.StartAsync("AclEventLive", ct);
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var key = new ApiKey
|
||||
{
|
||||
ApiKeyId = KeyId,
|
||||
Name = KeyId,
|
||||
SecretHash = "hash",
|
||||
Principal = KeyPrincipal,
|
||||
Enabled = true,
|
||||
CreatedUtc = Start.AddDays(-1),
|
||||
ExpiresUtc = Start.AddHours(4),
|
||||
};
|
||||
rig.Enforce([key], ClusterGrant(KeyPrincipal, "acl-key"));
|
||||
rig.Materialise();
|
||||
|
||||
using var session = await rig.ConnectAsync(anonymous: false, ct);
|
||||
var events = new EventCollector();
|
||||
var subscription = await CreateSubscriptionAsync(session, events, ct);
|
||||
var item = AddEventItem(subscription, rig.UnsNodeId(session, EqA));
|
||||
await subscription.ApplyChangesAsync(ct);
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Transition("t1", active: true);
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => events.Has(item, "t1"));
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(20));
|
||||
rig.TickRevalidation();
|
||||
|
||||
rig.Transition("t2", active: false);
|
||||
await WaitUntilAsync(() => events.Has(item, "t2"));
|
||||
|
||||
await subscription.DeleteAsync(true, ct);
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await rig.DisposeAsync(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ───────────────────────────── helpers ─────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
private static NodeAcl EquipmentGrant(string equipment) => new()
|
||||
{
|
||||
NodeAclId = $"acl-{equipment}",
|
||||
ClusterId = Cluster,
|
||||
Principal = OpcUaPrincipals.Anonymous,
|
||||
ScopeKind = NodeAclScopeKind.Equipment,
|
||||
ScopeId = $"eq-{equipment}",
|
||||
PermissionFlags = NodePermissions.Read | NodePermissions.Browse | NodePermissions.Subscribe,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
private static NodeAcl ClusterGrant(string principal, string id) => new()
|
||||
{
|
||||
NodeAclId = id,
|
||||
ClusterId = Cluster,
|
||||
Principal = principal,
|
||||
ScopeKind = NodeAclScopeKind.Cluster,
|
||||
PermissionFlags = NodePermissions.Read | NodePermissions.Browse | NodePermissions.Subscribe,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
private static IReadOnlyDictionary<AclScopeRef, IReadOnlyList<NodeAclPath>> ScopePaths() =>
|
||||
new Dictionary<AclScopeRef, IReadOnlyList<NodeAclPath>>
|
||||
{
|
||||
[new AclScopeRef(NodeAclScopeKind.Equipment, $"eq-{EqA}")] = [new NodeAclPath([NodeAclRealms.Uns, EqA])],
|
||||
[new AclScopeRef(NodeAclScopeKind.Equipment, $"eq-{EqB}")] = [new NodeAclPath([NodeAclRealms.Uns, EqB])],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
private static async Task<Subscription> CreateSubscriptionAsync(
|
||||
ISession session, EventCollector collector, CancellationToken ct)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var subscription = new Subscription(session.DefaultSubscription) { PublishingInterval = 100 };
|
||||
subscription.FastEventCallback = collector.OnEvents;
|
||||
session.AddSubscription(subscription);
|
||||
await subscription.CreateAsync(ct);
|
||||
return subscription;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private static MonitoredItem AddEventItem(Subscription subscription, NodeId source)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var filter = new EventFilter();
|
||||
filter.AddSelectClause(ObjectTypes.BaseEventType, BrowseNames.EventId);
|
||||
filter.AddSelectClause(ObjectTypes.BaseEventType, BrowseNames.Message);
|
||||
|
||||
var item = new MonitoredItem(subscription.DefaultItem)
|
||||
{
|
||||
StartNodeId = source,
|
||||
AttributeId = Attributes.EventNotifier,
|
||||
Filter = filter,
|
||||
QueueSize = 100,
|
||||
SamplingInterval = 0,
|
||||
};
|
||||
subscription.AddItem(item);
|
||||
return item;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private static async Task WaitUntilAsync(Func<bool> condition)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var deadline = DateTime.UtcNow + TimeSpan.FromSeconds(10);
|
||||
while (DateTime.UtcNow < deadline)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (condition()) return;
|
||||
await Task.Delay(50);
|
||||
}
|
||||
condition().ShouldBeTrue("condition not met within timeout");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>Records which transition messages reached which monitored item.</summary>
|
||||
private sealed class EventCollector
|
||||
{
|
||||
private readonly object _gate = new();
|
||||
private readonly HashSet<(uint Handle, string Message)> _seen = [];
|
||||
|
||||
public void OnEvents(Subscription subscription, EventNotificationList notification, IList<string> stringTable)
|
||||
{
|
||||
lock (_gate)
|
||||
{
|
||||
foreach (var e in notification.Events)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (e.EventFields.Count > MessageFieldIndex
|
||||
&& e.EventFields[MessageFieldIndex].Value is LocalizedText { Text: { } text })
|
||||
{
|
||||
_seen.Add((e.ClientHandle, text));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public bool Has(MonitoredItem item, string message)
|
||||
{
|
||||
lock (_gate) return _seen.Contains((item.ClientHandle, message));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>A booted server with ACL enforcement, one native alarm wired to two equipment notifiers.</summary>
|
||||
private sealed class Rig : IAsyncDisposable
|
||||
{
|
||||
private readonly string _pkiRoot;
|
||||
private readonly FakeClock _clock = new(Start);
|
||||
private OpcUaApplicationHost _host = null!;
|
||||
private OtOpcUaSdkServer _server = null!;
|
||||
private SdkAddressSpaceSink _sink = null!;
|
||||
private AclRevalidationTimer? _timer;
|
||||
private int _port;
|
||||
|
||||
private Rig(string pkiRoot) => _pkiRoot = pkiRoot;
|
||||
|
||||
private OtOpcUaNodeManager Nm => _server.NodeManager!;
|
||||
|
||||
public static async Task<Rig> StartAsync(string name, CancellationToken ct)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var rig = new Rig(Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-{name}-{Guid.NewGuid():N}"));
|
||||
rig._port = AllocateFreePort();
|
||||
rig._server = new OtOpcUaSdkServer();
|
||||
rig._host = new OpcUaApplicationHost(
|
||||
new OpcUaApplicationHostOptions
|
||||
{
|
||||
ApplicationName = $"OtOpcUa.{name}",
|
||||
ApplicationUri = $"urn:OtOpcUa.{name}.{Guid.NewGuid():N}",
|
||||
OpcUaPort = rig._port,
|
||||
PublicHostname = "127.0.0.1",
|
||||
PkiStoreRoot = rig._pkiRoot,
|
||||
EnabledSecurityProfiles = [OpcUaSecurityProfile.None],
|
||||
AutoAcceptUntrustedClientCertificates = true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
NullLogger<OpcUaApplicationHost>.Instance,
|
||||
new KeyPresentingAuthenticator());
|
||||
|
||||
await rig._host.StartAsync(rig._server, ct);
|
||||
rig._sink = new SdkAddressSpaceSink(rig.Nm);
|
||||
return rig;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>Switches enforcement on with the given grants and no keys.</summary>
|
||||
public DataPlaneAuthorityState Enforce(params NodeAcl[] grants) => Enforce([], grants);
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Switches enforcement on, wiring the authorizer, the authority source (the deployment trigger)
|
||||
/// and the host's revalidation timer (the clock trigger) over one hand-advanced clock.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
public DataPlaneAuthorityState Enforce(ApiKey[] keys, params NodeAcl[] grants)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var state = new DataPlaneAuthorityState();
|
||||
state.Apply(Cluster, "rev-1", keys, grants, ScopePaths());
|
||||
|
||||
Nm.DataPlaneAuthority = state;
|
||||
Nm.Authorizer = new DataPlaneAuthorizer(
|
||||
state, new TriePermissionEvaluator(state.Tries), enabled: true, NullLogger.Instance, _clock);
|
||||
|
||||
// A long interval: the tick is driven by hand through the same component the host arms.
|
||||
_timer = new AclRevalidationTimer(
|
||||
() => _server.NodeManager?.RevalidateMonitoredItems(),
|
||||
TimeSpan.FromHours(1),
|
||||
TimeProvider.System,
|
||||
NullLogger.Instance);
|
||||
return state;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>One native condition on a raw device, wired as an event source of two equipment folders.</summary>
|
||||
public void Materialise()
|
||||
{
|
||||
_sink.EnsureFolder(RawDeviceFolder, parentNodeId: null, displayName: "dev1", realm: AddressSpaceRealm.Raw);
|
||||
_sink.MaterialiseAlarmCondition(
|
||||
RawAlarmPath, RawDeviceFolder, "temp_hi", "OffNormalAlarm", 700, AddressSpaceRealm.Raw, isNative: true);
|
||||
_sink.EnsureFolder(EqA, parentNodeId: null, displayName: "A", realm: AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
|
||||
_sink.EnsureFolder(EqB, parentNodeId: null, displayName: "B", realm: AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
|
||||
_sink.WireAlarmNotifiers(RawAlarmPath, AddressSpaceRealm.Raw, [EqA, EqB], AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>Fires one genuine condition transition, carrying <paramref name="message"/>.</summary>
|
||||
public void Transition(string message, bool active) =>
|
||||
_sink.WriteAlarmCondition(
|
||||
RawAlarmPath,
|
||||
new AlarmConditionSnapshot(
|
||||
Active: active, Acknowledged: !active, Confirmed: true, Enabled: true,
|
||||
Shelving: AlarmShelvingKind.Unshelved, Severity: 700, Message: message),
|
||||
DateTime.UtcNow,
|
||||
AddressSpaceRealm.Raw);
|
||||
|
||||
public NodeId UnsNodeId(ISession session, string id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ns = (ushort)session.NamespaceUris.GetIndex(V3NodeIds.UnsNamespaceUri);
|
||||
ns.ShouldBeGreaterThan((ushort)0);
|
||||
return new NodeId(id, ns);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>Event items attached to the fan-out of the manager's own notifiers.</summary>
|
||||
public int AttachedEventItems => Nm.AttachedEventItemCount;
|
||||
|
||||
public void Advance(TimeSpan by) => _clock.Advance(by);
|
||||
|
||||
public void TickRevalidation() => _timer!.Tick();
|
||||
|
||||
public async Task<ISession> ConnectAsync(bool anonymous, CancellationToken ct)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var appConfig = new ApplicationConfiguration
|
||||
{
|
||||
ApplicationName = "OtOpcUa.AclEventClient",
|
||||
ApplicationUri = $"urn:OtOpcUa.AclEventClient.{Guid.NewGuid():N}",
|
||||
ApplicationType = ApplicationType.Client,
|
||||
SecurityConfiguration = TestClientSecurity.Build(TestClientSecurity.AllocatePkiRoot()),
|
||||
ClientConfiguration = new ClientConfiguration { DefaultSessionTimeout = 60_000 },
|
||||
};
|
||||
await appConfig.ValidateAsync(ApplicationType.Client, ct);
|
||||
appConfig.CertificateValidator.CertificateValidation += (_, e) => e.Accept = true;
|
||||
|
||||
var endpoint = await CoreClientUtils.SelectEndpointAsync(
|
||||
appConfig, $"opc.tcp://127.0.0.1:{_port}/OtOpcUa", false, DefaultTelemetry.Create(_ => { }), ct);
|
||||
|
||||
var identity = anonymous
|
||||
? new UserIdentity(new AnonymousIdentityToken())
|
||||
: new UserIdentity(new UserNameIdentityToken
|
||||
{
|
||||
UserName = "apikey",
|
||||
// 1.5.378 carries the UserName token password as raw bytes; the host decodes UTF-8.
|
||||
DecryptedPassword = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes($"otua_{KeyId}_secret"),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return await new DefaultSessionFactory(DefaultTelemetry.Create(_ => { })).CreateAsync(
|
||||
appConfig,
|
||||
new ConfiguredEndpoint(null, endpoint, EndpointConfiguration.Create(appConfig)),
|
||||
updateBeforeConnect: false,
|
||||
checkDomain: false,
|
||||
sessionName: "AclEventSubscriptionEnforcementTests",
|
||||
sessionTimeout: 60_000,
|
||||
identity: identity,
|
||||
preferredLocales: null,
|
||||
ct: ct);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public async ValueTask DisposeAsync()
|
||||
{
|
||||
_timer?.Dispose();
|
||||
await _host.DisposeAsync();
|
||||
if (Directory.Exists(_pkiRoot))
|
||||
{
|
||||
try { Directory.Delete(_pkiRoot, recursive: true); }
|
||||
catch (IOException) { /* best effort */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private static int AllocateFreePort()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var listener = new TcpListener(IPAddress.Loopback, 0);
|
||||
listener.Start();
|
||||
var port = ((IPEndPoint)listener.LocalEndpoint).Port;
|
||||
listener.Stop();
|
||||
return port;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Admits the fixed <c>apikey</c> username as <see cref="KeyPrincipal"/> carrying
|
||||
/// <see cref="KeyId"/>; anonymous falls through to the interface default (the
|
||||
/// <c>anonymous</c> principal). Credential verification itself is covered in the Host suite.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
private sealed class KeyPresentingAuthenticator : IOpcUaUserAuthenticator
|
||||
{
|
||||
/// <inheritdoc />
|
||||
public Task<OpcUaUserAuthResult> AuthenticateUserNameAsync(
|
||||
string username, string password, CancellationToken ct) =>
|
||||
Task.FromResult(
|
||||
string.Equals(username, "apikey", StringComparison.Ordinal)
|
||||
&& password.StartsWith($"otua_{KeyId}_", StringComparison.Ordinal)
|
||||
? OpcUaUserAuthResult.AllowKey(KeyPrincipal, [], KeyId)
|
||||
: OpcUaUserAuthResult.Deny("Invalid API key."));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>A hand-advanced clock; the authorizer reads it on every decision.</summary>
|
||||
private sealed class FakeClock(DateTime utcNow) : TimeProvider
|
||||
{
|
||||
private DateTimeOffset _now = new(utcNow, TimeSpan.Zero);
|
||||
|
||||
/// <inheritdoc />
|
||||
public override DateTimeOffset GetUtcNow() => _now;
|
||||
|
||||
public void Advance(TimeSpan by) => _now = _now.Add(by);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
|
||||
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
|
||||
using Opc.Ua;
|
||||
using Opc.Ua.Server;
|
||||
using Shouldly;
|
||||
using Xunit;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Commons.OpcUa;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Entities;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Configuration.Enums;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.Core.Authorization;
|
||||
using ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.Security;
|
||||
|
||||
namespace ZB.MOM.WW.OtOpcUa.OpcUaServer.Tests;
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Gitea #563 (arch-review 03/S19 residual R2) — with <c>Security:Acl:Enabled</c> <b>off</b>, the two
|
||||
/// server-wide role gates (<c>WriteOperate</c> on Value writes, <c>AlarmAck</c> on the Part 9 methods)
|
||||
/// re-check that the session's API key is still usable on every call.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
/// <remarks>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// A session's roles are resolved once, at activation, from the key's grants. Before #563 nothing
|
||||
/// with the flag off ever looked at the key again, so a key whose <c>ExpiresUtc</c> passed — or that
|
||||
/// a deployment disabled — kept <c>WriteOperate</c> / <c>AlarmAck</c> until the client chose to
|
||||
/// disconnect, which on a machine-to-machine data plane can be never.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// <para>
|
||||
/// Every test here is an <b>allow-then-deny</b> on the same session: the first call proves the
|
||||
/// session genuinely holds the role, so the later denial can only have come from the key check. A
|
||||
/// deny-only test would pass against a gate that denied everything.
|
||||
/// </para>
|
||||
/// </remarks>
|
||||
public sealed class NodeManagerKeyUsabilityGateTests : IDisposable
|
||||
{
|
||||
private const string Cluster = "SITE-A";
|
||||
private const string Principal = "scadabridge";
|
||||
private const string KeyId = "k-563";
|
||||
|
||||
private static readonly DateTime Start = new(2026, 10, 7, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
|
||||
|
||||
private static CancellationToken Ct => TestContext.Current.CancellationToken;
|
||||
|
||||
private readonly string _pkiRoot = Path.Combine(
|
||||
Path.GetTempPath(), $"otopcua-keygate-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// THE #563 test for the write gate: ACL off, a key-carrying session holding <c>WriteOperate</c>
|
||||
/// writes; only the clock moves past <c>ExpiresUtc</c>; the next write is refused and never reaches
|
||||
/// the device.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task An_expired_key_loses_its_write_role_on_the_clock_with_acl_off()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var (host, server) = await BootAsync();
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var nm = server.NodeManager!;
|
||||
var gateway = new RecordingWriteGateway();
|
||||
nm.NodeWriteGateway = gateway;
|
||||
var clock = new FakeClock(Start);
|
||||
var (state, authorizer) = Wire(nm, clock, Key(expiresUtc: Start.AddMinutes(10)));
|
||||
authorizer.Enabled.ShouldBeFalse();
|
||||
var nodeId = Writable(nm, "Plant/Modbus/dev1/Setpoint");
|
||||
var identity = KeyIdentity(OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.WriteOperate);
|
||||
|
||||
Write(nm, identity, nodeId, 1f)[0].StatusCode.Code.ShouldBe(StatusCodes.Good);
|
||||
|
||||
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(20));
|
||||
|
||||
Write(nm, identity, nodeId, 2f)[0].StatusCode.Code.ShouldBe(StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied);
|
||||
gateway.Writes.Count.ShouldBe(1);
|
||||
state.Current.GenerationId.ShouldBe(1); // no deployment moved anything — only the clock did
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await host.DisposeAsync(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// The deployment axis of the same gate: a deployment that disables the key strips the write role
|
||||
/// from the session that is already open.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task A_key_disabled_by_a_deployment_loses_its_write_role_with_acl_off()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var (host, server) = await BootAsync();
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var nm = server.NodeManager!;
|
||||
var gateway = new RecordingWriteGateway();
|
||||
nm.NodeWriteGateway = gateway;
|
||||
var (state, _) = Wire(nm, new FakeClock(Start), Key(expiresUtc: null));
|
||||
var nodeId = Writable(nm, "Plant/Modbus/dev1/Setpoint");
|
||||
var identity = KeyIdentity(OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.WriteOperate);
|
||||
|
||||
Write(nm, identity, nodeId, 1f)[0].StatusCode.Code.ShouldBe(StatusCodes.Good);
|
||||
|
||||
var disabled = Key(expiresUtc: null);
|
||||
disabled.Enabled = false;
|
||||
state.Apply(Cluster, "rev-2", [disabled], [], NoScopes);
|
||||
|
||||
Write(nm, identity, nodeId, 2f)[0].StatusCode.Code.ShouldBe(StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied);
|
||||
gateway.Writes.Count.ShouldBe(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await host.DisposeAsync(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Anonymous carries no key, so nothing can expire: an anonymous session granted
|
||||
/// <c>WriteOperate</c> keeps writing however far the clock moves, against a snapshot holding no keys
|
||||
/// at all. Pins that the new check keys on the presence of a key id, not on "is this session in the
|
||||
/// key table".
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task An_anonymous_session_is_unaffected_by_the_key_check()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var (host, server) = await BootAsync();
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var nm = server.NodeManager!;
|
||||
var gateway = new RecordingWriteGateway();
|
||||
nm.NodeWriteGateway = gateway;
|
||||
var clock = new FakeClock(Start);
|
||||
Wire(nm, clock);
|
||||
var nodeId = Writable(nm, "Plant/Modbus/dev1/Setpoint");
|
||||
var anonymous = new RoleCarryingUserIdentity(
|
||||
new AnonymousIdentityToken(), [OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.WriteOperate],
|
||||
OpcUaPrincipals.Anonymous, apiKeyId: null);
|
||||
|
||||
Write(nm, anonymous, nodeId, 1f)[0].StatusCode.Code.ShouldBe(StatusCodes.Good);
|
||||
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromDays(400));
|
||||
Write(nm, anonymous, nodeId, 2f)[0].StatusCode.Code.ShouldBe(StatusCodes.Good);
|
||||
|
||||
gateway.Writes.Count.ShouldBe(2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await host.DisposeAsync(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// The alarm half: ACL off, a key-carrying session holding <c>AlarmAck</c> acknowledges; the key
|
||||
/// expires by the clock; the next acknowledge is refused and routes nothing.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
[Fact]
|
||||
public async Task An_expired_key_loses_its_alarm_ack_role_on_the_clock_with_acl_off()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var (host, server) = await BootAsync();
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
var nm = server.NodeManager!;
|
||||
var routed = new List<AlarmCommand>();
|
||||
nm.AlarmCommandRouter = routed.Add;
|
||||
var clock = new FakeClock(Start);
|
||||
Wire(nm, clock, Key(expiresUtc: Start.AddMinutes(10)));
|
||||
|
||||
nm.EnsureFolder("eq-1", parentNodeId: null, displayName: "Equipment 1", realm: AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
|
||||
nm.MaterialiseAlarmCondition(
|
||||
"alm-1", "eq-1", "HighTemp", "OffNormalAlarm", severity: 700, realm: AddressSpaceRealm.Uns);
|
||||
var condition = nm.TryGetAlarmCondition("alm-1")!;
|
||||
var ctx = new ServerSystemContext(server.CurrentInstance)
|
||||
{
|
||||
UserIdentity = KeyIdentity(OpcUaDataPlaneRoles.AlarmAck),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
condition.OnAcknowledge!(ctx, condition, Guid.NewGuid().ToByteArray(), new LocalizedText("1"))
|
||||
.ShouldBe(ServiceResult.Good);
|
||||
|
||||
clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(20));
|
||||
|
||||
condition.OnAcknowledge!(ctx, condition, Guid.NewGuid().ToByteArray(), new LocalizedText("2"))
|
||||
.StatusCode.Code.ShouldBe(StatusCodes.BadUserAccessDenied);
|
||||
routed.Count.ShouldBe(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally { await host.DisposeAsync(); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ───────────────────────────── helpers ─────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
private static readonly IReadOnlyDictionary<AclScopeRef, IReadOnlyList<NodeAclPath>> NoScopes =
|
||||
new Dictionary<AclScopeRef, IReadOnlyList<NodeAclPath>>();
|
||||
|
||||
private static ApiKey Key(DateTime? expiresUtc) => new()
|
||||
{
|
||||
ApiKeyId = KeyId,
|
||||
Name = KeyId,
|
||||
SecretHash = "hash",
|
||||
Principal = Principal,
|
||||
Enabled = true,
|
||||
CreatedUtc = Start.AddDays(-1),
|
||||
ExpiresUtc = expiresUtc,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>A key-carrying session whose activation-time roles are <paramref name="roles"/>.</summary>
|
||||
private static RoleCarryingUserIdentity KeyIdentity(params string[] roles) =>
|
||||
new(new UserNameIdentityToken { UserName = "apikey" }, roles, Principal, KeyId);
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>
|
||||
/// Wires a production-shaped, flag-OFF authorizer over one applied snapshot. The node manager's
|
||||
/// authority source and the authorizer's are the same instance, as the host wires them.
|
||||
/// </summary>
|
||||
private static (DataPlaneAuthorityState State, DataPlaneAuthorizer Authorizer) Wire(
|
||||
OtOpcUaNodeManager nm, TimeProvider clock, params ApiKey[] keys)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var state = new DataPlaneAuthorityState();
|
||||
state.Apply(Cluster, "rev-1", keys, [], NoScopes);
|
||||
var authorizer = new DataPlaneAuthorizer(
|
||||
state, new TriePermissionEvaluator(state.Tries), enabled: false, NullLogger.Instance, clock);
|
||||
nm.DataPlaneAuthority = state;
|
||||
nm.Authorizer = authorizer;
|
||||
return (state, authorizer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private static NodeId Writable(OtOpcUaNodeManager nm, string rawPath)
|
||||
{
|
||||
nm.EnsureVariable(rawPath, parentFolderNodeId: null, displayName: rawPath, dataType: "Float",
|
||||
writable: true, historianTagname: null, realm: AddressSpaceRealm.Raw);
|
||||
return nm.TryGetVariable(rawPath, AddressSpaceRealm.Raw)!.NodeId;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private static List<ServiceResult> Write(
|
||||
OtOpcUaNodeManager nm, IUserIdentity identity, NodeId nodeId, object value)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var context = new OperationContext(
|
||||
new RequestHeader(), secureChannelContext: null, RequestType.Write, identity);
|
||||
var writes = new List<WriteValue>
|
||||
{
|
||||
new()
|
||||
{
|
||||
NodeId = nodeId,
|
||||
AttributeId = Attributes.Value,
|
||||
Value = new DataValue(new Variant(value)) { StatusCode = StatusCodes.Good },
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
var errors = Enumerable.Repeat<ServiceResult>(null!, writes.Count).ToList();
|
||||
nm.Write(context, writes, errors);
|
||||
return errors;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>Records what actually reached the device.</summary>
|
||||
private sealed class RecordingWriteGateway : IOpcUaNodeWriteGateway
|
||||
{
|
||||
public List<string> Writes { get; } = [];
|
||||
|
||||
public Task<NodeWriteOutcome> WriteAsync(
|
||||
string nodeId, object? value, AddressSpaceRealm realm, CancellationToken ct)
|
||||
{
|
||||
lock (Writes) Writes.Add(nodeId);
|
||||
return Task.FromResult(new NodeWriteOutcome(true, null));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>A hand-advanced clock; the authorizer reads it on every decision.</summary>
|
||||
private sealed class FakeClock(DateTime utcNow) : TimeProvider
|
||||
{
|
||||
private DateTimeOffset _now = new(utcNow, TimeSpan.Zero);
|
||||
|
||||
/// <inheritdoc />
|
||||
public override DateTimeOffset GetUtcNow() => _now;
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>Moves the clock forward.</summary>
|
||||
/// <param name="by">How far forward.</param>
|
||||
public void Advance(TimeSpan by) => _now = _now.Add(by);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private async Task<(OpcUaApplicationHost Host, OtOpcUaSdkServer Server)> BootAsync()
|
||||
{
|
||||
var host = new OpcUaApplicationHost(
|
||||
new OpcUaApplicationHostOptions
|
||||
{
|
||||
ApplicationName = "OtOpcUa.KeyGateTest",
|
||||
ApplicationUri = $"urn:OtOpcUa.KeyGateTest:{Guid.NewGuid():N}",
|
||||
OpcUaPort = AllocateFreePort(),
|
||||
PublicHostname = "localhost",
|
||||
PkiStoreRoot = _pkiRoot,
|
||||
},
|
||||
NullLogger<OpcUaApplicationHost>.Instance);
|
||||
|
||||
var server = new OtOpcUaSdkServer();
|
||||
await host.StartAsync(server, Ct);
|
||||
return (host, server);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private static int AllocateFreePort()
|
||||
{
|
||||
using var listener = new System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener(System.Net.IPAddress.Loopback, 0);
|
||||
listener.Start();
|
||||
var port = ((System.Net.IPEndPoint)listener.LocalEndpoint).Port;
|
||||
listener.Stop();
|
||||
return port;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// <summary>Cleans up the PKI root directory.</summary>
|
||||
public void Dispose()
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (Directory.Exists(_pkiRoot))
|
||||
{
|
||||
try { Directory.Delete(_pkiRoot, recursive: true); }
|
||||
catch (IOException) { /* best effort */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user